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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



Volume 17 - 1989

H8 L: 24918

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Printed in the Netherlands

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Journal of Indian Philosophy is published 4 times per annum: March, June, September and December.

Subscription prices, per volume: Institutions \$ 125.50, Individuals \$ 49.00. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. USPS No. 491-790.

U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue (Suite 917), New York, NY 10022.

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Spuiboulevard 50, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands and 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

Postmaster: Please send all address corrections to: Journal of Indian Philosopy, c/o. Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue (Suite 917), New York, NY 10022, U.S.A.

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
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SOME LOGICAL ISSUES IN MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

In this paper we should like to argue that the *prasajya* negation of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy is not the same as that of the non-Madhyamaka schools (that is, that the distinction between *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* negation is not drawn in the same way). We should also like to argue that the terms and concepts of elementary set theory, employed in conjunction with the elementary predicate calculus, are useful in the explication of the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction and also in the clarification of the *catuṣkoṭi*. Finally we shall defend the Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna against two charges that have been laid against him to the effect that he has been guilty of certain errors of reasoning.

I. NEGATION

1. Non-Madhyamaka negation

In the standard notation of the predicate calculus, a statement of the form A(x) consists of a predicate A and a subject x. An example would be 'x is a giraffe', in which the predicate A is 'is a giraffe'. Now while philosophical logicians often say 'x is such-and-such', mathematical logicians prefer not to use the copula 'is' in this way, on the ground that if x is such-and-such then it would be possible to conclude that such-and-such in its entirety is also x (the 'is' implying identity); they prefer to make the meaning more clear by saying (what is really intended) 'x is a member of the set A'; thus there is a distinction between the predicate A and the set A, the predicate A being precisely 'is a member of the set A'. But once the relation between the set and the predicate is understood it poses no further problem and we may write A for both the set and the predicate, because the context suffices to make clear at any point whether we are dealing with the one or the other. We write

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$$A(x) \equiv x \in A \tag{1}$$

where ≡ indicates equivalence and ∈ means 'is a member of'. Thus we have an equivalence between a predicative statement and a settheoretic statement.

So far, x is a single individual, a point, let us say. If we wish to consider a group of individuals we may consider x to be a set also and thus to be a *subset* of A. In this case we write

$$A(x) \equiv x \subseteq A \tag{2}$$

Let us consider Fig. 1. We have here certain sets of points in the plane; the set of points A is bounded by a rectangle and consists of all points within it, whereas the set of points x is bounded by a circle and consists of all points within this. Because every point of x is also a point of A (but not vice versa!) we say that x is a subset of A, that x is included in A, and that A has $vy\bar{a}pti$ over x. The notation is as in Eq. (2) above. Not labeled, but present nonetheless, is the set A - x, which consists of all points within A but not in x; its shape is that of a rectangle with a hole in it. It is called the complement of x with respect to A or (if it is made clear by the context) x-complement. We write

$$A - x = \bar{x} \tag{3}$$

This set can also be referred to as not-x and can be written as -x or even as ^{7}x using the 'not' symbol that is more properly employed for a predicate than for a set, but we wish to point out that the 'not' here




Fig. 1. Set A consists of all points within the rectangle. Set x consists of all points within the circle; thus x is a subset of A. Set A - x, not labeled, consists of all points in A and not in x; its shape is that of a rectangle with a hole in it.

is not the same as the 'not' of a predicate. Thus for us a set is complemented, a predicate negated. The set \bar{x} may be defined as the set of all points not in x; thus for an arbitrary point p in A we may say that p is in \bar{x} if and only if p is not in x, thus

$$p \in \bar{x} \equiv \lceil (p \in x) \tag{4}$$

But the distinction between complementation of a set and negation of a predicate should be kept in mind. The relationship between the two that we see in Eq. (4) is an exact one, but the two are not the same.

In Fig. 1 it can be seen that both x and \bar{x} are included within A. Now let us consider the statement A(x) defined by $x \subseteq A$; the negation of this is ${}^{\neg}A(x)$ or ${}^{\neg}(x \subseteq A)$ or $x \not\subseteq A$, which is not true in the present instance, of course. The statement we obtain by taking the complement of x is $A(\bar{x})$ or $\bar{x} \subseteq A$, which is true. Obviously there is no equivalence between ${}^{\neg}A(x)$ and $A(\bar{x})$. These are the results of the negation of A and the complementation of x respectively. It happens that the same Sanskrit word pratisedha is used for both processes. Let us consider the following statement and its two pratisedha:

A(x) A brāhmaṇa is here affirmation vidhi A(x) A brāhmaṇa is not here 'predicate negation' prasajya-pratisedha

 $A(\bar{x})$ A nonbrāhmaṇa is here 'term negation' paryudāsa-pratisedha

In quotation marks we have placed the usual English expressions of the corresponding Sanskrit technical terms; but the third of these really should be 'term complementation'. It is important to see that it is really an affirmation, a positive statement concerning the object \bar{x} . No doubt this object is elsewhere negatively defined as 'what is not a member of the set of brāhmaṇa', but once defined it is a positive object, a set of real people (or one person), not merely the absence of a brāhmaṇa. Thus a 'term negation', even if we insist on calling it so, is not a negative statement. 'A nonbrāhmaṇa is here' affirms the presence of someone.

'A brāhmaṇa is not here', on the other hand, gives no information about who is here (perhaps a nonbrāhmaṇa, perhaps no one at all). Thus the *prasajya-pratiṣedha* is more negative, as is frequently stated. Kajiyama (1973) quotes an anonymous grammarian thus (p. 170 n.)

aprādhānyam vidher yatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā, prasajya-pratiṣedho 'sau kriyayā saha yatra nañ; prādhānatvam vidher yatra pratiṣedhe 'pradhānatā, paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottarapadena nañ.

'The nonprimacy of affirmation, where [we have] primacy in negation, this is the *prasajya* negation, where *na* is with the verb. The primacy of affirmation, where [we have] nonprimacy in negation, this is to be known as *paryudāsa* [complementation], where a^{-2} is the first member of a compound [lit. 'is with the last (member of a compound)'].' From context, it appears that all occurrences of the word *pratisedha* mean 'negation' here; a fourth occurrence is implied after *paryudāsa* (it does not appear *metri causa*): this one would be 'complementation'.

Less easy to follow is the more detailed analysis of Arcata, quoted by Kajiyama (1973), p. 170; we may propose an interpretation differing slightly from his.

yatra (a) vidheḥ prādhānyam, (b) pratiṣedho 'rtha-grhītaḥ, (c) vidhi-bhāk svapadena nocyate, (d) ekavākyatā ca tatra paryudāsa-vṛttitā . . . prasajya-pratiṣedhaḥ punar etad-viparīto mantavyaḥ, tatra hi (a) pratiṣedhasya prādhānyam, (b) vidhir arthād gamyate, (d) vākyabhedaḥ, (c) svapadena nañā pratiṣedha-bhāk sambadhyate.

Note the differing order of terms, the (d) and (c) of the second part. If we interpret artha as 'subject' and vākya as 'predicate' 3, then ekavākya may be the 'same predicate' (complementation leaving the predicate unchanged) and vākyabheda may be 'different predicate' (predicate made different by the addition of the negative particle). (For ekavākya see Monier-Williams (1899) s.v. eka; for vākyabheda see Apte (1957-1959) s.v. vākya.) Thus we translate the passage as 'Where [we have] (a) the primacy of affirmation, (b) complementation included in the subject, (c) the affirmative aspect not expressed by its own word si.e. the ksatriya is not referred to as such but is called a nonbrāhmaṇa], and (d) the same predicate [in the negative as in the positive statement], there [we have] the paryudāsa usage . . . The prasajya-pratisedha should be thought of as the opposite of this, where [we have] (a) the primacy of negation, (b) affirmation understood in the subject si.e. the subject remains in its original uncomplemented state], (d) a different predicate, and (c) the negative aspect attached by

its own word *na*.' One can see how the four characteristics of each of the two *pratisedha* are fulfilled in the statements above about the brāhmaṇa and nonbrāhmaṇa.

Let us now consider the sentence sūryam paśyanty ete 'they see the sun'. Because we have two substantives here, we can apply complementation to either. If we apply it to ete 'they' we obtain 'not-they' and we shall have 'some other people, not the ones we spoke of before, see the sun'. If we apply it to sūrya 'sun' we shall obtain 'they see something that is not the sun', the moon perhaps. In each of these cases we have a paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. The prasajya-pratiṣedha in this case is 'they do not see the sun', and we feel that this statement is weaker in its information-content, that it conveys less, and hence that the negation is stronger; we have the pratiṣedhe prādhānatā.

Thus we have the possibility of three pratisedha, one for the verb ('predicate negation') and one for each of the two substantives; in general a sentence with y substantives will have y+1 possible pratisedha forms. Thus the notation of the predicate calculus requires to be modified so that the substantive in the predicate (i.e. the direct object, in this case) can be expressed. Let x be 'they', let s be 'the sun', and let s be the predicate 'see'; finally let

S(s)(x) They see the sun

 $S(\bar{s})(x)$ They see what is not the sun

 $S(s)(\bar{x})$ Others see the sun

All of these, it is to be noted, convey some positive information, or, if we like, negative information, but information. We may call these statements nonzero statements. They have content; they are not meaningless. A statement conveying no information at all — which by some standards would not deserve to be called a statement at all — might be called a zero statement. We may draw an analogy with the concept of efficacy advanced by some Buddhist writers as a method of defining conventional 'reality': if a thing can be used, if it has a function, then it is in some sense real. Thus a screwdriver, which has efficacy in the driving of screws, will be deemed real in contradistinction to the hare's horn, which has no efficacy. Similarly a statement that conveys information may be deemed nonzero in that (like the

statements above about the brāhmaṇa and the sun) it is possessed of content and is meaningful in respect of carrying information on which we may conceivably act.

2. Madhyamaka negation

The Mādhyamika requires, for philosophical reasons, a form of negation more radical than any we have heretofore considered. Because it is a form of 'strong' rather than 'weak' negation, it is referred to as a prasajya-pratisedha, but it is not the same as the prasajva-pratisedha of the non-Madhyamaka schools. Applied to a statement A(x), it allows us to conclude neither $A(\bar{x})$ nor A(x), because it allows us to conclude nothing whatever. Conventionally we may say that it allows us to conclude only a zero statement, a statement having no information-content (we do not, of course, take this nothing for a something; we speak of it as if it were a something, a statement, purely for linguistic and notational convenience). Now this negation cannot be represented in the predicate calculus as presently constituted, because the idea of such negation did not arise in the minds of the inventors of the notation and they therefore made no provision for it. New notation is therefore required here; let us, by analogy with Ø for the set with no elements in it (the empty set), write 0 for the statement with no content and call it the zero statement.

At this point it is convenient to distinguish between the process of negation and the negative statement that results from the process. The process of strong or prasajya negation of the non-Madhyamaka schools may be represented by $(A(x)) \rightarrow A(x)$; that is, the negation of the whole is taken as the negation of the predicate. By Madhyamaka standards, however, this is still weak negation, because a 'positive' conclusion (i.e. something other than the zero statement) is still reached. Thus the Mādhyamikas will give us

$$(A(x)) \rightarrow A(x)$$
 madhyamaka-paryudāsa-pratiṣedha madhyamaka-prasajya-pratiṣedha

In the first case we may read 'the negation of the statement leads to the negative of the statement'. In the second case we will have 'the negation of the statement leads nowhere; we deny the validity of the statement but accept no implication of any other statement'. For

the Mādhyamika, any negation other than this very radical one is a parvudāsa. Bhāvaviveka in his Prajñāpradīpa 4 considers possible negations of the affirmative proposition 'things arise from themselves' and objects to the negative version 'things do not arise' on the ground that it implies an annihilationist 'nonarising', that is, there is a 'positive' implication of an annihilationist kind. He objects too to 'things arise, just not from themselves' on the ground that it implies that they arise from other things. He further objects to 'things arise, not just from themselves' on the ground that it implies that they arise from both self and other things; and all these he characterizes as paryudāsa. But he does not object to 'things just do not arise from themselves', and this is the formulation from which he draws no implication and which he calls prasajya. He does not want us to conclude that things do not arise at all, nor does he want us to conclude that they arise in a particular way. He simply rejects 'things arise from themselves' and proposes no alternative theory of arising (any such theory would be wrong from the Mādhyamika point of view because it would presuppose a real 'thing' of which arising could validly be predicated). Things do not arise from themselves, but no statement is made about how they do arise.

Thus for the Mādhyamika the prasajya negation is not merely predicate negation, for although the predicate is indeed negated (at least in a formal sense), it would be much fairer to say that the whole statement, subject included, is vacated or voided or zeroed. In a way we have predicate negation applied to the predicate 'arise', but the attack on arising leads to no thesis of 'nonarising' nor any alternative theory of possible arising. But we also have an attack, by implication (and elsewhere explicitly), on the subject, the bhava or 'thing' (for if things do not arise in any definable way then this fact has implication for the ontological status of things themselves). Here we find that we can speak validly, for the first time, of term negation rather than complementation; if the attack on the bhava were supportive of the abhāva we would indeed have a case of complementation, but for the Mādhyamika the attack on the bhāva leads to no implication of abhāva (which is itself also explicitly repudiated). We thus have the negation of the term, and the term is negated in prasajya fashion, just as the predicate was negated in prasajya fashion. So for the

Mādhyamika the distinction between term and predicate negation is not the distinction between *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* negation. Both term and predicate negation should be done *prasajyavat*, and the meaning of *prasajya* negation is 'nonimplicative negation'. (The *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* negations of the non-Madhyamaka schools would both be considered as *paryudāsa* or implicative by the Madhyamaka.)

The Tibetan translations of the terms prasajya-pratisedha and paryudāsa-pratisedha, translations made by Indian and Tibetan pandita specifically for Madhyamaka purposes, confirm this interpretation of nonimplicative and implicative negation. That the translations are not at all literal - in contradistinction to the general 'literalist' Tibetan practice — perhaps makes them even more significant than they might otherwise be; they are based on two verbs meaning generally 'to be' but having a distinction of implication to which neither Sanskrit nor English has an exact analogy. Yin is used to connect the subject with a noun or adjective, as in *na slob-phrug yin* 'I am a student'. Yod on the other hand is used to situate the subject in a place, as in *na hdir yod* 'I am here' and to assert the mere existence of the subject, as in *na yod* 'I exist'. The negatives of these two verbs thus mean roughly 'is not this or that' and 'is not anything at all'; so that ma-yin-par dgag-pa (paryudāsa-pratisedha) denies that the subject is this or that but by implication affirms that the subject is the other thing. Denial of na slob-phrug yin results in na slob-phrug ma yin (min in modern Tibetan) and this, in context, will have the implication that the subject is a teacher. med-par dgag-pa (prasajya-pratisedha), on the other hand, denies flat out that the subject is anywhere or anything and carries little or no positive implication concerning where or what it might be. Thus it is a question, as Matilal (1971) states (p. 163), of the degree of commitment; and for the Madhyamika the degree of commitment, in the case of the prasajya negation, turns out to be zero.

In short, both term and predicate negation, for the Mādhyamika, are *paryudāsa* negations if they carry implication (if the denial of the term is acceptance of the complement of the term, or if the denial of the predicate is acceptance of the opposite predicate). But both can be, and indeed really should be, *prasajya* negation, if no implication is carried in either case. Thus Ruegg (1977) writes (p. 5), using the two

Sanskrit terms first in the non-Madhyamaka senses of term and predicate negation,

in the usage of the Mādhyamika authors, it does not seem to be the case that negation which is of the *paryudāsa* type on the syntactic level — i.e. nominally bound negation — has the logical value of relational negation, in contradistinction to absolute negation as expressed by the verbally bound *prasajya* type of negation; and both syntactic schemata appear to have been interpreted by these exegetes as involving, from the logical point of view, what they term absolute (*prasajya*) negation.

If we write the thesis that a *bhāva b* arises from its own self as $b \Rightarrow b$, then Nāgārjuna's four negations of MMK 1.1, seen as *prasajya* negations leading to the zero statement, can be written as

Thus Nāgārjuna has no *pratijāā* ⁵ concerning the manner of arising, although he does not really say absolutely that there is no arising either ⁶; evidently there is for him the illusory arising of illusory objects, i.e., objects without *svabhāva* and hence *śūnya* ⁷. Such objects continue to function rationally on the *saṃvṛti* level; they continue to have 'causal efficacy' with regard to each other, and in general this level of 'conventional truth' is not false *tout court* ⁸. As concerns logic and intellection in particular, we need not 'abandon in despair all attempts at reasoned analysis' (Matilal 1971, p. 167).

II. THE LAWS OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE AND OF NONCONTRADICTION

Let us consider Fig. 1 again. The two sets x and A - x, taken together, fill up all of A: they are exhaustive of A (which in this case can be called the universal set). In addition they are mutually exclusive: if a point is in x it cannot be in A - x and vice versa (the points on the border of x pose no problem; we assign them to one set or the other or exclude them from A entirely). The quality of exhaustiveness means that an arbitrary point p in A must obey the law of the excluded middle; it must be in one or the other of the two sets and there is no third or 'middle' possibility. The quality of mutual exclusion means that p must obey the law of noncontradiction: it cannot




Fig. 2. The point p illustrates the violation of the law of noncontradiction, being both in x and in y. The point q illustrates the violation of the law of the excluded middle. Violations are possible because x and y are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive of A.

simultaneously be in both sets. Consider Fig. 2, however, where the possibility exists of violating both laws. The central portion where sets x and y overlap, which portion is called the intersection of x and yand is written $x \cap y$ or $x \cdot y$, contains points that violate the law of noncontradiction; these points are 'contradictory' in the sense that they have opposite characteristics at once, if x and y are thought of as contraries in any sense. Of course they are not contradictories, because of their overlap, but we wish to prepare the reader for a Buddhist linguistic usage that will appear later, in which things are spoken of as 'P or not-P or both or neither'; the terms P and not-P would appear to be contradictories from the very meaning of the word 'not', and yet provision is made in this scheme for 'both' and 'neither'. So in our figure here we can think of x and y as P and not-P respectively and observe that the law of noncontradiction would be 'a thing cannot be both', a law clearly violated, or violable, by some points in the figure. The point p here is such a point. The point q, on the other hand, violates the law of the excluded middle; the third set, neither x nor y, can be thought of as a 'middle' between the two (though not graphically; it is a 'third possibility'). In Fig. 3, by contrast, we return to the situation of Fig. 1, because the shaded portion is conventionally regarded as having no points and thus the two sets x and y are exhaustive of the universal set and are obviously mutually exclusive. Fig. 3 is thus isomorphic to Fig. 1; we may imagine a mapping of the set A - x onto the set y.

When two sets are exhaustive of the universal set and are mutually exclusive, that is, when points in the universal set must follow the two

SOME LOGICAL ISSUES IN MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT




Fig. 3. Two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of a set x + y. (The shaded portion is considered to have no points.) This is isomorphic to Fig. 1, with y mapped onto A - x.

laws of the excluded middle and of noncontradiction, then we call the two sets complementary and speak of them as complements of each other. A set complementary to the set x is written, as in Eq. (3) above, as \bar{x} , and because complementation is symmetrical we can write, for Fig. 1,

$$x = A - \bar{x}$$

$$\bar{x} = A - x$$

$$x = \overline{A - x}$$

$$\bar{x} = \overline{A - \bar{x}}$$
(6)

And for Fig. 3,

$$\begin{aligned}
x &= \bar{y} \\
y &= \bar{x}
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Because the two sets in Fig. 1 do not overlap, we refer to them as mutually exclusive or disjoint. Their intersection (product) is the null set (the set with no elements in it, in this case, no points), and we write

$$x \cap \bar{x} = \emptyset$$
 exclusivity (8)

(or $x \cdot \bar{x} = \emptyset$). Their exhaustive quality means that their union (sum) is the universal set and we write

$$x \cup \bar{x} = U$$
 exhaustiveness (9)

(or $x + \bar{x} = U$). Thus Eq. (8) corresponds to the law of noncontradiction and Eq. (9) to the law of the excluded middle. Now let X be the

predicate 'the point p is in the set x' and let $\ ^{7}X$ mean 'the point p is not in x and is therefore in \bar{x} '. Then in terms of the propositional calculus, with \wedge as 'and' and \vee as 'or', we can write

$$(X \wedge X)$$
 (10)

(or $(X \cdot X)$) and

$$X \vee {}^{\gamma}X$$
 (11)

(or $X + {}^{\neg}X$). Note the analogy between \cap and \wedge and between \cup and \vee . If a point is either in x or in y ($p \in x \vee p \in y$) then it is in the union $x \cup y$:

$$(p \in x) \lor (p \in y) \equiv p \in (x \cup y)$$

Similarly if p is in both x and y at the same time, we write

$$(p \in x) \land (p \in y) \equiv p \in (x \cap y)$$

Now Eq. (10) is the law of noncontradiction and corresponds to Eq. (8); Eq. (11) is the law of the excluded middle and corresponds to Eq. (9). In standard logic courses these two are deemed equivalent (in that they are both always true, they have a constant and equal truth-value), and one is taught freely to transform one predicate into the other by De Morgan's Law. And they are equivalent, as tautologies, although their set-theoretic origin is different, as we have seen.

For 'p is not in x' we can also write in full $(p \in x)$ and infer

$$\begin{array}{l}
 (p \in x) \equiv p \notin x \\
 \equiv p \in \bar{x}
\end{array} \tag{12}$$

cf. Eq. (4); or in propositional terms,

$$^{\mathsf{T}}(X) \equiv (^{\mathsf{T}}X) \tag{13}$$

This is the Mādhyamika conception of the *paryudāsa* negation, a negation from which one infers the negative.

III. THE TRIKOȚI AND THE CATUȘKOȚI

The division of a set into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets, the complementary x and \bar{x} , is a special case of a partition.

This mathematical term refers to the division of a set into n mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets; thus the partitioned set $S = s_1 + s_2 + s_3 + s_4 + s$ $s_2 + s_3 + \ldots + s_n$, and for any s_x and s_y , $x \neq y$, we have $s_x \cdot s_y = \emptyset$. If n = 2 we are back at x and \bar{x} ; but if n = 3 we can no longer speak of complementation, although we have an analogous situation. Let us consider a set partitioned with a 3-partition, as we may call it, and name the three subsets a, b, and c (Fig. 4). Coining a Sanskrit word, we may call this situation a trikoti (although koti is in no sense a translation of 'partition'). (The catuskoti, as we shall see, is a 4-partition of a special type.) Note again that the three do not overlap and that together they cover all of S. Does this necessarily involve a threevalued logic? It does not, because a proposition concerning a point is still either true or false, and a point in S must still be either in a (for example) or not in a. We can, then, at all times reduce the situation to that of a 2-partition, in which the two subsets are called complementary to each other; we can consider the set a with respect to the set b + c, and in so doing we note that complementation reappears, because

$$a + (b + c) = S$$

$$a \cdot (b + c) = \emptyset$$
(14)

And indeed, we can make any grouping (partial departition) that we like, forming b+c or even a+c, because contiguity is in no sense required. Thus any partition can always be reduced to a 2-partition.

The first 3-partition in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* is found in 2.1, which runs ¹⁰




Fig. 4. A 3-partition of the rectangle. The three sets are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the rectangle.

gatam na gamyate tāvad agatam naiva gamyate // gata-agata-vinirmuktam gamyamānam na gamyate //

We consider here the road or path or course over which motion takes place and ask ourselves over what portion of the road the motion occurs. The portion of the road already gone over or traversed (gata) is not being gone over now; the portion of the road not yet traversed (agata) is not being gone over now; and the idea that there is a point now being gone over is considered only to be rejected, as we shall see. but it is in some sense considered. Thus we have a logical 3-partition of the road into gata, agata, and gamyamana portions; the third possibility is rejected on the ground that the road, in reality, as distinguished from our mathematical abstraction, is and can be only two-partitioned, by the law of the excluded middle, into the gata and agata portions. The argument that there is a mathematical point at which motion occurs, even though it has no length and is thus no finite 'portion of the road', can be taken up as follows. We consider a point x moving along a line that contains a fixed point c (Fig. 5). The point x has either not yet reached c, or it has just reached it, or it has passed it. In the first and third cases there is of course no traversing of the one point by the other; the second case Nāgārjuna appears to deny entirely; what can he mean by saying that the portion being gone over is not being gone over? First of all, the point being gone over, being a mathematical point which we can think of as a line segment of zero length, is simply an abstraction, indeed a figment of the imagination; on a real road in the real world we can find no such 'point', only various lengths that have, or have not, been gone over. Second, if we insist on imagining a point nevertheless, and if we then consider the instant when the moving x coincides with the stationary c, then we cannot find any motion, for there is no room within a point within which motion might occur, nor is there any time for it, inasmuch as xmoving at a finite speed will cross the zero distance c in zero time. When x and c do not coincide, there is no 'traversing', and we learn



Fig. 5. The point x moves rightward along the line.

nothing of the nature of motion; when they do, there is still no traversing and we still learn nothing.

e,

Nāgārjuna reduces this particular 3-partition to a 2-partition by finding a fatal deficiency in one of the three, not by the method of grouping that we mentioned earlier; but he does employ the grouping method in *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* 19, as we shall see. The number line (Fig. 6) may provide clarification of this method: although there are three possibilities for a number, positive, negative, and zero, the three can be reduced to two, and indeed in more than one way: positive and nonpositive, or negative and nonnegative, or zero and nonzero. In *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* 19 Nāgārjuna considers present-and-future (*pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca*) as against past (*atītaḥ*) rather than taking the three separately, and he tells the reader in effect to try making the other two possible reductions (past-and-future as against present, past-and-present as against future), which is actually done explicitly by Candrakīrti.¹¹




Fig. 6. The number line, with zero in the center.

So far we have been dealing with sets that do not overlap, so that we have been able to speak of complementation and partition; if we now turn to the traditional catuskoti we enter a realm wherein the possibility of overlap is taken into account, so that for two sets a and b it is not necessarily true that $a \cdot b = \emptyset$. Thus we ought not to call them complements of each other, even if they are exhaustive of U. But the traditional rhetoric speaks of them as x and not-x or \bar{x} ; so for convenience we shall continue to use the overbar, interpreting it differently however. Let us consider Fig. 7. A point a must, if it is in U, be in x, or in \bar{x} , or in both, or in neither. This is the statement of the catuskoti in its positive form; in its negative form, when a is not in U, we have that a cannot be in x, and cannot be in x, and cannot be in both, and cannot be in neither (note the change from 'or' to 'and' as a connector of the four terms of the positive and negative catuskoti




Fig. 7. Here x is every point within the circle; $x \cdot \bar{x}$ is the lune-shaped central portion, whose points are both in x and in \bar{x} ; it is their overlap or intersection.

respectively). In the standard set-theoretic notation we shall have in positive form

$$(a \in x) \lor (a \in \bar{x}) \lor ((a \in x) \land (a \in \bar{x}) \lor \lor ((a \in x) \land (a \in \bar{x}))$$

$$(15)$$

The last term is logically equivalent to $((a \notin x) \land (a \notin \bar{x}))$ and thus by De Morgan's Law to $((a \in x) \lor (a \in \bar{x}))$; so switching to propositional notation we obtain

$$X \vee {}^{\gamma}X \vee (X \wedge {}^{\gamma}X) \vee {}^{\gamma}(X \vee {}^{\gamma}X)$$
 (16)

This, however, is really only an approximation of the *catuṣkoṭi*; strictly speaking the first term should include not all of x but only that portion that does not overlap with \bar{x} (see Fig. 8) (remember that the bar is no longer a sign of true complementation). Thus for the first term in Eq. (15) we should have written $(a \in x - \bar{x})$ and for the second $(a \in \bar{x} - x)$; in Eq. (16) our first term should be $(X \land \bar{X})$ and our second $(\bar{X} \land \bar{X})$. This understood, it will do no harm to remain with the approximate notation of Eqs. (15) and (16). These of course are the positive forms, used when a is in U; for the negative form of the *catuṣkoṭi* we must negate each term and change each outer 'or' to 'and'.

Kristeva (1969), following Mäll (in an article not seen by the present writer), gives us (p. 136)

$$\pi = D + (-D) + (D + (-D)) + (-(D + (-D))$$




Fig. 8. Detail of Fig. 7. $x - \bar{x}$ is the crescent-shaped portion on the left; $x \cdot \bar{x}$ is the lune-shaped portion on the right.

in which the third term is wrong; it should be $(D \cdot (-D))$.¹² She sets this equal to zero, which is correct enough, but it is unclear what the relationship of this is to the 'réunion non synthétique de différentes formules souvent contradictoires' of which she writes or to the 'triangle des deux systèmes précédents (le système symbolique et la pratique transformative)' or for that matter to the 'triangle où la loi occupe un point au centre'; and her statement

L'écriture qui a l'audace de suivre le trajet complet de ce mouvement dialogique que nous venons de représenter par le tétralemme, donc d'être une description et une négation successive du texte qui se fait dans le texte qui s'écrit, n'appartient pas à ce que l'on appelle traditionnellement "littérature" et qui, elle, relèverait du système sémiotique symbolique

seems insufficiently grounded in the *catuṣkoṭi* to which she appeals. Let us, then, notate the *catuskoṭi* in some such form as

$$X + \overline{X} + (X \cdot \overline{X}) + \overline{(X + \overline{X})} \tag{17}$$

which is analogous to Eq. (16); the negative would be

$${}^{\neg}X \cdot {}^{\neg}\overline{X} \cdot {}^{\neg}(X \cdot \overline{X}) \cdot {}^{\neg}\overline{(X + \overline{X})}$$
 (18)

meaning that the subject is not in any of the four sets. The philosophical question that we must address is whether such a fourfold negation is really possible in practice.

For a universal set U that is universal only in name, for a U clearly limited, there is no problem. Consider the set of baboons along with the assumption that 'brown' and 'gray' are the only two meaningful color-predicates that apply to the members of this set. Then it is possible to say with justice that x is not a brown baboon and that it is not a gray baboon and that it is not a brown-and-gray baboon and

that it is not a neither-brown-nor-gray baboon, because x need not be a baboon at all. Because x is outside U, no logical problem occurs with the negative catuskoti. But if our U is really the universe then there is nothing outside it and we may encounter a difficulty. The Mādhyamika states (with Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.1) that a thing — any thing — can arise neither from itself nor from something else nor from both nor from neither; how is this possible? Expressed in notation it might take the form of Eq. (18), but the notation of course does not answer the question. What Nāgārjuna's commentators do is to take each term separately and advance specific arguments to show that it is untenable, obtaining in the end only a zero statement at each point; if A be the predicate 'arises from itself' and \bar{A} be 'arises from something else' we might write

Now by non-Mādhyamika standards the predicate $^{7}A(x)$ must mean that x exists outside the set named in the predicate A, in this case that x must arise from what is other than itself; but as we see from the above, the Mādhyamika denies a form of arising without making any implication about how else arising might occur. And he can deny it in all ways, even in an impeccably set up catuskoti, because for him there is no real x or $bh\bar{a}va$ that could arise (though it is provisionally real as phenomenon) and therefore no real arising; this lack of pith, of true reality, of svabhāva in things and in their arising is not expressed in our notation except by inference in the above, where from any thesis about arising the zero statement is derived. The interesting thing is that Nāgārjuna reaches this transworldly conclusion by worldly means, finding the paramārtha through the vyavahāra; he investigates a supposedly existing bhāva and finds that it cannot arise in any of the four logically possible ways and must not therefore be truly existent. It must be repeated that conventional reality is not denied; the dreamelephant is doubtless a real dream-elephant really seen in a real

dream, but neither these facts nor the subjective vividness of the experience make the elephant *really* real.

Thus for a really existing x and a valid, applicable ¹³ predicate A the fourfold negation of the *catuskoti* is impossible; one of the four possibilities must be true. Nāgārjuna's solution to the dilemma of the incompatibility of the subject or *bhāva* x with the logical *catuskoti* is not to deny the validity of such a negated *catuskoti* but to deny the validity of the *bhāva*. Because each of the four statements in Eq. (19) above leads by *prasajya* negation (for so do we interpret the negation sign $^{\neg}$ in this case) to the zero statement, their fourfold conjunction with 'and', which is precisely the negative *catuskoti* in this case, also leads only to the zero statement; hence no pernicious result logically follows, and certainly no contradiction.

Of the four alternatives A, \bar{A} , both, neither, we sometimes find, as in Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 1.1, that the last two are somewhat summarily disposed of, inasmuch as the negation of the four is effectively a negation of the first two, after which it is pointed out that if A and \bar{A} are untenable then the thesis of 'both' involves us in the faults of each; and the thesis of 'neither' amounts to nothing. Once self-production and other-production are shown to be impossible, production from both will hardly stand, and production from neither amounts to a thing's arising out of nothing, which is absurd on the face of it, according to the Akutobhaya, 14 or has impossible consequences, according to Buddhapālita.15 In MMK 25.10 Nāgārjuna finds only two possibilities to consider, that nirvāna is a bhāva or that it is an abhāva, and his rejection of both is clearly not intended as acceptance of the fourth position of the catuskoti (which here is not employed) in spite of the verbal similarity - see Ruegg (1977) pp. 16 - 18

IV. DOES NĀGĀRJUNA VIOLATE THE LAW OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE?

Let us consider a thing x and two truly complementary sets A and \bar{A} (see Fig. 3 mutatis mutandis). Then x must be in either A or \bar{A} by the law of the excluded middle — provided it exists, or, to put it another

way, provided x is in the universal set U. Consider Nāgārjuna's argument in MMK 15.4:

svabhāva-parabhāvābhyām rte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ / svabhāve parabhāve ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati //

A bhāva or existent x must be either in the set of svabhāva or in the set of parabhāva (because sva 'self' and para 'other' are exhaustive and mutually exclusive). But the set of svabhāva has been shown to be empty in MMK 15.1 and 15.2, and the set of parabhāva has been shown to be empty in MMK 15.3. Therefore x cannot be in the one or the other. Evidently x cannot be reconciled with the law of the excluded middle. Thus we must reject either x or the law, and Nāgārjuna, far from rejecting the latter, quite unambiguously throws out the x, the bhava. The law must be considered a fundamental law of thought, or alternatively it follows directly from our conception of complementation (mutual exclusivity and exhaustion in a 2-partition) which is fundamental. Those who believe that Nāgārjuna rejects the law should show us where he so states. What he states here, in the form of a rhetorical question, is that the bhava must be rejected: bhāvah kutah 'what bhāva can there be' which surely means 'there can be no bhāva'. Buddhapālita makes this quite clear:

gan gi tshe no bo nid kyan med la / gṣan gyi dnos po yan med pa deḥi tshe no bo nid dan gṣan gyi dnos po dag ma gtogs paḥi dnos po brjod par bya ba ma yin pa $//^{16}$

'When there is no *svabhāva* and there is no *parabhāva*, then a *bhāva* included neither in the *svabhāva* nor in the *parabhāva* is not to be spoken of.' Candrakīrti says much the same:

bhāvo hi parikalpyamānaḥ svabhāvo vā bhavet, parabhāvo vā, tau ca purva-ukta-vidhinā na staḥ, iti tayor abhāvād bhāvo 'pi nāstīty avadhāryatām.'

'A supposed *bhāva* must be a *svabhāva* or a *parabhāva*, and these two, by previous argument, are not; and without these it must be affirmed that a *bhāva* also is not.' No denial of the law is made; it is the *bhāva* that is denied. The law is explicitly affirmed by *svabhāvo vā bhavet*, *parabhāvo vā*; a third possibility is definitively ruled out.

Murti (1955) gives two examples in which he believes that the law must be deemed invalid (p. 147). The first is the proposition 'an

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integer between 3 and 4 is prime', a proposition neither true nor false. But the reason it is neither true nor false is not that there is some third truth-value but because it is meaningless by virtue of a non-existent *bhāva*: the integer in question does not exist. Not existing, it is not prime and not composite, but it is not any third thing either. It is not anything at all, and this fact is not a third possibility or a third kind of number but the absence of possibility. So this example shows neither a third truth-value nor a third kind of number neither prime nor composite. The sentence is neither true nor false because it is meaningless, and 'meaningless' is not a truth-value; its meaninglessness is a consequence of the nonexistence of its *bhāva*, or rather of its *parikalpyamāno bhāva*.

Murti's second example is the familiar rope-snake, the illusory snake that someone believes he sees when in fact what he sees is a coiled rope in the darkness. This 'snake' is neither existing nor non-existing, according to Murti; but neither has it any third existential status. We must analyze the supposedly troublesome proposition 'the rope-snake exists'. We can analyze the subject or the predicate, and in neither case is a third possibility necessary.

Accepting for a moment the validity of the subject 'rope-snake', we can split the predicate into two (because indeed there are two implied predicates that have been illegitimately conflated here) and obtain 'the rope-snake exists as rope' and 'the rope-snake exists as snake'. The first of these is unambiguously true and the second unambiguously false.

If instead we analyze the subject, we find that there are in fact no 'rope-snakes' in the world; there are ropes, and there are (what are rather different) snakes. Thus we obtain 'the rope exists' and 'the snake exists', the first of which is unambiguously true and the second unambiguously false.

Thus the difficulties with 'the rope-snake exists' turn out to be neither logical nor existential; they arise only when we fail to make needed distinctions between possible senses of the predicate that is clear verbally but certainly not clear in meaning, or when we take as valid a subject that is really two subjects.

If we take as our subject 'the illusion of a snake' then here too no law is violated; the illusion is real as an illusion and unreal as a snake.

No third status between 'real' and 'unreal' is involved. Here as elsewhere *tertium non datur*. ¹⁸

Thus if the proposition 'the rope-snake exists' seemed incompatible with the law of the excluded middle it was not because the law was invalid but because the proposition was not a proposition but a jumble, a hodge-podge in which different conceptions were conflated. We only needed to decide exactly what we meant by the proposition. Once we did so, compatibility with the law was obtained. But if we applied the law not to a proposition but to a hodge-podge, we can hardly blame the law if unsatisfactory results were obtained.

V. DOES NĀGĀRJUNA VIOLATE THE LAW OF CONTRAPOSITION?

If we know the truth of a proposition A and of a proposition $A \rightarrow B$ 'if A and B' then we can validly infer the truth of the proposition B by *modus ponens*.¹⁹ That is, if we know that a always causes b and that a is present, then b must also be present. This does not preclude that b might be caused also by something other than a. It may thus be present even if a is not. A field can be watered by irrigation or by rainfall; if it rains, the field becomes wet, thus

$$rain \rightarrow wet$$
 (20)

We can also conclude the *contrapositive* of this statement, that if the field is not wet, it must not have rained, thus

The equivalence between $A \rightarrow B$ and its contrapositive ${}^{\neg}B \rightarrow {}^{\neg}A$ may be called the law of contraposition.

We cannot infer, however, from Eq. (20), its *inverse*, that if it did not rain the field must not have become wet, thus

because of the possible irrigation of the field, thus irrig \rightarrow wet. Thus in general from $A \rightarrow B$ we conclude $\ B \rightarrow \ A$ but not $\ A \rightarrow B$. This is not peculiar to traditional Western logic as Nakamura (1958) would have it (p. 387). If logic means anything, then the reasoning

here must stand for every place and time, and in fact traditional Western logic, modern mathematical logic, and traditional Indian logic all hold to this. Dharmakīrti for example knows this very well.²⁰

The accusation that Nāgārjuna violates the law of contraposition by concluding $A \rightarrow B$ from $A \rightarrow B$ arises from a number of passages of which MMK 13.7 is perhaps typical:

yady aśūnyam bhavet kiñcit syāc cchūnyam iti kiñcana / na kiñcid asty aśūnyam ca kutaḥ śūnyam bhaviṣyati //

'If there were anything nonempty there would be something empty; but there is nothing nonempty, so from whence will the empty be?' Now *prima facie* Nāgārjuna has indulged in the prohibited reasoning, as far as words are concerned.

nonempty → empty
¬nonempty → ¬empty

We have, technically, $(\exists x)(x \notin S) \rightarrow (\exists y)(y \in S)$ 'if there exists an x such that x is not a member of the set S of \hat{sunya} or empty things, then there exists a y such that y is a member of S'.21 This differs from the generalized $A \rightarrow B$ both by having two different subjects (arguments), so that the matter cannot be written as $A(x) \rightarrow B(x)$, and by having complementary predicates 'is a member of S' and 'is not a member of S'. Even more important, it is clear from the context that Nāgārjuna means the relationship to be symmetrical: not only $A \rightarrow B$ but also $B \to A$ because A and B, or better S and \bar{S} , 'there is something empty' and 'there is something nonempty', are relative (pace Stcherbatsky we do not use this English word as the translation of śūnya), in this specific sense, that each is meaningful only if the other is meaningful. Thus one of the questions with which we are dealing here is whether the statements S and \bar{S} are meaningful at all, and in this question the law of contraposition cannot help us. Thus Ruegg (1977) writes,

if two opposite concepts or terms stand in a relation of complementary correlation in the framework of dichotomous conceptualization — that is, if they are *pratidvandvins* (Tib. 'gran zla or 'gal zla') — the negation of one necessarily involves the negation of the other, without the problem of the antecedent and consequent in a hypothetical syllogism ever arising. (p. 56)

The propositions S and \bar{S} place a supposed $bh\bar{a}va$ in the set of empty things and the set of nonempty things respectively, but for Nāgārjuna neither statement can be meaningful because there are really no $bh\bar{a}va$, and probably also because 'empty' and 'nonempty' are ultimately just concepts, whose function is 'medical' (in traditional Indian medical theory a medicine, after it has done its benefical work, is supposed to exit the body, and $s\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$, after it has removed false conceptions in the mind, is supposed to leave the mind as well).

In any case, it is possible to maintain that we have here, properly, $S \leftrightarrow \bar{S}$ with a double-headed arrow (which means, of course, $S \to \bar{S} \land \bar{S} \to S$). Nāgārjuna's reasoning is not, then, $((A \to B) \land \neg A) \to \neg B)$, which would indeed be invalid, but

- (1) $A \leftrightarrow B$ Given
- $(2) B \to A By (1)$
- (3) ^{7}A Given
- (4) $^{\neg}A \rightarrow ^{\neg}B$ Contrapositive of (2)
- (5) ^{7}B modus ponens on (3), (4)

or $((B \rightarrow A) \land \lnot A) \rightarrow \lnot B)$. Verbally all we need to do is to interpret Nāgārjuna's *yadi* as 'only if', thus 'only if there is something nonempty will there be anything empty', which is exactly equivalent to 'if there is anything empty there will be something nonempty'; the supposed problem disappears, and we conclude with Nāgārjuna 'but there is nothing nonempty, therefore there is nothing empty'.

But do we really have the right to reinterpret Nāgārjuna's words in this way? It would seem clear from the larger context that we must, for even the strictest of philosophical writers sometimes indulges in approximative langage, and we must remember too that in poetry the constraint of meter is to be considered; things are sometimes said in a different fashion metri causa than would be the case if prose were employed. Besides, in any text there are passages to be taken literally, the nītārtha, and others whose meaning must be 'led out', the neyārtha. And we should not interpret a passage in the work of a major philosopher in such a way that a crude logical error is the result.

NOTES

Frege in his Begriffsschrift (van Heijenoort (1967), p. 12) considers the subject-predicate analysis inadequate, pointing out that an active sentence and a passive one having the same meaning do not have the same subject, as in 'The Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea' and 'the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea'. In the one case the grammatical subject is 'the Greeks' and in the other it is 'the Persians', but the argument of the propositional function is 'the Greeks' in both sentences. The Indian grammarians have made the same point, and would refer to the Greeks as the kartr in both cases. Once understood, however, this point poses no problem, because we can imagine all sentences put into some sort of 'normal' form. We may make them all active, or all passive, or (as Frege suggests) all impersonal, in the form of 'The defeat at Plataea of the Persians by the Greeks is a fact'. For our purposes we need only imagine all sentences as active, so that the grammatical subject will equal the argument of the propositional function and the kartr.

² Abhyankar (1961) makes clear that na, given as $na\tilde{n}$ by the grammarians, includes the negative prefix a- also; he writes s.v. na (1) that it 'when compounded with a following word, is changed into a or an'; see also the examples given s.v. $na\tilde{n}$, e.g. aniksuh śarah (presumably 'an arrow is not a sugar-cane', expressed as 'is a not-

sugar-cane').

³ Strictly, 'predicate' means a sentence shorn of its subject and of words associated with the subject. It is true that in loose usage $v\bar{a}kya$ can mean a whole sentence, but here it is just 'predicate'. In Renou (1942) we find s.v. $v\bar{a}kya$ the definition 'phrase' (i.e. French 'phrase', which is English 'sentence'), but we also find, more precisely,

le verbe et les invariants (= adverbes), les formes casuelles (= régimes) et leur déterminants

and 'collection de mots ayant un même objet (artha)' and 'verbe avec les déterminants' and even simply 'verbe'. Abhyankar (1961) characterizes the vākya s.v. as sāvyayam sakārakam sakārakaviśeṣanam, and because the kāraka includes but is not limited to the kartr (s.v. kāraka), we have here too the possibility of interpreting vākya as subjectless predicate (Abhyankar's example s.v. vākya is odanam pacati, the subjectless 'cooks rice', where we have a kāraka but no kartr).

⁴ Quoted by Kajiyama (1973) p. 168 and also in M. Walleser (Bibliotheca Indica n.s. 1396, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1914) p. 10. We draw on both sources in

presenting the following.

ma yin par dgag pa yons su bzun na ni, de sgrub pa gtso che baḥi phyir, (1) 'chos rnams ma skyes so' ṣes sgrub pas skye ba med pa ston paḥi phyir mdsad paḥi mthaḥ dan bral bar hgyur te, lun las gzugs kyi skye ba med pa la spyod na śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa ma yin no, ṣes hbyun baḥi phyir ro. hdir 'dnos po rnams bdag las skye ba med pa kho naḥo' ṣes nes par bzun bar byaḥo. gṣan du nes par bzun na (2) 'bdag kho na las skye ba med de' ḥo na ci ṣe na, 'gṣan las skyeḥo' ṣes bya bar nes par hgyur ba dan, de bṣin du (3) 'bdag kho na las ni skye ba med de' ḥo na ci ṣe na, 'bdag dan gṣan las skyeḥo' ṣes bya [bar] nes par hgyur bas de yan mi bṣed de, mdsad paḥi mthaḥ dan bral baḥi phyir ro.

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(Only Kajiyama has the italicized ni, only Walleser the bracketed bar.) Our interpretation of this passage differs in some respects from that of Kajiyama (1973). 'Taken as a paryudāsa negation, affirmation would be primary; thus (1) "dharma do not arise" (dharmā utpannā na), showing [affirmative] nonarising, without an instrumental case (karana-kāraka); but according to tradition those who practice in the nonarising of form are not those who practice in the prajñāpāramitā. We must take as prasajya negation] "existents from themselves just do not arise" (bhāvāh svata utpannā na" eva). Otherwise we would have to accept [the paryudāsa negations] (2) "arise, just not from themselves" (svata na° eva° utpannā), meaning "arise from other things"; or (3) "arise not just from themselves" (svata eva na° utpannā), meaning "arise from self and other things": these are not acceptable, because of the separation [of the predicate] from the instrumental.' The Sanskrit is conjectural, but it is to some extent confirmed by Kajiyama, who gives (2) naiva svata utpannā bhāvā na vidyante and (3) svata eva utpannā bhāvā na vidyante; for the expression that 'we must take' he gives bhāvā svata utpannā naiva vidyante. 'Instrumental case' is also conjectural, and is not shared by Kajiyama, but see s.v. byed in Das (1902). What could Bhavaviveka mean by it? Perhaps he considers svatas as an instrumental semantically (not, of course, morphologically) and objects to its separation from the predicate 'arise'. Using parentheses in the mathematical fashion for association of terms, we write

- Things (do not arise) [from themselves or anything else] (1)
- (2) Things (arise) (just not from themselves)
- (3) Things (arise) (not just from themselves)

Bhāvaviveka objects to these three on philosophical grounds, inasmuch as the first is annihilationist and the next two are eternalist and present untenable views of origination. At the same time, these three have the feature of separation of svatas from the predicate (in the first case there is no svatas, and in the next two svatas is associated with na and eva rather than with the predicate 'arise'). But Bhavaviveka accepts

Things do not (arise from themselves)

wherein the 'from themselves' is an inseparable part of the predicate. And from this he draws no implication; 'arising from self' is simply denied, and no implication concerning arising in any other way is made. That this is a prasajya negation he explicitly affirms: 'bdag las ma yin' ses bya bahi dgag pa hdi ni med par dgag pahi don du blta bar bya ste (Kajiyama (1973) p. 168), and this is the formula from which he draws no implication (while drawing undesirable implications from each of the other three), thus supporting the thesis that the prasajya negation is a nonimplicative one. ⁵ The prasajya negation results in a zero statement, and this perhaps is just the lack of pratijñā that Nāgārjuna maintains. Ruegg (1983) has performed a clarification of great value in distinguishing between two senses of this word (see also Ruegg (1977) pp. 49-50). In Sense 1, pratijñā means a statement, positive or negative, i.e. by the terminology adopted here a nonzero statement; thus 'I have no pratijñā' means 'I make only zero statements', statements obtained by prasajya negation in the Mādhyamika sense. In Sense 2, a pratijna is any verbal formulation at all (or the content of the same), and Nāgārjuna of course makes these all the time, but in a 'nonharmful' sense, because he advances such statements only 'procedurally' in order

to refute the theories of others (indeed only to establish the zero statement that is the main thrust of his argument). Thus he makes no statements *paramārthavat*. — The reference here is to 'The Vigraha-vyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna' (E. Johnston and A. Kunst, eds.), *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 9 (1948—1951): 99—152, p. 127: nāsti ca mama pratijñā.

Lopez (1987), on the other hand, writes 'When Nāgārjuna says that he has no position, he means, according to Tsong-kha-pa, that he has no inherently existent position' (p. 51). But by this interpretation one could hold any position (pratijñā) at all; one could assert 'things arise from what is other than themselves' provided only that one covered oneself by adding 'this thesis does not inherently exist'; but Nāgārjuna does not seem to give himself this freedom to assert any thesis. — Lopez argues against 'the Western scholars cited above', which include T. R. V. Murti (!), in their belief that the 'Mādhyamikas have no position of their own, that they refute all philosophical views while upholding none' (loc. cit.). It can be argued that this is true paramārthavat; but Lopez writes, inexplicably, 'From this point it is a short jump to the charge that the Mādhyamikas are nihilists.' But having no philosophical views paramārthavat is not at all the same as nihilism; and the quotation from Candrakīrti that Lopez here adduces has to do with the question of a possible relationship between asvabhāvatā and nihilism, not that between apratijñātva and nihilism.

⁶ At least according to Bhavaviveka (see n. 4 above).

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⁷ The suggestion has been made more than once that Nagarjuna obtained the concept of śūnyatā from mathematicians, who used the word śūnya for zero. A more likely source, however, is its prior usage in early Buddhism itself, for in the Pāli canon, for instance, we find the term used in at least a proto-Mahāyānist sense as a symbol for a transworldly reality. Keith (1923) has called our attention to this (see his index s.v. void), and Murti (1955) reminds us of the passage in the Samyutta Nikāya wherein the Buddha laments a future time when the monks would no longer strive for doctrines 'deep, deep in meaning, reaching beyond the world, dealing with the Void (suññatā-patisamyuttā)' (p. 51). The passages in the Majjhima Nikāya to which both Keith and Murti seem to refer must be in the Cūla- and Mahā-suññata-sutta (Rahula Sankrityayana, ed., J. Kashyap, General Editor. Bihar Government, Pāli Publication Board, 1958, pp. 168 ff., 174 ff.). In the first of these the Buddha states that by dwelling in emptiness he dwells in fullness: suññata-viharena bahulam viharāmi, and he repeatedly advocates the attainment of a parisuddhā and paramānuttarā suññatā. In the second he speaks of the attainment of an ajjhattam suññatam after the wellknown four jñāna. The three gates of liberation, or doors to deliverance, are attested at a number of places, see e.g. Conze (1962) p. 59, who gives a reference to the Udānavarga; this triple (suññato, animitto, appanihito) is furnished by all traditions of Buddhism and is unquestionably early. The present writer would also like to call attention to a passage in the Vinaya reminiscent of the Majjhima Nikāya passage above (Cullavagga, J. Kashyap, ed. Pāli Publication Board, 1956, p. 426) wherein Sabbakāmī states suññatā-viharena kho aham bhūmi etarahi bahulam viharāmi and Revata identifies this suññatā-vihāra with mahāpurisa-vihāra.

The work of Mäll (1968) on the Buddhist śūnyatā, work referred to favorably by Ruegg (1977), need not detain us long here, because so much of it consists of restatements of truths already known (is it really necessary to begin an article on Buddhist philosophy with a two-page argument in defense of the thesis that the 'orient' might have something to teach 'us'?), not always in the clearest of language; he seems

to share with his semioticist colleagues a predilection for unnecessary neologism (why 'lysiologique' from Greek *lysis* in relation to Sanskrit *mokṣa* when surely 'soteriologique' would serve?); and like Stcherbatsky he tends to equate Sanskrit technical terms rather too assiduously (śūnyatā and madhyamapratipad are certainly related, especially for the Mādhyamikas, but they are hardly 'considérés comme synonymes et souvent substituables l'un à l'autre' (p. 60), nor will everyone admit that 'śūnyavāda a pour synonyme madhyamika [sic]' (p. 58 n. 18). Moreover his mathematical notation for the *catuṣkoṭi* cannot be accepted, as we shall see later.

Ruegg's (1978) own work on the possible connection of the philosophical śūnyatā with the mathematical śūnya is rather more important, and it is perhaps significant that he has been unable to show more than an interesting analogy between the two; starting without preconceptions, he appears to have concluded that no clear evidence exists for the influence of either concept on the other.

Finally, one crucial difference must be noted between the two. The great achievement of the Indian mathematicians, to which the world is indebted, was for the first time to regard zero (śūnya) as a number like other numbers, not as the mere absence of a number. But emptiness (śūnyatā) is not a dharma like other dharma. Quite the contrary, indeed; Mahāyāna sūtras like the Prajñāpāramitā and the Kāśyapaparivarta spend more time warning against misapprehension of śūnyatā as an entity than they do uncritically advocating it. The śūnyatā is logically prior to everything and informs everything; it is in no sense a part of the system the way zero is a part of the mathematical system. Applied to negation, śūnyatā is not something that first appears in the zero statement, as we have called it; it subsists in the positive statement (before negation) as well. (Our zero statement could be a step in the direction of śūnyatā, as an upāya, but not ontologically.)

⁸ A conventional truth is true within its own proper (and limited) sphere; Kumārila on the other hand says that relative or conventional truth is simply falsehood, according to Matilal (1971 p. 15). But Buddhists, being characteristically *vibhajyavādinah*, insist on the distinction of two truths, a distinction that may derive from the old *nūārtha/neyārtha* dichotomy in textual analysis. — On the *paramārtha* level the conventional truth is not negated; it remains true but becomes irrelevant.

The unification of the two truths, which is occasionally carried out (e.g. by Jñānagarbha), can be done in favor of the *paramārtha* or in favor of the *saṃvṛti*; but the matter cannot be gone into here as it is really not a logical issue but an ontological (and even soteriological) one

De Morgan's law is the equivalence of $P \vee Q$ with $\neg(\neg P \wedge \neg Q)$. In the special case of complementary sets we have contrary propositions P and $\neg P$. Thus $P \vee \neg P = \neg(\neg P \wedge \neg P) = \neg(\neg P \wedge P) = \neg(P \wedge \neg P)$. The principle of double negation that is employed here, i.e., the equivalence of P with $\neg P$, is certainly not identical with either the law of the excluded middle or the law of noncontradiction; it operates on a single proposition, whereas the two laws have to do with the set $\{P, \neg P\}$ of complementary propositions. — De Morgan's law is so named after the modern rediscoverer of something known to the Medievals Ockham, Burleigh, and Peter of Spain; see Bocheński (1961) 31.35 ff., p. 207 of the English translation (original German not seen).

Dwarika Das Shastri, ed. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1983, p. 35.
 Op. cit. p. 164, and in the *Prajñāpradīpa ad loc*. according to Lindtner (1982)
 p. 272 n. 244.

12 Following an article of Mäll not seen by the present writer. - Kristeva has made other mathematical errors. On p. 131 she gives the disjunctive sum $A \oplus B$ as equivalent to $A \cap \bar{B}$; it must be rather $(A \cap \bar{B}) \cup (\bar{A} \cap B)$. Her misstatement of Gödel's (1931) second incompleteness theorem is salient. She writes of the supposed 'constatation de Gödel concernant l'impossibilité d'établir la contradiction d'un système par des moyens formalisés dans ce système' (p. 129). In fact it is not impossible to prove within a self-contradictory system its self-contradiction, and Gödel never said that it was. He explicitly stated the opposite, that it is possible to establish. in a contradictory system, its contradictory character, or any other result desired. Nor is this surprising or in any way due to Gödel. What he did establish, very much contra exspectationem, was that in a noncontradictory, widerspruchsfrei, consistent system, its noncontradictory character cannot be proved within the system itself, Gödel (1931) writes, 'insbesondere ist die Widerspruchsfreiheit von P in P unbeweisbar, vorausgesetzt, daß P widerspruchsfrei ist (im entgegengesetzten Fall ist natürlich jede Aussage beweisbar)' (p. 196). In short, in an inconsistent system one can prove anything one likes; in a consistent one one cannot prove either its inconsistency (because it is not true) or its consistency (this is the unexpected result due to Gödel).

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In this context Kristeva (p. 129) performs a singular contortion: 'La notion de constructibilité qu'implique l'axiome du choix [that the axiom of choice implies constructibility will come as news to those mathematicians — the great majority, indeed - who call upon the axiom without the slightest intention of showing constructibility], associé à tout ce que nous venons de poser pour le langage poétique, explique l'impossibilité d'établir une contradiction dans l'espace du langage poétique. Cette constatation est proche de la constatation de Gödel [is it? He makes no mention of the axiom in his paper | . . . Malgré toutes les ressemblances de ces deux constatations et les conséquences qui en découlent pour le langage poétique (par exemple, le métalangage est un système formalisé dans le système du langage poétique), nous insistons sur la différence entre elles.' And after having yoked together two things of dubious relationship, called them 'proche' and spoken of 'toutes les ressemblances', she 'insists on the difference between them'. This obviously is not the place to consider whether her attempted application of mathematical concepts to the 'poetic langage' has been at all successful; as regards Buddhism it is clear that her arguments, like those of Mäll, are weak, rendering difficult to interpret Ruegg's (1977) suggestion, it seems that semiotics can accommodate within its theory the idea of the tetralemma and its negation, and it appears to be worth exploring further for its potential contribution to an approach to Mahāyānist thought' (p. 54).

13 An example of what we are calling 'inapplicability' is given by Matilal (1971) p. 165: '2 is not red' (or for that matter '2 is red'); '2' is a valid subject in some sentences, and 'is red' is a valid predicate, but the two do not go together, so to the statement we cannot assign either the truth-value 'true' or that of 'false'. The idea that some statements (or rather they are things that appear to be statements) must be thrown out i.e. not assigned a truth-value is supported by the Buddha, who said that certain questions could not be answered because they were 'not rightly put' — that is, the corresponding positive statements were not well-formed and hence were neither true nor false. Just what sort of sentences are valid and what require to be thrown out has been the subject of much discussion. At first glance we might be tempted to say that 'valid subject', 'valid predicate', and 'applicability' would be the three criteria; but this will not do, because a subject that some at least would consider invalid, because

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nonexistent, a subject like Meinong's 'round square', can fit very nicely with the predicate 'does not exist'. (It appears that 'empty subject terms' as they are called can be of two types, the self-contradictory and the merely unexperienced; the 'round square' being an example of the former and the 'hare's horn', the 'son of a barren woman', 'Plato's beard', and 'the present king of France' being classic examples of the latter: these are 'contradicted by experience' — or is the 'son of a barren woman' self-contradictory?) In general, Buddhists will have no problem with the existence of empty subject terms, as terms; *vikalpa*, false conceptions, occur in real life, so presumably a place must be made for them in philosophy, and if their origin is sought, it is simply the very *avidyā* that has afflicted us from beginningless time. And perhaps there is no problem in applying to them the predicate 'does not exist' or some such. What does become problematical is the application to an empty subject term of a predicate that attributes a quality to it, as in 'the rabbit's horn is sharp' or 'is not sharp'.

Now such a sentence can perhaps be considered true or false if there is some convention about the matter: if everyone says that rabbits' horns are sharp or not just as we say that the touch of a unicorn's horn enables a woman to conceive. In the absence of a convention, or if the convention is not accepted, we would have to ascertain for ourselves whether the rabbit's horn were sharp, and this is impossible. One approach to the problem is that of Udayana, who would regard such a sentence as invalid and thus neither true nor false. He writes (see Matilal (1971) p. 134), 'If nobody has ever seen or known a person called "Devadatta" anywhere at any time, then the question "Is Devadatta white, or is he black?" results simply from some outrageous perversion. And if . . . someone answers the question by saying "he is white" another person has as much right to answer by saying "he is black". Nothing is established by such questions and answers", and he speaks quite rightly of the "lack of our means of knowledge" in the matter. The Nyayapraveśa also insists on a paksa that is prasiddha, an 'established' subject of a logical inference, and adds that it must be pratyaksa-ādy-aviruddha 'not contradicted by perception' (Tachikawa (1971) p. 140). If nevertheless we wish to deal with 'the rabbit's horn is sharp' the Nyaya school is certainly right to wish to analyze this into its component implications (as shown in Matilal (1971) p. 140); we would also like to tease it apart, but perhaps in a somewhat different fashion, considering it to be an illegitimate conflation of two sentences: 'the rabbit's horn exists' and 'this existing rabbit's horn is sharp'. Now the first is false, and the second is therefore moot in the exact legal sense of this term, thus neither true nor false. — But the matter is complex, and the reader is referred to the whole of Ch. 4 in Matilal (1971).

14 rgyu med pa ni tha chad kho na yin pas de las kyan dnos po rnams skye bar mi hthad do. Peking bstan-hgyur, dbu-ma tsa, vol. 95, p. 18, first leaf. For tha chad see Das (1902) s.v. tha cad, where tha chad is listed as an alternative spelling and the other Tibetan expressions, none of them complimentary. Walleser (1911) has nikṛṣṭa and 'ganz schlecht' (p. 10).

15 Things arise only when and where their causes are assembled. If no causes were necessary anything could, and therefore would, arise anywhere: rtag tu thams cad las thams cad skye bar thal bar hgyur bahi phyir; moreover everything would have already arisen and there would be no sense in speaking of a 'beginning': rtsom pu thams cad don med pa ñid (M. Walleser, ed., Bibliotheca Buddhica 16, S.-Petersburg:

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1913, pp. 11–12; Peking *bstan-hgyur*, dbu-ma tsa, vol. 95, p. 75, leaf two). A few lines later Buddhapālita also uses the term *tha chad*.

16 Peking bstan-hgyur loc. cit., p. 104, first leaf.

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17 Madhyamakaśastra of Nāgārjuna with the Commentary Prasannapadā by Chandrakīrtti [sic] . . . ed. Swami Dwarika Das Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1983, p. 116. Schayer (1931) p. 65 also construes parikalpyamāna with bhāva: hypostasiert man den Begriff bhāva, dann . . . The hi that separates them, being enclitic, is placed there only for stylistic reason.

¹⁸ In this context Ruegg (1977) quotes p. 49 Śāntideva's famous

yadā na bhāvo na° abhāvo mateh samtisthate purah / tadā° anyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati //

'When neither existent nor nonexistent stands before the mind, then in the absence of any other [third!] possibility, the independent [mind] is calmed.' He quotes also (n. 176) the *Samādhirājasūtra* 9.27:

[astīti] nāstīti ubhe 'pi antā [śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'pi antā / tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā madhye 'pi sthānam na karoti paṇḍitaḥ //

"It is", "it is not", both are extremes; "pure", "impure", these also are extremes; therefore avoiding both extremes, the wise takes up no middle position.' And of course asti and nāsti are both rejected in the Kaccāyana Sutta quoted by Nāgārjuna in MMK 15.7 and referred to again in 15.10:

asti° iti śāsvata-grāho nāsti° ity uccheda-darśanam / tasmād astitva-nāstitve na° aśrīyeta vicakṣanaḥ //

(Or is this a reference to the Samādhirāja itself?)

Some might argue that the very term *madhyama-pratipad*, associated as it is with Buddhism in all its phases, implies a third way of some kind; and in some non-philosophical contexts this may be so. The middle way between asceticism and luxury is a life of moderation, and this is a life. But ontologically the middle way is merely the absence of error on one side together with its absence on the other; a twofold absence of deviation is not a third deviation.

On the maintenance of the law of the excluded middle and the rejection of the existent or subject, see Ruegg (1977) p. 50: the Mādhyamika 'considers that the subject of such sentences is in fact null; hence, to use modern terminology, such a proposition is not semantically well-formed. But from this it is not possible to argue that the Mādhyamika does not recognize the principle [of the excluded middle] as valid: he simply does not find that the thing in question can be the subject of a qualification in any appropriate and meaningful way'; he refers to the work of Staal and of Schayer (1931), who writes, 'Das ist aber gleichbedeutend mit der Feststellung, daß kein Gegenstand möglicher Prädizierung real ist, daß es überhaupt keine "Gegenstände" im Sinne der pluralistischen Ontologie gibt und daß die absolute Wirklichkeit im Urteil überhaupt nicht erfaßt werden kann. Man denkt die letzten Konsequenzen einer These und deduziert aus ihrer Affirmation die Negation; so wird die antinomiale Struktur des diskursiven Denkens aufgedeckt und die Selbstaufhebung des "thetischen" [this a reference to Husserl, *Ideen* S. 241 ff.] Bewußtseins, die

mahāyānistische Reduktion aller Aussagen auf "neutralisierte Sätze", das "Fahrenlassen" aller *drṣṭis* vollzogen (P. xxvi).

19 $((A \rightarrow B) \land A) \rightarrow B$. Ruegg's (1977) version of this (p. 55) is typographically in error; in his notation it should be $p \supset q \cdot p : q$.

D. Daye (1986) attempts to convince us that the same process of reasoning is not going on in the parārthānumāna as in modus ponens. This is not the place to argue their underlying identity; we should only like to say here that for us their identity is not a "deeply buried methodological assumption" (Daye p. 118) but an openly acknowledged conclusion, arrived at after some thought. The difference between the two forms of reasoning appears to be precisely formal. To say that the Indian syllogism deals with the attribution of a second dharma to a dharmin already known to have its first dharma (on the ground of the vyāpti of the pakṣa of the first dharma over the pakṣa of the second dharma) — this is in effect what Daye argues at the top of p. 122 — is no argument against putting the thing into the form of a syllogism with modus ponens; we can write

((dharmin, dharma $_1$) \rightarrow (dharmin, dharma $_2$)) \land (dharmin $_a$, dharma $_1$) \rightarrow (dharmin $_a$, dharma $_2$)

²⁰ That Dharmakīrti understood the equivalence is clear from his treatment of the three criteria for a valid inference. Let us consider the time-honored smoke-fire example; if the linga or hetu 'smoke' is validly to prove the existence of fire somewhere, then, first, it must really be present in that place; we write of a hill h that it has smoke S emanating from it in the form S(h) 'this hill is smoky'; second, it must be true that a smoky hill means a fiery hill, thus $S(h) \to F(h)$; third, $\neg F(x) \to \neg S(x)$ must be true, i.e. in the absence of fire there must be no smoke. Only if all three criteria are met can we conclude F(h), that the hill in question has fire. Now given the complete logical equivalence between the last two of these - they are contrapositives - we would expect Dharmakirti to see this, and he does. He expresses the second point in this way: the linga must have sapaksa eva sattvam 'presence only in similar cases', i.e., here smoke must be present only in cases of fire, so that we have 'smoke only if fire', which is equivalent to 'if smoke then fire' $S \rightarrow F$. The third point is that the linga must have vipaksa asattvam eva 'only absence, in dissimilar cases', i.e., smoke must always be absent where fire is absent, that is, 'if no fire no smoke' ${}^{\gamma}F \rightarrow$ 3. On the equivalence of the two he states,

nanu ca 'sapakṣa eva sattvam' ity ukte 'vipakṣa asattvam eva' iti gamyata eva / tat kim arthaṃ punar ubhayor upādānaṃ kṛtam / tad ucyate / anvayo vyatireko vā niyamavān eva prayoktavyo nānyathaiti darśayituṃ dvayor apy upādānaṃ kṛtam / (p. 24)

'But surely, when "presence only in similar cases" [if smoke then fire] is said, then "only absence in dissimilar cases" [if no fire then no smoke] is understood. Then what use to cite both? The reply is that either the positive $|S \rightarrow F|$ or the contrapositive there is no other.' Thus not only is he aware that the two are equivalent, he is aware that there is no other form, and thus he rules out $|S \rightarrow F|$, because his enumeration of all (two) correct forms does not include this. — For the text's *niyamavān* we stcherbatsky (1930) translates this word differently (p. 57) but confirms Dharmakīrti's view of the equivalence of the thesis and its contrapositive. Unlike Stcherbatsky we

propose to read *nānyathaiti* with *darśayitum*. For the Sanskrit see Chandra Shekhar Shāstrī, ed., Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1982). ²¹ Quantification has been unnecessarily introduced by some writers into the discussion of Madhyamaka logic, where in fact almost all propositions are universal and 'for all x' must be assumed; but here perhaps it is justified.

Aristotle's four forms involving quantification are certainly not equivalent to the *catuṣkoṭi*: he gives us 'all *a* is *b*', 'no *a* is *b*', 'some *a* is *b*', and 'some *a* is not *b*'. What do these mean? The third, 'some *a* is *b*' is on the face of it entirely compatible with the first, 'all *a* is *b*'. If we rule out this compatibility, then the third becomes 'some *a* is *b* and some *a* is not *b*'. As for the second and fourth, they too are *prima facie* compatible; ruling out this compatibility in an effort to obtain four mutually exclusive possibilities, we obtain 'some *a* is not *b* and some *a* is *b*', which is identical with what we obtained for the third possibility! In short, the third and fourth are compatible also. Whereas in the *catuṣkoṭi* we have four mutually exclusive possibilities. Moreover nothing in Aristotle's system corresponds to the fourth of the *catuṣkoṭi*, which would be 'no *a* is *b* and no *a* is not *b*'.

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SENTENCE-HOLISM, CONTEXT-PRINCIPLE AND CONNECTED-DESIGNATION ANVITABHIDHĀNA: THREE DOCTRINES OR ONE?

Frege's context principle was first formulated in the introduction to his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' as a prohibitive principle of meaning analysis: "Never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation but only in the context of a proposition". Later on in the same book there are also positive formulations of the same principle and since then Wittgenstein and other philosophers have made the positive form more famous:

It is only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning. Now, because this principle was propounded by Frege at a period when he had not yet made any distinction between meaning as sense and meaning as reference, one does not know whether he would intend it as a principle about sense or as one about reference. Or again some interpreters have thought that after Frege arrived at the distinction between sense and reference he actually gave up the context principle and attached more importance to the composition principle that the sense and reference of a sentence were wholly determined respectively by the sense and reference of the constituent words.

Looking at Frege's slogan as such we tend to mix up the following three positions as virtually saying the same thing or following from each other:

1. The sentence is the smallest unit of meaning in language rather than the word. (The *Akhanda-paksa* of Bhartrhari or the Sentenceholism of Quine and many Western Philosophers of language.)

2. Instead of designating individual entities first singly, and then their connection being made, each word in a sentence designates a connected complex. (The *Anvitābhidhāna* or Connected Designation theory of the Prabhākaras).

3. A word has meaning only in the nexus of a sentence.

The main point that I wish to make in this paper is that, the history of

philosophy apart, these three doctrines are logically quite independent of each other. One can be a Sentence-Holist without being an adherent of the Context principle or *Anvitābhidhānavāda*, one can be an *Anvitābhidhānavādin* without being a Sentence-Holist or an upholder of the Context principle and one can support the Context principle without agreeing with either the Sentence-Holist or the *Anvitā-bhidhānavādin*.

Take the sentence:

Gangesha teaches.

The hard-core Sentence-holist will say that in this sentence 'teaches' has as little independent meaning as 'each' in 'teaches', or 'Gang' in 'Gangesha'. That is to say that individual words in a sentence carry as little meaning as letters in a word. The fact that Grammarians still dissect sentences into words is explained as *Apoddhāra* or artificial postmortem analysis without any *real* compositeness to be thereby revealed.

This view might look very much like the Context principle, but if we think carefully it is actually quite incompatible with the Context principle. The Context principle does admit that inside the sentential context the individual word really has a meaning. Take for example Wittgenstein's use of the Context principle in the Tractatus. Reducing all individual words into names, and taking the reference of a name to be its only meaning, he says that a name stands for an object only in the nexus of a sentence. But it is extremely important for his Semantics and Ontology to maintain that the name so used in a sentence does have its own meaning, i.e., each name stands for an individual object. Looked from the side of reference, Wittgenstein is far from a Sentence-Holist because according to him the sentence does not have any reference (just as a Naiyāyika would say a Vākya has no Sakya). Only individual words have references. But they have these references only when they are combined with other words and not by themselves. Thus we can see how Thesis (1) and Thesis (2) are logically separable from each other.

Now the confusion between thesis (2) and thesis (3) is even more irresistible. But we have to resist it. One thing is quite clear: in the internal family feud of the Mīmāṁsakas (the quarrel between designa-

tion-and-then-connection versus connected designation) both parties believe that individual words *are* bonafide bearers of meaning, neither is a Sentence-holist. Even the Prābhākara doesnot believe that it is the whole sentence which has 'Śakti' or primary meaning. Even the upholder of connected designation is a believer in the primacy of word meaning.

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Roughly, what the Prābhākara says is that each word stands for an entity with a link with other entities or more specifically, refers to an entity as related to an action — the action being the centerpiece of the entire meaning-complex. If we formulate this view as the view that a word means an other-related-object, we must distinguish it from the view that only an other-related word means an object. The latter is the Context principle which speaks of necessary connectedness of words whereas the former is Anvitābhidhānavāda which speaks of necessary connectedness of meanings. If Anvitābhidhānavāda meant Anvitaih Śabdaih Abhidhānam then it would have been equivalent to the context principle. But it only means 'Anvitasya Arthasya Abhidhānam'— so it is quite a distinct position.

In fact if Frege is interpreted as having retained his Context principle even after arriving at his mature theory of sense and reference of words then we can see how, without entering into the camp of *Anvitābhidhānavāda*, one can adhere to the Context principle.

According to Frege's matured theory, in the sentence "Gangesha teaches" — 'Gangesha' the name stands for the *object* — the complete object — the individual Gangesha. The name would not have stood for any-thing *just by itself* but once used in a sentence its semantic value is an independent unconnected (*Ananvita*) entity — an individual person. The word 'teaches' or, to make the sentence-dependence of the word even more clear, the gappy expression '... teaches', once used in the sentence, referred to the *concept* teaching. Now the concept is called an incomplete or unsaturated entity which has a hunger for a sort of gapfiller or an object to make it complete and that may look like designating a connected object. But Frege would not say that an unsaturated teaching is teaching linked up already with *teachers in general* — so that, as the Prābhākara would say, the further word Gangesha only helps to specify the already meant entity *the teacher in general*. To say so would go against the unsaturatedness of the concept

teaching. And about the meaning of the name 'Gangesha' at least it is clear that Frege would assign it inside the sentence an independent reference, whereas Prābhākara would assign it a reference already connected with *some* action.

The Nyāya position, it is well known since Jayanta showed it clearly, is neutral between Abhihitanyaya and Anvitabhidhana. No one ever took the Naiyayika for a supporter of the connected designation or Anvitābhidhāna theory. Yet Jagadīśa clearly writes in the Śabda Śakti Prakāśikā — in defining a Sārthaka Śabda — a meaningful word, "Sabdantaram Apeksaiva Sarthakah Svarathabobhakrt". Translated literally it reads "A meaningful word makes its own meaning understood only depending upon other words." This is not only to say the obvious thing that a single word can never give rise to an unified understanding of the sentence-meaning (Anvayabodha) which is another name for Śābdabodha in Nyāya. But this crucial statement purports to assert that although a word carries an independent meaning and we have to remember that meaning first on hearing the individual word, its role in bringing about the understanding of the sentence is dependent upon or awaits the role of other words in a sentence. In other words, there cannot be any understanding of the single word, understanding or bodha is always of the sentence. So, if meaning is necessarily defined as that which is understood - apet thesis of Michael Dummett - an individual word has no understandable meaning independently of the sentential context. It has a learnable meaning which is known at the time of Śaktigraha or language-mastery and a meaning which is remembered at the stage of Padarthasmrti, but nothing of a sentence that is understood. Thus interpreted the Naiyāyika can be seen to agree with one version of the Context principle. Michael Dummett himself admits that in the order of recognition - that is in our process of learning - the word actually carries its own independent reference. Yet if meaning is said to be the contribution of the word to what is understood by the sentence - to the Anvayabodha generated by the sentence of which it is a constituent - then the individual word's svārtha - own meaning is understood only along with that of others.

Although I have tried to go somewhat outside the tradition to give a Fregean slant to Jagadīśa's theory of word meaning, I am well aware

of the fact that the Nyāya is a firm believer in the primacy of word-meanings as against that of sentence-meaning. There are at least five different arguments for that.¹

It can be shown that,

- (a) gathered by perception of co-presence and co-absence the knowledge of Word meanings determines our linguistic understanding;
- (b) that the learner's initial knowledge of what is meant by what also concerns individual words;
- (c) giving primacy to sentence meaning would make explanation of our automatic grasp of hitherto unapprehended sentence meaning difficult;
- (d) the cognition of word meanings alone can cause the kind of doubly qualificative cognition which is normally generated by linguistic understanding;
- (e) admitting word meanings as primary promotes conceptual simplicity.

Indeed the attempt by Frege to extend the notion of reference to whole sentences has led to the worst sort of Ontological and epistemological quagmires. So, even while recognising the connectedness of words and word meanings, we can avoid both Sentence-holism as well as *Anvitābhidhāna* — which taken strictly creates troubles for explanation of the very fundamental phenomenon that we can understand new hitherto unheard sentences if the constituent words are familiar.

NOTE

A little later, in the same book, Jagadīśa says that a word contributes to the connected sentence meaning only when fitted into a sentence — when it assumes Vākyabhava. Here, of course, he is arguing against the Prābhākara position that a single word suffices to designate a connected meaning. This shows clearly that the spirit of the Context principle, which always requires an understandable (knowledge-generating) word to stand in combination with other words, is diametrically opposed to the spirit of Anvitābhidhānavāda which tries to extract something like the connected sentence-meaning from a single word. I am indebted to my teacher Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatirtha for summarising these five arguments from the literature. See also SEN and MATILAL: The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies (MIND: January 1988) for an extensive discussion of some of the issues raised here.

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ŚĀNTARAKṢITA ON THE FALLACIES OF PERSONALISTIC VITALISM

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The study of Indian Buddhist philosophy has, for the most part, been connected closely to the study of the Buddhist religion. This, of course, is just as it should be and to say that this is the case is in one sense only to state the obvious. What I wish to point out here, however, is how this may bias in certain respects our perceptions of Buddhist thought: we are drawn to focus on those issues which lend themselves to discussion in the contexts of contemporary Religious Studies or Philosophy of Religion, perhaps neglecting topics which have no immediate bearing on the concerns of these disciplines. The problem arises in part because Indian Buddhists did not categorize their intellectual pursuits in quite the same way we do, a difficulty that affects not only the study of non-Western civilizations, for similar considerations apply to the study of the pre-modern West. The topic of the present essay is a case in point: the conflict between mechanism and the various types of vitalism belongs to the domain of natural science and the philosophy thereof, but in Greek and mediaeval philosophy it crops up frequently in discussions of what we now call "philosophical psychology" or "philosophy of mind." What I will argue here is that significant features of this debate are to be found in the conflict between Buddhist thinkers and their opponents over the existence of a substantial self (ātman). Given the many issues this conflict raises, as well as the prolonged and intense philosophical research it generated in India, it is not surprising that quasi-scientific problems would have arisen in this context, for the debate about atman was, in the end, a debate about the nature and ends of human beings.1

Under the general heading of "vitalism," historians of philosophy and science unite a great many biological and pseudo-biological doctrines. Their unifying property is the notion that a living organism

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 43—59, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. lives in virtue of something other than its inanimate parts and their interaction alone, viz. that the organism is in possession of some special element upon whose presence its animate condition depends. This element is often called simply "life." Generally conceived in this manner, vitalism has appeared throughout the history of human thought in many different cultural settings. Its primitive versions, as known from the literatures of early antiquity and from the evidence of anthropological research, have always been very widespread. Indeed, colloquial speech includes many expressions which embody vitalistic notions, e.g., in modern English, "the pressures of her career left her lifeless," or, "since his book was rejected he's been lacking vitality." The particular form of vitalism with which I shall here be concerned has been exemplified among both the beliefs of primitive cultures and the sophisticated metaphysical doctrines of the philosophers, and, though personalistic vitalism has had few adherents in recent philosophy, it continues to exercise an influence among spiritualists and theosophical thinkers.

The central tenet of personalistic vitalism is this: there is a particular substance which is at once the self-conscious subject, the ground for personal identity through time, and which, when appropriately associated with a functional animal body, causes that body to be alive. This substance is often called "self" or "soul" in English. Astral body-theories may also exemplify personalistic vitalism. The personalistic vitalist, therefore, holds that the substantial self, besides individuating the person, also acts as a sort of "psychic battery," that imparts life to a body which is physically capable of living and which it "inhabits," or otherwise enters into intercourse with. When the self withdraws the body in question dies, whether or not it is still physically capable of living, just as a battery-operated toy ceases to operate when the batteries are removed, regardless of the mechanical condition of the toy they had powered. Personalistic vitalism, as I understand it here, thus falls within the range of, but is more narrowly defined than, what C. D. Broad has termed "substantial vitalism." 3

Let us review, briefly, the history of personalistic vitalism in the West: It is the doctrine of Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedo*,⁴ and something like it may have been held by some of the Pythagoreans as well.⁵ It is debatable, at least, whether or not Aristotle sought to

espouse any form of personalistic vitalism through his teaching of the tripartite soul, which treats the vitalizing aspect of the soul as distinct from the soul's rational part, and not in and of itself separable from the body which it informs.6 Nonetheless, thinkers in the later Aristotelian tradition have interpreted Aristotle's teaching as a species of personalistic vitalism.7 The philosophy of Descartes clearly involves a rejection of vitalism in all of its forms, through the hypothesis that living bodies are automata,8 but it is equally clear that interactionist versions of Cartesianism can be elaborated in which the presence of the Pure Ego is regarded as a necessary condition for the life of the body with which it interacts: from this is derived a Cartesian form of personalistic vitalism.9 This last version of the doctrine is historically very important, for it is a doctrine that Kant criticizes in connection with the fourth paralogism of pure reason. Kant's discussion of it represents perhaps the first attempt in modern Western philosophy to arrive at a clear analysis of the conceptual basis for personalistic vitalism. He defines the doctrine he is criticizing in these words:

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... the relation [of the substantial self] to objects in space gives *commercium* with bodies, and so leads us to represent the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (*anima*), and as the ground of *animality*. This last, in turn, as limited by spirituality, gives the concept of *immortality*.¹⁰

Kant, however, was inclined to sort out the problems which he believed were involved here in terms of his peculiar doctrines of the representation of space and of transcendental idealism, the discussion of which would take us far from the subject-matter of this essay. So he never undertakes to analyze in its own right the conflation of the concepts of life and selfhood, upon which personalistic vitalism is founded, except in so far as the remarks just quoted suggest such an analysis.

The preceding summary provides a measure against which we can assess the positions held by the classical Indian thinkers we will be considering in their treatment of arguments involving notions of personalistic vitalism. Vitalism, in one form or another, was present in Indian thought from the period of the *Rg Veda* onwards, and by the age of the earliest *Upaniṣad-s* (ca. 800—500 B.C.E.), a wide range of vitalistic theories had already been elaborated.¹² While the early

history and evolution of the Indian versions of the doctrine will not be detailed here, it should be noted that personalistic vitalism may have been attractive to the Indians for at least one fundamental reason shared with the Greeks and speakers of Latin, and whose seductive influence must not be overlooked in the present context. I am referring to some of the lexical peculiarities of the languages in question, whereby soul-words and life-words were from the earliest times only imperfectly differentiated. Concerning the state of affairs which obtains in Greek and Latin, Flew provides this summary:

The word $\psi\nu\chi\dot{\eta}$, always translated *soul*, is etymologically related to several other words: such as $\xi\mu\psi\nu\chi\sigma\varsigma$, meaning *alive* (literally "ensouled"), and $\lambda\iota\pi\sigma\psi\nu\chi\iota\dot{\alpha}$, meaning *swooning* or *death* (literally, "abandonment by the soul"). There is the same sort of relationship in Latin, the language in which Aquinas thought; between *anima*, taken as the equivalent of $\psi\nu\chi\dot{\eta}$; and *animatus* and *inanimatus*, the words from which *animate* and *inanimate* are derived. These features smooth the way for a use of *soul* in which to *have a soul* is merely synonymous with *to be alive*. ¹³

Sanskrit, like Greek, Latin and English, is an Indo-European language, and its lexicon similarly includes not just a few soul/life ambiguities. Thus, from $\sqrt{j\bar{\nu}}$, a verb meaning "to live," is derived $j\bar{\nu}$, "life-force, soul" and $\bar{\nu}$, and $\bar{\nu}$ at most common word for "self" is to be derived either from a verb meaning "to breath," or from one meaning "to move." Hence, vital breath, usually referred to as $pr\bar{\nu}$ in the classical literature, regularly comes to be regarded as a power of the self, or as strictly identical to self. One final example is in order here: sattva, literally "being," may refer, among many other things, to an empirical living creature, a substantial self, or vital energy.

Obviously, there is a sense in which, in the languages we have just been considering, "to be alive" does mean "to be ensouled," and so to affirm their synonymity is simply to give expression to a tautology. It is important that we bear in mind, however, that the "soul" whose existence is tautologously affirmed in this manner is not the soul of the personalistic vitalist. It is, in fact, no thing at all: we must resist becoming confused by the use of a substantive to denote a state of affairs, in this case the condition of being alive. That the soul/life conflation is a very difficult one for speakers of languages in which it is semantically embedded to dispel is indicated, I think, by the historical sketch given above: in the West we have only recently succeeded, despite the continuation of vitalist idioms in ordinary speech, in

disambiguating the terminology involved here.¹⁶ Nonetheless, we should recall too that the influence of language was never so great as to preclude the development of conceptions opposing personalistic vitalism: purely mechanistic theories appeared in both India and Greece at an early date, and were occasionally quite influential,¹⁷ and so, too, various kinds of non-personalistic vitalism.¹⁸

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In the remainder of this essay I will examine the manner in which three prominent representatives of the Vaiśesika, Nyāya and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka schools respectively treated the question of personalistic vitalism. It will emerge from this that the Vaisesika school was committed to some form of the doctrine, that it was virtually irrelevant to the purposes of the Nyāya philosophers, who nonetheless lent it their weak support, and that the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, as a Buddhist school, was thoroughly determined to expose personalistic vitalism as fallacious. The three paradigmatic thinkers with whom we will be concerned are Praśastapāda (ca. 500 C.E.), Uddyotakara (ca. 600), and Śantaraksita (mid-8th century). We should note at the outset why it was that the disagreements about the doctrine in question immediately placed it in the context of the Buddhist-Brahmanical debate over the ontological status of the self: from the standpoint of the proponents of personalistic vitalism, this represented one possible way of challenging the Buddhist non-self theory (anātmavāda); whereas for the Buddhists the decisive rejection of this brand of vitalism provided one further ground for rejecting the Brahmanical (and Jaina) hypostasis of selfhood. The essential point here is that, given the assumption that some relationship with a substantial self is a necessary condition for a body's being alive, one can then demonstrate that there in fact is some such self just by affirming that there are living bodies. In what follows I will attempt to survey from a historical perspective the philosophical development of arguments bearing on the fundamental assumption that is made here.

PERSONALISTIC VITALISM IN CLASSICAL NYĀYA-VAIŚESIKA THOUGHT

The basis for the Vaiśeṣika commitment to personalistic vitalism and the corresponding Nyāya ambivalence about it is explained by reference to the aphorisms which constitute their respective scriptural

authorities. These were probably compiled during the early centuries of the Christian Era, but in many respects also reflect more ancient traditions. The complementary character of the two schools already emerges from the two collections of aphorisms, for there is much duplication of material between them. The aphorisms which are of particular interest in the present context are those which concern the proof of the self's existence, which are closely similar in the versions preserved in the two texts. In the *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.10, it reads:

Desire and hatred, conation, pleasure and pain, and knowledge are the marks of the self. [icchā-dvesa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny āt mano lingam.]

But in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 3.2.4,20 it takes the following form:

Inhalation and exhalation, opening and shutting of the eyes, life, imagination, and sensory changes, pleasure and pain, desire and hatred, and conation, are the marks of the self.²¹ [prānāpāna-nimesônmesa-jīvana-manogatîndriyavikārāh sukha-duhkhêcchā-dvesa-prayatnāś câtmano lingāni.]

Whether the Nyāya version is to be regarded as attributing a vitalizing function to the self depends largely on one's interpretation of the role to be played by desire and hatred, and, above all, conation (prayatna). It is probable that early Nyāya intended that this lastmentioned activity of the self should somehow link the self to the body's vital forces, so that the self becomes at least indirectly the agent of vitality. The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, attributed the vital forces directly to the self. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika school, in contrast to the Nyāya, appears to have adhered to a form of personalistic vitalism as a fundamental tenet involved in its essential concept of the self. Praśastapāda, certainly the most influential of early mediaeval Vaiśeṣika scholastic writers, has two arguments which are of interest to us here. The first is his argument against identifying the self with the body, viz.:

Consciousness is not of the body; for, like a pot, it [body] is a product of the elements, and when it dies it is without [consciousness].²²

The second is an independent argument, apparently derived from *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 3.2.4, quoted above: ²³

[The existence of the self a inferred] "by inhalation, etc." so it is said. How so?

Because, when the vital wind $[v\bar{a}yu]$ is conjoined with the body, changing activity is seen, as when a bellows is pumped ...²⁴

According to Prasastapada, then, life and death are respectively indicative of the presence and absence of a substantial self, which is also the basis for the presence or absence of consciousness.

The argument that we will be primarily concerned with in what follows is one that appears to be very closely related to those of Praśastapāda. It is summarized by Śāntarakṣita, who attributes it, however, to the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, in this verse, followed here with the comment of Kamalaśīla, Śāntarakṣita's disciple, who restates the argument in conformity with the formal conventions of Buddhist logic:

Assuming there to be no self at all, This living body must be disjoined From vital force, just like a pot. Therefore, selfless it is not. (*Tattvasamgraha*, v. 184)

That very one [Uddyotakara] has utilized this contrapositive reason to establish the self: "This living body is not selfless, because that would imply it to be devoid of vital force, etc., like pots and such like."

Reformulated in the fashion to which Western philosophers are accustomed, the argument may be expressed:

(1) If the living body were selfless, then it would be without vital force.

(2) But, the living body is not without vital force.(3) Therefore, the living body is not selfless.

The argument is called "contrapositive" (vyatirekin) owing to the form of the major premise. It is clear, moreover, that the argument is a

formally valid one.

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Though its elements recall Praśastapāda's arguments cited above, so that it seems certainly to represent the position of at least some adherents of the Vaiśeṣika school, the argument, as already noted, is supposed to be derived from the work of Uddyotakara, whose arguments on the self form the subject-matter of the verses immediately preceding. Kamalaśīla's commentary is altogether clear about this attribution. The problem is, however, that Uddyotakara nowhere seems to advance the argument in just this form, and this is rather odd: after all, Kamalaśīla usually goes to pains to provide verbatim

citations of the philosophers whom Śāntarakṣita subjects to criticism, and Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* is frequently quoted by him with perfect accuracy.

What, then, was Uddyotakara's argument? In Jha's translation the first two lines, which here are all-important, read as follows:

Others again, having stated the Proposition in the form — 'the living body is not with Soul' — put forward, in support of it, such premisses as 'because it exists' and the like. This also is not right; because none of the alternatives possible under this is admissible. (*Nyāyavārttika*, book 3, introduction)

It is not at all clear who the "other" referred to here might be. In the arguments preceding this one Uddyotakara has addressed himself precisely to well-known Buddhist arguments against the substance theory of the self, and probably he addresses the Buddhist logicians in the present instance. It would be easier to resolve this point if we had some definitive interpretation of the reason given here for denying the living body's possession of soul, viz. "because it exists." I am inclined to agree with A. Chakravarti 25 that this is an oblique reference to the equation, in the philosophy of Dignāga and his followers, of existence with impermanence and causal efficacy. Thus, the body's existence would be held to entail its utter difference from the permanent, and so inefficacious, self.

Let us assume that the interpretation just advanced is the correct one. Then, the next puzzle is to determine just what the "this" is that Uddyotakara thinks "also is not right." Is it the denial that the living body has a soul, or the denial that the soul exists? This is the crux of the matter, for if it is the former, then we can see how Sāntarakṣita came to attribute the argument of personalistic vitalism to Uddyotakara, but if the point is only to refute the denial of the soul's existence, then there would appear to be no basis at all for attributing that argument to him. In fact, Uddyotakara's text turns out to be curiously equivocal about this: he *does* object to the opinion that the living body is soulless, but he then turns about and makes it clear that he is not wedded to that line of objection, for even if we deny any relationship between self and body we will still have to affirm the reality of the self! Evidently, Sāntarakṣita took Uddyotakara's disowning of personalistic vitalism to be more a rhetorical ploy than a statement of serious

intent, and so saw himself obliged to refute that doctrine in addition to those which Uddyotakara weighs more heavily.

SANTARAKSITA'S REFUTATION OF THE DOCTINE

Before turning to the text of Śāntarakṣita's arguments against the positions just surveyed, we should review briefly the background for the Buddhist point of view here. The Buddhist critique of personalistic vitalism began during the early stages of the evolution of Buddhist thought: jīva, with its ambiguous evocation of the concepts of both life and soul, is, with ātman, regularly treated as a pseudo-entity, whose existence is flatly denied. In a famous passage, the Buddha refuses to answer Vatsagotra's question as to whether the jīva is the same or different from the body, a refusal which in the later commentarial literature is said to follow from the very non-existence of the thing in question. In fact, it sometimes appears that early Buddhism was opposed to vitalism in all of its aspects, though Buddhism was never to exorcise entirely the vitalist ghost from its worldview. An example of the tendency towards a mechanistic concept of living organisms is found, for instance, in the *Milindapañha*:

"Reverend sir, whatever is the inner mobile principle, the life-principle that enters and issues forth, I think that is 'Nāgasena.'"

"But if this breath has issued forth and does not enter (again) or has entered but does not issue forth (again), could that man live?"

"O no, reverend sir."

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"But when those who are conch-blowers blow on a conch, does their breath enter (again)?"

"No, reverend sir."

"Or when those who are blowers on bamboo-pipes blow on a bamboo-pipe, does their breath enter (again)?"

"O no, reverend sir."

"Or when those who are horn-blowers blow on a horn, does their breath enter (again)?"

"No, reverend sir."

"Then why do they not die?"

"I am not competent to converse on this assertion with you. It were good, reverend sir, if you uttered the meaning."

"This is not the life-principle; in-breathing and out-breathing are bodily activities." ²⁷

At the same time, it is clear that the Abhidharmists refused to endorse mechanism *simpliciter*.²⁸ The result of their efforts to mediate

between the apparently conflicting demands of mechanistic and vitalistic lines of thought within their own tradition led to the formation of a curiously hybrid doctrine, an interesting and, in the present context, highly relevant, instance of which may be found in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, attributed by Chinese tradition to Nāgārjuna.²⁹ There *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 3.2.4., is put forward by a disputant who argues against the *anātman* doctrine, and who is then rebuked as follows:

Mais tous ces caractères sont des caractères de la connaissance (vijnānalakṣaṇa)! C'est parce qu'il y a connaissance, qu'il y a respiration, regard droit ou oblique, vie, etc. Et quand la connaissance quite le corps tout cela disparaît. Selon votre conception d'un Ātman éternel (nitya) [Lamotte gives anitya. — M.K.] et omniprésent (vyāpin), le cadavre (kuṇapa) lui-même devrait posséder encore regard droit ou oblique, respiration, vie, etc.

En outre la respiration (ānāpāna), etc., sont les dharma matériels (rūpidharma) se mouvant au vent de la pensée: ce sont des caractères de la connaissance (vijñāna) et non pas des caractères de l'Ātman. Quant à la vie (āyus) qui est une formation dissociée de la pensée (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra), c'est aussi un caractère de la connaissance.³⁰

Consciousness thus comes to assume here precisely the functions of the Vaiśeṣika ātman, the differences being with respect to the properties of permanence and pervasiveness, which are attributed to the latter but not to the former.

The viewpoints just outlined belong to the ancestry of the position which Sāntarakṣita seeks to defend. But Śāntarakṣita is the product of an age of greater philosophical sophistication, and this is reflected by his attention to matters of logical form and conceptual analysis which are without parallel in the literature of early Buddhism. His argument against personalistic vitalism provides us with a fine example of philosophical progress in classical Indian thought; for though the problem addressed was in his day an already ancient one, his analysis of it would have been possible only after the age of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

Because the argument attributed to Uddyotakara is a formally valid one, any criticism of it must revolve around an inquiry into the truth of the premises themselves. Sāntarakṣita's main objections are given in two cryptic verses, which are amplified by Kamalaśīla in his commentary:

If vital force, etc., were proven to have some connection with the self, whether through an internal or a causal relationship, then the implication that absence of vital force in the body would follow from the absence of its self would be reasonable. For, otherwise, in case they are unrelated, but such that it is implied that the absence of the one entails the absence of the other, [despite their being] unrelated, absurd consequences follow. For it is not the case that in the absence of a barren woman's son there is the absence of the vital force, etc., that are not related to that [non-existent barren woman's son]. Therefore, as the argument is an uncertain one, with ruinous implications, as illustrated by "there being no barren woman's son, the absence of unrelated vital force, etc., follows, as in the case of a pot," just so your [argument], in which absence of self implies absence of vital force, etc., is uncertain, because the [relevant] relationship has not been proven. (*Pañjikā* on *Tattvasamgraha*, vv. 207—208)

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Let us set out this argument with some care. It turns, of course, on the theory that relationships can be reduced to two categories: internal relationships (tādātmyalakṣaṇasambandha); and causal relationships (tadutpattilakṣaṇasambandha). Things that are not related in one or the other of these two ways are "unrelated" (asambaddha). A detailed investigation of this theory will not be attempted here, but some of its salient features must be surveyed nonetheless, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding. My account here will, for simplicity's sake, be a contemporary restatement, rather than a straightforward exposition.

Following Dharmakīrti's Investigation of Relations (Sambandhaparīkṣā),31 the later Buddhist scholastic traditions explicitly opposed the realist account of relations; above and beyond the relata, the relationship is not an additional existing thing. Relations, therefore, are conceptual or linguistic constructs. However, we should not conclude that every kind of relationship that is thus constructed is just as good as every other: some putative relations are either formally defective or utterly vacuous, while others, though they are similarly constructs, are nonetheless contentful. Contentful relations can be reduced to the two categories of internal and causal relationships. Objects not related by any such contentful relationship are "unrelated," though there is a sense in which it is always possible to stipulate some relationship holding between them, however vacuous it might be. Thus, the "nonbeing of a barren woman's son" is vacuously related to everything, or, in the terms of the present discussion, significantly related to nothing. What Santaraksita and Kamalasila seem to be arguing under the rubric of "unrelatedness," then, is that their opponents have failed to point

out any non-vacuous relationship holding between the posited substantial self and vitality.

The precise interpretation of the two relational categories is not by any means unproblematic. Among Western philosophical concepts, the relationship that I have referred to as "internal" has often been interpreted as identity, but, strictly speaking, that cannot be correct: a material thing, e.g., a pot, has this relationship not only to the stuff of which it is made, but also to the properties of being an artifact, being impermanent, being causally efficacious, etc. But despite the apparent appropriateness of the concept of internal relations here, the so-called "causal relationship" cannot be identified with external relations in general, but only with a sub-class thereof. This, however, is not very problematic: recalling the reduction of contentful relations to the two categories in question, it seems clear that, from the perspective of the Buddhist logicians, external relations are all and only causal relations.

These considerations will help to clarify Śāntarakṣita's elaboration of his examination of the relationships in question. Again, it will be clearer to follow his commentator, for Śāntarakṣita summarizes his own views in just two short verses:

In what sense is their relationship not proven? . . . There is no internal relationship connecting the self and vital force; for their essential difference has been affirmed, as follows: the vital forces are impermanent, non-pervading [i.e. spatially fixed], and corporeal, while self is just the opposite. Neither is there a causal relationship, because given the totality of the vital forces' causes, [their] occurrence-all-at-once [yaugapadya] is implied. And there is no relationship besides these. Therefore, why is it that the vital forces abandon that body, that is, a body qualified by life? (Pañjikā on Tattvasamgraha, vv. 209—210)

In other words, an internal relation between the self and vital energy is necessarily precluded because the essential definitions of the terms in question are mutually exclusive; and a causal relationship cannot be supposed because if, *per impossibile*, an eternal and ubiquitous entity were causally efficacious, its effects would come into being not sequentially, but everywhere in an instant.³²

In closing his discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika soul theory, Sāntarakṣita reaffirms that the processes of life are to be explicated only in terms of the universal principle of causation; plants and persons are just alike in this respect. Though his view of consciousness, which is elaborated elsewhere, does not permit us to conclude that he was a thorough-going mechanist, his diction at this juncture is strongly suggestive of such a view: "The similarity with pots, etc.," he says, "whereby our opponents seek to refute [the doctrine of] non-self with respect to living bodies, becomes in this instance our proof." 33

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CONCLUSIONS

What was the fate of personalistic vitalism in later Indian thought? That question is too large to be considered here, but it is certain that the doctrine did reemerge, and has remained influential. Nonetheless, there is some reason to believe that Śāntarakṣita's critique of personalistic vitalism did have an immediate impact on philosophers within the Nyāya tradition: Vācaspatimiśra, Uddyotakara's sub-commentator, whom we know to have been familiar with Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṃgraha*, simply passes over Uddyotakara's already equivocal argument without making any effort to defend it.³⁴ Certainly, he had concluded that Uddyotakara's weak assertion of personalistic vitalism was either not important, or else a lost cause. Is it too much to suppose that he might have let himself be convinced, in this case, by a Buddhist?

The ancient debate between atmavadin and anatmavadin was at the heart of a conflict between opposing systems of salvation. To construe this, however, in accordance with our contemporary categorical schemes involves a fundamental error, for "systems of salvation" in ancient India were concerned with human nature and the human world, in a rich and full sense. What I have tried to indicate here is that one strand of the debate in question can be isolated and shown to involve progressive developments in the conceptual analysis of a basic biological doctrine. Other strands that might similarly be analyzed bear upon the theories of agency and causation, and rational and empirical psychology. To study these and many other topics in classical Indian thought from the perspective here advocated does not require our losing sight of the essential religious interests which motivated and informed the Indian discussions with which we are concerned; what it does require is an involvement in the history of ideas quite broadly conceived. In this context we should recall that it

is now possible to treat much of classical Indian thought from a truly historical, and not merely doxographical, vantage-point. By focusing less upon belief and doctrine within single systems, and more upon the dynamic tension that arose where competing systems came into conflict, we discover that there was indeed historical progress, and that it is characterized in part by the application of methodological refinements in the areas of logic and epistemology to problems that had been defined in antiquity. This sounds very much like the history of philosophy in other settings; what must be done is to fill in the details with respect to the splendid array of questions which Indian thinkers posed and the answers about which they argued.³⁵

NOTES

A paper on an altogether different topic, which also illustrates the need to approach the study of Indian religions from the standpoint of the history of ideas more broadly conceived, is Frits Staal's "Ritual, Grammar, and the Origins of Science in India," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* **10** (1982), pp. 3–35.

² For a general introduction to the philosophical use of this term, see Morton O. Beckner, "Vitalism," in Paul Edwards, ed.. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New

York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 8, pp. 253-256.

³ C. D. Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), pp. 56ff. Broad writes: "The doctrine which I will call 'Substantial Vitalism' . . . assumes that a necessary factor in explaining the characteristic behaviour of living bodies is the presence in them of a peculiar component, often called an 'Entelechy', which does not occur in inorganic matter or in bodies which were formerly alive but have now died." Broad contrasts this with what he calls "Emergent Vitalism," which maintains that living bodies are to be differentiated from inorganic matter not because the former include some special substantial component, but rather because of structural differences which nonetheless cannot be described in purely mechanistic terms.

⁴ Plato's *Phaedo*, trans. David Gallop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 59: 'Answer then, and tell me what it is, by whose presence in a body, that body will be living.'

'Soul.'

'And is this always so?'

'Of course.'

'Then soul, whatever it occupies, always comes to that thing bringing life?'

⁵ This is suggested by such interpreters as A. Ed. Chaignet, *Pythagore et la Philoso-phie Pythagoricienne*, vol. 2 (Paris: Didier, 1873), pp. 175ff.; idem., *Histoire de la Psy-chologie des Grecs*, vol. 1 (Paris: Hachette, 1887), p. 53. More recent writers, however, have not generally implied that Pythagoras and his school held the doctrine I have been calling "personalistic vitalism." See, especially, Jonathan Barnes, *The*

Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), vol. 1, ch. VI, "Pythagoras and the Soul." In the extant relevant fragments the only one which seems to me to be indicative of the doctrine we are considering, however weakly, is no. 271 in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1971), p. 223. It comes from Porphyrius, Vita Pythagorae: "... he maintains that the soul is immortal; next that it changes into other kinds of living

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6 Aristotle, On the Soul, 413b25-30 (trans. J. A. Smith): "... mind ... seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of the soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition." See, also, Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle (Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1977), especially pp. 28-41. ⁷ The teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Man (= Summa Theologica, Questions 75-89), is sometimes understood to involve this. Consider his remarks in Question 75, Article 1: "To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life in those things in our world which live; for we call living things animate, and those things which have no life, inanimate. Now life is shown principally by two activities, knowledge and movement." (From Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1945), vol. 1, p. 683.) Cf., also, F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), p. 160: "... in virtue of his one rational soul the human being can exercise not only the vital activities of plants and of animals but also a still higher range of vital

activities, namely, those which are linked with the possession of mind."

See, e.g., Sir William Cecil Dampier, *A History of Science and its relations with Philosophy and Religion* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1971), pp. 186 and 357–358.

A good example of this line of thought is represented by the biological speculations of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660–1734), on whose vitalist notions see W. C. Dampier, op. cit., p. 186; and Aram Vartanian, "Stahl, Georg Ernst," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 8, p. 4.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:

St. Martin's, 1965), A 345, B 403.

On this, see, for instance, P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), pp. 170–174. "The Complications of Transcendental Idealism."

I do not know of any attempts to study systematically the history of vitalism in India. Nonetheless, most works on early Indian thought will be found to contain a great many references to vitalistic notions *inter alia*. Of particular interest in this respect are: Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (New York: Dover, 1965), trans. A. S. Geden, esp. pp. 263–296: Arthur Berriedale Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), esp. vol. 2, pp. 551ff.; Betty Heimann, *Facets of Indian Thought* (Now York: Schocken, 1964), ch. III, "India's Biology"; Franklin Edgerton *The Beginnings of Indian*. Dec. 25ff.

Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 25ff.

Antony Flew, Body, Mind, and Death (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 15.

The use of this term is, of course, particularly prominent among the Jains, who, however, may have partially emptied it of its vitalist connotations at an early date. See

Mohan Lal Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy (Bangalore: Jaina Mission Society. 1954), ch. II, "Nature of Soul."

15 Cf. Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: The Clarendon

Press, 1899), p. 135.

16 The retention of vitalist idiom in colloquial language may be compared with our continued use of such terms as "sunrise" and "sunset," though we have long known that the phenomenon involved is really one of "earthspin." Examples of terms which have been more or less purified of soul/life ambiguities in recent times include "animate" and its derivatives. Consider, also, "ghost," which is still associated with vitality in a few quaint expressions, e.g. "he gave up the ghost."

17 Cf. Brhad-āranyaka, II. iv. 12.

18 See, for example, my remarks on jivitendriya in note 28, below.

19 Concerning the historical questions involved here, see Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nyāya-vaiśesika, in Jan Gonda, ed., A History of Indian Literature, vol. VI, fasc. 2 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977).

²⁰ This sūtra occupies the same position even in the various divergent redactions of

the Vaisesikasūtra.

²¹ The notion of the self and its "marks" embodied in these sūtras can already be found in numerous Upanisadic passages. An interesting example here is Taittirīya Upanisad, 1, 7.

²² Durgādhara Jhā, ed., *Prašastapādabhāsya* (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1977), p. 171: na śarīrasya caitanyam, ghatâdivad bhūtakāryatvāt,

mrte câsambhavāt.

²³ This is fairly clear from Praśastapāda's own text, which, following the argument of the sūtra, takes up the implications of the opening and shutting of the eyes immediately after sketching out the argument from inhalation and exhalation. Śrīdhara, in his Nyāyakandalīvyākhyā, also states that Praśastapāda intends the phrase "by inhalation, etc." to stand as an abbreviation for the entire sūtra.

²⁴ Praśastapādabhāsya, pp. 199—200: . . . prāṇâdibhiś cêti. katham? śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikrtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayitêva . . .

²⁵ Arindam Chakravarti, "The Nyāya Proofs for the Existence of the Soul." Journal of Indian Philosophy, 10 (1982), pp. 211-238.

²⁶ See Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, vol. 2, pp. 1209ff.

²⁷ I. B. Horner, trans., *Milinda's Questions* (London: Luzac & Company, 1963), vol.

1, p. 41. Cf. also pp. 76ff.

- ²⁸ What they posited was the existence of a special faculty possessed by living organisms, which was termed jivitendriya, "life-force." According to some accounts. this seems to have been conceived in substantial terms, in which case the doctrine in question is a form of substantial vitalism. But according to the later Abhidharmists and the Mahāyāna philosophers, this "life-force" is itself a conceptual construct, in which case we approach mechanism more closely (though it is still possible that the doctrine is to be interpreted as a type of what Broad terms "emergent vitalism"). Cf. Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.
- ²⁹ On this important text in general, see Richard H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Reprinted, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), pp. 34-39. Etienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, vol. 3 (Louvain: Institut

Orientaliste, 1970), pp. 1449-50. Lamotte, however, did not notice the precise

correlation with Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 3.2.4, which was first pointed out by Robinson, op. cit., p. 69.

31 Swami Dwarikadas Sastri, ed., Vādanyāyah Sambandhaparīkṣā ca (Varanasi:

Bauddha Bharati, 1972), pp. 139-149.

32 This assumption recurs throughout Buddhist discussions of both the self and of God. It demands a thorough critical investigation in its own right, which, however, I will not be able to undertake in the present brief essay.

33 But cf., here, Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, xviii. 32, quoted in Collins, op. cit.,

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The mental and the material are really here, But here there is no human being to be found. For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll, Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.

But while such mechanistic imagery is found throughout Buddhist doctrinal literature, the question about whether it really is indicative of opposition to substantial vitalism can only be resolved with reference to the doctrine of jīvitendriya, referred to above. Santaraksita, certainly, would have held this "life-force" to be a conceptual construct, and not a substantial constituent of a human being. I am not yet clear as to what Buddhaghosa's views about this may have been.

³⁴ Introduction to *Tātparyatīka*, book 3, in *Nyayadarśanam*, vol. 2.

35 An earlier version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 1986. Among those whose comments at that time contributed to the task of revision, I would like to thank in particular Professors Steven Collins (University of Bristol), Luis O. Gómez (University of Michigan), and Karl Potter (University of Washington).

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The University of Chicago

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Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

NYÁYA CRITIQUE OF THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NON-SOUL*

INTRODUCTION

Is there a soul apart from the body? It is an old, old question. This was one of the famous ten questions recorded in the Pali Canons. It has been asked in many other forms throughout the history of philosophy, east and west. Is there a person independent of the psychophysical complex? Recently this question has received renewed attention in the context of moral philosophy, thanks to Derek Parfit. Parfit's fundamental idea has been to convince moral philosophers today that much less is involved in being a particular person than we ordinarily assume, and that this shedding of ontological load, to some extent at least, ought to make us less concerned with ourselves and more receptive to a broadly utilitarian outlook that emphasizes the well-being of mankind as a whole.

A Buddhist would have been naturally delighted. For the original idea of Buddhism was to convince its followers that there is no ego or self or soul for whose pleasure or happiness we yield to the 'thirst' for becoming and perpetuate the cycle of suffering. This conviction is supposed to pave the way for the right style of living with right attitudes, right beliefs and thoughts, which, in turn, would facilitate the realization of nirvana at the end. It may be noted that the kind of altruistic ethics which receives support from the Buddhist doctrine of complete egolessness can paradoxically receive similar support from the diametrically opposite doctrine of Advaita Vedanta, according to which every soul is identical with the One, the Universal Soul, distinction between one and the other being only an illusory appearance. If the distinction between self and others 'evaporates' in this way, then any self-regarding action becomes other-regarding and vice-versa, for the self here becomes all-pervasive, inclusive of all others. There will arise obviously some problems here, but I am not going to go into them in this context. (Some interesting ideas along this line have been recently developed by Dr. R. C. Gandhi.)

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The aim of the Buddhist or the Vedantist however was decidedly different from the altruistic goal of the utilitarian philosopher. But there may be a remote resonance. In later Buddhist thought the concept of a soul as a metaphysical entity was elaborately refuted. All other schools of Indian philosophy (except the Carvakas, of course) believe in the metaphysical reality of the soul, although each have a different notion about its ultimate nature as well as about how it is or could be shown to exist. Śālikanātha in eighth century A.D. noted the following variety of views regarding the metaphysics of personhood. According to Advaita Vedanta, the self is identical with the one Universal Soul which inhabits every individual's body: the others (Nyāya, Sāmkhya Yoga, Mīmāmsā and Jainism) accept plurality and assign a separate self to each individual. Besides, many believe that the soul has a size or magnitude. Some contend that it is atomic, others say that it has a medium size (like the body), still others that each soul is an all-pervading ubiquitous entity. For Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras, the self is inferable on the basis of evidence. For Bhāttas and some Naiyāyikas, its existence is directly known through our inner perception. Others (Sāmkhya, etc.) claim that the self is self-revealing. For the Jainas, the self is revealed in the Kevala-jñāna 'pure awareness' of the saints.

The ethico-religious doctrine of Buddhism, in spite of its radical difference in the metaphysics of self-hood from other Indian schools, should not be supposed to be very different or unique. In fact it is of a piece with the general, pan-Indian ethico-religious attitude. The structural affinity is unmistakable. The ultimate goal is the cessation of suffering; the means to achieve it must be a particular set of ethico-religious practices coupled with the real knowledge of the nature of the self. For the Buddhist, selfhood consists in a conglomerate and a realization of this knowledge must inform his religious practices directed towards the state of nirvānā. For others, self-hood constitutes a separate entity from body, mind, senses, etc., and such a realization must influence their ethico-religious activities.

Udayana² in the beginning of his *Ātmatattvaviveka* has underlined two types of 'doctrinal agreement' (*ekavākyatā*) among all schools of philosophy in India. First, cessation of the universal experience of suffering is possible through a means, and that means is, by universal

consent, the knowledge of the truth or 'thatness' (or 'what it is all about') (tattva). Second, all agree that the natural or normal way of understanding the self does not constitute the required knowledge of the truth. The Buddhist will have to know the nature of self-hood in order to understand how this composite entity is to be dissolved in his vision of the nairātmya doctrine. The others will have to know how and in what way it could fit in their individual doctrines for achieving cessation of suffering.

1. THE UNDECIDABLE QUESTIONS

The Buddha's doctrine of non-soul can be seen to be related to one of the 'undecidable' avyākṛta questions. It may be that the Buddha did not intend to accept the stronger thesis. For "avyākṛta", though it has sometimes been translated as 'unanswerable' (Jayatilleke, 472) or 'inexpressible' (Murti, 36), should literally mean 'unexplained' or 'unanswered' (also Jayatilleke, 471). If we say "these questions cannot be answered", this seems to be stronger claim. Today it may not be surprising to claim that some philosophical questions, the deepest and oldest of them, "have no solutions" (Nagel, xii). For they show us the limits of our understanding. I believe the present question falls into this category. Whether answerable or not, this question is askable all right. It is not an unreal question.

Regarding the Buddha's questions, however, we may say that they do not have any easy answer, or that there is no definite or straightforward answer to them. In free translations the ten 'unanswered' questions would be (according to another count there were fourteen such questions):

- 1. Is the world (universe) eternal?
- 2. Is it impermanent?
- 3. Is it infinite?4. Is it finite?

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- 5. Is the person (soul) identical with the body?
- 6. Is it different from the body?
- 7. Does Tathāgata exist after death?
- 8. Does he not exist after death?
- Does he both exist and not exist after death?
 Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?

(Majjhima nikāya, Culamalmkya-sutta)

Another formulation of questions 5-6 is:

Does he who acts also 'enjoy' (i.e. get reward and punishment)? Is he who acts different from the 'enjoyer' of reward and punishment?

We cannot dismiss all these questions as unimportant. At least the pair 5—6 has not lost its relevance today. Even when we say that these are not important questions today we cannot deny that they are at least very disturbing, particularly because while no definite and decisive answers are easily available we feel that there must be some answers that will be true. There can be in fact several possible answers but such answers are often in conflict with each other. Accordingly philosophers over the ages have tried to give persuasive *a priori* arguments and/or find some plausible evidence in favour of one answer or the other. But such evidence often amounts to only plausible evidence, and *a priori* arguments are often inconclusive. Thus as philosophical argumentation goes, the rival view may gather equally plausible evidence and persuasive argument. Hence an *avyākṛta* may imply that there is no decidable answer.

We may set aside the question regarding survival after death. Most religious traditions believe in some form of 'post-mortem' existence. This is even true of Buddhism even though the doctrine of a surviving soul is explicitly rejected. What survives physical death is said to be the left-over karma (called also samskāra) which acts in conjunction with the congenital or 'beginningless misconception' (avidyā), and these two become the condition for the consciousness series to be connected with another physical body series. This misconstrued personality series is exhausted only at nirvana. This part of the Buddhist doctrine will not concern us in the present discussion. The question whether he who acts is the same as he who 'enjoys' is however deemed much more fundamental for any ethical or religious system. It seems undeniable that human actions, at least most of them, presuppose a sort of personal identity or at least a continuity which must be at the same time distinct from all other similar continuities. Otherwise nobody would sow the seed for others to reap the harvest. But this does not conclusively settle the question whether we (the persons) are separately existing entities, over and above our bodies, sense-faculties and mind, over and above the causally connected series of physical and mental events. The non-Buddhist philosophers usually

believe that persons are separately existing entities although about the nature of such entities, as I have already noted, there is a variety of views propounded by them. The Buddhist answer is of course that there are no such entities, for the concept of a person is easily analysable into physical and mental constituents — a set of five aggregates.

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2. THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF TWENTY-FOUR ELEMENTS

A proto-Sāmkhya analysis of a person may be given as follows. We may break a person into five sense-faculties, five organs of action, five sensory objects (the sense-givens), five elemental substances to be accessible only through the sense-givens, and three other faculties which roughly constitute what we ordinarily call *mind*. The primary constituent of the mind is called buddhi, 'intellect', also called the 'great soul' or the 'great reality', the second constituent is "I" awareness or ahamkāra, the third is a mental faculty through which the inner perceptions are received. These three constituents are distinguished by their separate functions, and taken together they constitute the psychological life of the person. All these twenty-three are then said to be the evolutes of the original unmanifest matter or the "chief" (pradhāna). These twenty-four elements are supposed to exhaust the description of the person, although it remains complete only if we think that this is a mechanical analysis to which no purpose, no teleology has been added. Why does the "chief" or the "unmanifest" matter evolve the way it does? This question, if it is raised at all (and surely it was raised, as the history of Sāmkhya philosophy undoubtedly shows), will make us recognize that our former description of the person has not been properly exhaustive. In other words, those who are inclined to raise such questions feel that something, in fact something very important, has been left out in our previous analysis of the person into its constituents. The material constituents of the person work in the way they do work, they are arranged in the way they are in fact arranged, because there is also a spiritual constituent of the person which transcends these material constituents and whose purpose the latter are trying to fulfil. The set of the material constituents found in conglomeration (it is a saṃghāta). Similarly a chariot, a bedstead or a house, is a conglomeration. It is argued that usually such conglomerations are designed to serve some end. But the conglomerate itself can hardly *have* a purpose of its own. The bed serves the sleeper, its chariot the driver. Hence the need for admitting a spiritual constituent called *puruṣa*. In this way the Sāṃkhya theory has been allegedly rounded up, although it has generated an internal tension in the system which has been variously explained and resolved by successive philosophers.

The alleged internal tension of the Sāṃkhya theory is not our present concern. The Buddha (see Aśvaghoṣa) found it very unsatisfactory. For one thing, it was pointed out that if the spirtual constituent has to be admitted it would be almost impossible to explain the actual relationship between the two, their involvement or the entanglement of the spirit by the material constituents. If the entanglement cannot be explained, we cannot explain how and why the spirit could actually be free. For another, there does not seem to be any necessity for the conglomerate to have a purpose or to be guided by some purpose or teleology. Hence the Buddha's attempt was to knock down this spiritual constituent (called variously, *puruṣa*, ātman, soul, self) and remodel the description of the person, or suggest some alternative models, which he did in terms of five aggregates, or twelve bases or 18 base-elements (*pañca skandha*, *dvādaśāyatana*, astādaśadhātu).

We may note a couple of points before we leave the Sāmkhya view. First, it is significant that within the material evolutes are included what we understand ordinarily by mental states and mental properties. Even the mental substrate, *buddhi* is said to be the first "subtle" evolute of the unmanifest inert matter. Hence the usual opposition between the mental and the material has to be given up on this view. They do not constitute two different ontological categories or two different substances. Each of these material elements is characterized by some sort of activity. Causation is conceived here as only making explicit what was implicit before, manifestation of the unmanifest, modification of the appearances. On this view, therefore, the mental and the non-mental have a common origin, the 'chief', which proves that both have a material essence.

According to this style of philosophizing, many modern questions would seem to be irrelevant or unnecessary. The usual assumption of the mind-body dichotomy is avoided. There is no need to step into

what is usually known as Cartesian dualism if we do not go into the spiritual constituent. And this spiritual constituent may very well be like the Kantian idea of a person, which explains the unity of a mental life, or Strawson's idea of a person as a primitive unanalysable concept. But this is arguable. The above also avoids the question whether epiphenomenalism is true, that is, whether mental properties can be causally idle. In other words, the above Sāṃkhya view seems to escape between the two horns of the dilemma, Cartesian dualism and mind-body identity theory. Instead of worrying about the relation, or the lack of relation, causal or non-causal, between consciousness and corporeal stuff, Sāṃkhya saw both as evolving out of a common causal source.

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I concede that the above way of looking at Sāṃkhya is somewhat unorthodox and hence open to criticism. But my point now is to provide a philosophical background for the origin of the no-soul doctrine in Buddhism. So the lack of historical accuracy may be compensated by philosophical adequacy.

3. THE BUDDHIST WAY

When we consider the Buddhist analysis of a person we cannot but be struck by the resemblances with as well as the difference from the Sāmkhya analysis. The proto-Sāmkhya view is closer. But the fundamental difference emerges as we see that the Buddhist prefers to explain the phenomena of change and continuity as explicitly nonpurposeful and mechanical. Unlike the Sāmkhya, the Buddhist initially not only does not believe there to be any unchanging core or material essence underlying the ever-changing appearances, he also denies there to be any goal, telos, ends, purposes or values by which the ever-changing reality is ordered. Hence the question which led the Sāmkhya to the doctrine of the spiritual constituent or soul was directly rejected by Buddhism as useless. Change is regarded here as the built-in nature of reality. It is automatic, non-purposeful, unteleological. A mechanical analysis of the concept of a person and an explanation of its continuity was deemed quite sufficient and satisfactory in Buddhism.

Like Sāmkhya, Buddhism was also concerned with the origin of suffering and its cessation. The origin of duhkha was located in desires, propensities to pleasures, etc., propensity to becoming. The roots of such desires were located in the psycho-physical complex that we call the person. There cannot be any desire unless it is involved with notions of "I" and "mine" (ahamkāra, mamakāra). '... desires ...' etc. are two-place predicates, and hence require both a subject and an object to function. We must also note that in this metaphysical sense of desire, it is never set at rest permanently or allowed to cease finally through satisfaction or fulfilment. It is like fire that will burn as long as the fuel is supplied. Hence to destroy or completely eliminate it we can do either of two things. We may show that the objects of desire are only illusions. They are hollow or empty or do not exist. Or we may show that the subject is an illusion, does not exist. In fact the second way is the more radical way — a way that was first chalked out by the Buddha. In fact the claim is that the second way is also superior in the sense that it is infallible. It would be logically impossible to maintain the reality of a desire once we are convinced of the truth that the subject does not exist. It would be logically impossible for us to be attached to something if there is a discovery that there is nobody, no subject, who is supposed to be attached to the objects. If on the other hand we are shown that the objects of our desire are illusions, māyā, or magic objects, we can still be attached to or desire them, for even the "dream" objects can satisfy the "dream" desire and the run for it cannot be easily given up.

The Buddhist way was to say there is no real subject, no real "I". There is only a conglomerate of five aggregates, each element of which is pushing ahead on its own, but which jointly falsely create a sense of unity that plays the role of the subject. The continuity or flow of these five phenomenal series allows for the identity of the person over time. If the liberating insight shatters the unity of the subject in this way, desire etc. are thereby shattered altogether. And if the unity of the subject is lost into the multiplicity of fluctuating phenomena, the object to be grasped by perceptions and intended by desires etc. are also automatically shattered into phenomenal pieces. In other words the Buddhist phenomenalism or the world-view that envisions a world of ever fluctuating phenomenal particulars is of a piece with the Buddhist view of no-soul or 'no unified subject'. The deep philosoph-

ical lesson that presents itself is this: if the unity of the subject is shattered, can the shattering of the unity of the objects and the objective world be far behind? There may also be, arguably, a clue here to the resolution of the 'subjective-objective' controversy. Objectivity requires persistence of a subject standing apart and 'grasping' objects. To argue for the latter in the absence of the former would be pointless.

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We may derive another philosophical insight here. Some years ago when the terminology of sense-data was introduced in the discussion of the problem of perception and the perceived world, a controversy gradually became prominent: are these data material or mental? No straightforward answer to this question was found to be wholly acceptable. If we follow the Buddhist view here and dismiss the notion of the unity of the subject, it would seem that this sharp line of demarcation between physical and mental phenomena would disappear, and a sort of neutral monism would emerge. Each phenomenon would be a momentary flash and a series of similar flashes would be called continuity. On this view, the physical phenomena would be as much dependent upon the mental phenomena as the mental upon the physical. Strictly speaking, this view maintains that there are some neutral fundamental elements called dharma, out of which both mind and matter originate. It is significant to note that there is a distant resonance here of the view developed by William James and Bertrand Russell at some point, which was called neutral monism, which held that sense-data and images constitute a kind of neutral stuff, neither mental nor physical.

James put forward this view in his article "Does 'consciousness' Exist?" in 1904. He described the subject as 'the name of a non-entity', 'a mere echo, faint rumour left behind by the disappearing "soul" upon the air of philosophy'. This persuaded Russell to abandon the relational theory of sensation and propound a theory called neutral monism. Russell argued that so long as the 'subject' was retained there would be a 'mental' entity to which there was nothing analogous in the material world, but if sensation were only occurrences and not essentially relational in character, there would not be the same need to regard mental and physical occurrences as fundamentally different. On this theory, a sensation may be grouped with a number of other occurrences by a memory-chain, in which case it becomes part of a mind; or it may be grouped with its causal ante-

cedents, in which case it appears as part of the physical world. This does not resolve all the traditional problems connected with the dualism of mind and matter. But Russell embraced it because it went a long way towards a resolution. The Buddhist position is not exactly the same as held by Russell and James. But the point was to illustrate that one of the consequences of adopting the view that the 'subject' is a logical fiction, not one of the actual ingredients of the world, is that one is led to not only phenomenalism but also a sort of non-dualism as far as the mind-matter dichotomy is concerned.

4. ANALYSIS OF SELF

The Buddhist analysis of self is usually given in three different ways. The three analyses are somewhat independent of each other. The first and the most common one is in terms of five aggregates or groups of elements which are also in perpetual flux themselves.

Table I: Groups

- Aggregate of material forms or visible forms (rūpa) (This covers the physical elements.)
- 2. Aggregate of feelings
- 3. That of perceptions
- 4. That of dispositions or (mental) forces
- 5. That of awareness or consciousness in general.

We should note that there is no sharp line of demarcation between material and mental in this classificatory table. The theory states that a member of any group is in perpetual flux, it is by nature conditioned by members of all groups in the previous moment and is in its turn a conditioning factor of any member of all the groups in the following moment. Each is also connected with a member of its own kind by a causal nexus.

- 1. Faculty of vision
- 2. Faculty of hearing
- 3. Faculty of smelling
- 4. Faculty of taste
- 5. Faculty of touch
- 6. Faculty of mind

- Table II: Bases
 - 7. Colour and shape
 - 8. Sounds
 - 9. Odours
 - 10. Tastes
 - 11. Objects of touch
 - 12. "mindable" objects (64 dharmas, according to Vasubandhu)

Note here that nos. 1—5 and 7—11 are only detailed elements comprising the aggregate of material forms, i.e., no. 1 in Table I. Nos. 2—4 in the former table (I) is comprised under no. 12. There is however no real agreement among the schools whether no. 6 in table II gives a real dharma or it is given simply for the sake of symmetry. "Mindable" objects comprise an assortment of entities, volitions, feelings, birth, decay and even the unconditional elements such as space.

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Table III: Base Elements

13. Visual awareness

- 14. auditory awareness
- 15. olfactory awareness
- 16. gustatory awareness
- 17. tactile awareness
- 18. mental awareness

It is clear that Table III distinguishes the sensory objects from their respective awarenesses (sensations), while table II combines them as one. But both tables are evaluated in the same way. It is not said that one is more fundamental or basic than the other. It is only an *upāya kauśalya* of the Buddha.

5. PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

We may now look at some philosophical arguments given in favour of these views, the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. Belief in a soul apart from the body is very commonplace. Belief in the identity of the person, or the self is even more commonplace. Usually an argument against a well-known belief or a pervasive view takes the form of a challenge. The Buddhist, in proposing elimination of such a belief, went apparently against the wind. The main part of his argument consisted in plausible explanation of such apparently overwhelming evidence as points toward the separate existence of the self. Bits of such evidence are presumably unity of consciousness, memory, recognition of the previously experienced objects, self consciousness, motivated and sustained activity by us for future results, and so on. The Buddhist strategy is to deny the evidencehood of such phenomena for proving the thesis that there is a self apart from the psychophysical complex. His further strategy is to show that the acceptance of the

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"soul" thesis would lead to absurd and undesirable consequence (prasanga).

I shall gloss over the first part of this strategy as far as this paper is concerned. Literature on it is quite substantial.3 Instead I shall comment on the latter part. In order to do that, unfortunately, I have to introduce some banalities to clarify the nature of a philosophical argument as it was understood in the Indian pramāna theory. To prove that something does not exist is the hardest thing on earth. This is not simply because the apparent dilemma provides only an air of paradox that can be easily blown off. The difficulty lies at a much deeper level. That is why in spite of all the atheistic argument against God, theism has persisted. For each such argument has proven to be finally inconclusive. Theism therefore enjoys the benefit of doubt. This does not mean that to prove that something exists is in any way easier. Some philosophers have taken the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" to be a fundamental question of metaphysics (Heidegger, for example). Others have maintained that this is not a proper question, i.e., it is ill-formed and meaningless, while still others think that it may be impossible to answer yet it is an inescapable question (Nozick). But this is not exactly the point here. I have noted that if it is almost impossible to show that something does not exist (unless it is obviously the case that it does not exist), it is equally difficult even to show that something exists, if it is not obviously so. Of course to prove the existence of something is not as baffling as to prove the non-existence of something.

To prove that x exists we have to have some evidence, an evidence that is logically connected with existence of x. Perception can be an evidence for the thing perceived, provided however, this perception amounts to what is called a $pram\bar{a}$, a veridical perception. The old theory of evidence, or what is called the $pram\bar{a}na$ - $s\bar{a}stra$ in the Indian tradition, states that there are broadly speaking at least two kinds of evidence, direct, call it 'perception' (or pratyaksa), indirect, call it the evidential, or inferential sign (linga) which leads to the knowledge of something besides itself. If God exists, or if x exists, we can prove that it exists either by direct evidence or by indirect evidence, i.e., an inferential sign. Observation, which in this context is only another name for perception or direct evidence, is the best evidence, provided it is a true one and we are not suffering from illusion, delusion,

hallucination, mass hypnosis, etc. Hence if one can see God in this sense, then there must exist a God whom one sees. Further, if I see a ghost, I mean I really see it, then it, he or she must exist. Besides it must be admitted to be a perceptible object. But most objects, God, soul, ghost, spirit, atom, power, etc. about which we raise controversy because we are in doubt, are not perceptible objects, at least not so in the ordinary sense. They are not directly evident. Hence let us note that while true perception or observation may establish existence of something, non-perception, or simple lack of observational evidence cannot establish non-existence. (This is how Udayana argued on a similar occasion in Nyāyakusumāñjali, Chapter III.) For this reason. we admit indirect evidence or inferential signs for many important objects which we do believe to be there. We adduce indirect evidence even for many important beliefs we hold to be true. The logical evidence or sign must be critically examined to see whether it is logically faultless. This is not quite enough. For the concept of logical adequacy or faultlessness may be defined in various ways. A set of conditions or requirements are usually mentioned to ensure their adequacy or soundness. Sometimes a logical sign or reason may meet the requirements of adequacy or faultlessness, but may still lead to a belief that is found to be false. To avoid such problems, one needs to add such further conditions as that there is no other conceivable explanation of the cited evidence ("sign" = linga) besides its being logically connected with what is being proved and that there is no stronger evidence (direct or otherwise) to prove just the contrary.

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The above way of characterising the inferential evidence was an issue among the *pramāṇa* theorists of India, and the details of it were disputed between the Nyāya and the Buddhists. Let us note further that this notion of logical evidence makes it also a 'positive' evidence in the sense that it is supposed to prove either the existence of something or truth of some belief, and only indirectly can it show that the contrary is not the case. We can call it the 'negative' evidence when it shows in this way that something is not the case. Besides these two types of evidence, philosophers often use what I shall call a priori arguments. Here we may note that to prove that something does not exist it is often expedient to show that admission of its existence or truth of the belief held leads necessarily to absurdities or inconsistent beliefs. The atheist therefore finds it convenient to show that the

concept of God leads to inconsistency, and similarly the non-soullist or the Buddhist would like to show that the concept of soul leads to conflicting consequences. This type of argument is called the *prasanga* argument in the Indian tradition. But the theory of evidence or Indian *pramana-sastra* has made very little room for *a priori* reasoning unless it is also directly or indirectly supported by a doctrine of evidence, i.e., empirical evidence, or it serves an important purpose for the theory of evidence itself.

The theory of evidence outlined here is primarily conceived as 'supportive' evidence that proves or establishes something. It can also be conducive to the notion of 'confirmatory' evidence, provided the belief in question has another prima facie evidence to support it. I shall refer to two important arguments variously cited to prove that a person is a separate, persisting entity. One is based upon the phenomenon of pratisandhāna and memory, which requires a persistent entity amidst the ever fluctuating factors. The other re-describes mental events as properties or qualities, i.e., locatees, and then argues for a substratum of them. The Buddhist has faulted both these inferences in their own ingenious way. Both these inferences are supposed to be based upon a vyāpti, i.e., a concomitant relationship between the 'evidential' property and the 'concluding' property, between what is adduced as evidence and what is proven. Such a relationship cannot be known a priori, hence we need empirical evidence to support it, i.e., an undisputed example for the co-incidence of the two properties, 'evidential' and 'concluding'.

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Now we can see the limitation of the theory of evidence that has been delineated above. The supposed example must be undisputed in the sense that it must lie outside the scope of the conclusion, i.e., fall outside the cases that are to be covered by the inference. Hence presumably on this theory, I cannot prove that all human beings are rational on the basis of their being human, for to cite the empirical example in support of the concomitant relation between humanity and rationality, I have to consider the case of some human being. But this I cannot do because it is already included within the scope of what I am trying to establish: a truth about all humans. This of course does not preclude the possibility of the belief that all humans are rational being accepted as a piece of definition (laksana) or an inductive

generalisation. But this will raise many intricate logical issues which I wish to skip in this context.

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The Buddhist has argued that both inferences are directly or indirectly based upon some sort of concomitant relationship, but a knowledge of such a relationship cannot be empirically derived from the citation of an undisputed example of the required sort. For instance, we cannot talk about memory and pratisandhāna in the strict sense (take machine "memories" as figurative uses) without talking about a psycho-physical complex; which is already to be covered by the scope of the inferential conclusion. Similarly an example of a mental episode is always associated with a body or a 'mind-body' complex and hence it cannot show that the person is a separately existing entity. Technically, the fault is called sādhyasama, where the evidencehood of the adduced evidence has not been established beyond a shadow of doubt. To put it simply, our concept of memory presupposes the concept of a persistent person, and hence cannot be used to prove its existence. Besides, what is ordinarily called 'memory' can be explained away in such a way as would neither presuppose nor entail the identity of the person as a persisting entity.

Denial of a persistent self leads to many problems such as explanation of memory and recollection, sustained and motivated activity for further results and unity of consciousness. The Buddhist has provided alternative models for explaining all these phenomena without assuming or presupposing the soul. Very generally, they are explained on the basis of causal relations ('causal' being defined in the Buddhist sense of pratyaya) in the 'stream' of the same psycho-physical states (kāya-citta-santāna). Even transmigration is explained without assuming the existence of a persistent entity to transmigrate.

I shall refer to another powerful argument of the Buddhist. This seeks to prove that the very conception of a persistent, permanent entity called soul leads necessarily to inconsistent beliefs, to absurdities. This is the *prasariga* type of argument that I alluded to earlier.⁴ All the ethico-religious systems (including Buddhism) believe in the doctrine of some sort of human bondage and freedom. In this background, the Buddhist argument can be presented very roughly in this form. If bondage (i.e., desires, pursuit of desire, resultant anguish, sufferings, thirst, etc.) is a *necessary* and *essential* property of the

independently existing person then that person can never be free from it, for nothing can exist without its 'own nature' or essential properties. If the person on the other hand is by nature free, he would never have been affected by bondage. In other words, the fact of bondage runs counter to the conception of a permanent soul which should be, by definition, free and independent. Vasubandhu has therefore said in the beginning of the 9th chapter of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* where the 'self' is being examined: "In any other theory that accepts a permanent soul, there cannot be any freedom possible".

The concept of a person may very well be reduced to the 'stream' or the series (santāna) of the psycho-physical complex. Different phenomena which presuppose a single persistent entity called soul can somehow be explained under a different model which would be free from such presupposition. This can certainly make the assumption of a soul metaphysically superfluous.

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Udayana in eleventh century A.D. has tried to give an elaborate defence of the Nyāya doctrine of the Self against the Buddhist attack. He thinks that the reality of the self as an entity is threatened by at least four major metaphysical doctrines. 1. The flux doctrine or exclusive phenomenalism. 2. Indecision about the reality of the external world or immaterialism, 3. Non-distinctness of the quality from the qualified substance or the substratum. 4. Simple empiricism or lack of any empirical proof. The Naiyāyika would argue that neither the flux doctrine (i.e. extreme phenomenalism), nor the 'consciousness only' doctrine (or idealism or Buddhist immaterialism), can be maintained without running into problems. A sort of robust realism dictates that the substance or the substratum must be distinguished from the features, properties or qualities it holds. This would require a substratum for the so-called mental episodes and dispositions, awareness, desires. preferences, etc., and the body, because of its continuously changing nature, cannot be regarded as adequate for such a substratumhood. Lack of empirical proof has already been noted earlier. The Nyāya answers by constructing several proofs, a detailed analysis of which has enriched the philosophical literature of India over the centuries.⁵ I will refer to a couple of age-old arguments.

Udayana first asserts that direct perception should be enough to supply the proof for the separate existence of the self. But then he

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says: "Kaḥ punar atra nyāya? Pratisandhānam". Thus he believes that a proper analysis of pratisandhāna would be potent enough to establish the reality of self-hood. He continues "What is it? It is the regular occurrence of cause and effect in one stream of awareness". But this is to be understood, not in the Buddhist way, but as a certitude regarding the unity of the agency of the successive mental acts or awareness events. We cannot say the successive mental events are only causally related and hence appear (falsely) to belong to one substratum. For then the teacher's knowledge (a case of a mental event) being causally related to the student's knowledge would also have caused the (false) notion of the identity of the two continuous series. The debate continues for a long time and towards the end some analysis of the notion of pratisandhāna is extracted so as to justify the inference of the unity of the substratum (agency) for the causally related awareness-episodes.

The other well-entrenched argument of the Nyāya school is that the soul-substance is a necessary prerequisite for locating such "mental" phenomena (the so-called "soul's" attributes) as desire, awareness, hate, pleasure and pain. The origin or occurrence of these phenomena can neither be located in the senses, nor in the body. They do not belong, on this theory, even to the 'mind'. For 'mind' or manas (and there is a terminological problem here) in the Nyāya vocabulary, which follows in general, the linguistic intuition of Sanskrit, stands for the 'instrument' for acquiring beliefs (awareness), desires, pleasures, etc., just as the outer sense-faculty, the eye, is the 'instrument' for visual perception. Thus it may be advisable to translate manas in its technical sense as the inner faculty or the 'inner sense' for sensing pleasure, pain, etc. That which is a mere instrument can be neither an agent nor a locus. A telescope, for example, is an instrument by which one sees, it does not see by itself, nor can seeing belong to, or be located in, it. Using such 'eliminative inference' (technically sometimes called *śesavat*, elimination of the available alternatives, senses, body and mind), Nyāya argues in favour of positing an additional and distinct entity, a soul-substance, which, standing apart, acts as both the causal substrate of such so-called "mentally originating" phenomena, desire desire, etc., and the agent of such psychological verbs, desires, believes believes, knows, etc. An additional argument in support is what is called parsimony or simplicity. For acceptance of a separate entity

here makes it simpler to account for various other matters, personal identity, continuity, unity of consciousness, memory, etc.

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The situation seems to be as follows. Whether we admit the person to be a separate entity or not, it is incumbent upon us to rationalize our beliefs, our faith, and make our experience or observational data compatible with such beliefs. But this can be done in a number of ways with different results. We can construct different ontological theories, and support different sets of beliefs on the basis of the same total evidence, the totality of experience. We have our total pie, the total evidence, the totality of experience, and it depends upon us how we can carve it or cut it and for what purpose. We can explain or interpret it in such a way as to support a belief in the separate existence of the soul. Alternatively we can devise explanation that would support the Buddhist claim that soul is not a separate ontological entity, but only a psycho-physical complex with a structure. That this is possible may simply be a particular instantiation of the general 'indeterminacy' thesis — the thesis that claims that our theories are always underdetermined by the totality of evidence upon which we retical entities in Physics). But then if there is a change in paradigm, such postulation may be pointless.

NOTES

- *An earlier, unrevised version of this paper was published in Freeedom, Transcendence and Identity: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharya, J.C.P.R., 1988, under the title "The Buddhist Concept of a Person".
- Salikanātha, *Prakaraṇapancikā*, pp. 315—16 (ed. A. S. Sastri, Benares).

² Udayana, p. 5 (ed. D. Sastri, Chowkhanba, 1940).

³ See S. Collins, *Selfless Persons* for the early Buddhist arguments; see also A. Chakrabarti, for the Nyāya arguments from Uddyotakara.

⁴ See for further discussion on *Prasariga*, Matilal, pp. 9–22.

For the most important philosophical arguments, see Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhásya*, Ch. 9, Śantarakṣita's *Tattvasamgraha*, Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī, Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

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Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri REVIEW ARTICLE

WAS THE BUDDHA A BUDDHA?

Tilmann Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika*. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Prāmaṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 12, Wien 1984. Price: ÖS 230, —. To be ordered from Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Maria Theresien-Strasse 3/4/26, A-1090 Wien, Austria.

The four noble truths may be considered not only as the starting point of Buddhist philosophy, but also as a conceptual framework within which almost all Buddhist philosophical theories may be subsumed. The truth of suffering may include all theories answering the question what the world is in general and living beings (especially humans) in particular. The truth of the arising of suffering may include the theories of causality. The truth of the cessation of suffering may include theories of the absolute, that is, of Nirvana, of Buddhahood, of tathatā, etc. And the fourth truth may include theories of practice, especially ethics and theories of meditation. These are, roughly speaking, the traditional themes dealt with by Buddhist philosophers. However, it is less than obvious whether, and if so how, the Buddhist pramāṇa-school, which deals mainly with epistemological and logical problems, is to be related to this conceptual framework; all the more so as Dignāga, the founder of the school, as well as all the other logicians who came after him, did not recognize scripture or authoritalive verbal communication (āgama, śabda) as an independent means of knowledge.

In a short but most edifying case-history Professor Steinkellner pointed out that the majority of modern scholars who dealt with the

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 81—99, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. spiritual place of epistemology and logic in the Buddhist tradition may be classified under two categories: Those, like Conze, who stressed the practical and religious ideas of Buddhism, and considered the epistemological tradition as a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic Buddhist values; and those, like Stcherbatsky, who considered the epistemological tradition as the greatest achievement of Indian philosophy, but who equally considered it as un-Buddhistic in its spirit. "The assumption common to all these approaches", concludes Steinkellner "is that the epistemological tradition presents an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism. And the methodical fault common to all these approaches is that none of them raises the question of the tradition's self-understanding."²

However, Steinkellner notes one important exception to these approaches, namely, that of Professor Vetter, who gave a "fully acceptable" explanation of this relationship in his Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti.3 Surprisingly enough, Vetter's explanation has been ignored by the vast majority of scholars, and it is indeed disconcerting to observe that a book by a well-known and respected scholar, which was published in the well-known and easily available series of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, remains largely unknown; especially as Vetter's book is, to the best of my knowledge, the one and only monograph on Dharmakīrti in any European language. Partly it is no doubt due to the fact that it was not written in English, and it might serve as an alarming indicator that German is becoming something of an esoteric language⁴. Partly it is also due to the extremely condensed style of the book which makes its reading an arduous task. Whatever the case may be, I sincerely hope that the book under discussion here will not share the fate of its predecessor, and will draw the attention it deserves as a major contribution towards the understanding of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism.

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
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The relation between the *pramāṇa* theory and Buddhist spirituality was laconically stated by Dignāga in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and in the *Vṛtti* thereon. It consists of five epithets of the Buddha which stand in causal relation to each other. These are usually represented in the following scheme:⁵



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It should be noted, however, that this scheme, albeit correct, is incomplete, for it fails to account for the relation among the four last epithets (jagaddhitaisitā etc.), as well as the relation between perfection in cause and perfection in effect. (Are they cause and effect of each other, or of a third and even fourth party?) Dharmakīrti, who raised the question, claimed that each of the four is a necessary condition for the next one (i.e., jagaddhitaisitā → śāstrtva → sugatatva → tāyitva), and this enables him to infer the epithets from each other in the following order: Because the Buddha is a protector (as is evident from his revealing of the four noble truths), he is sugata (the root gam is interpreted as "to know", and together with the three meanings of su- it means that the Buddha's knowledge is true, lasting and complete); because he is sugata (i.e., because he has far more knowledge than what is necessary for a simple arhat), he is a teacher; because he is a teacher (i.e., because he exerts himself for the sake of others), he is full of compassion, that is, seeking the benefit of all living beings. And because of all four taken together the Buddha is a means of valid cognition or authority.6 Note, however, that this inference does not account for the complexity of relations among the four terms; as far as the Buddha's motivation is concerned, Dharmakirti construes them in a different order: Because the Buddha is full of compassion he wants lo become a protector, and the best way to become a protector is to

become a teacher, but in order to become a teacher one has first to experience the way and its result (i.e., to become *sugata*).

None of these interpretations seems particularly faithful to Dignaga Unfortunately, however, we do not have any other commentatorial tradition except Dharmakīrti's, and, therefore, in order to understand Dignāga we should better look at his predecessors rather than his successors, for at least one could determine the direction from which his thought developed. One important passage which seems to bear directly on our subject matter here is found in the Abhidharmakośabhāsı on 7.34, where Vasubandhu explains the similarities and dissimilarities among the different Buddhas. The similarities consist in the accumulation of all merit and knowledge, in having the dharmakāya and in being helpful to all living beings. These three are called perfection in cause, perfection in effect and perfection in means (hetu-, phala-, upakārasampat)7. Dignāga seems to have had this passage in mind while composing his manigalaśloka, although he uses the terms in a different sense and one to one relationship of the sub-divisions is difficult, not to say impossible, to establish. In any case the epithet pramānabhūta could correspond to perfection in means which is explained by Vasubandhu as perfection in liberating from the three bad destinies and from the suffering of samsāra, or, alternatively, in putting people in the three yānas (i.e., śrāvakayāna etc.) and in good destinies. As far as the term pramāṇabhūta itself is concerned, it could have been borrowed from the Mahābhāṣya where Pāṇini is thus called 8. This could hint at Dignaga's aspiration to grant his epistemology the status of the highly respected science of Vyākarana, and further perhaps to establish an epistemology which would be acceptable to, and used by different philosophical schools, just as is the case with grammar. But I shall leave the matter at that because Vetter's book is not about Dignāga, but about Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga, which is, as usual, something completely different.

The book consists of a most interesting, daring and intriguing introduction (pp. 13–35) and a translation of verses 131cd–285 of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter⁹. Vetter's view of Dharmakīrti's view of the Buddha's career may be summarized as follows. There was a person who practiced compassion for a long time during many lives. None of the other perfections (*pāramitā*) known from Mahāyāna texts

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is mentioned by Dharmakīrti, and, therefore, he considered that compassion alone is necessary for becoming a Buddha. The best way to help someone in the long run is to become his teacher. A good teacher has first to experience for himself what he teaches, and that is why the Buddha undertakes the necessary steps towards liberation, although he is not interested in liberating himself but only in liberating others. The Buddha already knew from tradition (agama) and argumentation (yukti) that suffering has a cause, that this cause is not eternal, and that it is absent where the apprehension of Self, desire, etc., are absent; he also knew that their opposite (i.e., the apprehension of Selflessness etc.) had to be practiced in order to destroy them. However, he had to employ different methods in order to find out the best way for his purpose. He practiced many different methods for a long time, understood their advantages and shortcomings, and realized that the only definitive way to realize his aim is the apprehension of Selflessness (nairātmyadarśana). From this interpretation of the first three predicates Vetter reaches the conclusion that Dharmakīrti's Buddhism is unique of its kind (p. 19):

Bei der Erörterung des Prädikats 'das Heil der Welt suchend' war zu sehen, dass Dharmakīrti beim historischen Buddha keinen Mahāyāna-Weg zum Ziel der Buddhaschaft vor Augen hat und ebensowenig ein Bodhisattva-Ideal, dem möglichst viele zu folgen hätten. Auch diejenige Richtung des Hīnayāna, welche das Erscheinen des historischen Buddha als die Manifestation einer höheren Macht interpretiert der sogenannte Lokottaravāda —, war auszuschliessen. Dharmakīrti ist auch nicht ohne weiteres der breiten Hīnayāna-Tradition zuzurechnen, zu der auch der Pāli-Kanon gehört. Entgegen diesem breiten Strom behauptet Dharmakirti nämlich, dass der Buddha für sich selbst keine Erlösung suchte; er suchte die Erlösung nur, weil er in dieser wichtigen Sache gut Bescheid wissen musste, um anderen helfen zu können. Entgegen vielen Texten dieser breiten Tradition war der Inhalt seiner Lehre auch nicht das Ergebnis einer einmaligen Erleuchtung (bodhi). Nebenbei sei bemerkt, dass der heit der bei uns gebräuchliche Name Buddha (der Erleuchtete oder Erwachte) von Dharmelte Dharmakirti nie verwendet wird. Die wichtigsten Elemente der Lehre waren dem Buddha von der Überlieferung angeboten und von seinem Nachdenken gebilligt oder verbessert verbessert worden . . .

It seems to me, however, that Vetter's interpretation is improbable, for in the final analysis it would leave no room for the Buddha to innovate anything, not even to improve a previously existing way to liberation. According to Dharmakīrti the practice of apprehension of Selflessness is not only the best way to Nirvana, it is also the only way. And if it is

accepted by tradition that certain persons reached liberation before the Buddha, it follows that they also reached it by practicing the very same method. This, however, implies that they also knew and understood its presuppositions, such as the five skandhas being suffering, etc. The only thing left for the Buddha to do was to give his approval to a way with the discovery of which he had nothing to do. In other words, not only are the four noble truths not originally discovered by the Buddha, they were not even rediscovered by him. Though it is not explicitly stated, I think Vetter will actually accept this conclusion in some form or another, as he says (p. 18): "Der Buddha wusste zwar durch Agama und Argumentation (yukti), dass das Leid eine Ursache hat, und dass diese Ursache keine ewige Natur hat (132c-133b, vgl. 179) ... und was die Ursache ist (132c-134, vgl. 183-185) ... er wusste damit auch, dass die Gegensätze zu diesen Fehlern zu üben seien." Such a belittling of the Buddha seems odd, but before pronouncing any judgement on it one should, of course, ask what Vetter adduces as evidence for it. As far as I can see, his evidence amounts to one single word — Āgama — in v. 132: yuktyāgamābhyām vimršan duhkhahetum parīksate/ "Reflecting with [the help of] reason and tradition he examines the cause of suffering." Vetter, however, translates as follows: "Forschend mit Hilfe von Argumentation und Überlieferung stellt er die Ursache des Leides fest." Of course, there is some difference whether one examines something with the help of tradition or whether one determines something with the help of tradition. And obviously the role of tradition is strengthened under the latter alternative. However, the rendering of pariksate with "stellt fest" is very strange; as far as my reading experience goes, I never saw it used that way, and none of the dictionaries available to me (I checked the MW, PW, Apte and Renou) glosses the word in this meaning. I do not doubt for a minute that Vetter knows what the verb usually means, and, therefore, I fail to understand why - if he wanted to convince us that Dharmakīrti uses the verb in this highly unusual meaning - he did not adduce some evidence for it, or add a few words of explanation 10. Failing that, one could suspect that Vetter twists the text to support his theory.

But even if we assume, at least for the sake of argument, that Vetter is correct in his translation, this would still not be enough for his far-

reaching conclusions. For Dharmakīrti does not say that the four noble truths are a part of the tradition referred to in the verse; as a matter of fact he does not say anything about the content of this tradition. Moreover, I must admit that I do not know what Vetter means by tradition (or rather the tradition, since he uses the definite article). Does it mean that the four noble truths were common knowledge, at least among certain groups of renouncers? If so, how is this compatible with the epithet pramāṇabhūta? For one of Dharmakīrti's criteria for being a pramāna is to reveal something which was not previously known (ajñātārthaprakāśa).10a Or should we assume that we deal with a secret tradition which was made public by the Buddha? Should we connect this tradition with the ancient belief, found already in the Pāli canon, that there were other Buddhas before the historical Buddha? Is it possible that the term "tradition" refers to non-Buddhist tradition? Could it refer to the theories of the teachers of the Buddha, or to other theories (such as the śāśvatavāda and the ucchedavāda or all the other theories which appear in the Brahmajālasutta) which were rejected by the Buddha as too extreme, dangerous, or inappropriate? Couldn't it be that Dharmakīrti used yuktyāgama as a readymade expression without taking into account all its implications? Finally, is it not possible (or even likely) that the subject of this verse is not the Buddha? Dharmakīrti's laconicism does seem to leave room for more than one interpretation.

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ed lo Furthermore, there is another problem which immediately arises in this context: One of the things which distinguish a Buddha from a simple Arhat is that a Buddha reaches enlightenment by himself: For all Buddhas are said to have gained their knowledge without having received instruction (cf. for instance AKBh on 7.34 p. 415.23: jñānasampat punaś caturvidhā — anupadiṣṭajñānam . . .; de la Vallée Poussin: "Perfection de savoir: 1. savoir non enseigné . . ."; cf. also Yaśomitra ad loc. 12: anupadiṣṭajñānam iti svayamabhisambodhanārthena — "Untaught knowledge [is used] in the meaning of becoming enlightened by oneself"). Thus Vetter's interpretation of Āgama is incompatible with one of the most important characteristics of a Buddha. Vetter may have been aware of this problem when he says that according to Dharmakīrti the Buddha's teaching is not the result of a single enlightenment, and that Dharmakīrti does not use

the word Buddha. If I understand him correctly, what he actually claims is that the Buddha was not a Buddha and the four noble truths (give or take a few minor improvements) are not originally his own. (All this in the name of Dharmakīrti, of course.) This is a very strong and interesting claim indeed, but, unfortunately, I do not see that Vetter has any conclusive evidence for it. As for the fact that the word Buddha never occurs in the *Pramāṇavārttika* ¹³, this, of course, does not prove anything.

Although it is not explicitly stated, it is clear from the context that Vetter draws his conclusion from v. 136:

bahuśo bahudhopāyam kālena bahunā'sya ca/ gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām//

"Ihm, der intensiv (bahuśo) und über eine lange Zeit hin (kālena bahunā) auf vielerlei Weise (bahudhā) ein Mittel übt [um die aus Überlieferung und Nachdenken gewonnene Einsicht zu verwirklichen und dann diese und die zu ihrer Verwirklichung einsetzbaren Mittel anderen zu lehren], gelangen diesbezüglich [d.h. bezüglich der verschiedenen Mittel] die Vor- und Nachteile zu [voller] Klarheit."

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However, Vetter's interpretation is certainly not the only possible one. While commenting on this verse, Prajñākaragupta explicitly mentions the Buddha's enlightenment, for he considers that the verse refers to the time after the Buddha's enlightenment, or more precisely, when the enlightenment unfolds or blossoms (*prabodhavikāsa*). (The biographies of the Buddha usually mention four, or sometimes seven 14, weeks.) Although the Buddha is free from suffering, he further practices different means and perfects his qualities as a teacher; e.g., he exerts himself to eliminate his imperfections of speech etc. Or, alternatively, although his suffering is destroyed, the Buddha is not yet omniscient 15. Nothing in this implies or suggests that the content of the Buddha's teachings is not the result of a unique enlightenment.

Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, on the other hand, do not mention the enlightenment at all, because they consider that the practice during long time refers to the time when the Buddha was not yet a Buddha, i.e., when he was still a Bodhisattva. Nothing in their

interpretation implies anything unusual in their understanding of the future Buddha's enlightenment.

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The interpretation of v. 136 bears directly on the problem of āgama in 132cd. For, if I understand them correctly, according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin the Buddha used agama only in his previous lives when he was a Bodhisattva. This is probably the simplest solution to the problem. Cf. Pramāṇavārttikavrtti (ed. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1968) p. 51.12-15: etam duhkhahetum tadvipaksam cāgamād upaśrutyānumanān niścityā [niścitya or a lacuna?] bahuśo 'nekaśo bahudhopāyam anekaprakāram kālena ca bahunāsya bodhisattvasyābhyasyato bhāvayatas tatra duhkhahetau tadvipakse ca gunadosā yathāyogam prakāśatām gacchanti. "Having heard the cause of suffering and its opposite from tradition [and] having determined [these two] by inference, the advantages and shortcomings in respect to the cause of suffering and its opposite as it fits (i.e., in reversed order) become clear to the Bodhisattva who is practicing, [i.e.] meditating, manifoldly (intensively?) in many different ways and for a long time on the means [to destroy suffering through its cause], which has many different forms" 16. This seems a perfectly sound solution. In any case, one cannot simply ignore it the way Vetter does.¹⁷

It is only according to Prajñākaragupta's understanding of Dharmakīrti that the role of $\bar{a}gama$ becomes problematic; and he proposes two different interpretations. According to the first, $\bar{a}gama$ makes known objects which are beyond the scope of perception and inference ¹⁸. According to the second, — and this is the one on which Vetter bases his interpretation (cf. p. 40, n. 1) — the examination of suffering etc., is done in a threefold succession of tradition, inference and meditation ($\bar{a}gama$, yukti and $bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}^{19}$).

The issue is quite complicated, and many questions have to be raised and answered before a definitive solution can be accepted. Vetter has certainly given some thought to the subject, but unfortunately he does not share his deliberations with his readers. Failing that, one may assume that he was led astray by Prajñākaragupta.

The problem of the originality of the Buddha has arisen long before Dharmakīrti, and he must have been aware of its traditional solution. Had he anything original, not to say revolutionary, to say on the

subject, I would expect him to state it explicitly, as he does in many other cases, and not to hide it behind such remote implications. It seems to me, therefore, that Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's interpretation does better justice to Dharmakīrti's original intention, for if it is accepted, the problem of *āgama* does not even arise in the context of v. 132cd. As far as I can see there is nothing in Dharmakīrti's words to indicate the innovations which Vetter reads in them, and inasmuch as the Buddha is considered as a person, and not as an abstract principle, Dharmakīrti probably followed the traditional Buddhist doctrine, as it appears for instance in the *Milindapañha* ²⁰, namely, that there were many Buddhas, and they all have exactly the same teaching, but each of them discovers the way by himself.

The pramānasiddhi-chapter is anything but a systematic treatise, and Vetter has accomplished a veritable tour de force in reconstructing a whole system out of it. By the very nature of things he had to rely on odd bits and pieces scattered here and there; sometimes not even directly there, but only hinted at or alluded to by the employment of certain terms, by omission of what could be expected, etc. The reconstruction is indeed fascinating in certain aspects, but from the very nature of things highly speculative, and I feel that Vetter, in spite of his experience and intimate knowledge of Dharmakīrti, ought to have been more cautious. For instance, how much can one read into a simple "etc."? Discussing the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths Dharmakīrti mentions the first four by name and then adds "etc." (cf. v. 270). Vetter observes that the remaining twelve are not convincing and are merely a by-product of the first well-functioning four, which is a legitimate opinion for any modern scholar, but to say that Dharmakīrti's "etc." corresponds exactly to this appreciation, is a bit far-fetched. Cf. p. 26-7:

Die nicht als solche genannten 12 falschen und 12 wahren Aspekte von den insgesamt 16 sind wenig überzeugend und wohl eher Ausfluss der bei der ersten edlen Wahrheit gut funktionierenden Reihe von vier Aspekten; Dharmakīrtis blosses "usw." entspricht genau dieser Einschätzung. ²¹

One of the most provocative parts in Vetter's interpretation of the

pramāṇasiddhi-chapter concerns the epistemological presuppositions of the way to Nirvana. Contrary to the usual affiliation of Dharmakīrti to the Yogācāra school, or more precisely to the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school, Vetter claims that for the last stages of the way to Nirvana Dharmakīrti assumed a realistic theory of knowledge (p. 32):

Auch ist hier — im Gegensatz zu Höhepunkten der Theorie in den Wahrnehmungskapiteln von Pramāṇavārttika und Pramāṇaviniścaya — nichts von einem Einfluss des Idealismus späterer Yogācāra-Texte zu merken. Das passt gut zu der Beobachtung, dass Dharmakīrti — anders als sein Kommentator Prajīākaragupta (siehe Anm. 1 zu 139) — dem Erblicken der Irrealität der Gegebenheiten keinen Platz im Erlösungsweg einräumt. An diesem Höhepunkt der Praxis scheint sogar eine realistische Erkenntnistheorie nötig zu sein. Denn das ist doch wohl der Hintergrund der vor dieser Lehre vom leuchtenden Geist stehenden Behauptung, dass es eine Eigenschaft des Erkennens sei, das Objekt so zu erfassen, wie es ist. Diese Behauptung kann man wegen der dabeistehenden Umschreibung, dass das Objekt mittels eines wirklich bestehenden Wesens die Erkenntnis hervorrufe, kaum in einem anderen als in einem realistischen Sinne verstehen.

Again, how does Vetter substantiate his assumption? As far as I can see his evidence is very meager. His main argument is that the cognition whose basis is transformed, and which apprehends the object correctly with no conceptualization, arises from the capacity of the thing (vastubalotpatti or similar expressions). But Dharmakīrti does not say that the thing has to be a material object; at any rate Vetter produces no evidence to that effect. On the other hand such expressions as vastubalotpatti can easily fit in an idealistic epistemology where they would refer to the apprehension of the mind by itself, that is, a moment of cognition arises from the previous moment of cognition, carries the latter's form and apprehends this form as its object. It seems, therefore, that in this case, just as in many other cases, Dharmakīrti is consciously using terms which are ambiguous enough to allow both realistic and idealistic interpretation. And, of course, it is the idealistic interpretation which reflects a higher level of truth.

Vetter wants to support his argument by the fact that Dharmakīrti does not mention the apprehension of the unreality of the elements (dharmanairātmya) as a necessary condition for liberation. This could have been at most an argument from omission, but in fact one does not even expect Dharmakīrti to include the unreality of the elements

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as a part of the way; on the contrary, it would have been very surprising if he were to include it, because - unlike in Yogācāra properly speaking - in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, or what should better be called Yogācāra with certain Sautrāntika presuppositions, as we know it for instance from the Vimśatikā and Trimśikā, the mental elements are the final absolute reality. In other words, there is no relativisation of the mental elements into a higher level of reality usually called tathatā. This is in fact one of the most important criteria to distinguish the two schools. There is no place for the unreality of elements in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, and, therefore, there is no reason to assume that Dharmakīrti deviates from it towards a realistic theory just because he does not mention it. (As for the term dharmanairātmya, when it appears in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra texts, it has a completely different meaning, namely, that cognitions lack the manifold nature of apprehending, apprehended, etc., but they do not lack the real unexpressible nature which is apprehended by the Buddhas.²²) Furthermore, Vetter admits that the pratyaksa-chapter in the Pramānavārttika does contain clear influence of later (i.e., idealistic) Yogācāra texts, but he does not attempt to reconcile the two chapters. Are we to understand that Dharmakirti changed his mind in the time between writing the two chapters? Or that he was a crypto-realist?

To conclude, it seems to me that Dharmakīrti's religious ideas are not so much original as they are reductionist. This is probably due to the logician's mind which looks everywhere for the necessary and sufficient conditions, and has a distaste for encumbering a subject matter with unnecessary or superfluous factors. This tendency can be observed on several occasions, which have been duly noted by Vetter, though I am not sure whether he would agree with me in drawing from them a general conclusion, and in calling Dharmakīrti a reductionist. Thus, we have the reduction of the perfections to compassion; the reduction of all faults (dosa) to one single cause, namely, satkāyadrsti, and its equation with avidyā (cf. p. 22); the reduction of desires to one main desire responsible for suffering, namely, the desire for existence (instead of the traditional three: bhavatrsnā, kāmatrsnā and vibhavatṛṣṇā); the reduction of the eightfold path to one main member, namely, samyagdrsti (which changes its meaning accordingly, cf. p. 26); the consideration of all spiritual exercises except nairātmyadarśana as meaningless (cf. p. 27), etc. I think Dharmakīrti's touch is best seen in these things. In theory of knowledge he reduced inferential relations into two (tādātmya, tadutpatti), and the objects of valid cognition into one (svalakṣaṇa), and one can feel that it is the same mind which now works in a religious field, trying to put some order into the world — making it metaphysically somewhat poorer, but as simple and coherent as possible. However, a note of caution should be added, for in developing these theses Vetter relies very heavily, almost exclusively, on an argument ex silentio.

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Now, as far as the translation is concerned, let me start by emphasizing that it is very good, and that it is a real help for the reader who tries to wrestle with Dharmakīrti's Sanskrit. However, I must admit that it is not as good as I expected. I believe that every translation even by the best of scholars — and especially of such a difficult text as the Pramānasiddhi, should be meticulously checked by at least another pair of eyes before it goes into print. This has apparently not been done in this case, and accordingly the translation contains some simple mistakes, which are probably due to momentary lack of concentration, and which could have been easily avoided. For instance, hetu (cause) in v. 139 is translated as "suffering" ("Leid"). I presume Vetter wanted to translate "cause [of suffering]," and that it somehow slipped his mind. This trivial mistake is indeed unfortunate, because Vetter drags it on for the next three verses as well, considering the giving up of suffering as the subject of the discussion where, however, one would simply expect the explanation of the particle su- (well) in the predicate sugata (well-gone). Such cases, however, are rare. The problematic part of the translation lies not in the literal rendering of words but in their interpretation which is added in brackets, and which is sometimes three and four times as long as the translation itself. For instance v. 222:

> prahāṇir icchādveṣāder guṇadoṣānubandhinaḥ/ tayor adṛṣṭer viṣaye na tu bāhyeṣu yaḥ kramaḥ//

(Note that Vetter reads *adrster* against all Sanskrit editions which read *adrstir*; from the Tibetan translation one would expect an instrumental.)

Verlangen, Hass usw. werden, [da] sie sich an Vorzüge und Nachteile [eines Objekts] heften, aufgegeben durch das Nichtsehen von [Vorzügen und Nachteilen] beim Objekt. Die Methode [um von der letztlich auf das Selbst gerichteten begehrenden Liebe als solcher und nicht bloss von dieser oder jener auf ein bestimmtes Objekt gerichteten Manifestation dieser Liebe frei zu kommen] ist aber nicht [dieselbe wie bei den] auf äussere [Objekte gerichteten Emotionen; man kann sie nämlich nicht dadurch aufgeben, dass man die nachteiligen Folgen, die aus ihr selbst hervorgehen, betrachtet].

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Vetter's interpretation is highly improbable, for it is clear from the context that Dharmakīrti is replying in this verse to an opponent who claims that one does not have to give up the notion of Self, but only desire; for the Self is free from all faults, it is only desire which is faulty (cf. v. 221ab: snehah sadosa iti cet tatah kim tasya (scil. ātmano) varjanam/). Against this opponent Dharmakīrti argues that one cannot give up a faulty desire in the manner one gives up a faulty object. One can give up a faulty object by seeing its faults, but in order to give up desire one has to see not the faults of the desire itself, but the faults of the object towards which the desire is directed. Therefore, as long as no faults are seen in the Self, the desire towards it cannot stop. In other words, what Dharmakirti has in mind is not, as Vetter claims, a distinction between two kinds of desire, the one, desire as such, which in the final analysis is directed towards the Self, the other, a manifestation of the former, directed towards an external object. The distinction he made is simply between desire and external object. This is also how Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin understood Dharmakīrti, and I fail to understand why Vetter did not follow them. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti himself elucidates his argument in the next half-verse in a manner which hardly leaves any room for misunderstanding: na hi snehagunāt snehah kim tv arthagunadarśanāt/ "For desire does not [arise] from the qualities of desire, but from seeing the qualities of an object."

The weakest point of the translation is due, I think, to Vetter's unusual relationship to Dharmakīrti's commentators. Dharmakīrti was, no doubt, a great philosopher, but, as Collingwood once said of Kant, the stylist in him was not equal to the philosopher, and the way he expresses himself could sometimes make you wish he said what he meant in a simpler and clearer manner. Tradition tells us that he knew he would not be understood already by his contemporaries and recognized the need even for a simple word to word explanation of

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the Pramāṇavārttika — how much more so for his philosophical ideas, but for that purpose even his own disciples were not good enough for him²³. Whether the sad stories about Devendrabuddhi are true or not - they certainly have a ring of truth to them — it is clear that we cannot understand Dharmakīrti without some help by the commentators. This does not mean, of course, that we have to accept everything they say, but as a methodological rule I think they should be given the benefit of the doubt and considered innocent until proven guilty by using sound criteria. That holds especially for Devendrabuddhi's commentary which is supposed to have been approved by Dharmakīrti himself. And even if this is just a legend, at least this commentary has the advantage of being the oldest, and of not being written by an original and relatively independent philosopher like Prajñākaragupta. Of course, if one has some sound reasons, whether philosophical, philological, contextual or whatever, to disagree with a commentator, one should do so by all means. But if all three, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, agree on an interpretation of a certain verse, and Vetter proposes a completely different one, I would certainly expect him to state his reasons why he thinks they are all wrong, and explain in what manner his interpretation deviates from the traditional one; and the least he could do is to warn the reader about it. I checked the Pramāṇavārttikālankara and -vrtti (which almost always agree with each other 24), and occasionally Devendrabuddhi's Vrtti (or Pañjikā); and it is clear that Vetter deviates from them in dozens of cases.

As a rule the traditional interpretation is simpler than Vetter's, often more convincing, and I cannot help feeling that Vetter complicated things unnecessarily. Sometimes the difference between Vetter and the commentators is so great, you can hardly believe they were reading the same text. For instance v. 168cd—169ab, directed against the Cārvākas:

bhūtānām prāṇitābhede 'py ayam bhedo yadāśrayaḥ/ tan nirhrāsātiśayavat tadbhāvāt tāni hāpayet//

[Im allgemeinen führt ihr das Belebtsein auf eine Besonderheit in der Zusammensetzung der Elemente zurück.] Wenn nun trotz des unterschiedslosen Belebtseins (prāṇitā-abhede 'py, Tib. srog chags khyad med kyan) der [den Körper formenden] Elemente dieser Unterschied [in Begierde usw. da ist, dann muss] die [Sache], worauf

sich [dieser Unterschied] stützt, [ebenfalls] ein Weniger oder Mehr besitzen [und kann nicht identisch sein mit der besonderen Zusammensetzung der Elemente, die eurer Meinung nach für das Belebtsein sorgt]. Da es diese [Sache — das durch Hegung stärker oder schwächer seiende Residuum von Begierde usw. —] gibt, soll man die [Elemente und ihre Zusammensetzung als eine doch nicht befriedigende Erklärung] aufgeben.

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There are several problematic things here, but let us concentrate on the last three words (tadbhāvāt tāni hāpayet). Devendrabuddhi comments (Derge ed. 73b 6-7); gan las ñams par 'gyur ze na / de vod pa las te (= *tadbhāvāt)/ 'dod chags la sogs pa dan ldan pa ñid las so (= *rāgādimattvāt)/ de ltar na 'ga' źig skye bźin pa ñid ni / sdug bsnal dan bde ba la sogs pa med pa dan ldan pa dan / 'dod chags dan bral ba dan / źe sdan dan / phrag dog dan ser sna dan bral ba skye bar 'gyur ro // Prajñākaragupta does not comment on these words directly and the text is partly corrupted, but nevertheless it is clear that he understands them in a similar manner (129.5-6): yatah kāranād bhūtātiśayatvād (read with the Tibetan translation 25: -atiśayād) bhedas tathā (tasya?) nirhrāsātiśayam antare (read with the Tib. trans.: -atiśayasambhave) 'tyantāpacayo 'pīti vitarāgah syāt. Manorathanandin also follows Devendrabuddhi (p. 61.13): tadbhāvād rāgādimattvāt tāni bhūtāni hāpayed bhramśayed iti nīrāgo 'pi kaścit sattvah syāt. According to all three commentaries one should translate as follows: "Although there is no difference of vitality in the elements [which constitute a living being (i.e., one living being is not more alive or less alive than another), there is this difference [in desires] (i.e., some living beings have stronger, some weaker desires); its basis (i.e., cause), which is characterized by increase and decrease, could make the [elements] loose that [property of possessing desire, etc.; thus, there could be a living being without desire]."

We have two completely different interpretations of the same verse; which one is to be preferred? I cannot evaluate Vetter's interpretation, because he does not say what led him to it, nor why he thinks that Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin are so completely off the mark. I do see, though, that the traditional interpretation has the advantage of accounting better for the use of the causative (hāpayet).

Vetter seems to be aware, at least to some extent, of this problem

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as he says in the preface (p. 7) that "Man hat das grösste Recht, von mir zu erwarten, dass ich auch in jedem Punkt Rechenschaft ablege über die Meinung der frühen Kommentatoren Devendrabuddhi (7.Jh.?) und Prajñākaragupta (8. Jh.). Nur für Prajñākaragupta kann ich diese Erwartung zum Teil erfüllen." This statement, however, could be misleading by its modesty, for it could give the false impression that Vetter uses only partly Prajñākaragupta's commentary, and not at all Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries. A quick glance at the notes, however, reveals that Vetter does use all three commentaries (Manorathanandin is referred to several times: Devendrabuddhi seems to be used only occasionally and he is mentioned, I believe, only once in p. 156). Moreover, when one compares the translation with the commentaries, one sees clearly that Vetter relies on them quite heavily; sometimes he even brings utsūtras into the brackets. (Personally I would prefer utsutras to be in footnotes for which there is plenty of unused space in the book — and not as an integral part of the translation, for sometimes they do distort Dharmakīrti's arguments.) One has to conclude, therefore, that in those cases where Vetter deviates from the commentators he is conscious of that (at least in respect to Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin), and for this reason it is unexplainable to me why he proceeded the way he did. The trouble is that Vetter hardly ever tells you whether he follows one of the commentaries or whether he goes his own way, and when he deviates from the commentaries, he often proposes interpretations which are far from being self-evident, but with very few exceptions he never explains how he arrived at them.

In spite of its shortcomings, and those mentioned above are not meant to be exhaustive but only a few of the most conspicuous ones, Vetter's book is undoubtedly an important contribution towards the understanding of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism. A perfect translation and interpretation of Dharmakirti is not likely to be achieved by a single scholar in a single stroke, and Vetter's study is certainly not, nor was it meant to be, the last word on the subject. However, it does form a solid as the last word on the subject. Solid starting point, and as such it is a considerable achievement. Therefore, one can only be grateful to Professor Vetter for a book which is interesting, stimulating and which will occupy, I am sure, a central position in future Dharmakīrti-studies.

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- ¹ Cf. E. Steinkellner, "The spiritual place of the epistemological tradition in Buddhism," Nanto Bukkyu 49, 1982, pp. 1-18. To the second category Steinkellner adds modern Indian scholars like Sukumar Dutt, who share Stcherbatsky's positive approach, but unlike the latter who made a case for the compatibility of Buddhist "atheism" with Marxism-Leninism, are motivated by nationalistic ideology, discovering in the epistemological tradition the dawn of a Western-like rational secularism within the monastic culture.
- ² Ibid., p. 6.
- ³ Wien 1964.
- ⁴ Cf. Conze, The Memoirs of a Modern Gnostic, Part I, Sherborne 1979, p. 12: "..., and one of the greatest benefits of my return to England has been that I have been able to do my Buddhist work in English and not in German, a language scarcely worth writing in any longer on scholarly matters concerning the East."
- ⁵ Cf. Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception, Cambridge 1968, n. 1.2 (p. 74).
- 6 I cannot enter here the anuloma-pratiloma controversy in all the details which it implies. The conflicting positions of Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin have been clearly explained by M. Inami and T. J. F. Tillemans in "Another Look at the Framework of the Pramanasiddhi Chapter of Pramanavarttika", WZKS 30, 1986, pp. 123-142. I believe they are methodologically right to prefer Devendrabuddhi's interpretation, according to which the pratiloma starts in v. 146, to Manorathanandin's who situates the break in v. 280. (The difference is not as big as it may seem; it depends on the answer to the question whether the section on the four noble truths is the last part of the anuloma or the first part of the pratiloma.) It seems to me, however, that in this particular case exception should be made, for Manorathanandin's division of the text is more elegant, and further, it is more natural to interpret v. 146b (tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam) as an alternative to v. 145a (tāyah svadṛstamārgoktiḥ), rather than as a beginning of the pratiloma-part. As for Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, in order to accept the claim that it is quite possible that he situated the break in v. 146 and not in v. 280 (cf. ibid., pp. 125-126, n. 7), one has to have some reason why he should refer to this break while commenting on the latter and not on the former.

⁷ Cf. Abhidharmakośabhāsya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan, 2nd ed., Patna 1975, p. 415.14f; tribhih kāraṇaih sāmyam sarvabuddhānām, sarvapunyajñānasambhārasamudāgamato dharmakāyaparinispattito 'rthacaryayā ca lokasya . . . etām eva ca trividhām sampadam manasikurvānena vidusā śakyam buddhānām bhagavatām antike tīvrapremagauravam cotpādayitum (perhaps: -premam gauravam cot-) yaduta hetusampadam phalasampadam upakārasampadam ca.

8 Cf. The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, ed. Kielhorn, repr. Osnabrück 1970, vol. I, p. 39.10: pramāṇabhūta ācāryah . . . (as opposed to pramāṇīkaraṇa ibid.. p-39.4). I owe this reference to Professor A. Wezler.

- Throughout this paper I follow Vetter's numbering of the verses; the numbering in other editions differs slightly, but the correspondence is easily made: Vetter's 131cd 132ab = Miyasaka's 132, *Pramāṇavārttikālankāra* 133 and *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* 134. Nor could this be a slip of pen, for Vetter uses "feststellen" consistently throughout the translation.
- 10a Cf. PVV, p. 9.15-16: tadvad bhagavān pramānam; yathābhihitasya satyacatuṣṭayasyāvisamvādanāt, tasyaiva parair ajñātasya prakāśanāc ca. Cf. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Paris/Louvain 1923-31, vol. 6, p. 82.

12 Abhidharmakośa and Bhāsya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Acarya Yasomitra, ed. D. Sastri. Varanasi 1981, vol. II, p. 1097.19. of Acta).

13 Cf. Y. Miyasaka, "An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā," Acta Indologica III.

1974, pp. 1-157.

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14 Cf. E. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, repr. Louvain 1967, p. 18. More specifically, Prajnākaragupta may have had the first week in mind; cf. next note and Lalita Vistara, ed. S. Lefmann, Halle a. S. 1902 (repr. Tokyo 1977) vol. I, p. 351.15f.: prathame saptāhe bhikṣavas tathāgatas tasminn eva bodhimande niṣanno 'sthāt . . . samanantaraprāpte khalu punar bhiksavo bodhisattvena sarvajāatve

15 Cf. Pramānavārttikālankara (ed. R. Sankrityayana, Patna 1953) p. 110.20-23: tato vägvaigunyädikam api nivartayitum prayatate . . . atha vä yadi näma duhkhaprahänam

tathāpi na sarvajñātvam bhavati . . .

16 Cf. also Devendrabuddhi's Vrtti, Derge ed. No. 4217, fol. 56b7f.: ji srid du ma lus par thugs su chud pa med pa de srid du ston pa ñid phun sum tshogs pa rdzogs pa dan ldan pa ma yin pa de ltar na skyes bu chen po dag gis dus rin por goms par mdzad pa 'bras bu med pa ma yin no . . . grol bar bźed pa (≈ *muktikāma) 'dis kyań bdag med pa mthoù ba dus riù por rnam pa du mar goms par byed pa yin no. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin probably understood the practicing of means as one of the Bodhisattva's perfections, namely, the upāyakauśalya (cf. H. Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, London 1932, p. 248ff.). This interpretation is quite possible for Dharmakīrti as well.

¹⁷ As a matter of fact, Vetter does refer the reader to the above quoted passage (cf. p. 40, n. 1), but the reference is done in such a way that the reader is misled to

assume that Manorathanandin supports Vetter's interpretation.

18 Cf. PVA, p. 109.1: anumānāgocare cāgamah, atīndriyapratyāyanahetuh.

bid., p. 109.1-6. Cf. also G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts. Part II, The First Bhavanakrama of Kamalasīla. Serie Orientale Roma IX, 2. Roma 1958.

²⁰ Cf. *Milindapañhapāli*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 13,

Varanasi 1979, pp. 156-157. (Rhys Davids' transl., vol. II, p. 13f.).

Cf. also p. 27: "Evident ist jedoch, dass das Gegenteil der sechzehn falschen Aspekte geübt werden soll, eigentlich nur der vier ersten falschen Aspekte . . ." (my emphasis).

²² Cf. Viņišatikā Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi, ed. S. Lévi, Paris 1925, p. 6 (on 10d): yo bālair dharmanām svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādih parikalpitas tena kalpitenātmanā tesām

nairātmyam na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānām viṣaya iti.

Cf. Frauwallner, "Devendrabuddhi," WZKSO 4, 1960, pp. 119–123 (reprint in Kleina S. L. Wiesbaden 1982, pp. Kleine Schriften, ed. by G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkellner, Wiesbaden 1982, pp.

²⁴ In fact these two commentaries help us understand one another. Manorathanandin helps us to see how Prajñākaragupta's general comments can be read into Dharmakīrti's verses uk verses, whereas Prajnākaragupta's deliberations provide the rational behind Manorath Manorathanandin's short glosses. I did not read enough of Devendrabuddhi's Vṛtti in order to be a consecut checked there seems order to be able to generalize about it, but from the few cases I checked there seems to be a stree to be a strong unity among all three commentaries. 25 TTP, vol. 132, Te 142b8.

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Srinivas Rao: 'Advaita: A Critical Study', Jnana Bharati, Bangalore. 88 pp. Rs. 25.

It is a tempting thing to try and philosophize like Wittgenstein did: dealing with problems in a series of pointillistic statements of inquiry and analysis, which go to compose a canvas of balanced if enigmatic composition, and mind-blowing sweep. Srinivas Rao has not resisted this temptation, which I think a great many professional philosophers feel but dare not succumb to. The chances of an imitation working out do not seem high; depressingly, that is the case here. Writing in the terse, aphoristic style of the *Tractatus* or the *Philosophical Investigations* is not, to put it mildly, an easy thing to carry off.

The central thread of the critique concerns the rope-thread superimposition. And things start unravelling from there on. For polemical purposes, the superimposition performs as an analogy; in a more pervasive way, one should properly look at it as a metaphor - for perception, epistemic grasp and the definition of metaphysical existence. Even as an analogy, its power is severely circumscribed — it is no proof of the Advaitic doctrine. Treat it as a literal appeal to draw logical consequences for a metaphysical theory, and it blows up in your face. Why, asks Rao, are only false snakes and not real ones sublated. A fine touch of wry humour perhaps. An attempt to make an ironic metaphysical inquiry, and it becomes an illustration of taking a metaphor literally — a cardinal sin, that. In consequence of this overextended analysis, a confusion emerges between 'sadasadvilakśana'/ 'anirvacanīya' and 'asat'. Unless I am mistaken, Advaita does not hold the barren woman's son (from the empirical point of view) as analogous to the world (from the transcendental state), as the author seems to claim [5.4]. Rather, the whole point of the 'inexplicable' nature of the world is that it does not fall under either the category of the existent or the non-existent (in effect, the existential statement being neither true nor false, 'sat' nor 'asat'). If this is correct, then surely there is just this core this confusion in Rao's account with regard to the ontological status of the world. It is this unfortunate obfuscation that leads to talk of the World as 'non-existent' in the favoured Indian style of 'false' (i.e.,

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 101–104, 1989.
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logically false). But actually, there is good reason to wonder if the concept of 'mithya' (or terms used with roughly the same intent) is not a qualified doctrine which claims something other than transparently bivalent expression. What sets Advaita apart from psychologistic or perceptual idealism is precisely this notion of the ambiguity of the world's ontological status, given the conceptual tension between 'sat' and 'asat'. It is from this that the whole mimicry of realism is possible in the 'vyavahāra' realm, in the form of objective experience. In the light of Advaita's challenge to bivalent statements regarding existential notions (in the form of 'sadasadvilakśana' and 'anirvacanīya'), the author's whole project of exploiting the 'ātman'-'anātman' distinction in terms of existence and non-existence becomes questionable. Which is a pity, because the argument as such about the incoherence of relating the 'anātman' and the transcendental 'ātman' is quite nicely dealt with.

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I confess too that I do not see how Frege's puzzle of the Morning Star and Evening Star serves as a paradigm for the "reality-Reality" (i.e., world-Brahman) distinction [10.7—10.11], whether it be Hiriyana's original analogy or the retelling here. Reference itself is the problematic concept in the case of Brahman and the world. It is Advaita's point that the 'sense' in which we talk of the world fails to refer, going by the 'sense' in which Brahman is "Real". As the scare quotes imply, the convoluted and misread nature of the analogy becomes apparent. On the other hand, if it is an epistemological point that is being made (as in the Jastrow 'Duck-Rabbit Head'), the author only states the obvious fact that aspect-change does not change the object whose aspect changes. So too, Rao goes on, with the rope and the snake; and, he adds blithely, "this applies equally to 'reality' and 'Reality'". Since the whole thrust of the Advaitic argument is the incommensurability of world and Brahman, transition here as a parallel instance must be carefully explained; for that would in itself show a radically different interpretation of the Advaitic position regarding the relative natures of the world and Brahman. It should not be thrown in as self-evident.

From a more traditional Indian metaphysical line, one wonders why Rao repeatedly talks of 'point of view' from 'Brahmānubhāva' (translated as 'transcendental experience'), not indeed as a conventional verbal device, but as if it were a metaphysical state. I would tend to think that the Advaitin would hold just that there is no such 'point of

view' in Brahman, for that would raise once more, the whole vexed question of 'otherness' and the possibility of an independent "view from everywhere" that is a realist position most distasteful to the Advaitin. Even if my reading of the Advaitic position is not entirely correct, at any rate there is a need to handle locutions very carefully in discussing the content of mystical expression.

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There is some wandering done in the jungles of quantum theory which this reviewer found almost embarrassing. One is amused to note 'velocity' doing the job of 'momentum' in the (unacknowledged) reference to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. And contrary to what Rao thinks, we do not "see" atomic particles through "extremely powerful electron microscopes". We never do see them, we only gather information through suitably set-up detection equipment. As for an alien seeing people hanging upside down in the southern hemisphere, one shudders to think of the amount of instruction needed to explain the nature of orientation (or the meaninglessness of up and down) in space (even granted "extremely powerful" telescopes . . .). Also, how does 'reading' a Feynman diagram in different ways, i.e., giving different state-descriptions, entitle one to hold that reality is 'read' differently in an ontologically vital way? This is by no means an obvious or indeed reputable idea to hold in all but the most trivial popularizations of science; if it is to be held, it must be done so with the greatest of care. And to refer to one of Feynman's more thorough text-books on quantum electrodynamics, when there is no other evidence of a systematic bibliography in the philosophy of quantum theory, is risky, to say the least.

I would also tend to ask if this is supposed to be an original inquiry in the Advaitic spirit or some sort of quasiexegesis. There are nice passages on the 'paradox' of the sublation of 'maya' not reinstating the sublated world. But nothing is added; e.g., a suggestion that the paradox is merely a verbal one, involving the locution, say, "the illusion of the world", which would disappear with the surely more cogent form that illusion (sic) is a predicate of the world, not another category in relation (other than predicability) to the world. I admit that is perhaps rather terse, but this is not the place for an elaboration. There are also other nice passages on causation, and the problematic need for the sublatable world to persist in Brahman. But

since the first is an admitted gloss on the 'vivartavāda' criticism of other causal theories, and since Rāmānuja tackled the second, quite some nine hundred years ago, what does Rao aim to do here?

One wishes that the product had achieved the level the author's obvious effort and confessed difficulties should have led it to deserve. And one does wish there had been less of a need to cry 'Whoa!' as one galloped over loose outcroppings of 'reference', 'denotation', 'truth', 'assertion', 'experience', 'thought', 'language', 'existence' . . . Only the sincerity of the book carries through.

Oriel College, Oxford C. RAM PRASAD

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JAIN LIVES OF HARIBHADRA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOURCES AND LOGIC OF THE LEGENDS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF HARIBHADRA'S BIOGRAPHY AS THE RECORD OF A LIFE

The name of Haribhadra is justly revered in the Svetambara Jain tradition, almost as a synonym for prodigious scholarship and literary imagination. Even discounting the traditional ascriptions to Haribhadra's pen of hundreds and sometimes tens of thousands of volumes, Haribhadra would have been a prolific scholar by the standards of his time and certainly by any known standards today. Haribhadra is said to have composed commentaries on various canonical texts, written independent philosophical treatises, some difficult and abstruse in their refutations of non-Jain doctrine, and others more suited for the introductory student, and he is also held to be the author of works like the Samarāiccakahā, a Prakrit religious tale illustrating the workings of karma, and the Prakrit Dhūrtākhyāna, a biting and often hilarious attack on Brahmanical mythology. To judge from the variety and breadth of all these works, Haribhadra would have been without a doubt one of the most versatile as well as gifted scholars of his day. It is impossible not to marvel at the erudition which marks these works and which would well accord with their author's status as a monk, and at the penetrating insights into human foibles and warm sensitivity which some of these writings display and which could in turn serve as evidence of his depth as a man.

It is precisely as a flesh and blood man, as an historical individual, that Haribhadra, the prolific author/poet/scholar, most eludes the modern investigator. Indeed today the question is raised whether Haribhadra even was a single individual and thus whether the works ascribed to him belong to one person. To the Jain tradition, however, Such a doubt never appeared and the tradition knows Haribhadra as a single single person, the author of abundant works, about whom in addition there grew up a rich body of biographical material. This paper

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 105—128, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

will deal with the contrast between these two traditional images of Haribhadra, the Haribhadra whom we come to know from all the works ascribed to him, and the Haribhadra whom we meet in the biographies.

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Haribhadra, in all of the many works that do bear his name, in fact tells us virtually nothing about his life; the only information he gives is the names of his teachers.2 In contrast to this extreme paucity of information, however, is the abundance of traditional accounts that others within the Śvetāmbara community have told of Haribhadra.3 There are a number of obvious peculiarities about these biographies that strike one at once. The first is their considerably late date. The biographies of Haribhadra do not seem to appear until well into the twelfth century, at least four hundred years after Haribhadra is held to have lived.4 The second curious fact about them is the extent to which they contradict the image of the man Haribhadra that emerges clearly from a reading of even a sample of the many works ascribed to him. Haribhadra in the writings is so clearly a man of religious tolerance, of quiet respect for differences and particularly of respect for Buddhist ethics and spiritual practices, that to read of him in his traditional biographies as a murderer of hundreds or thousands of Buddhist opponents cannot fail to be a startling experience. Before considering the traditional biographies of Haribhadra it is worth reviewing briefly Haribhadra's stance towards his philosophical and religious opponents in some of these works, to make as clear as possible the extent to which the traditional renditions of Haribhadra's life are at stark variance with what can be inferred of the author of the works that bear his name.

In the small treatises on *yoga* that bear the name of Haribhadra and were written in Sanskrit and Prakrit the author makes explicit his respect for what is true in other faiths, and specifically for what is praiseworthy in Buddhism. Haribhadra in these texts seems to feel a particular affinity for the Buddhists because they share with the Jains two distinctive beliefs: the belief in an omniscient being and an emphasis on non-violence and the abstention from taking life which comes through in their equal hostility to Hinduism with its sacrifices that involve the killing of animals. In the *Yogadrstisamuccaya*, vs. 103–109, Haribhadra tells us that all of those who believe in the

existence of an omniscient being are participating in the true faith; the difference in the name that they may call that being is immaterial and the slight differences in their religious practices are also insignificant.5 Elsewhere, in the Yogabindu, vs. 118, Haribhadra stresses that at least in the early stages of spiritual cultivation it is wrong to exclude from one's devotion any God; the proper path is to worship all Gods. The commentary to this verse specifically enjoins the worship of the Buddha.6 In verse 120 he further states that even when the aspirant reaches a higher stage where he is able to distinguish among the virtues of various objects of devotion, the worship of the one true God must be done without any hatred of the others. In verses 302 and 303 of the Yogabindu are found the same sentiments as in the Yogadrstisamuccaya mentioned just above; any individual who is endowed with greatness should be worshipped, whether he be Buddha or someone else. The differences are in name only and not in any essential substance.7 Haribhadra's tolerance extends beyond this reverence for the Buddha to a general reverence for the religious man even at a lower level of his development. Thus in the Yogabindu, verse 122, he asserts that a gift given to any holy man, regardless of his religious affiliation, is an act of merit.8 In addition, Haribhadra particularly singles out the Buddhist holy man for praise by such statements as those in verses 270-271 of the Yogabindu, which directly identify the Buddhist bodhisattva with the Jain seeker, and verse 288 which praises the compassion of the bodhisattva by saying that the urge to save all creatures makes the bodhisattva in truth a tirthamkara, the highest aspirant of the Jain faith.9 Finally, Haribhadra exhibits a remarkable broad-mindedness in terms of doctrine; in many cases he states clearly that one should not reject a religious teaching if it is true even if it is found in an opponent's writings; one should instead act with an open mind and be prepared to accept any religious lenet that is in conformity with logic and is correct. 10 Even at his most disputatious, in a text like the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya, which is written with the with the sole intent of refuting rival doctrines, Haribhadra makes clear at the very outset of the text that his motives are not to stir up hatred and dissent, but to enlighten his readers and bring them the benefits of ultimate spiritual peace. 11 And even if it is possible to see gentle sarcasm in his calling his Buddhist opponent sūkṣmabuddhi, "a man of

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subtle intellect" or *mahāprājña*, "the very wise one", (verse 296 and 238), Haribhadra ultimately is relying on his intelligence to see the truth (vs. 347). Most importantly, Haribhadra's respect for the Buddha is unmistakable in such verses as 446, when he calls him *mahāmuni*, "the great sage", and assures his readers that the Buddha would not have proclaimed such untenable doctrines as the unreality of external objects without a purpose, relying on the Buddhist doctrine of *upāyakauśalya* to explain both the diversity of opinions in Buddhist philosophy and their ultimate refutation by Haribhadra himself. Finally, Haribhadra even shows Dharmakīrti great respect when he quotes him in refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas, vs 603—604, and one is left with the general impression that Haribhadra's respect for his Buddhist opponents is unchanged by his philosophical differences with them on specific points.¹²

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Even this brief review of a few of the writings ascribed to Haribhadra should suffice to illustrate the broad general attitude that must be considered the hallmark of the Haribhadra whom the Svetāmbara tradition so honored as a philosopher and religious teacher. Whether writing about devotion and worship, religious deeds or doctrinal matters, Haribhadra consistently displays good will towards those who differ from him and particularly towards the Buddhists. There is no doubt that he could be biting and caustic, most often against the Brahmins and against Hindu religious practices and doctrines. His Dhūrtākhyāna, after all, is a spoof of Brahmanical mythology and one calculated to offend by the nature of the examples he has chosen to illustrate the improbability of puranic religion. The Samarāiccakahā, too, must be regarded as an argument in story against Brahmanical rites, dwelling as it does on the evil effects of taking life. Striking in all of Haribhadra's sharpest attacks against those who differ from him, however, is the absence of such ridicule of Buddhism or the Buddhists. It is worth noting that other Jains regarded Buddhism with similar respect. Yasahpāla in the Moharājaparājaya, a drama written between 1174-1177 A.D., in praise of King Kumārapāla's commitment to Jain ethical and religious norms, calls him paramabodhisatta, "the highest Bodhisatttva", at the opening of the play, and the religions that come under criticism later in the play there is no mention of Buddhism, but only of Hindu sects that show no respect for life.13

In direct opposition to this portrait of the tolerant and gentle man which emerges so clearly from Haribhadra's writings are all of the traditional accounts of his life from the later period. The picture of Haribhadra drawn by the later writers who have given us his life history shows Haribhadra in open hostility with the Buddhists. Haribhadra's biography in fact can be understood to exist in three distinct versions. In all of them Haribhadra has two favorite pupils, nephews in fact, who go to study Buddhism under disguise, are discovered, pursued and one or both of whom is killed.14 The versions differ from each other first of all in how they describe Haribhadra's response to this loss, and secondly in the details of the contest between the young students and their Buddhist antagonists and in the particulars of the pursuit. The most fundamental distinction, however, separating type 1 from both the other versions, which I shall call types 2 and 3, is the question of Haribhadra's reaction to the loss of his nephews. In the first version Haribhadra responds to the Buddhist violence with a suicidal depression. He is dissuaded from taking his own life, but he has clearly allowed himself to be subject to unmonkly emotions. The recorders of this biography seem not to take note of this incongruity and are quick to justify the veracity of their account by stating that the story clearly explains the somewhat curious fact that Haribhadra usually ends his texts with a benediction that uses the word viraha, for example that all people may achieve bhavaviraha, separation from the world of transmigratory existence. To these biographers, viraha has clearly called into mind the concept of personal loss of a loved one, and the story serves to clarify the nature of his loss. 15 In the second and third versions of his biography Haribhadra turns his anger outward; instead of feeling suicidal depression he feels murderous rage and he does indeed either directly murder or watch the murder of hundreds of Buddhists; his anger is only finally stopped by his teacher who sends two students to him with verses that become the kernel of the Samarāiccakahā. 16 What distinguishes version 2 from version 3 among other details is that version 2 seems less well integrated; there are still remnants in the slory of the tolerant Haribhadra and version 2 does not erase the contradiction between Haribhadra the patient monk and respecter of the Rud III. the Buddhists and Haribhadra the violent murderer of thousands of

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Buddhists as does version 3, which makes all of Haribhadra's writing follow his repentance for the murders and thus places the murder of the Buddhists prior to his contrite recognition of the need for peace between competing religious groups.

The biographies of Haribhadra show striking resemblances to stories told of another Jain, Akalankadeva, the Digambara logician and opponent of the great Buddhist Dharmakīrti, who was in fact almost Haribhadra's contemporary. 17 The legends of Akalanka, like those of Haribhadra, are also late; they do not appear until again several hundred years after Akalanka lived. They tell of Akalanka and his brother studying in disguise as Buddhists, being discovered and pursued, with Akalanka's brother forfeiting his life. The earliest reference to this story appears to be in the Kathākośa of Prabhācandra, datable to 1077 A.D., and a reference to the events told there occurs in a Śravana Belgola inscription of 1128 A.D.18 The story of Akalanka predates by about a hundred years the similar tale told of Haribhadra, and I believe that Haribhadra's biography assimilates Akalanka's life history in gradual progression and with varying degrees of thoroughness.¹⁹ Haribhadra's biography additionally supplies the motif of a murderous response to the loss, something that is absent from the Kathākósa account of Akalanka. I believe that Haribhadra's biography developed this murderous motif only gradually, the original story holding close to a curious detail about Haribhadra, namely his use of the benediction involving the word viraha, separation or loss, and adopting, from the story of Akalanka, the story of the two brothers studying Buddhism under disguise and pursued and ultimately murdered by the Buddhists to explain the loss. The next step was the shift in emphasis from the motif of loss, the original motivation of the biography, to murder, passing through a transition stage which I call version 2 and finally a completed stage in type 3. All three versions ultimately circulated independently and concurrently. The most baffling step in the process is the change from version 1 to version 2, the addition of the murder, and it requires explanation beyond that which I can at this stage provide. The normal process of development in Jain narrative tales is in the opposite direction, a process that one scholar has called "bowdlerization", and that would have led not to the creation of something so morally objectionable as Haribhadra's

murder of Buddhists but to its elimination from later accounts.²⁰ I should like to proceed to an analysis of the biographies of Haribhadra, some of which I have of necessity anticipated here, and then finally to some speculation on the motivation for the change in Haribhadra's life history. I should also like to comment on the nature of the biographical texts, the *prabandhas*, which for the most part are the most extensive records of biographies like that of Haribhadra.

II. THE BIOGRAPHIES

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A. Type 1: Bhadresvara's Kahāvali and Sarvarājamuni's Commentary to Jinadatta's Ganadharārdhaśataka

The text of the Kahāvali has never been published, although several summaries of the biography of Haribhadra in the Kahāvali do exist.²¹ From these summaries it is clear that Haribhadra loses his nephews to the Buddhists who discover the young Jains studying Buddhism under false pretenses and murder them. He responds to the news of their death with depression and an attempt at suicide from which he is later dissuaded. The commentary of Sarvarājamuni to Jinadattasūri's Ganadharārdhaśataka is the earliest version of this account of loss and bereavement that was available to me.22 It begins with a brief account of Haribhadra's life before his conversion to Jainism and an account of his conversion. Interestingly, the account of Haribhadra in his pre-Jain days is no more exclusive to Haribhadra than is the tale of his two nephews. And ironically, it is told for the first time by Haribhadra himself in his commentary to the Avasyaka in connection with a monk/magician who challenges Rohagutta, the sixth schismatic in the Jain community.²³ Sarvarāja begins his story of Haribhadra with a description of an arrogant, overweening monk whose behaviour is very definitely eccentric. Haribhadra is a learned Brahmin who fancies himself to be omniscient. To display to the world his prodigious knowledge, he does the odd thing of wearing a golden plate over his abdomen, because otherwise it would burst with all his wisdom. The lext has a small lacuna here, but it is easily filled from other texts. The Prabhāvakacarita, for example, adds that besides this gold plate, Haribhadra carried a twig from the jambu tree to show to all that

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there was no one his equal in all of Jambudvīpa, that is in all the civilized world. He also carried a spade, a net and a ladder in his desire to seek out creatures living in the earth, in water and in the ether in order to defeat them with his great learning.²⁴ Haribhadra. assuming that there is nothing he does not know, makes the pronouncement that he will become the student of anyone who can recite something that he does not understand. He meets up with a Jain nun. Yakkini, who recites a verse from the Avasyaka on the Jain culture heroes and which Haribhadra is at a loss to explain. He keeps his promise and becomes her student, and herewith is accomplished his conversion to Jainism. He is given the title sūri and begins his career as a teacher. Two of his favorite students (not specifically his nephews as they are in other versions) go to Mahābodhi (the modern Budhgaya) to study Buddhism in disguise and it is discovered that someone is writing down Buddhist doctrine and carefully composing its refutation. In an effort to discover the culprits the Buddhist master has an image of the Jina drawn on the floor, knowing that a pious Jain would never place his foot on the Jina image. The students outsmart him, though, by adding a line which converts the picture from that of the Jina to a picture of the Buddha.25 They then tread on it without the slightest hesitation. The teacher knows their ruse and informs the king who sends his army in pursuit of the two fleeing Jains. The eldest of the two brothers is slain by the army, while the younger brother seeks refuge with the wife of the King Himasītala. She guards him for six months, after which time he leaves her only to be slain by the Buddhist king somewhere on the road. When he learns of all this, Haribhadra is stricken with grief, and thus Sarvarājamuni concludes he ends his writings with such phrases which include the word viraha, "separation". Sarvarāja ends his story here, leaving out any mention of Haribhadra's resolve to commit suicide, which had been a part of Bhadresvara's account.

The distinctive elements of Haribhadra's biography as told by Sarvarājamuni seem to me to be the following. Before his conversion to Jainism Haribhadra, the Brahmin *purohita*, is extremely arrogant, his behaviour bizarre in the extreme. As a Jain he suffers a major loss when his two pupils are killed by Buddhists. The story of their flight and their contest with the Buddhists is brief; there is mention only of a

queen who protects one brother and of the fact that the elder brother is murdered first. Both of these stories appear in other contexts before they are ever told of Haribhadra, and it is worth pausing to examine these parallel tales in slightly more detail.

B. The Parallel Stories

The arrogant and eccentric Brahmin monk appears as mentioned above in Haribhadra's own commentary to the $\bar{A}va\acute{s}yaka$ passage that deals with the sixth schism in the Jain community. The parallels between this story and Haribhadra's biography are too striking to be overlooked. The wandering monk carries a jambu twig to show that he is foremost in all of Jambudvipa, and he ties his robes with a metal thread because he fears they would burst open from the sheer amount of the wisdom he has crammed into his belly. The monk is irascible and has terrible powers of magic, traits that are not visible in Haribhadra in this version of his life but will reemerge in versions 2 and 3 as we shall see below.

The story of the two brothers studying Buddhism in disguise belongs in its earliest recorded version to Akalanka's life history as related by Prabhācandra in the Kathākośa.26 Briefly, the story is told of two brothers, Akalanka and Niskalanka, who go to study Buddhism in Mahābodhi, disguised as pious Buddhists. Akalanka, one day when the teacher has gone to take some exercise, corrects what the Buddhist master has written, for he has made an error in his quotation of a cardinal Jain doctrine that he was then going to refute. The teacher on his return to the lecture room realizes at once that there must be a Jain in disguise amongst the students. To smoke out the culprits, he first tries the trick of having them step on a drawing of the Jina. The Jain students turn it into an image of the Buddha and step on it readily. The next attempt has the Buddhists making a racket in the dead of night with brass vessels. Awakened from sleep and caught off guard the Jain students mutter an imprecation to the Jina. Discovered, they are brought before the Buddhist master who tells the Buddhist students to hold them prisoners on the seventh floor of the monastery and then kill them at night. Niskalanka is despondent but Akalanka has a way out. He grabs an umbrella which is somehow nearby and the two t the two brothers float down from the top of the roof using it as a

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parachute and begin their flight. The Buddhists in the dead of night return to murder them and find them gone. When a quick search in the vicinity uncovers nothing, the Buddhists send horsemen after Akalanka and Niskalanka. Niskalanka, realizing that for both of them to escape will be impossible, in deference to Akalanka's superior wisdom tells Akalanka to hide himself under some lotuses in a lake they are passing by. Akalanka agrees. Niskalanka continues to run when he is seen by a washerman. The washerman asks him what is happening: quick to seize the opportunity of saving his brother, Niskalanka tells the slowwitted washerman that the army is after him. The washerman runs off with Niskalanka, only to be killed with him as well. The soldiers retreat with the two heads, thinking that they have slain both the Jain students. Akalanka comes out of hiding and makes his way to Kalinga.²⁷ The king there is Himasītala, and his wife is a pious Jain. Akalanka comes to her aid when she wants to hold a chariot festival for the Jina and is prevented from doing so by a Buddhist, Samghaśri, who tells the king that the Jain doctrine is false and the Jain festival should not be held. The queen prays to the Jain Śāsanadevī, or patron Goddess, who tells her that a divine man, Akalanka, will come and defeat Samghaśrī so that the festival in honour of the Jina may take place. Akalanka comes and the debate begins. Samghaśrī quickly realizes his own inferiority and summons other Buddhists from afar. Together they pray to Tārā and request her assistance. Tārā agrees to come down into a pot in the king's assembly and from behind a curtain carry out the debate on the Buddhists' behalf. For this reason Samghaśrī requests King Himaśītala that he be permitted to debate from behind a curtain, and the request is granted. Akalanka is startled to see the Buddhist's ability and realizes at once that his opponent cannot possibly be a mere mortal. Cakreśvarīdevī appears to Akalanka and reveals the truth: all this time Akalanka has been debating with Tārā. She tells Akalanka that if he wants to defeat Tārā all he needs to do is ask the Goddess to repeat what she said the day before, for the speech of the Gods is one and without divisions as to time. This done, Akalanka defeats Tārā, pulls back the curtain and stomps on the pot. He gives his human Buddhist opponent a good swift kick as well, and proclaims to all his great victory.

I have given the account of Akalanka in some detail because more

and more of it will turn up in the subsequent accounts of Haribhadra's life that will be treated below. It is immediately apparent that the story of Akalanka and Niskalanka and Sarvarājamuni's version of Haribhadra's story are the same basic story. The two pupils go to the same place to study, Mahābodhi, they are discovered and pursued, and in both stories a Jain queen, the wife of the King Himasītala appears. Akalanka survives his ordeal, whereas both brothers are killed in the Haribhadra story. There is no debate, no mention of Tārā and no display of anger, though these things will appear in other versions of Haribhadra's life.

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In summary, then, the version of Haribhadra's life I have called tale type I appears to be a composite of two stories from other sources, a story of a wandering monk/magician that we know from the commentary of Haribhadra on the $\bar{A}va\acute{s}yaka$, among other sources, and the story of Akalanka and his brother. The motif of loss dominates, and the pursuit and capture of the brothers is told in brief detail. It will not be until version 3, particularly with the *Prabhāvakacarita* (1277 A.D.), that the story of Akalanka is taken into Haribhadra's biography with all its multitude of details. I would repeat that this type I also seems to me to be the earliest of the biographies in that it alone retains some concrete link with something we know to be true of the author Haribhadra, namely his use of the concluding benediction involving the word *viraha*.

C. Type 2: The Version in the Purātanaprabandhasamgraha

The biography of Haribhadra in the collection which is published under the title *Purātanaprabandhasamgraha* begins very much as had Sarvarājamuni's account, with the exception that there is no mention of the eccentric behaviour we had identified in Sarvarājamuni's account as belonging to the wandering monk/magician and challenger of Rohagutta. A significant difference occurs when Haribhadra is about to convert to Jainism in keeping with his promise that he will become the student of anyone who can tell him something he does not understand. Taunted by his Brahmin companions Haribhadra replies with verses that could well have come from a text like his *Yogabindu* or the *Yogadrstisamuccaya*, although I could not locate them precisely. He answers the Brahmins who would seek to prevent him from leaving their fold and becoming a

Jain by telling them that one must accept what is true no matter what religion it comes from. Further he says that he has no bias in favour of Mahāvīra, no hatred for Kapila and the other teachers. He is simply following the rule that whatever is true should be adhered to, no matter whose words they are. Continuing, he mocks Hindu mythology very much as he does in the Dhūrtākhyāna, but again not in a direct quote from that text, and concludes with a verse praising the dispassionate Jina, after which he formally becomes a Jain. These verses. so close to Haribhadra's own lofty sentiments, extracted from their context and from their position as general moral pronouncements and used to justify Haribhadra's own conversion to Jainism seem a mockery of the tolerance they were meant to proclaim. In changing from generalized statement to opportunistic utterances, the verses have become tinged with an irony that is alien to similar verses in Haribhadra's own writings and it is difficult to escape the suspicion that Haribhadra's religious open-mindedness, well-known as it was, proved an embarrassment to a biography writer who was going to go on to record the death of 700 Buddhists at his hands!

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The account continues, mentioning that Haribhadra composed 1400 books and eventually concludes with the story of Haribhadra's two disciples, now his nephews and called Hamsa and Paramahamsa, who ignore Haribhadra's warnings and go to study Buddhism in disguise. In secret they write down their own opinions, but the Buddhist Goddess Tārā creates a breeze that blows their papers from their private room into the public lecture hall. The Buddhist master sees on the heading the words, "Praise to the Jina!" and suspects that there are some Jains studying in disguise. To discover them he resorts to the ruse of the image of the Jina; the elder brother draws the line with chalk to make it into a Buddha and they both step down on the image. The Buddhist master informs the king who sends his men after the brothers. Hamsa urges his brother to seek refuge with someone and save himself, and he dies fighting the soldiers. Paramahamsa seeks shelter somewhere and when the soldiers demand of the king there that he hand him over, counting upon the fact that this king is also a Buddhist, the king refuses. Paramahamsa suggests that he debate with the Buddhists and that if he wins he be set free, his life spared, if not

that he be killed. He is defeated by the Buddhists and killed. His broom, with which he cleared a path for himself as he walked to avoid killing living creatures, is turned into a bird by some Goddess and conveyed back to Haribhadra. Seeing his student's blood-smeared broom Haribhadra is seized with rage. He makes a cauldron of boiling oil and magically causes the Buddhists to fly through the sky and land in his boiling pot, where they are scalded to death. When 700 Buddhists have thus met their end Haribhadra is brought to his senses by a student who comes from his teacher Jinabhadrasūri, on the pretext of getting a penance for himself since he has taken life. He mentions to Haribhadra that the teacher has warned him the penance will be severe and told him about the tale of Samarāditya. Haribhadra is awakened and stops his murdering of the Buddhists. He then composes the *Samarādityakathā* and subsequently ends his life with a holy fast unto death.

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Significant in this account is, of course, the change from despondency to murderous rage that occurs in Haribhadra. Realizing that his favorite pupils are dead, Haribhadra turns into an angry wizard who through black magic makes a burning cauldron and forces into it his Buddhist opponents. Significant also is the mention of a debate between the fleeing Jain student and the Buddhists. The Prabhāvakacarita greatly expands this motif as we shall see below and in so doing draws Haribhadra's story much closer to that of Akalanka in the Kathākośa. Another important difference from Sarvarāja's account is the mention of the role played by Tārā. This too will expand greatly in the Prabhāvakacarita to resemble the tale of Akalanka. Finally this story seems to me to be earlier in development than the version 3 which I will treat next for the following reasons. It is definitely aware of the contradiction between the tolerant monk and the murderous magician, an awareness that is highlighted in the ironic twist given to Haribhadra's words of tolerance that seem almost parodied here. In addition the incongruity between the monk who writes these words of tolerance and indeed other words against displays of passion and the taking of life and other words against displays of passion and the taking of life and the perpetrator of the murders is allowed to stand here. Haribhadra writes all of his works except the Samarāiccakahā before his attack of rage.

D. Type 3: The Prabhāvakacarita of Prabhācandra (1277 A.D.) and the Prabandhakośa of Rājaśekharasūri (1349 A.D.)

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By far the longest and the most detailed account of Haribhadra's life is to be found in the Prabhāvakacarita. The opening of the biography is exactly what we have seen in Sarvarājamuni. Then is added a brief story of Haribhadra's taking refuge from an elephant in a Jina temple and his reciting an insulting verse before the Jina, a verse which he alters after his conversion to make it a verse of praise. The verse of praise alone occurs in the Prabandhakośa. Additional details are provided of his conversion, particularly details of his conversation with the Jain monk Jinabhatasūri after he hears the Āvaśyaka verse from Yakkini. The greatest part of his life history, however, is taken up by the story of Hamsa and Paramahamsa and their adventures among the Buddhists. The two students go off to study under the Buddhists and while there they write down refutations of the Buddhist doctrine (9.65). A wind, having nothing to do with the Buddhist Goddess Tārā, blows their papers into the presence of the Buddhist master (9.66). Aware of the subterfuge, the teacher seeks to discover the hidden Jains. First he has his students draw an image of Jina on the floor and asks everyone to tread upon it; the result is as in all of our other accounts. (verses 70-78). The brothers are finally uncovered as in the Kathākośa account of Akalanka when they are suddenly awakened with the sounds of rattling pots (verses 83-86). Fearing that they will be murdered, Hamsa and Paramahamsa grab umbrellas and float down with their aid unharmed to the ground (verses 86-88). The brothers flee, pursued by Buddhist soldiers. Hamsa, the older brother, tells Paramahamsa to go on ahead and run back to Haribhadra (verses 90-91). He advises Paramahamsa to take refuge with the King Sūrapāla who is known to offer protection to those in need (verse 92). Hamsa is killed by the soldiers while Paramahamsa reaches the city of Sūrapāla and is granted protection. (verse 96). Sūrapāla refuses to give Paramahamsa up to his enemies. The king proposes a debate (verse 100) to which the leader of the Buddhist assents on the condition that he be permitted to debate without directly facing his opponent; the reason he offers is that he does not wish to cast his eyes on the scoundrel who stepped on an image of the Buddha (verse 101). The

Buddhist also makes clear that if Parmahamsa wins he is to be set free, but if he loses he is to be slain (verse 102). After debating for days with the Buddhist, Paramahamsa becomes despondent. He immediately thinks of the patron Goddess of Jainism, the śāsanadevatā Ambā (verse 105). Ambā reveals to him that he is really debating with the Buddhist Tārā and that the way to defeat her is to ask her to repeat herself (verses 106-109). Paramahamsa does as Ambā has advised him, and when his opponent is silent he pulls back the curtain and smashes the pot in which Tara was residing. The king realizes that the Buddhists still intend to kill Paramahamsa and he gives him a sign to flee (verses 111–114). As he is running from his pursuers, Paramahamsa sees a washerman. He yells to the washerman to flee from advancing danger, and then cleverly resumes the washerman's place beating the dirt out of the clothes. The soldiers approach and ask him if he has seen anyone running away and he points out the washerman to them. As he had hoped, the soldiers set off in hot pursuit of the washerman and Paramahamsa heads back to Citrakūṭa and Haribhadra. Paramahamsa dies from grief as he tells Haribhadra what had befallen him and his brother (verse 122). Haribhadra laments the loss of his two nephews, and recalls that even the Jain doctrine says that it is not good to die with a pain in one's heart. He is determined to avenge the death of the two boys and sets off for Sūrapāla's city (verses 123—134). He seeks from King Sūrapāla the right to challenge the Buddhists to a debate; Sūrapāla warns him that the Buddhists fight dirty, but Haribhadra replies that the śāsanadevī is on his side (verses 139–141). The king sends a messenger to the Buddhist leader, who responds eagerly to the challenge. The messenger then suggests that the wager between the Buddhist and Haribhadra be that the loser must enter a vat of burning oil (verse 150). After a debate in which the Buddhist attempts to prove that everything is momentary, Haribhadra silences his opponent and the Buddhist falls into a vat of burning oil (verse 166). Other Buddhists are defeated and similarly die, while some manage to flee from the terrible sight (verses 162) (verses 167–168). The Buddhists begin to rebuke Tārā for their defeat defeat, and she appears before them and reprimands them for their lerrible terrible murder of Hamsa and Paramahamsa (verses 169–177). Tārā then advises the Buddhists to return home and promises them absolu-

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tion from their sins (verse 178). The *Prabhāvakacarita* then notes the existence of a version of Haribhadra's biography which makes Haribhadra the deliberate and direct author of the murders, that is to say the version that we have seen in the *Purātanaprabandhasaṃgraha*. The text then continues with Jinabhaṭasūri learning of Haribhadra's anger and sending two pupils to enlighten him with verses about the deeds of Samarāicca. The *Prabhāvakacarita* also connects the story with Haribhadra's use of the word *viraha* at the end of his writings, as had Sarvarājamuni (verse 206). In addition, Haribhadra is relieved of his grief by words of the śāsanadevī, Ambā, who assures him that he will live on in his writings, in the absence now of suitable disciples (verses 202—203). Haribhadra goes on to write his many works, and the biography then continues with two brief additional episodes that are not relevant to the present discussion.

It is at once clear that the author of the *Prabhāvakacarita* knows well the story of Haribhadra as murderer of the Buddhists but prefers a somewhat gentler version in which it is the king Sūrapāla and his messenger who are responsible for the wager that leads to the death of the Buddhists. Haribhadra, of course, does not do anything at all to stop the murders; in fact he continues to defeat Buddhists in debate and thus to cause more deaths. In addition it is clear that when Haribhadra hears of the death of Hamsa and sees Paramahamsa die in front of his eyes, his reaction is indeed murderous rage, and he sets out at once with the thought that the Buddhists must be killed (see verses 132—133).

Besides offering an alternate, somewhat softened version of the murder motif, the *Prabhāvakacarita* has greatly expanded the story of the brothers to include details that are remarkably close to Akalaṅka's story in the *Kathākośa*. Paramahaṃsa is now saved by sacrificing a washerman, although here it is the idea of the brother who is saved to allow the washerman to die, whereas in the Akalaṅka story it is the brother who sacrifices himself who conceives of the idea to sacrifice the washerman as well. There is also the debate with Tārā in a pot, an event so closely associated with Akalaṅka that it is mentioned in the Malliṣeṇa inscription about Akalaṅka cited in note 18 above. The story of Haribhadra, then, grows as it acquires more and more details from Akalaṅka's life, and softens the harshness and unpleasantness of the portrait of Haribhadra as repentant murderer.

A final rendition to be considered is the Prabandhakośa of Rājaśekhara Sūri.²⁹ The biography begins as our others, with the wandering monk and his arrogance, his gold plate over his belly, and his challenge to become the student of anyone who can recite something beyond his comprehension. The tale proceeds with Haribhadra's conversion by the Jain nun and then with the story of Hamsa and Paramahamsa. The two brothers defeat the ruse of stepping on the Jina image as before and then simply flee. At first they defeat the enemy army, but then a second army is sent against them. One of them fights, and the other, taking his notes with him, flees. Hamsa is beheaded in the fight but the Buddhist teacher is not satisfied. He wants their notebook which contains the secrets of Buddhism, Eventually Paramahamsa is also discovered and killed. Haribhadra discovers the headless corpses of his students and is filled with anger. He makes vats of oil which he heats up and then magically causes the Buddhists to fly through the sky and into the oil. In this way he kills 1440 Buddhists before his teacher learns of the murders and sends to him two students with verses about the deeds of Samaraicca and the evils of anger and killing. Haribhadra repents and as a penance composes his 1440 works, one for each victim. The biography continues with incidents that are not strictly relevant here.

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There is much in this account that resembles the brief account of the Purātanaprabandhasamgraha which I have sought to distinguish from the present account by calling it type 2, an intermediary so to speak in the development of the biography of Haribhadra from tale of loss and despondency to tale of murderous rage. Nonetheless, my reasoning for considering Rājaśekhara's account as type 3 was that in many ways the account by Rajasekhara appears the most mature, the most fully consistent in its depiction of Haribhadra's rage and its consequences. There is no mention of Haribhadra's religious tolerance, no allusion to his respect for other faiths and there is no longer any inconsistency in the portrait that is presented of Haribhadra. Before his conversion to Jainism he is a thoroughly arrogant and eccentric individual. individual, a reflection of the wandering monk/magician in earlier and no doubt well-known stories. After his conversion he writes nothing himself himself, but receives divine books which he conceals in magic pillars, while in the control with the conceal which he conceals in magic pillars, while in the control with the c While in the Purātanaprabandhasamgraha he writes his works after his conversion and conceals his own works, leaving wide open the

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contradiction between the gentle tolerant author of those works and the later murderer. In the *Prabandhakośa* Haribhadra writes nothing until after his repentance, and thereby is erased any suspicion one might have of the veracity of the account. There is no longer open the issue of how Haribhadra the author of the texts we know could have been so given to rage and murder.

III. CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted here to trace the development of Haribhadra's biography. My contention throughout has been that there is a basic incongruity between what one can discern from the actual works about the author Haribhadra and the legends that came to be associated with him. I have argued that the legends initially came from elsewhere in part from the legends of the arrogant monk who challenges the schismatic Rohagutta, and in part from the stories told of Akalanka, who probably was Haribhadra's contemporary. The question must inevitably arise as to why these stories were attached to Haribhadra, when they so poorly match what we can clearly know to be the attitudes displayed by the writer of the works associated with his name. That is a question I cannot satisfactorily answer, although I suspect that in general the hostile attitude of the prabhadhas and related texts towards Buddhism is a late, deliberately contrived and very political stance.30 It would seem that these legends of Haribhadra and the stories told of others which are also replete with examples of Jain hostility to the Buddhists came to take shape around the 12th century A.D., during a period when Jainism was making significant Hindu conversions, particularly among royalty. We know that the prabandhas were primarily written for royal audiences or for ministers close to the kings. A natural question is then whether we can discern anything specific in the relationship between Buddhism and royal power during the 12th century in India that might have led Jain writers deliberately to cast the Buddhists in an unfavourable light and portray Jains as the extirpators of the Buddhist menace and thus as champions of the true faith. In fact the mid -12th century was a low period for the fortunes of Buddhism in its final stronghold in Bengal. Valāllasena of the Sena dynasty came to power c. 1158 A.D. His

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Danasāgara was completed in 1169 A.D. and gives ample evidence of the strong emphasis on orthodox Hinduism and promotion of the cause of the Brahmins that historians have associated with the Senas.31 It is tempting to see in the prabandhas, which were addressed to the ruling class, and in the legends of Jain religious and intellectual leaders which emphasize the conflict between Jainism and Buddhism, a continued attempt to separate Jainism radically from Buddhism which was anathema to these kings in Bengal. Hindus had historically regarded Jains and Buddhists as equally outside the Hindu fold and outside the fold of civilization. That Jains in the 12th century devise biographies with a distinct emphasis on the Jain triumph over a Buddhist enemy requires some explanation. That the collections of these biographies were usually addressed to kings and their ministers suggests that courting the royal court may have had something to do with the tone of the biographies. The most obvious historical circumstance that suggests itself by way of explanation for the anti-Buddhist tone of medieval Jain biographies is the contemporary Hindu revival in Bengal with its decidedly anti-Buddhist stance. Perhaps Jain writers in seeking to win royal patronage for their faith and indeed royal converts felt the need to divorce Jainism from the religion with which it had been so closely associated and which became so obviously out of royal favour elsewhere in the country. I offer this only as a suggestion which must await further research for confirmation.

NOTES

Oxford: Oxford University Press, London Oriental Series, vol. 14, 1963, pp. 4—7 and "Haribhadra", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1965, pp. 101—111. Williams believes that there must have been at least two Haribhadras and Possibly more. The two he identifies would belong to the 6th century, the traditional date of Haribhadra, and the 8th century, the revised date modern scholars have given Haribhadra. Williams does add that current research on Haribhadra is in its infancy and it is too early at present to make any definitive conclusions. I do not consider this issue in the present discussion precisely because I am concerned not with the that emerge from a reading of the texts that the traditional images of Haribhadra portrait in the traditional biographies. All of these biographies were written well after into one individual. The traditional biographies speak of Haribhadra as the author of

all the works ascribed to him over the years, from the canonical commentaries to the *Samarāiccakahā* and the *Dhūrtākhyāna*. To avoid unduly confusing my reader, in what follows I shall speak of Haribhadra as if he were one, though what I am discussing is not the historical man, but two images of a man that the Jain tradition created. My point of departure is the incompatibility of these two images and the possible explanation for their coexistence. I thank Mrs. Luitgard Soni for the reference to Williams' article.

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² See Hermann Jacobi's introduction in Haribhadra's Samarāiccakahā, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1926, p. iv. For studies of Haribhadra's life the best sources are the various introductions in English and in Hindi and Gujarati to Haribhadra's many works. H. R. Kapadia in his introduction to Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapaṭākā, Baroda: Gaekwads Oriental Series, LXXXVIII, 1940, gives a list of the secondary sources known to him. Unfortunately many of these are impossible to obtain in North American libraries. The focus of all of these works that I have had the opportunity to examine differs greatly from what will be the focus of this article and can be clearly seen in Jacobi. Scholars have occupied themselves most with what can be discovered to be historically true in the legends of Haribhadra. Only one author, Dr. Mahendrakumz Jain, in his introduction to the Siddhiviniścayaṭikā of Anantaviryācārya on Akalaṅka's Siddhiviniścaya in the Jňānapītha Murti Devī Jaina Granthamālā, no. 22, Kāšī: Bhāratīya Jñānapītha, 1959, pp. 27—28, deals with the legends as such, recognizing their affinity with similar stories told of Akalaṅka. His analysis, however, still centers on gleaning, wherever possible, historical truth from behind the tales.

A list of these sources is to be found in Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 5 and 6.

⁴ Until recently Bhadreśvara's Kahāvali was considered to be the earliest source for the biographies of most of the famous Jains of a period later than that of the Tirthankaras (Hermann Jacobi, introduction to Hemacandra's Parisistaparvan. Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, no. 96, 1932, pp. xi-xiii; Muni Jambuvijayaji, introduction, in Sanskrit, to Mallavadī's Dvādaśāranayacakra, Bhavnagar: Jaina Ātmānanda Sabhā, Ātmānanda Jaina Grantharatnamālā, no. 92, 1966, pp. 11-13). More recently Dalsukh Malvania has reviewed the question of the date for Bhadreśvara's Kahāvali as eleventh century and prior to Hemacandra, in an article, "On Bhadreśvara's Kahāvalī", Indologica Taurinensia, vol. XIII, 1983. There are to begin with several Bhadreśvaras and there is no overwhelming reason to consider the author of the Kahāvali as the earliest of these authors, although ultimately Malvania does do so and at the same time argues that this Bhadresvara lived not in the eleventh century A.D., but in the twelfth century A.D., from 1100-1190. Even with these dates it would be conceivable that his Kahāvali preceded the Parisistaparvan, but difficult indeed to prove definitively their relative chronologies. More important for the present study is the fact that the author of the Kahāvali might indeed be one of the later Bhadreśvaras. In the absence of further hard evidence it is probably best to rest our argument not on a rigid chronology of texts but on internal evidence supplied by the legends themselves. Even considering the Kahāvali as much later than the twelfth century, sion; we would still have a twelfth century date for Haribhadra's legends, with the first authentically datable accounts still belonging to the twelfth century according to Jacobi's list cited above.

⁵ Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya, in Haribhadrayogabhāratī, edited Muni Jayasundara Vijaya for Divyadarsan Trust, Bombay: Samgīta Printing Press, V.S. 2036, pp. 101–102.

6 Yogabindu, ibid., p. 171.

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1 lbid, pp. 230—232. It is worth noting that such broad-mindedness is not confined to Haribhadra. Similar sentiments are attributed to Akalanka, for example, whose biographical legends I will show are the source for the stories of Haribhadra's life. See the Akalankastotra, cited in the Sanskrit introduction to the Bhaktāmarastotra of Mānatunga by H. R. Kapadia, Bombay: Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series, no. 79, 1932, p. 1. Kapadia names others who display equal tolerance towards the objects of reverence of other religions, pp. 8—12. Included are Mānatunga in the Bhaktāmarastotra, verse 25, Siddhasenadivākara in his Paramātmadvātrimšikā and Munisundarasūri in his Gurvāvali. Kapadia also cites two verses from Haribhadra's Mahādevāstaka (p. 9) which are very close to the verses from the Yoga texts that I am citing here. In addition he aptly calls Haribhadra madhyasthabhāvaparipūrnašāstravārtāsamuccayādigranthagumphitāro, "the author of such works as the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya which are filled with the spirit of tolerance."

8 Ibid., p. 173.

" Ibid., pp. 211-226.

¹⁰ See for example the Yogabindu, vs. 2, page 130; verse 317, p. 237.

- Sāstravārtāsamuccaya, edited with Syādvādakalpalatā of Śrī Yaśovijaya by Ācārya Śrī Badrināth Shukla, Vārānasī: Chaukambha Prācyavidyā Granthamālā, no. 7, 1977, verses 1 and 2.
- ¹² Beyond chapter one I have used K. K. Dixit's edition of the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute Series no. 22, 1969.

¹³ Edited by Muni Caturavijaya, Baroda, 1918.

14 The story of a non-Buddhist studying Buddhism under false pretenses is also known to the Buddhists, although in the version with which I am familiar it is not a Jain but a Brahmin who pretends to be a Buddhist, studies the law and then uses his position to embarrass the Buddhist community and publicly spurn the teachings. The Kapilāvadāna in the Avadānakalpalatā of Ksemendra, dated 1052 A.D., tells the story of fishermen who catch an enormous sea-creature with eighteen heads. The Buddha hears of the event and hastens to the spot. He asks the creature if it recalls the sin of its former life and moreover if it knows whatever became of its evil mother. The animal sadly responds in the affirmative and the Buddha continues to explain the mystery of the past birth of the monster. In short, formerly a Brahmin, the creature had been egged on by its mother to challenge the Buddhists. Under her lutelage he falsely became a Buddhist monk and then a preacher (dharmakathaka, verse 91) and when discoursing totally misrepresented the Buddhist teaching. As a result of this heinous crime he was reborn as a sea-monster, while the mother sojourned in hell, (Avadānakalpalatā, edited P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series and Indianakalpalatā, edited P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, avadāna number 41, pp. 269—276, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959). This story has an interesting history in it. history in itself and illustrates the way in which a story may change over the years. In the Pali the Pali renditions the sea-creature was a schismatic in its former life and not a heretic who falsely entered the Buddhist order (references to the Pali sources are to be found in Alarman published by the Pali be found in Malalasekhara's Pali Dictionary of Proper Names, published by the Pali Text Society Text Society, London).

Muni Kalyāṇavijayaji has made a list of all the uses of *bhavaviraha* in Haribhadra's lexts. His results are included in his introduction to Haribhadra's *Dharmasaṃgrahaṇ*i, the Devendra Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhāra series, no. 42, Bombay, 1916. Unfortu-

nately this work is not available to me, although I have been able to use Jacobi's citations of it in his introduction to the *Samarāiccakahā* mentioned above in note 1.

As Jacobi explains in his introduction to that text there is something amiss here in the account. In fact Haribhadra in the *Samarāiccakahā* himself repeats the verses that formed the nucleus of his tale; they are different in number and description from what his biographers give us. In addition Haribhadra also makes clear that he did not get these verses from his *guru*, as the biographers would have us believe. See Jacobi, *op. cit.*, page xxi.

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17 There is as much controversy surrounding the date of Akalanka as there is about the date of Haribhadra. For an overview of the subject see Kailaścandra Shāstrī, "Bhattakalanka kā Samaya", Jaina Antiquary, vol. 4, part 3, 1938, pp. 165-175. 18 On the dating see Nathuram Premi, Jaina Sāhitya Aura Itihāsa, Bombay: Hemacandra Modhi, 1942, pp. 434-439. Premi after careful investigation felt that the Kathākośa account of Akalanka's life was the earliest and remarked on the curious fact that his biographical legend would appear to be such a late development. We know that this is true of other biographies as well, of Haribhadra as shown here, and of Mallavadi, as mentioned in note 4 above. The Sravana Belgola inscription is reproduced in the Jaina Śilā Lekha Samgraha, vol. 1, pp. 101-115, inscription no. 54, edited Śrī Hīralāl Jain, in the Māṇikcandra Digambara Jaina Granthamalā, no. 28, Bombay, n.d. An excellent summary of the legends about Akalanka may be found in an article in Hindi by Kāmtā Prasād Jain, "Srīmadbhattākalankadeva", Jaina Antiquary, vol. 3 no. 4, March, 1937, pp. 149-165. The author of this article also asserts that the Kathākośa of Prabhācandra is the earliest record of the legend as associated with Akalanka. He alludes briefly to the similarity Akalanka's story displays to that of Haribhadra, although he does not offer any further comment on the biographies of Haribhadra. See p. 156.

Johannes Hertel, Jinakīrti's Geschichte von Pāla und Gopāla. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1917, pp. 142-145, suggested a very early date for a text that knows the legend of Haribhadra's murder of the Buddhists. This is Mānikyasūri's Yaśobhadracarita. which alludes to Haribhadra's murder of 700 Buddhists and which Hertel sought to date as early as the 11th century A.D. It seems to me that Hertel was operating under several important misconceptions. He seeks to date Manikyasuri so early because he felt that with the passage of time the number of murders ascribed to Haribhadra would only increase. This of course is not necessarily true. A text that is in fact very late may have a lower figure than earlier written versions so for example the version in the *Purātanaprabandhasamgraha*, gives the number of Haribhadra's victims as 700. Moreover it is extremely difficult to correlate the date of a written text and the development of the legends which clearly had a long and complicated non-written history. Hertel made another assumption that I think is not correct. He was not aware of the fact that there are two clearly independent traditions regarding the life of Haribhadra, one in which there was no murder (type 1 in this paper) and one in which there was (my types 2 and 3). Hertel utilized Sarvarājamuni's commentary to the Ganadharárdhasataka of Jinadattasūri, wrongly dating it to the 11th century A.D. which is too early by at least 100 years, since the *Ganadharārdhaśataka* itself belongs only to the first half of the 12th century. He assumed that when Sarvarājamuni, who tells type 1 of the biography, attributes to Haribhadra over 1400 works that he knows the legend with that many murder victims. This is unfounded. In fact in the Puratanaprabandhasamgraha the murder victims number 700, while the number of texts attributed to Haribhdra is 1400. He then went on to conclude that at least

JAIN LIVES OF HARIBHADRA

several generations must have elapsed from Māṇikyasūri's time for the number to have doubled like that. Until there is some outside evidence for such an early date of Manikyasūri, it must remain that the stories told of Akalanka predate similar accounts of Haribhadra's life.

Nalini Balbir, "Normalizing Trends In Jaina Narrative Literature", Indologica Taurinensia, vol. XII, 1984, pp. 25–38. I wish to thank Dr. Balbir for sending me copies of some of her work, including this important article.

For example Mahendra Kumar Jain in his introduction to Akalanka's Siddhivinisćaya, cited in note 1. ²² It was published by Weber in his Verzeichniss der Sanskrit und Prakrit Handschriften,

vol. II, pp. 982 ff.

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3 See Ernst Leumann, "Die Alten Berichte von den Schismen der Jaina", Indische Studien, XVII, 1885, pp. 116-123

²⁴ Prabhāvakacarita of Prabhācandra, edited Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 13, Bombay: Bharatīya Vidyā Bhavan, 1940, p. 62, chapter 9 verses 9 and 10. The Prabandhakośa of Rājaśekhara instead of the jambu twig has Haribhadra wear shoes over his eyes to show that he sees with his supernatural wisdom and is blind to all but the highest truth. Prabandhakośa, edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 6, Santiniketan: Singhi Jaina Pītha, 1935, p. 24.

25 The text here actually says rekhām vidhāya praveśah krtah, "They drew a line on it and stepped on it". The exact nature of the line and how it transformed the Jina image into an image of the Buddha is more explicit in the other biographies. In the story of Akalanka, the line serves to mark a monastic robe and Akalanka and his brother, concentrating in their minds on the fact that the image is clothed, deliberately then step on it. In the Purātanaprabandhasamgraha account the students of Haribhadra draw a bambhasūtra, a sacred thread which makes less sense than the Kathākośa sūtra or thread to delineate clothing. They also draw sacred threads, upavīta, in the Prabhāvakacarita, verse 78, while in the Prabandhakośa they draw three lines on the neck to make the image into that of the Buddha.

Edited by A. N. Upadhyaye, Manikcandra Digambara Jain Granthamala, vol. 55,

Varanasi: Bharatiya Jnana Pitha, 1974, pp. 3–8.

With this story of pursuit should be compared the flight of Canakya and Candragupta in the eighth chapter of Hemacandra's *Parisistaparvan*, vs. 242–278, where Canakya confounds his pursuers by sending a washerman off running and resuming the washerman's work, and where earlier in their escape Candragupta hides in a lake. I am indebted to my student Mrs. Luitgard Soni for this reference. For an additional variant of the Cāṇakya-Candragupta tale the reader is refered to Devendra's commenlary to the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*, summarized in Hindi in "Candragupta aur Cāṇakya," Jvoli Prasa Jyoti Prasad Jain, Jaina Antiquary, vol. 13, 1950, p. 9.

For the text I am using the Singhi Jain Series, edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, vol. 2, Calcutta: Adhisthātā Singhi Jaina Jñānapītha, 1936. The biography of Haribhadra is pages 103. 106 haribhadra in Hindi b Pages 103–105. For some speculation as to its date see the introduction in Hindi by Jina Vijava 1. Jina Vijaya. I will argue here that in content, at least, the version here seems to record a stage of the Line Prabandhakośa.

a slage of the biographical legend that is in fact anterior to that in *Prabandhakośa*.

Jozef Dela biographical legend that is in fact anterior to that in *Prabandhakośa*. Jozef Deleu has some remarks on the differences between the *Prabhāvakacarita* count and the some remarks on the differences between the *Prabhāvakacarita* count and the some remarks on the differences between the *Prabhāvakacarita* counts and the some the lain Prabandhas." account and that in Rājaśekhara. See the article, "A Note on the Jain Prabandhas" in Studien zum Jain Rājaśekhara. Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gendenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, edited Klaus Bruhn Gendenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, pp. 65–66 Klaus Bruhn and Albrecht Wezler, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1981, pp. 65–66.

This is not at the Buddhismus. This is not to imply that Jains were otherwise universally tolerant of the Buddhists

or that earlier Jain works are free from hostile remarks about Buddhism. Śīlānka, for example, in his commentary to the Ācārāngasūtra (Lālā Sundarlāl Jain Āgamagranthamālā, vol. I, re-edited Muni Jambuvijayaji, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978) widely attacks the Buddhists, as indeed the sūtra itself seems to do. Šīlānka belongs to the late 9th century, and thus predates our text by several hundred years. In addition there is evidence that the Buddhists could equally vilify their Jain opponents. The Divyāvadāna records a story of Jyotiska, who murders his pregnant wife, an act applauded by the Jains who have heard it predicted that the child she is carrying will be a great Buddhist (Divyāvadāna, edited by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, vol. 20, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959, avadāna no. 19, pp. 162-180). The same avadāna appears in Ksemendra's Avadānakalpalatā, dated 1052, and there is no indication that the hostility has increased to match what we find exhibited by the Jains against the Buddhists in the prabandhas studied in the present paper. (Ksemendra, Avadānakalpalatā, edited P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, vol. 22, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959, avadāna no. 9, pp. 78-85). In fact a cursory reading of the Buddhist narrative material leaves the investigator with the impression that the Buddhists were preoccupied less with threats from outside and more with internal dissenssion. Thus a favourite theme of the avadānas is the relationship between the Buddha and Devadatta over a series of lives, while Mahāyāna sūtra literature concerns itself more with the hostility from and towards non-Mahāyāna Buddhists than with other religions.

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³¹ Edited Bhabatosh Bhattacharya, Bibliotheca Indica, work no. 274, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1953. Valāllasena's extreme hostility to non-Brahmanical sects is clear in his opening account of the texts he has used to write his *Dānasāgara*; anything remotely connected with the heretical faiths he has ommitted from consideration. A discussion of Sena anti-Buddhist policy and anti-Buddhist sentiment in Bengal may be found in Upendranāth Bhaṭṭācārya, *Banglār Baul o Bauler Gān*, Calcutta: Orient Book Company, 1957, pp. 245 ff. Bhattacarya cites the *Dānasāgara* amongst other

evidence.

VASUBANDHU'S 'REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD' (ÂTMAVÂDAPRATISEDHA)

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INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION

The Abhidharmakośa (Kośa) is generally believed to have been written in India during the later part of the fifth century A.D. Vasubandhu himself wrote a commentary on this work, the Abhidharmakośabhâsva (Bhâsya). The Kośa and Bhâsya were discovered in Tibet in 1935 by Râhula Sâmkrtyâyana, who had attempted earlier to reconstruct them from Tibetan and Chinese translations and Yasomitra's Sphutârhâbhidharmakośavyakhyâ (Vyâkhyâ), which to this date is still the only other Indian Buddhist commentary on the Kośa known to survive in Sanskrit. The manuscripts found by Sâmkrtyâyana were first fully edited by Prahlad Prahlan, and published, along with the Vyâkhyâ, at Patna, India, in 1967 by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Dwarkadas Shastri also made a critical edition of the text which was published in four volumes at Varanasi, India, in 1970-1973, along with the Vyâkhyâ, as part of the Bauddha Bharati Series.

The chapter translated below, which lacks an autocommentary, Vasubandhu himself entitles 'Refutation of the Theory of Selfhood' (Âtmavâdapratisedha). Yaśomitra's title for the chapter, "A Resolution of Questions About Persons" (Pudgalaviniśchayah), I have used as a subtitle. It was written in prose as an appendix to the verses that constitute the first eight chapters. The translation presented here is based on Dr. Shastri's edition, which I have checked against the revision of Dr. Pradhan's edition made by Aruna Haldar and published in 1975 by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. To my knowledge, it will be the first into a modern Western language from an unreconstructed Sanskrit text. From the Vyâkhyâ and the Tibetan translations T. Stcherbatsky composed an English translation, entitled The S. T. Stcherbatsky composed an English translation, entitled The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" (first published by the Bulletin de l'Acad l'Academie des Sciences de Russie, 1919, pp. 823–854, 937–958 and reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). The

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 129–135, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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French translation, by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his monumental *L'Abhidharmakośa De Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1923—1931), was made primarily from Yaśomitra's commentary and the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang. In preparing my own translation I have consulted Yaśomitra's commentary, the Tibetan translation of Jinamitra, and, with the help of Mr. Michael Olson, the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang and Paramârtha, as well as the Chinese commentaries of P'u-kuang, Fa-pao, Yuan-hui, and K'uei-tao. The Sanskrit commentaries on the *Kośa* by Sthiramati, Punyavardhana, Śamathadeva, Dighâga, and Vinîtedeva are now lost, but exist in Tibetan translation. Among these only Dighâga's commentary includes a discussion of the appendix, but it is merely a summary of its arguments.

Vasubandhu's abbreviated style of composition, tailored to the use of scholarly monks steeped in Buddhist dogma and privy to oral traditions of commentary, makes his treatise rather difficult to understand and translate at times. This difficulty is surely one of the reasons this very important work of Buddhist philosophy has not received the attention it deserves. In the translation that follows, I have often placed in parentheses words, phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressed parts of theses and arguments presented in the text. The additions most often are made on the basis of information supplied by Yasomitra's commentary, though I also rely on the commentaries of P'u-kuang, Fa-pao, K'uei-tao, and Yuan-hui when their views seem reasonable; but at times I simply supply what the context of argument and our general knowledge of Buddhism seem to require. So the reader can better distinguish what Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in the hope of making it clearer, I have translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions. To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader need only disregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation. I welcome any suggestions readers of this journal may care to make concerning improvements in the translation. Sanskrit-English and English-Sanskrit glossaries for the translation can be obtained by contacting the translator at the Philosophy Department of the University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 52242, USA.

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Because the argument of the appendix is often presented in question-answer form Stcherbatsky and Poussin chose to translate it as a philosophical dialogue. But this falsely represents the appendix to the Western reader as if it were meant to be a philosophical dialogue of the sort written by Plato, Berkeley, or Hume. In fact it is a treatise which often, but not always, develops its subject within a relatively terse question-answer format. For literary reasons I have not followed the Tibetan and Chinese practices of simply replicating this format. I have tried to retain the confrontational spirit of the writing, but without reproducing its frequent and distracting use of short questions and answers. I have, in addition, supplied section headings, numbered according to related issues raised in the text, as an aid to reference and to comprehension of the twists and turns of Vasubandhu's argumentation.

Those who seek information about the scriptural sources of quotations in the text and about philological matters may consult the extensive footnotes to Poussin's translation. The footnotes to my translation are confined primarily to explanations of translations and additions, sources consulted for the additions, and clarifications of the meanings of theses and arguments. The footnotes of Stcherbatsky which deal with questions of meaning are still of some interest, but my footnotes are meant in fact to supercede them. My philosophical commentary on Vasubandhu's treatise will appear, along with the translation and an extensive introduction, in a book Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. has agreed to publish later as part of the series, "New Perspectives in Philosophical Scholarship: Texts and Issues."

I am making my translation of Vasubandhu's treatise available now, well before its inclusion in the above-mentioned book, because of the keen and wide-spread interest contemporary Western philosophers are showing in what Derek Parfit calls reductionist theories of persons, the most famous examples of which are presented by David Hume and by Parfit himself. Vasubandhu's work includes a clear statement and extensive defense of a reductionist theory and a number of important criticisms of non-reductionist theories, both of which are significantly different from those found in the works of Hume and Parfit. Western philosophers, I believe, will therefore welcome as soon as possible a chance to study and evaluate Vasubandhu's treatise with

the help of a translation expressly composed to facilitate its philosophical study and evaluation. In what follows of this introduction to the translation I shall provide what I believe to be the proper categorial framework for this study and evaluation.

The reductionist theory of persons, as Parfit presents it, includes theses about both the existence of persons and their identity over time. The theses are (i) that a person's existence is reducible to the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and (ii) that a person's identity over time is reducible to a set of impersonal facts about a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events. Such facts are impersonal, Parfit explains, if they can be described without presupposing the identity of a person, without explicitly claiming that the experiences in a person's life are had by the person, and without explicitly claiming that a person exists.² According to Parfit, reductionists claim that persons exist, but need not explicitly claim that they exist, since in their view a complete description of reality can be given without claiming that persons exist.

What is common to every non-reductionist theory, as characterized by Parfit, is simply the denial of the above two theses. But its most prevalent form, one against which both Hume and Parfit himself argue, is the substance theory, according to which (i) a person is a separately existing entity, an entity whose existence is distinct from that of a brain and body, and from that of the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and (ii) personal identity is a non-reducible fact about this entity. Versions of the view presented by the Tîrthikas are challenged by Vasubandhu, whose arguments against them may be most profitably compared to those of Parfit and Hume against the Cartesian view.

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There is a minimalist version of the non-reductionist theory, not discussed at all by Hume or at any length by Parfit, but subjected to an extensive analysis by Vasubandhu. This is the view that (i) the existence of a person cannot be reduced to that of a brain and a body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and the fact of personal identity cannot be reduced to a set of impersonal facts, yet (ii) a person cannot be said to be a separately

existing entity and the fact of personal identity cannot be said to be a non-reducible fact about such an entity. Persons, on this view, are ontologically inexplicable in the sense that they cannot be said to be in nature other than or the same as a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events.

That part of the minimalist theory that concerns personal identity Parfit calls the further fact view and summarily dismisses it because it offers no explanation of the fact of personal identity.3 Once seen in the perspective provided by the minimalist theory as a whole. however, we can see that Parfit's criticism misses the mark, since the view criticized is put forward on the basis of arguments which purport to show that the existence of persons and their identities over time cannot be explained. To give an adequate appraisal of the further fact view one must, as Vasubandhu does, engage the minimalist's arguments for the inexplicability of both the existence of persons and their identity over time. Vasubandhu in effect rejects the further fact view of personal identity as part of his extensive critique of the arguments given for the minimalist version of the non-reductionist theory of persons presented by the Vâtsîputrîyas, an early school of Buddhist philosophers.

I have included Vasubandhu and Hume among those who hold reductionist theories of persons, even though they do not explicitly say that the existence of persons and their identity over time are reducible to those of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and so I must explain why I believe that it is proper to classify their theories of persons in this way. First of all, we should notice that Parfit does not commit himself 10 a complete metaphysical analysis of the brain and body, or of the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events to which he refers in his characterizations of theories of persons. (He himself states that physicalist, idealist, and dualistic versions are possible.4) His characterizations of views about the existence of a person, therefore, lend themselves to a variety of specific metaphysical analyses. They lend themselves, in particular, both to Vasubandhu's view that a person is just the five skandha's or aggregates into which he analyzes the person's body and mind, and to Hume's view that a

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person is just a bundle of perceptions into which he believes the person's body and mind can be analyzed. Thus Parfit's characterizations of views about the existence of a person can provide a framework in which the views of Parfit, Vasubandhu and Hume concerning the existence of a person may be compared and criticized.

Parfit's characterizations of views on personal identity can also be applied to views held by Hume and Vasubandhu and some of their opponents. For Hume and the Cartesians the application is relatively staightforward, even if complicated by Hume's famous second thoughts about his account of personal identity in A Treatise of Human Nature.5 But because Vasubandhu and the Tîrthikas do not explicitly disagree about personal identity it might be doubted that Parfit's characterizations apply to views held by them. That they do in fact apply, however, is strongly suggested by Vasubandhu's claim, against the Tîrthikas' view that persons are permanent (nitya), that they are only the continua of the impermanent phenomena (anityadharma-s) he calls the aggregates. The notions of a permanent entity and of a continuum of impermanent phenomena, I believe, may be construed, for purposes of comparative study and evaluation, as metaphysical analyses of the notion of identity over time. A continuum of impermanent phenomena, without in any obvious way violating the meaning intended by Vasubandhu and his opponents, may be defined as a continuant that retains its identity over time by virtue of being reducible to a series of self-natured events tied together by the laws of causality, and a permanent entity may be defined as a continuant that retains its identity over time by virtue of being an unchanging selfnatured entity not reducible to such a series. These may be understood, respectively, as metaphysical accounts of what many Western philosophers, including Hume, have called loose or imperfect and strict or perfect identity over time, and, in their application to persons, accounts of what Parfit takes to be personal identity as a fact reducible to a set of impersonal facts and personal identity as a fact about a separately existing entity. Thus Vasubandhu's view that persons are continua of the impermanent aggregates may be counted as a reductionist view of personal identity and the Tîrthikas' view that persons are permanent may be counted as a non-reductionist view.

NOTES

- See his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 199-217.
- ² Ibid., p. 210.
- 3 Ibid., pp. 239—240.
- 4 Ibid., p. 241.

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See A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 633–636.

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REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD: A RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONS

1 The Theory of Selfless Persons

There is no (way to achieve) liberation (from suffering) other than (through) this (practive of the teachings of the Buddha), since (in the teachings of the Tîrthikas the error of) seeing (oneself as) a self1 is to be found.2 (Those who practice their teachings will not be liberated from suffering,) for they do not understand that the name and concept of a self, (when used to refer to a person,)3 are applicable only to a continuum of aggregates (which as a collection comprise what we commonly call the person's body and mind and form the basis upon which we refer to a person): they believe, (instead), that a self is a substance that is separate (in existence from any and all phenomena present within the continuum,) and the mental afflictions, (which cause all suffering,) arise from conceiving (oneself as) a self (of this sort).

We know that the expression, "self," (when used to refer to a person,) is applicable only to a continuum of aggregates and not to anything else because there is no direct perception (of anything else,) or sound inference (to the existence of anything else, among its bases of reference).4

(Whatever exists can be known to exist by means of one or the other of these sources of knowledge.) For every phenomenon (is one of the twelve bases of perception, and) is either directly perceived, as are the six kinds of objects of perception and the organ of mental perception if (direct) perception of them is not impeded, or soundly

inferred (to exist), as are the five kinds of organs of (sense) perception. (For instance,) this is a sound inference (to the existence of one of the organs of sense perception): (i) it is common knowledge that an effect of effect does not arise when all but one of its causes are present, but does arise when all are present; (ii) for instance, a sprout (does not arise when all are present; (ii) for instance, a specific when all of its causes are present except its seed, but does arise when the when the seed is also present); (iii) we know that there are some who

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 137–187, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. do not perceive an object when both the object and attentiveness are present as causes (of the perception of the object), and that there are others who perceive the object when these causes are present; (iv) (for instance,) the blind and the deaf (do not perceive the object when these causes are present) and those with sight and hearing (do); (v) thus we may conclude that in the first case one of the causes (of perception) is absent, while in the second case it is present. This other cause is an organ of (sense) perception.⁵ This is a sound inference (by which the existence of an organ of sense perception is established).

There is no sound inference of this sort for (the existence of) a self. (Nor is there any direct perception of a self.) Therefore, (we know that) there is no (person that is a) self.

2 The Rejection of the Vâtsîputrîya Theory of Persons

2.1 How the Vâtsîputrîya Theory of Persons Differs From Ours

The Vâtsîputrîyas,6 (who profess to be followers of the Buddha's teachings,) assert that a person (really) exists.7 (To determine whether or not their assertion conforms to the Buddha's teachings,) we must first consider whether in their view a person is substantially real or is real in name or concept (only).8 If it is a distinct entity like a bodily form and other such things (which have natures of their own by virtue of which they are named and conceived), it is substantially real, but if it is (actually) a collection (of substances possessed of natures of different sorts), like milk and other such things (which are, as wholes, not something other than their constituent parts, and so do not possess single natures of their own by virtue of which they are named and conceived), it is real in name or concept (only). Consequently, if a person is substantially real, it must be said that it is something other than the aggregates in the way that each of them is other than the others, since it will (in fact) possess a different nature (than possessed by any of the aggregates). And (in that case, if a person is a causally conditioned phenomenon,) its causes should be explained,9 but if it is (a) causally unconditioned (phenomenon), the false theory (of persons) espoused by the Tîrthikas is held and a person is without (a causal)

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(But the Vâtsîputrîyas claim that) a person is neither substantially real nor real in name or concept (only). (They assert, instead, that) a person (really exists, but unlike a visible form, which is named and conceived in reliance upon the visible form itself, or milk, which is a mere collection of elements of different sorts to which a name and concept are applied, it) is named and conceived in reliance upon (its) aggregates, (which are) (i) associated with a self, (ii) appropriated (as possessions of this self), and (iii) present (at the time the person is being named or conceived).

2.2 Why Persons Named and Conceived in Reliance Upon Their Aggregates Are Real Only in Name or Concept

If we are to understand this obscure statement (of how a person is named and conceived), its meaning must be disclosed. What is meant by (saying that a person is named and conceived) "in reliance upon (the aggregates)"? If it means (that the person is named and conceived) "on the condition that the aggregates have been perceived," then the name or concept, ("person,") applies only to them, just as when visible forms and other such things (that comprise milk) have been perceived, the name or concept, "milk," is applied only to them. If (saying that the person is named and conceived "in reliance upon the aggregates" means that it is named and conceived) "in dependence upon the aggregates being present," then (once again, the name or concept, "person", is applied only to them,) because the aggregates themselves will be the cause of the name or concept of the person (being applied. So in either case,) the difficulty, (that the Vâtsîputrîyas must accept the consequence that a person is either substantially real or real in name or concept only,) is the same.

2.21 How the Vâtsîputrîyas Try to Avoid This Objection With an Analogy To How Fire Is Named and Conceived In Reliance Upon Its

(They believe that they can avoid this objection by claiming that) a person is not named and conceived in this way (that milk is named

and conceived in reliance upon the perception or presence of the different kinds of elements of which it is composed), but rather in the way a fire is named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel.¹⁵ A fire is named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel, (they claim, in the sense that) it is not named or conceived unless its fuel is present, but the fire (so named or conceived, unlike the milk, cannot be said either to be or not to be something other than that in reliance upon which it is named or conceived, for it) cannot be named or conceived if it is or is not something other than its fuel.

(Moreover, they believe that the fire must really exist, because as an agent that ignites its fuel, it must have a nature. But this agent cannot be said to be or not to be something other than the patient upon which it acts. For) if the fire were something other than its fuel, its fuel could not become hot, (since what is other than another cannot share a nature with it and the fire is by nature hot.) And if it were not something other than its fuel, what is burned and what burns it could be the same, (which is absurd, since an agent of an action cannot be the same as the patient that receives its action.) ¹⁶

Similarly, (they contend,) a person (that is named and conceived) is not named or conceived unless the aggregates are present, (and) we cannot claim that a person is something other than its aggregates, lest we hold the eternalistic theory (that a person is a permanent phenomenon), and we cannot claim that a person is not something other than its aggregates, lest we hold the nihilistic theory (that there is no person at all).¹⁷

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2.22 Why the Analogy Fails

They must explain, first of all, what fuel and fire are so we shall know how (to evaluate the view that a really existent person is named and conceived in reliance upon its aggregates in the way that) a (really existent) fire is named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel. (Their explanation, that) fuel is what is burned and fire is what burns it, (is insufficient), (since) what is burned and what burns it are the very things we need to have explained.

It is commonly said that fuel is unignited wood or other such things and can be burned, and that fire is ignited (wood or other such things) and burns the fuel.¹⁸ The blazing, intensely hot fire (so defined) ignites and burns its fuel in the sense that it brings about an alteration in its

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continuum. (However, so defined, analysis shows that) the fire and its fuel are composed of the eight (elemental) substances, ¹⁹ and the fire (that burns its fuel thus) arises in dependence upon its fuel in the way that curds arise in dependence upon (uncurdled) milk and sour (milk) upon sweet. Therefore, we say (that a fire arises) in reliance upon its fuel and (yet that) it is something other than its fuel, since it exists at a different time. And (so) if a person arises in the same way in dependence upon its aggregates, it must, (contrary to the views of the Vâtsîputrîyas,) be something other than them. It must also be impermanent, (since it will be causally conditioned and what is causally conditioned is impermanent.)

(They reject our analysis of a fire and its fuel and propose instead that) a fire (named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel) is the heat present in the above-mentioned ignited wood and other such things (and is the defining characteristic of, and hence, is identifiable with, the element of fire which is present in such things ²⁰), and assert that the fuel (in reliance upon which the fire is named and conceived) is comprised of the three elements (of earth, air, and water) which arise together with it.

(However, even on this analysis) the fire must still be something other than its fuel, since they will have different defining characteristics. Moreover, the meaning of "in reliance upon" must be explained, (since in this case) how is the fire named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel? For the fuel will not be a cause of the fire, (since the fire will no longer arise in dependence upon its fuel;) nor will it even be a cause of the name or concept of the fire (being applied), since the fire itself will be the cause of this (application of the) name or concept.

If (they argue that a fire is named and conceived) in reliance upon (its fuel) because of (the fuel) being the support or inseparable concomitant (of the fire so named and conceived), then the aggregates must also be said in the same way to be the support or inseparable concomitant of a person, in which case they clearly must say that the aggregates are something other than a person. And (they must also say, contrary to their view, that) a person does not exist unless its

aggregates exist,²¹ just as a fire does not exist unless its fuel exists.

Moreover, what does "hot" signify in their earlier claim ²² that if a fire were something other than its fuel, its fuel could not become

hot?²³ If it signifies heat, (the defining characteristic of the element of fire present in ignited materials,) then (even in their view) the fuel itself does not become hot, since it possesses the natures of the other (three) elements (rather than the nature of the fire element).

(Should they attempt to save the identification of fire with the fire element, and fuel with its three concomitant elements, in ignited materials, by claiming that in this case) what possesses heat, even though it is something other than the fire, which is hot by its own nature, can be shown to be hot in the sense that it can be combined with (the element whose defining characteristic is) heat, then, (contrary to their earlier claim,) there is no problem with a fire being (said to be) something other than its fuel.²⁴

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But should they claim, (alternatively,) that ignited wood and other such things (do not have, as distinct parts, fire and fuel, but rather) are, as a whole, both the fire and its fuel, they must explain what it can mean in this case to say (that a fire is named and conceived) "in reliance upon" (its fuel. For since the fuel would then be the same as the fire, the fire would actually be named and conceived in reliance upon the fire itself). Moreover, since the aggregates themselves would then also be (the same as) a person, it follows that they could not avoid the view that a person is not something other than its aggregates.

Therefore, they have not shown that a (really existent) person is named and conceived in reliance upon its aggregates in the way that a (really existent) fire is named and conceived in reliance upon its fuel.

2.3 Why the Vâtsîputrîyas Cannot Classify Persons As Inexplicable Objects of Knowledge

Since they cannot say that a person is something other than the aggregates, they cannot claim (as they do) that there are five kinds of object of knowledge, (namely, the causally conditioned phenomena of) the past, future, and present, causally unconditioned phenomena, and the (phenomena that are) inexplicable; for they cannot assert that the inexplicable (phenomena) constitute a fifth kind (of object of knowledge apart from the other four, since in their own view persons, which are inexplicable phenomena, cannot be said to be other in kind than the aggregates, which are causally conditioned phenomena,) nor that they do not constitute a fifth kind, (since in their own view persons cannot be said to be the same as the aggregates).²⁵

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD

2.4 Why, Regardless How Named and Conceived, Persons Must Be Either the Same As Or Something Other Than Their Aggregates

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When we name and conceive a person, moreover, do we name and conceive it after we have perceived the aggregates or after we have perceived the person? If we name and conceive it after we have perceived the aggregates, the name and concept of the person apply only to them, since we have not perceived the person. But if we name and conceive the person after we have perceived it, then how can we (be said to) name and conceive the person in reliance upon the aggregates, since in that case the person itself is the basis for the name and concept (being applied)?

(They claim that) we name and conceive a person in reliance upon the aggregates because we perceive a person when the aggregates are present. (But) in that case, since we also perceive a visible form when an organ of sight, attentiveness, and light are present, they would have to say that we name and conceive a visible form in reliance upon them (rather than in reliance upon the visible form itself); and just as the visible form (is something other than an organ of sight and the other things required for its perception), clearly a person would be something other (than the aggregates).

2.5 The Vâtsîputrîya Account of How Persons Are Perceived by All Six Kinds of Consciousnesses

(If they claim that we perceive a person when the aggregates are present, then since all objects of perception are perceived by one or another of the six kinds of consciousnesses,) they must state by which of the six kinds of consciousnesses we perceive a person.

Their view is that we perceive a person by all six, and they explain this as follows: if we are aware of a person in dependence upon visible forms perceived by means of an organ of sight, we may say that we perceive a person by means of an organ of sight, but not that a person is or is not (the same as) the visible forms (perceived); in the same way (they explain how we perceive a person by the other five kinds of consciousnesses) up to (and including an organ of mental perception upon phenomena perceived by means of an organ of mental perception

tion, we may say that we perceive a person by means of an organ of mental perception, but not that a person either is or is not (the same as) the mental phenomena perceived.

2.51 How Their Account Shows that Persons Are the Aggregates as a Collection

However, the same account can be given (of a perception) of milk and other such things. If we are aware of milk or water in dependence upon visible forms perceived by means of an organ of sight, we may say that we perceive the milk or water by means of an organ of sight, but not that the milk or water either is or is not (the same as) the visible forms perceived. For the same reason, if we are aware of milk or water in dependence upon sensible forms perceived by means of organs of smell, taste, and touch, we may say that we perceive milk or water by means of these organs, but not that the milk or water is or is not (the same as) the sensible forms perceived.

(If milk or water is the same as these forms, individually,) the unwanted consequence follows that the milk or water would be of four different sorts, (just as the forms are, and if milk or water is not the same as these forms, as a collection, the unwanted consequence follows that we could not perceive milk or water by means of the organs of sight, smell, taste, and touch.)²⁶

(And since, for these reasons, milk or water is not the same as these forms individually, nor other than them as a collection, it must be the forms, as a collection, that are called milk or water if the milk or water is to exist at all.) Therefore, just as (it must be) these forms themselves, as a collection, (that) are called milk or water, in the same way it is established that the aggregates, as a collection, are called a person.

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2.52 Why, If Inexplicable, Persons Cannot Be Perceived in Dependence Upon Their Visible Forms and the Other Aggregates

Furthermore, what do they mean when they claim that a consciousness is aware of a person in dependence upon visible forms it perceives by means of an organ of sight? Do (these) visible forms cause a consciousness' perception of a person, or, (even if they do not,) does (not) a consciousness perceive a person when it perceives the visible forms?

If (the Vâtsîputrîyas claim both that) visible forms cause its percep-

tion of a person and (that) a person cannot be said to be something other than the forms, (then since they have not explained why an analogous account cannot be given of the perception of visible forms,) they cannot (also) claim (as they do) that visible forms are something other than light, an organ of sight, and attentiveness, since these are causes of the perception of visible forms.

If (they claim that) a consciousness perceives a person when it perceives visible forms, (they must mean that) it perceives a person by a perception the same (as the one by which it perceives the visible forms) or by a different perception.

If it perceives a person by the same perception, the person is the same in nature as the visible forms and only they are to be called a person. How, then, could we distinguish the forms from the person? And if we cannot distinguish them in this way, then how can they assert that both the visible forms and the person exist, since it is on the strength of a perception of something that we assert its existence? We can use this same argument (for all the other objects of consciousnesses) up to (and including) the mental phenomena (perceived by organ of mental perception consciousnesses).

If (a consciousness perceives a person) by a perception other than the one by which it perceives visible forms, then since it must perceive them at a different time, the person must be something other than its visible forms, just as yellow is something other than blue and one moment is something other than another. We can use this same argument (for all the other objects of consciousnesses) up to (and including) the mental phenomena (perceived by the organ of mental perception consciousnesses).

And if (they reply that) these perceptions, like (their objects,)

Sensible forms and a person, cannot be said either to be or not to be

other than one another, then they must contradict their own views,

since a causally conditioned phenomenon can then also be (said to be)

inexplicable.

(Nor can they appeal here to their theory that) a person (really) exists and cannot be said either to be or not to be its sensible forms, (for) if they hold this theory, how can they explain the Bhagavân's leaching that sensible forms, consciousnesses, and the other aggregates are selfless?

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Does an organ of sight consciousness that perceives a person arise in dependence upon visible forms, a person, or both? If it arises in dependence upon the visible forms, then it cannot perceive a person any more than it can perceive a sound or the objects of the other kinds of consciousnesses, since a consciousness that arises in dependence upon a specific kind of object has only that kind of object as its supporting causal condition. If it arises in dependence upon a person or both visible forms and a person, the following scripture, which states that a consciousness (of an object) arises in dependence upon both (an organ and an object of perception), is contradicted: "Bhiksus, an organ of sight is the cause, and visible forms the causal condition, for the arising of an organ of sight consciousness, since every organ of sight consciousness arises in dependence upon an organ of sight and visible forms." Likewise, (contrary to their view that a person cannot be said to be permanent or impermanent,) they must say that a person is impermanent, since in a scripture it is said that "both the causes and causal conditions for the arising of a consciousness are impermanent."

If (they claim, in order to avoid the above argument, that) a person is not a support (or supporting causal condition) for a consciousness, then a consciousness does not perceive it.

Again, if they assert that all six types of consciousnesses perceive a person, then because an organ of hearing consciousness perceives it, a person is something other than visible forms, just as sounds are. And because an organ of sight consciousness perceives it, a person is something other than sounds, just as visible forms are. This sort of reasoning can also be applied to the other types (of organ of sense perception consciousnesses).

Their view (that each of the six kinds of consciousnesses perceives a person) is also contradicted by the passage in scripture which states, "Oh Brâhmana, each of the five organs of (sense) perception has and experiences is own domain and objects. None experiences the domain and objects of another, neither the organ of sight, nor that of hearing, smell, taste, or touch. But an organ of mental perception experiences the domain and objects of the five organs of (sense) perception, which

rely on an organ of mental perception (in order to give rise to an organ of mental perception consciousness of their domain and objects)." (Since the organs of sense perception do not have and experience the domain and objects of one another, none wanders from its own domain and objects. Hence, a person cannot be an object perceived by all six kinds of consciousnesses.)

Perhaps (they will claim that) a person is not an object of perception (in the sense of the term used in this objection); (but) if it is not an object of perception (in this sense of the term), it will not be perceived (by a consciousness, nor can it be, as they claim it is, an object of knowledge).

2.531 How the Vâtsîputrîyas Use Scripture to Challenge Our Objection that the Restricted Scopes of the Organs of Sense Perception Show that Persons Cannot be Perceived by All Six Kinds of Consciousness

(They have objected that) if this is the case, (that we can infer, from the Buddha's statement that the organs of sense perception do not have and experience the domain and objects of one another, that none of them wanders from its own domain and objects,) then (it can be shown, contrary to the very passage we have quoted, that) an organ of mental perception also does not wander (from its own domain and objects, since) in the *Parable of the Six Animals*, it is said, "Each of these six organs of perception has and desires its own domain and objects."

2.532 Why Their Use of Scripture Fails to Answer Our Objection

(But we can in fact infer from the passage we cited that the five organs of sense perception consciousnesses cannot wander from their own proper domains and objects. Our inference is not vitiated, since) the organs of perception mentioned in the passage (quoted by the Vâtsîputrîyas) are not really organs of perception. For the five organs of (sense) perception do not have a desire to perceive (objects, since they are bodily forms, which cannot conceptualize, and hence, cannot desire, their domains and objects,) nor do the (five corresponding types of) consciousnesses (desire to perceive their domains and objects in their capacity as organs of mental perception of these sensible forms, for in that capacity a consciousness does not con-

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ig, es ich ceptualize, and hence, does not desire, its domain and objects. Only an organ of mental perception consciousness produced through the influence of an organ of mental perception can conceptualize, and thus desire, its domain and objects.)

Therefore, (we must infer that the six organs of perception mentioned in the passage cited by the Vâtsîputrîyas must in fact be six kinds of organs of perception consciousnesses.) An organ of mental perception consciousness which has been produced (not only by means of the organ of mental perception, but also) through the influence of (one of) the (five) organs of (sense) perception is called an organ of perception (because of its similarity to an organ of mental perception. For this reason five of the organs of perception mentioned in the passage are in fact the corresponding kinds of organ of mental perception consciousnesses, which do desire the objects they conceptualize). An organ of mental perception consciousness produced through the exclusive influence of an organ of mental perception (is also called an organ of perception. And although it desires its own domain and objects, it certainly) does not desire the domains and objects of the other organs of perception. So this (supposed consequence of our interpretation of the original passage, that an organ of mental perception does not wander from its own domain and objects,) is not a fault (incurred by our view).27

2.54 How the Scriptural Enumeration of the Objects of Knowledge Establishes that Persons Are Not Perceived

The Bhagavân said, "Let me teach you, Bhikṣus, all the phenomena of which you can have profound knowledge." Then he said, "You can have profound knowledge of an organ of sight, visible forms, an organ of sight consciousness, a contact (of the latter two) with an organ of sight, a feeling that arises, whether pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent conditioned by the contact, . . ." (and so on, until) ". . . the feeling that arises because of a contact with an organ of mental perception." He concluded, "These are the phenomena of which you can have profound and full knowledge." However, a person is not included among these phenomena about which he says that we can have profound and full knowledge. Therefore, a person is also not an object of a con-

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sciousness, since the objects of wisdom (or knowledge) are the same as those of consciousnesses.

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2.55 Why Persons Cannot Be Perceived by Means of the Organs of Perception

(Finally,) when the Paudgalikas say that we see (ourselves as) a person by means of an organ of sight, they commit themselves to (what scripture shows to be) the mistaken view that we see a self by means of what is selfless. (This view is mistaken because an organ of sight is said in scripture to be selfless in the sense that it is not something possessed by a self, and it is absurd to suggest that a self perceives itself by means of an organ it does not possess.)

2.6 How the Scriptures Establish that Persons Are the Aggregates Rather Than Inexplicable Phenomena

In the scripture, On the Human Condition, whose statements are to be understood literally, the Bhagavân said that what we call a person is simply the aggregates: "An organ of sight consciousness arises in dependence upon (the arising of) visible forms and an organ of sight; and when there is a contact, (which is) the meeting of these three, a feeling, a discrimination, and motivating dispositions arise. (The collection of) these four non-bodily aggregates, along with an organ of sight, (which is a bodily aggregate, is an example of what) we call a human being. This human being is called a sentient being, a man, Manu's offspring, a human being, a child, a soul, a person, an individual, and a creature. It is said to see visible forms by means of an organ of sight. The verbal conventions are adopted that it is venerable, has a certain name, belongs to a given caste, is a member of some family, eats food of a certain sort, is aware of pleasure and pain, lives for a while or for a long time, and completes its life. Thus, Bhiksus, these are mere names or verbal conventions. All of these phenomena, which are impermanent and causally conditioned, have arisen dependently." ently." And since the Bhagavân said to take refuge in scriptures whose statements are to be understood literally, this passage is not to be

The Bhagavân said, "Oh Brâhmaṇa, all things (thus enumerated) are

(substantially) real, those up to and including the twelve bases of perception." And so if a person is not a basis of perception, it is not (substantially) real, while if it is a basis of perception, it is not (an) inexplicable (phenomenon). This view, in fact, is expressed in the scriptures of the Vâtsîputrîyas, where it is said, "Bhikṣus, the Tathâgata teaches that all things are (substantially) real to the extent that an organ of sight, visible forms, (and so on,) are (substantially) real."

In A Discourse With Bimbisâra, the Bhagavân said, "Bhikṣus, those ignorant of the teachings, who are mere children and lack wisdom, hold on to the name and concept of a self, (and thereby suppose that this self possesses the aggregates of body and mind.) But (if they should search among the phenomena on the basis of which they refer to themselves, they would find that) there is no self or possessions of a self (to be found among them); there exist (among them only the aggregates, which we call) the sufferings."

The Arhatî, Śîlâ, also said to Mâra, "Do you, Mâra, believe that a sentient being is real? (You should not,) for this is a false view. This mass of (phenomena) causally conditioning (other) phenomena is empty (of selfhood). No (real) sentient being at all can be found among them. Just as we refer by name to a wagon on the basis of the collection of its parts, so, by convention, we speak of a sentient being in reliance upon the aggregates."

In the *Ksudraka* the following is also said to a mendicant Brâhmaṇa: "Listen carefully to the teaching that unties all the knots (that bind us in cyclic existence): (by a false conception) a mind is contaminated and (by a true conception) a mind is purified. For the self is not a real self, and it is mistakenly conceived (to be real). There is no self, no sentient being, here (to be found among the phenomena on the basis of which a person is named and conceived); there are only phenomena produced by causes. What exist are (the phenomena classified as) the twelve stages of the rebirth process, the aggregates (of body and mind), the bases of perception, and the elements, and when they are examined, no person is perceived (among them). See internal and external (phenomena) as empty (of selfhood). Even the one who meditates on (the) emptiness (of selfhood) is not at all to be found."

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As it was said, "The five evils of perceiving a self are that (i) one

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD

holds false views of self, individual, and so on, (ii) one's view (of self) is indistinguishable from that of Tîrthikas, (iii) one follows a wrong path, (iv) one's mind neither seeks emptiness, nor becomes clear about it, nor meditates on it, nor becomes liberated, and (v) one fails to develop the qualities of the Âryas."

2.61 Why the Vâtsîputrîyas Should Accept These Scriptures

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These passages, however, are not recognized (by the Vâtsîputrîyas) as authoritative because they are not included in their own scriptures. But are only their own scriptures authoritative? Or should what the Buddha said be the authority? If they accept only their own scriptures, then the Buddha is not their teacher and they are not his followers. But if they accept the authority of what the Buddha said, they must accept the authority of these passages. For it is unreasonable to claim that these statements are not what the Buddha said simply because they are not included in their own scriptural collection, since they are found in all other scriptural collections and do not contradict (other) scriptures or the truth. So it is overly bold of them to claim that our passages are not what the Buddha said because they are not included in their own scriptural collection.

2.7 How Their Own Scriptures Contradict Their Theory of Persons

Furthermore, do their own scriptures not include the teaching that all phenomena are selfless? (Why is this teaching included if a person really exists?) If they should claim (that it is included) because a person cannot be said either to be one of these phenomena or to be something other than one (of them), they must concede that a person cannot (even) be perceived by means of an organ of mental perception, (since) it is asserted in scripture that a consciousness arises in dependence upon both (an organ of perception and an object of perception, each of which is said to be selfless).

In a scripture (accepted by them) it is acknowledged (that the following is an uninterpretable statement): "'What is selfless is a self' is a mistaken perception, a mistaken mind, a mistaken view." (The Vâtsîputrîyas may try to avoid this criticism by saying that) the mistake (mentioned in this passage) is not (to suppose, as they do,) that the self is a self, but (to suppose) that what is selfless is a self.

(But) they will agree that the aggregates, the bases of perception, and the elements are selfless; so (if they admit that it is a mistake to suppose that what is selfless is a self,) their earlier claim, that a person, (which is a self,) neither is nor is not (said to be) a bodily form, is refuted. (For a bodily form, which is included in the aggregates, is here said to be selfless.)

In another scripture (in their collection) it is said, "Bhikṣus, those Śramaṇas and Brâhmaṇas who think that they perceive a self perceive only the five aggregates which have been appropriated (as possessions of a self)." Thus conceiving (oneself as) a self pertains (not to a really existent person, but) only to (the aggregates,) all (of which are) selfless phenomena.

(Finally, in one of their own scriptures) it is also said, "Whosoever has remembered, is remembering, or will remember his previous lives of many different sorts remembers only (the lives of) the five aggregates (of his body and mind)."

(They have replied that) if it is the case (that we remember the lives of the aggregates rather than those of a person,) the Buddha would not have said, (upon recalling one of his past lives,) "In a past life I possessed a bodily form."

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(However, in saying this the Buddha was merely following the convention according to which) those who remember past lives of certain kinds remember them in this way. Moreover, if (the Buddha's statement were to imply that) a person (in truth) possesses a bodily form, it would (also) imply (that he himself fell victim to the) seeing (of a self) associated with the perishable collection (of the aggregates). To avoid this consequence the Vâtsîputrîyas would need to deny the authenticity of the passage (which occurs in their own collection of scriptures.) Therefore, the person (mentioned in this passage) is real in name or concept (only) in the way a heap, (which is nothing but its many simultaneously existing parts,) and a stream, (which is nothing but its many successively existing parts), and other such things, are real in name or concept (only).²⁹

3. The Vâtsîputrîya Objections and Our Replies and Counter-Objections

3.1 How, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, a Buddha Can Be Omniscient Without Knowing Everything Simultaneously

(The Vâtsîputrîyas object that) if this (theory, that a person is nothing but its aggregates,) were correct, then the Buddha, (who is a person,) could not be omniscient. (For the Buddha's omniscience would then consist in his minds with mental concomitants knowing all things; and) because a mind with mental concomitants is momentary, it cannot know all things (unless it can know all things simultaneously, which is denied in scripture itself. In their own view, they claim, since the Buddha, as) a person, (cannot be said to be same as its aggregates, he) can (be said to) know all things (without implying that he has simultaneous knowledge of everything.)

However, this (objection) commits them to the view that a person is permanent, since it does not perish when a mind (within the continuum of aggregates called a person) perishes.

We do not, of course, teach the view that the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he simultaneously knows all things, but in the sense that the Buddha, as a continuous series (of consciousnesses), can know, without error, anything he wants (to know) merely by directing his attention to it. And so it was said, "Just as a fire is thought to (be able to) consume all things one after another because there is (within it) this capacity, so (the Buddha's) omniscience is asserted because there is (within him the capacity for) knowledge of all things one after another."

We know this, (that this capacity belongs to the Buddha, as a continuum of consciousnesses, rather than to a Buddha the Vâtsîputrîyas claim to be an inexplicable phenomenon,) because it was said, "The Buddhas of the past and the future, as well as the present Buddha, destroy the sufferings of the many." As they themselves claim, the aggregates do, but a person does not, exist (as causally conditioned) in (any one of) the three times.

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s ng 3.2 How, If Persons Are the Aggregates, There Can Be a Bearer of the Burden

(The Vâtsîputrîyas object that) a person cannot be the mere aggregates, since the Buddha would not have said, (in explanation of the problem of suffering and its solution,) "Bhikṣus, I will explain to you the burden, the taking up of the burden, the casting off of the burden, and what bears it." It is not reasonable, (they argue,) that the burden be the same as its bearer, since the two are not commonly known to be the same.

But (if this argument is sound, we may argue that) it is also not reasonable that there be an inexplicable (person that bears as its burden the aggregates), since it is not commonly known to exist. Moreover, (if we were to assume that an inexplicable person takes up the aggregates as its burden, then grasping, which in scripture is explained as) the taking up of the burden, would not be included, (as we both agree it is,) among the aggregates, (since it would be an action of an agent that takes the aggregates as the patient upon which it acts.)

The Bhagavân spoke of the bearer of the burden with the intention that just this much should be understood: (that reference to it is a verbal convention, just as reference to a person is, when it is said, for instance, that) "it is venerable, has a certain name . . . lives for a while or for a long time, and completes its life." ³⁰ But it should not be understood to be a permanent or inexplicable self. Since the aggregates by themselves cause harm to themselves, the earlier are called a burden (to the later) and the later the bearer of the burden, since "burden" means "harm." ³¹

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3.3 How Persons that Do Not Really Exist Can Be Spontaneously Born

(The Vâtsîputrîyas also object that we cannot deny that) a person really exists because (a sentient being is a person, and in scripture the belief,) "No sentient being can be spontaneously generated," was said to be a false view. (They reason that since a sentient being or person can, therefore, be spontaneously generated, and this would be impossible if it did not really exist, the denial of the real existence of a person is a false view.)

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3.31 Why the Denial of the Real Existence of Persons Is Not a False View

(In any case) the denial of the (real) existence of a person cannot be a false view, since it could not be abandoned (on the paths of insight and meditation). For it is not reasonable that this view be abandoned by (following the paths of) insight (into,) and meditation (upon, the four realities known to the Âryas,) since a person is not one of the realities, (and the only false views to be abandoned on these paths are the denials of the realities themselves.)

3.4 How, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, It Can Be Said in Scripture that a Person Born (for the Weal of the Many) is One

(They object that) a person is not the aggregates because (the aggregates are many, and when in scripture) it is said, "One person, when born in the world, is born (for the weal of the many)," 32 (the use of "one person" shows that the Buddha means to refer to one thing rather than to many.)

(But in this passage the term,) "one," is applied figuratively to the collection (of aggregates), just as (it is applied only figuratively to collections of elements when used in the expressions) "one sesame seed," "one grain of rice," "one heap" and "one word."

Moreover, (if they accept this passage as an uninterpretable statement of doctrine,) they must, (contrary to their own view,) also admit that a person is (a) causally conditioned (phenomenon), since they will have agreed that it is born.

3.41 How the Vâtsîputrîyas Explain the Birth of Persons

(They defend themselves by saying that) a person is born, but not in the way that the (causally conditioned) aggregates come to be, since it

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does not come to be again after having ceased to be in the previous moment. A person is said to come to be, (they claim,) in the sense that it acquires different aggregates in the way, for instance, that a priest or a grammarian comes to be because someone acquires knowledge, a monk or wanderer comes to be because someone acquires the appropriate mark, or an old or diseased person comes to be because someone acquires a certain bodily condition.

3.42 Why Their Explanation of the Birth of Persons Fails

But this (defense) is unacceptable, since it is contradicted by the Bhagavân in the scripture, *The Ultimate Emptiness*, in which he said, "Oh Bhikṣus, there are actions and their results, but nothing is perceived that casts off one set of aggregates and takes up another elsewhere, since a person is a conventional name for phenomena." And since in the scripture, *Phalguna*, it is said, "Oh Phalguna, I do not speak of (a person as) acquiring (or losing different aggregates)," there is nothing that acquires or loses them.

Moreover, in these examples, to what are the Vâtsîputrîyas referring when they speak of a priest or grammarian, monk or wanderer, and an old or diseased person? (On their own view, the examples to which they refer must either be a person that is an inexplicable phenomenon, minds with mental concomitants, or a body.) They cannot be referring to a (real, but inexplicable) person, whose existence is not established; nor to minds with mental concomitants, since they come to be anew each moment; nor to a body, which is also momentary.

In addition, the aggregates would then be something other than a person in the way that (the aforementioned) knowledge, appropriate mark, and bodily condition are other (than that which acquires them). And (we both believe, for instance, that) an old or diseased body is something other than the body (before it is caused to be old or diseased), since we have (both) rejected the Sâmkhya's doctrine of (causality, according to which an effect is a) transformation (of a substance that produces its own transformations, and thus is not something other than the substance that produces it). So these are poor examples.

When (they claim that) the aggregates arise anew every moment but a person does not, they have clearly shown, (contrary to their beliefs,)

not only that a person is something other than the aggregates, but also that it is permanent.

3.43 Why They Cannot Reject Our View Because a Person Is One and the Aggregates Are Many

(Finally,) if they say that (our view is false because) there is one person and five aggregates, they must admit that a person and the aggregates are something other than one another.

They have replied that even if a person is one and the aggregates are five, they need not be something other than one another, since, as Buddhadeva 33 says,) there is one visible form and four (primary) elements (that support its existence), even though the visible form is not something other than these elements.

However, the thesis that a visible form is nothing but the four elements (that support its existence) is mistaken, (since it implies the falsehood that a visible form is real in name or concept only,) and it is not accepted (by anyone except Buddhadeva. So if the Vâtsîputrîyas themselves should accept the thesis,) they must then also admit that just as a visible form is nothing but its elements, a person, (contrary to their own view,) is nothing but its aggregates, (and thus is real in name or concept only.)

3.5 Why, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, the Buddha Did Not Answer the Question of Whether They Are or Are Not Something Other than Their Bodies

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(They cannot object that) if a person were nothing but the aggregates, the Bhagavân would have settled the question of whether an individual (or person) is or is not something other than its body. (For he declined to answer this question because) he took into consideration the beliefs of the questioner. The person who asked the question had in mind a single substantial individual, namely, a soul operating within (the body). Since an individual of this sort is not present in anything Whatsoever, (and thus does not exist,) the Bhagavân declined to answer that it is or is not something other (than its body). To answer this queet. this question would be like answering the question of whether the hairs on a tortoise are hard or soft.

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Milinda³⁴ approached Sthavira Nâgasena, and said, "I would like to ask you a question, Venerable One. (I know that) Sramanas like to talk a lot, (but) could you answer just the question I shall ask? "Ask your question," the Sthavira replied. And then he asked, "Is an individual this body (in which it is said to be present), or is it one thing and the body another?" The Sthavira replied, "This question cannot be answered." The King said, "But Venerable One, did you not promise a moment ago to answer just the question asked? Why then did you reply that the question cannot be answered?" The Sthavira said, "I would like to ask you a question, great King. (I know that) Kings like to talk a lot, (but) could you answer just the question I shall ask?" "Ask your question," the King said. And so he asked, "Is the fruit on the mango tree in your inner court sour or sweet?" He replied, "There is no mango (tree) in my inner court." "But great King, did you not promise me a moment ago to answer just the question asked? Why then did you say that there is no mango tree?" The King said, "How can I answer that the fruit is sweet or sour if the mango tree does not exist?" The Sthavira replied, "Since, in the same way, great King, an individual does not exist, how can I answer that it is or is not something other than its body?"

3.51 Why, If Persons Do Not Really Exist, the Buddha Did Not Answer This Question by Saying that They Do Not Exist

(They object that in scripture) the Bhagavân, (when asked whether or not it is something other than its body,) would have said that an individual does not exist (if it does not).

(But when in scripture) the Bhagavân (did not give this answer, it was once again because he) took into consideration the beliefs of the questioner. (If) the questioner, who was ignorant of the dependent coorigination of the aggregates, (were told that the individual does not exist, he) would have embraced the false theory that the continuum of aggregates called an individual does not exist, (since he would have adopted the extreme view that there is no individual at all,) and he was not ready for the teachings on dependent co-origination (on the basis of which this nihilistic extreme is avoided).

(That the Buddha employed) this (practice of taking into consideration the beliefs of the questioner) is made clear by the Bhagavân

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(himself), who said, "Oh Ânanda, when Vatsagotra, the wandering ascetic, asked me (whether or not a self exists), would not I have been wrong to reply that it does? (For) all phenomena are selfless. And would not Vatsagotra, the wandering ascetic, who was already confused, have become even more confused if I had replied that a self does not exist? (For) he would have then once thought that a self existed, and now (that it) does not. Oh Ânanda, the view that a self exists is the extreme of eternalism, and the view that a self does not exist is the extreme of nihilism."

And it has also been taught (by Kumâralâbha, 35 who said), "The Jinas, who have seen both the wounds made by the teeth of false views and the abandonment of (virtuous) actions, teach the doctrine (with great care), just as a tigress carries her offspring (in her teeth neither too tightly nor too loosely). For one who accepts the (real) existence of a self is pierced by the teeth of false views and one who does not accept its conventional existence abandons the virtuous (actions which are its) offsprings."

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Again, he taught, "Because an individual does not exist, the Bhagavân did not say that it is the same as or something other than (its body). Nor did he say that an individual does not exist, lest (someone think that) it not be real even in name or concept. For the presence of good and bad results (of actions) in the continuum of the aggregates is called an individual, and because he taught that an individual does not exist, (someone could think that he taught the view that) these results would not exist there. Nor did he teach anyone incapable of understanding emptiness that an individual is a mere name or concept for the aggregates. Likewise, he did not say, when questioned by Vatsagotra, that a self does nor does not exist, since he look into consideration the beliefs of the questioner. Moreover, if a self exists, the Bhagavân would have said so."

^{3.52} Why the Buddha Responded as He Did to the Remainder of the Fourteen Unanswered Questions

The Bhagavân also took into consideration the beliefs of the questioner when he declined to say whether the world is eternal, not eternal, or neither. (For the questioner would have equated the world with a self or with the whole of cyclic existence, and) if he were

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to equate the world with a self, the Bhagavân would be wrong to answer that the world is, is not, both is and is not, or neither is nor is not, eternal, since a self does not exist. But if he were to equate the world with the whole of cyclic existence, any one of these answers would again be wrong. For if the world were eternal, no one could achieve the final release from cyclic existence, and if it were not eternal, the whole of cyclic existence could cease (at some point, and everyone would effortlessly achieve the final release). If the world were both eternal and not eternal, then some could (effortlessly) achieve the final release from cyclic existence, and others could not achieve it at all. If the world were neither eternal nor not eternal, then we could not even assert or deny that there is a final release from cyclic existence.

Thus, (it should be clear that) the Bhagavân refused to answer the question in any of these four ways because the final release from cyclic existence depends upon (making an effort to traverse) the paths. This case is like that of the naked Jain mendicant and the sparrow, (for when the mendicant asked the Buddha whether or not the sparrow he was holding in his hand behind his back was alive, the Buddha refused to answer because the bird's life depended upon the mendicant's decision to squeeze it to death if the Buddha answered that it is alive and to spare its life if the Buddha answered that it is dead).³⁶

For the same reason, the Bhagavân declined to answer the question of whether the world does, does not, both does and does not, or neither does nor does not, come to an end. This four-part question has the same meaning (as the first). For after the wanderer, Muktika, asked the same four-part question, (and was given the same response,) he again asked, "Will the whole world or only a part of it be liberated by (making an effort to traverse) this path?" Sthavira Ânanda said, "Muktika, you are now asking in a different way the very question you first asked the Bhagavân."

The question of whether the Tathâgata does, does not, both does and does not, or neither does nor does not, exist after death was also not answered because the beliefs of the questioner were taken into consideration. For the questioner assumed that the Tathâgata was a liberated self.

3.53 How the Vâtsîputrîya Theory that Persons Really Exist Is Inconsistent with the Buddha's Silence about the Existence of Persons after Death and after Final Release

The Paudgalikas must explain why, (if a person really exists,) the Bhagavân declared of a person, when alive, that it exists, but did not declare that a person exists after death. (Their response, that the Bhagavân did not declare that a person exists after death because) the fault of the eternalistic theory (of persons) is its consequence, (is unsatisfactory.)

(For in that case) he would not have said, "Maitreya, you will someday become an Arhat, a Tathâgata, and a Samyaksambuddha." Nor would he have said about a Śrâvaka who had died that in the past he was reborn in such and such a place. For in these cases also the eternalistic theory (of persons) would be a consequence.

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(Moreover, if a person really exists, the omniscient Bhagavân must be able to have knowledge of it.) If the Bhagavân has knowledge of (the real existence of) a person before, but not after, its final release from cyclic existence, he would not answer the question (of whether or not the person exists after its final release) because he did not know its answer. Hence, (the Vâtsîputrîyas must say either that) the leacher lacks omniscience or (that) a person does not (really) exist. Otherwise, if the Bhagavân has knowledge of it (both before and after its final release) and remains silent, the eternalistic theory (of persons) is established (as true).

Should they reply that we cannot say that the Bhagavân does or does not have knowledge of (the real existence of) a person after its final release, then in the same way they would have to say, very quietly, (because it is heretical,) that the Bhagavân neither is nor is not omniscient.

3.6 Why, Although Persons Do Not Really Exist, the Bhagavân Declared False the Denial of Their Existence

(The Vâtsîputrîyas claim that) a person really exists because it is false view. But since (in scripture) that "I am not in reality an enduring self" is a is (also) said to be false, their claim is inadmissible. The Âbhidhârmikas

say that these false views are, respectively, the extremes of nihilism and eternalism. Their claim is quite reasonable, since in the scripture, $V\hat{a}tsya$, it is said, "Oh Ânanda, to claim that a self exists is to fall to (the extreme of) eternalism and to claim that it does not exist is to fall to (the extreme of) nihilism."

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3.7 How, If Persons Do Not Really Exist, Cyclic Existence Is Possible

(The Vâtsîputrîyas object that) if a person does not (really) exist, there is nothing that undergoes cyclic existence. (They add that) cyclic existence itself cannot undergo cyclic existence, and (that) the Bhagavân spoke of sentient beings, obscured by ignorance, wandering in cyclic existence.

But how does the person they believe (really) to exist undergo cyclic existence? It cannot be by taking up and abandoning different aggregates, since we have already dismissed this view. On the contrary, just as we say that a momentary fire moves about as a continuum, so we say that the collection of the aggregates, commonly called a sentient being, undergoes cyclic existence on the basis of craving.

3.71 How, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, Reference to Their Past Lives Is Possible

(The Vâtsîputrîyas object that) if a person were merely the aggregates, the Bhagavân would not have said, "At that time and place I was the teacher called Sunetra," since the aggregates (of the Bhagavân) would be other than those (of Sunetra).

But it cannot be (to himself as) a (really existent) person (that the Bhagavân refers,) since he would then be committed to the eternalistic theory (that a person is a permanent phenomenon). Therefore, when the Bhagavân said, "I was the teacher called Sunetra," he was referring to a single continuum (of aggregates once called Sunetra and now called the Bhagavân), just as when we say, "This same burning fire has moved" (from here to there, we are referring to a single continuum of elements).

3.8 Why, If Persons Really Exist, There Would Be No Buddhas

(It is clear, therefore, that the Vâtsîputrîyas are committed to the theory that a person is a self. But) if a self were to exist, only the Tathâgatas could clearly know it. And those who could know it would

very powerfully conceive (of themselves as) a self and become attached to it. Since in scripture it says, "When there is a self, there are possessions of a self," their conceiving (of themselves as) a self would also involve conceiving the aggregates (as possessions of a self), and they would thus be engaged in the seeing (of a self) associated with a perishable collection (of aggregates). And when there is the seeing of possessions of a self, there is attachment to its possessions. Those who are bound by strong attachment to a self and its possessions are very far from liberation.

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(The Vâtsîputrîyas cannot reply that, although there is attachment to the self a person appears to be, but is not,) there is no attachment to the self (a person really is, for) why should there be an attachment to what is not a self because it is believed to be a self unless there is an attachment to the self itself?

3.9 How Our Theory of Persons Is the Middle Way Between the Extreme Theories Propounded by the Vâtsîputrîyas and the Mâdhyamikas

Therefore, a tumor of false views (concerning the mode of existence of a person) has grown within (the body of) the (authentic) teaching (of the Buddha). Some, (the Vâtsîputrîyas,) conceive of a person (as really existent, and thus fall to the eternalistic extreme). Others, (the Mâdhyamikas, who deny the real existence of the aggregates, undermine the only foundation upon which the nominal reality of a person could be established. Hence, since they) conceive of everything, (including the person,) as (totally) non-existent, (they fall to the nihilistic extreme.³⁷ Therefore, our view, that a person, as conventionally conceived, is real in name or concept only, and is in fact a continuum of its aggregates, is the middle way between these extremes.)³⁸

⁴ Tirthika Objections and Our Replies and Counter-Objections

4.1 Why Tîrthika Objections Must Be Considered
In addition (to these views) there are (those of) the Tîrthikas, who
propound (in common) the theory that (there is) a self (that) is
another substance. Here, also, the irreparable harm done (by this
theory) is that there will be no liberation (for those who accept it. Let
us now reply to their objections to our denial of the existence of a self

so that the obstructions to liberation created by these objections may be set aside.)

4.2 How, Without a Self, a Memory Can Occur

(Against our view the Tîrthikas have objected that) if a self does not exist at all and minds (within a continuum of aggregates we call a person) are momentary, there can be no memory or recognition of an object experienced in the past.

(This objection, however, is unwarranted, since in our view) we can remember an object because immediately before the memory occurs a special kind of mind arises which is (causally) connected to a (prior) discrimination of the object remembered. This is a mind that (i) is inclined toward the object to be remembered, (ii) is attended by a discrimination (of an object that is) associated with or like the object (to be remembered), and by other things (such as a resolution or a habit), and (iii) is not incapacitated by grief, distraction, or any other such condition which would change the character of (the aggregates which are) its support.

Even if a mind is of this special sort, it cannot produce a memory of the object unless it is (causally) connected (to a previous discrimination of the object). And should a mind be so connected, but not be of this special kind, it will not produce the memory. A memory is produced by this special kind of mind when it is (causally) connected to a discrimination of the object, since no other kind of mind is seen to have this power.

4.21 Why Our Account of How a Memory Can Occur Without a Self Does Not Imply that One Person Can Remember What Another Perceives

(They claim that our account of how, without a self, a memory is possible, implies that one mind remembers what another mind perceives, and then object that) what one mind perceives another cannot remember, since (in that case, *per impossibile*,) what a mind of Devadatta would perceive, a mind of Vajñadatta could remember.

(However, this example cannot be used to reject our account, for) there is no connection (of the appropriate sort between a mind in the continuum of Devadatta and a mind in the continuum of Yajñadatta), since these two minds are not related as cause to effect within one

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Posse Bi continuum. Nor do we say (simply) that one mind remembers what another perceives, but that a mind that remembers (something) arises from another mind that perceived (it within the same continuum), just as we explained earlier in our discussion of developments within a continuum.³⁹ So there is no fault (of this sort in our account).

(Since) a recognition arises only from a memory, (our account of a memory suffices as an account of how a recognition is possible.)

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4.22 Why a Self Is Needed Neither As an Agent of Remembering Nor As Its Cause

If a self does not exist, (they object,) what (is the agent that) remembers? What is meant by "remember" in this case, (they tell us, is that a self, as agent,) "remembers" in the sense (that it) "grasps an object of perception through (the occurrence of) a memory (of the object)."

But is a (self's) grasping of the object anything other than (the occurrence of) a memory (in a continuum of consciousnesses)? (Surely it is not. No separate act of grasping is required, and consequently no self as the agent of this act is required, to explain the occurrence of the memory. Nor can they say that a self is) what produces the memory (of the object, for) the producer of a memory, as we have already said, is the special kind of mind that causes a memory. Although we say that Caitra remembers, we say this because we perceive a memory that occurs in the continuum we call Caitra.

4.23 Why a Self Is Needed Neither As a Possessor of a Memory Nor As a Possessor of a Consciousness of an Object

If a self does not exist, (they object,) what possesses this memory? (They claim that) something possesses a memory in the way that Caltra possesses a cow. (In their view,) a cow cannot be used for million milking or for carrying anything unless it is possessed, (and in the same way, a memory cannot be directed to an object unless it is

But where (and why) does the possessor (of a memory) direct this memory, (the existence of) whose possessor they seek in this way (to establish)? (They state that) it is directed (by its possessor) to the Object to be remembered and (that) it is so directed for the sake of (its possessor) remembering (that object). But this statement makes no sense. For this (memory) itself must

(then) be directed (by its possessor to the object) for the sake of this (remembering of the object. In other words, since a self that directs a memory to the object must already possess the memory of the object, it already remembers the object and need not direct it anywhere for this purpose.)

And in what way is a memory directed (to its object)? (It must be directed) either by way of (something) producing (a memory of the object) or by way of (something) sending (the memory to the object). It must be by way of (something) producing (the memory), since a memory does not move. But then a possessor (of the memory) is merely its cause and the (memory) possessed (by it) is merely an effect (of this cause), since a cause determines (what) its effect (will be) and is said to have this (power to determine what its effect will be) because of (its possession of) the effect. A cause of a memory (may be said to possess the memory in the sense that it) is the cause of this (power to determine its effect).

What is called "Caitra" is (also) called the possessor of a cow because we perceive a single continuum of (phenomena) causally conditioning (other) phenomena (within that continuum) and assume a causal connection (within this continuum) to the occurrence of changes of place of, and alterations in, (the continuum of the phenomena we call) the cow. But there is no one thing called Caitra or a cow. Therefore, there is, (even in the Tîrthikas' examples,) no possessor-possessed relation other than that of a cause to its effect.

We can explain, in the same way, what is conscious (of an object) and what possesses a consciousness, (what feels and what possesses a feeling,) and so on. The only difference (in the explanations) is that, (for instance, in the case of a consciousness of an object) the parallel cause of this (effect) is (the conjunction of) an organ of perception, an object of perception, and attentiveness.

4.3 How the Vaiyâkaraṇas Argue that a Person Is a Separate Agent of both Walking and Consciousness of an Object

Some (Tîrthikas, the Vaiyâkaraṇas,⁴⁰) say that every action expressed by a verb depends (for its existence) upon (the separate existence of) an agent of that action, since an action of this sort depends (for its existence) upon (the separate existence of) an agent of that sort. (They argue that,) just as saying that Devadatta walks implies that walking.

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an action expressed by a verb, depends (for its existence) upon (the separate existence of) Devadatta, the walker, so (saying that Devadatta is conscious of an object implies that) a consciousness (of an object) is an action expressed by a verb (and that it depends for its existence upon the separate existence of Devadatta, an agent who performs the action of being conscious of an object). Therefore, that (agent, a self) which is conscious 41 (of an object,) must exist.

431 Why Their Argument Fails

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But what is (the mode of existence of) this Devadatta (to whom they refer in their examples)? If he is a self, (as they claim, we may reject the examples, since) they will be assuming (the existence of) the very thing they seek to establish. If he is what the world calls a man, (the existence of a self as an agent of an action expressed by a verb is not established, since) he is not just one thing (possessed of a single nature of its own), but (a continuum of aggregates, comprised of various sorts of phenomena) causally conditioning (other) phenomena (within the continuum) to which this name, ("Devadatta,") has been given. It is to these (phenomena) that we refer when we say that Devadatta walks or is conscious (of an object).

4.32 How, Though Merely a Continuum of Aggregates, a Person Can Be Said To Walk and To Be Conscious of an Object

And how, (the Vaiyâkaraṇas ask,) can Devadatta (be said to) walk (if he is merely a continuum of phenomena of various sorts causally conditioning other phenomena)?

The Devadatta of which common people speak, (in our view,) is an unbroken continuum of momentary (phenomena) causally conditioning (other) phenomena. They grasp (this continuum) as one thing, a sentient being with a body, and they say that Devadatta walks because they think that they cause (the bodily forms within) their own continua of arise in different places (at different times) and call this arising in the same sort and say that he too "walks.") They attribute change of both fire and sound.

For like reasons they also say that Devadatta is conscious (of an object), since they think that they cause a consciousness (of an object

to arise in their own continua and call this arising "being conscious of an object"). These terms are used, with their conventional meanings, even by the Âryas.

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4.33 Why a Consciousness, Though Not a Performer of Actions, Is Said To Be Conscious of an Object

(Even) in (some passages in our own) scriptures, (they object,) a consciousness is said to be conscious (of its object). In such passages, (they ask,) is (not) a consciousness (being said to be) performing an action? (And if it can be said to perform the action of being conscious, why cannot a person also be said to perform this action?)

(Although a consciousness is said to be conscious of an object,) a consciousness does nothing at all. Just as we say that an effect, even though it does nothing, conforms to its cause because it receives a form like that of its cause, in the same way we say that a consciousness, even though it does nothing, is conscious of an object because it receives a form like that of its cause. There is conformity (between the consciousness and the object of perception rather than between the consciousness and the organ of perception) because of the discernible form possessed (by the object). Since the form a consciousness receives is the discernible form of the object, the consciousness that arises because of an organ of perception is said to be conscious of the object rather than to be conscious of the organ.

(Moreover,) there may be no fault (in the implication that a consciousness is an agent) when we say that a consciousness is conscious (of an object), since in a continuum of consciousnesses a consciousness is a cause of a consciousness (that appears in the next moment), and its cause is (by some) called an agent. Similarly, (there may be no fault in the implication that a ringing bell is an agent of ringing) when we say that a bell rings, (since in the continuum of its ringing a ring in one moment is a cause of a ring in the next, and its cause is by some called an agent.)

We might also say that a consciousness is conscious (of an object) similar to the way in which a flame (of a butterlamp) moves (when blown about by the wind). We figuratively apply the term, "flame (of a butterlamp)," to the continuum of flames and say that the flame moves to another place when a flame (at a later moment in the continuum) arises in another place. In the same way, we figuratively apply the

expression, "a consciousness," to the continuum of consciousnesses, and say that a consciousness is conscious of a (different) object when a consciousness of a different object arises (at a later moment in the continuum).

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And just as we can say that a bodily form arises and endures (for a moment) without implying that there is an agent apart from the action (of arising or enduring), so we can say that a consciousness (is conscious of an object without implying that there is an agent apart from the action of being conscious of an object).

4.4 How, Without Arising From a Self, Consciousnesses of Different Character Can Arise in the Same Continuum

(Some Tirthikas 42 have objected that) if a consciousness arises not from a self, but from a consciousness (that immediately precedes it in the same continuum), either consciousnesses of exactly the same character will always arise or consciousnesses (of different character) will arise in a fixed order in the way, for instance, that a leaf (always) arises from a stem and the stem (always) from a sprout.

But (consciousnesses of exactly the same character do not always arise because consciousnesses are causally conditioned phenomena and) it is a defining characteristic of causally conditioned phenomena to differ in character (from moment to moment). For if it were not the nature of (phenomena) causally conditioning (other) phenomena necessarily to change in character (from moment to moment), then if we should achieve a perfect meditational equipoise, both body and mind would be the same (in character from moment to moment) and we could not emerge from it by ourselves, since there would be no difference in character between the first and last moment (of the meditational equipoise by reason of which we would emerge from the meditation after the last moment).

Moreover, there is a fixed order in the sequence of minds (that arise in the same continuum, but the order of the sequence is not so from another (of the sort) from which it must arise, (yet) minds of the sort can produce (minds of different sorts) because of different instance, suppose that a mind that forms the idea of a woman arises continua of minds of a monk and a layperson, respectively),

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and then immediately afterward there arises (in the monk's mental continuum) a mind that feels repelled by her body or (in the layperson's mental continuum) a mind that forms the ideas of her husband and son. In these cases, if at a later time in the changing (mental) continuum (of the monk or the layperson) a mind arises that forms the idea of the woman, it can give rise, (in the case of the monk,) to a mind that feels repelled by her body, or (in the case of the layperson, to) a mind that forms the ideas of her husband and son because of (the different) impressions (made on their respective mental continua on account of the ideas with which it was earlier associated). Otherwise, (without different impressions of these sorts,) the mind (that forms the idea of the woman) could not (give rise to these different minds).

Alternatively, (we may say that) although a mind that forms the idea of the woman may give rise to many different kinds of minds in different cases, only those minds arise which, (in their association with the mind that forms the idea of the woman,) are very common, (very intense,43) or recent, since the impressions (that are produced by these means) are more powerful (than impressions produced by less common, intense, or recent associations). The exception (to the rule) occurs when there is present a special bodily condition, (such as receiving a painful blow to the body,) or a special external condition, (such as encountering one's son, that inhibits the production of the mind associated in one of these ways with the mind that forms the idea of the woman.)44 This more powerful impression does not continually produce its (characteristic) result because it is a defining characteristic of causally conditioned phenomena to differ in character (from moment to moment) and this difference in character enables a (different) result to be produced (in the continuum of consciousnesses) from a different impression.

This is a mere portion of what can be known of all the workings of minds. A complete knowledge of the causes (of minds of different sorts) is the domain of the Buddhas. Thus it was said (by Sthavira Râhula, 45) that "Without omniscience we cannot know the great variety of causes of a single eye in a peacock's tail, (but) the omniscient one can know this." How much more then (are we ignorant of the great variety of causes of) the different kinds of minds, which lack bodily form!

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD

1.41 Why the Vaisesikas Cannot Explain How Consciousnesses of Different Character Arise From a Self

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The above objection may be levelled against those Tîrthikas, (the Vaiśeṣikas, 46) who believe that a mind (or consciousness) does arise from a self. In other words, from their view it follows that minds of exactly the same character will always arise or that minds (of different character) will arise in a fixed order in the way, for instance, that a leaf arises from a stem and the stem from a sprout.

If (they claim that minds of exactly the same character do not always arise) because (minds of different character arise from a self) in dependence upon (the self) being differently conjoined with an internal organ of perception, (we may reply that) they have not at all proved that a conjunction (between them exists that) is, (as they claim,) something other (than the things conjoined). Moreover, because two things which are conjoined are (in) separate (places) and they define conjunction as contact between things not previously in contact, a self (and an internal organ of perception) must be (in) separate (parts of the body, contrary to their claim that a self pervades the body). And (consequently,) when the internal organ of perception moves (from one sense organ to another, according to them, in order 10 perform its function of producing a perception of objects), a self either moves (out of its way), or it perishes, (since things that can exist in different parts of the body cannot exist in the same part. This result is contrary to their view that a self is immovable and imperishable).

Nor (can they say, in order to avoid this last result, that an internal organ of perception is) conjoined with a part (of a self, so that it can make contact with a part of a self with which it is not presently in contact), since they do not admit that a self has parts. And even if there could be a conjunction (with a part of the self), how could the conjunction differ in character, since (the parts of the self could not differ in character, and in their view) an internal organ of perception of the self could not help differs in character?

If they say (that the conjunction differs in character not because the self and internal organ of perception ever differ in character, but) conjunction and this conjunction is what) differs in character, they must her (explain how that prior cognition, which must also arise from the

self, can be of different characters. Hence, this retort will) face the same sort of objection we raised earlier. (For) how will these cognitions, (anymore than the aforementioned minds,) differ in character (if they are caused to arise from a self that never differs in character)?

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If they say (that these prior cognitions differ in character) because between a self and an internal organ of perception a conjunction arises under the influence of different sorts of motivating dispositions, why not let these (differences in cognition) arise from (previous) minds alone under the influence of different sorts of motivating dispositions? For we do not at all perceive a power of a self (to produce these differences). A self's power (to do this) would be like the power of "phûḥ svâha" uttered by a charlatan (to cure someone) when in fact the effect (he claims that it produces) is produced by medicine.

Their claim, (in response,) that neither (minds nor motivating dispositions) can exist unless a self exists, is mere words. They state that a self (must exist if they do, since it) is their support. But it cannot give support to them in the way that a wall supports a picture or a plate supports a piece of fruit, (the examples used to illustrate the idea of a support,) for it does not offer physical resistance to them or have a separate place.

We shall gladly accept the view that it is their support in the sense that earth supports odors and other sensible qualities, since we maintain that a self is not something other (than minds and motivating dispositions) in just the way that earth is not something other than its odors and other sensible qualities. For who could possibily discern earth that is something other than its odors and other qualities? We speak of odors and other sensible qualities of earth so that we can make a distinction (between earth and the other elements which are also comprised of these qualities). For these very odors and certain other sensible qualities are called earth so that we can become conscious of them (as earth) rather than as the other (elements). Likewise, we speak of the body of a wooden statue (even though the wooden statue is not something other than the body so that we can make a distinction between this body, which is a wooden statue, and a clay statue. This very body is called a wooden statue so that we can be conscious of it as a wooden statue rather than as a clay statue).

And if (they claim that the prior cognitions arise from a self, regardless of whether or not in conjunction with an internal organ of

perception,) under the influence of different sorts of motivating dispositions, why do not all (such) cognitions then arise simultaneously? (For a self, which is always the same in character, would produce all of the cognitions for which motivating dispositions are present.) They cannot say that a stronger (motivating disposition) blocks (the operation of) the others (and so prevents the simultaneous arising of all such cognitions), for (from their view it follows that) this stronger motivating disposition must then always produce its (characteristic) result (to the exclusion of others). They cannot argue (that the stronger motivating disposition does not continuously produce its result because) it is the nature of motivating dispositions (to differ in character from moment to moment), as we argued (above, that stronger impressions do not continuously produce their results because it is the nature of impressions to differ in character from moment to moment, 47 since) the (causal) function of a self as conceived by them would be negated.

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4.5 Why We Need Not Accept Their Claim that a Self Is Required as a Support of Qualities

(The Vaisesikas hold the view that) there must be a self, since a memory and other forms of cognition are qualities, qualities are supported by substances, and qualities (of this sort) cannot be supported by anything else (than the substance, a self).

However, the existence of qualities of this sort has yet to be proved. In our view, everything that exists is a substance, for it has been said, 'The fruits of religious practice are (the five purified aggregates and release from cyclic existence, ⁴⁸ which are) six kinds of substance." Nor can anyone prove that these (qualities, such as a memory and other forms of cognition,) are supported by a substance, since the notion of a support (of this sort) has already been subjected to analysis (and rejected). ⁴⁹ Therefore this (view) is unsubstantiated.

4.6 How, If There Is No Self, There Can Be a Person For Whose Sake and Action Is Undertaken

If there is no self, (they ask,) for whose sake is an action undertaken? That for whose sake an action is undertaken, (we agree, is to be expressed) in this way, "I would be happy and not suffer (if I should not perform this action)." The I (to which we refer in this

case, in our view,) is the object of the conception of an I. This object is (in fact) the aggregates.

The object of the conception of an I is known to be the aggregates (rather than a self) because it is to them, (not to a self,) that we are (in fact) attached (when we possess the conception of an I) and because, when we cognize (the body as) fair-skinned, and so on, the subject (said to be fair-skinned, and so on,) is the same (as the object of the conception of an I. Since we say,) "I am fair-skinned," "I am dark-skinned," "I am fat," "I am thin," "I am old," and "I am young," it is clear to us that, when we cognize (the body as) fair-skinned, and so on, the subject of these (attributes) is the same as this (object of the) conception of an I. Moreover, these attributes are not recognized (by the Vaisesikas) as belonging to a self. Therefore, we know that this (conception of an I) has the aggregates as its object.

4.61 Why The Vaiseṣikas' Account of How a Name for a Self Can Be Applied to the Body Fails to Show How the Conception of an I Applies to It

(The Vaiseṣikas attempt to avoid our counter-examples by claiming that although "I" is in fact) a name for a self, (in the above cases it) is applied figuratively to a body which acts on its behalf. Similarly, (they claim, a king can authorize a figurative application of "I" to the minister who acts on his behalf, by saying,) "My minister is (the same as) I myself."

But (their response fails, since) even if a name for a self is applied figuratively to what acts on its behalf, the conception of an I is not applied (figuratively to the aggregates, which cannot act on behalf of a self, which does not exist.)

4.62 How, With a Person's Body as an Objective Support, The Conception of an I Can be Applied to This Body and Not to Another

(They object that) since (we deny the existence of a self by reason of whose association with a particular body the conception of an I is applied to that body and not to another, and we believe that) a body is an objective support (for, or an object of, the conception of an I,) we cannot explain why the conception of an I (applies to a person's body, but) does not apply to another (sort of) body.

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patier Perforis rea (But we can, in our view, explain this,) since there is no connection (of the appropriate sort between the conception of an I present in the body-mind continuum of a person and a body present in some other continuum). This conception of an I arises only within (the continuum of) a body and mind related to it, and not elsewhere, since it is a habit (of mind) that exists in (the) beginningless cyclic existence (of that particular continuum). The connection (in question) is that of cause to effect.

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4.63 How, Without a Self to Possess It, the Conception of an I Can Arise

(They cannot object that) if there is no self, there is nothing to which the conception of an I belongs. (For) this question was already settled when we argued that there need be no self to which a memory belongs because a memory has a cause other than a self.⁵⁰ The cause (of the conception of an I) which is other (than a self) is a contaminated mind which has as its object its own continuum and is conditioned by a previous conception of an I (in that same continuum).

4.7 How, Without a Self as a Support, Feelings Can Have a Support

If there is no self, (they ask,) in what (support) does pleasure and pain arise? (For without a support, they claim, pleasure and pain cannot arise.)

There is a support, (we reply,) in which pleasure and pain arise in the way that flowers and fruit arise, respectively, in a tree and a garden, (which are, as their supports, merely collections of entities, not a single entity.) The supports of pleasure and pain, as we have explained, are the six (internal) bases of perception, (which are not a single entity, as a self is claimed to be.)

4.8 Why the Vaiśesikas Believe that If Persons Are Not Selves, They Cannot Be Agents of Actions and Patients that Experience Their Results

(The Vaisesikas object that we cannot deny that a person is a self, patient that experiences their results (and a person is an agent that is really meant by "agent" (and "patient") in this case? One cannot say

simply that an agent is what acts and a patient is what experiences a result, since these are the nominal rather than real meanings of the expressions.

(In response to the first half of our question the Vaiseṣikas claim that) the Lakṣaṇikas (correctly) define an agent as (an) independent (or first cause of actions and that only a self can be such a cause). Moreover, (the Vaiseṣikas add,) the world recognizes the existence of such independence in relation to its various effects, for instance, (recognizing the existence of the independence of) Devadatta in relation to his praying, eating, walking, and so on.

4.81 Why There Are No Agents of Actions

But in this (supposed) example (of what the world recognizes), the term "Devadatta" cannot refer to a self, whose existence is at issue, (since it needs to be proved that the Devadatta to which the world refers is an independent or first cause of praying, eating, walking, and so on;) and if it refers to the five aggregates, (as we claim it does,) the aggregates become the only agent. (So the Vaiśesikas cannot support their claim by the above appeal to what the world recognizes.)

(Nor can there be an agent as defined by the Laksanikas. For) the three kinds of actions (which are supposedly produced by a cause of this sort) are those of body, speech, and mind. And among these, actions of body, first of all, are dependent upon an action of mind, and an action of mind that gives rise to the actions of body is dependent upon its own cause, (a prior mind which itself arises in dependence upon its causes, and so on. Actions of speech are also dependent in the same way upon an action of mind, which is dependent upon its own causally conditioned cause, and so on.) Since even an action of mind is dependent in this way (on its own causally conditioned cause), there is no independence (or primary causality) among any of these (causes of actions of body, speech, or mind). For everything happens in dependence upon causal conditions.

Nor is the independence (or primary causality) of a self that is (defined as an) independent (cause) established, since its causality cannot be assumed, (as we have already argued.) ⁵² Therefore, no agent so defined is perceived (to exist).

But should the principal cause (of an action of body, for instance,) be called an agent, then since we do not at all perceive a self to be a

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longe (T cause (in this sense), a self is not even an agent in this sense. A self contributes nothing to the arising of an action (of body), for from a memory (of an object) a desire (to obtain the object) arises, (and this desire is the principal cause of an action of body. For) from this desire in turn arises a consideration (of how to satisfy the desire), and from this consideration there arises first an effort of the mind (to move the body for the sake of satisfying the desire), then (a movement in the) wind (channels), and (from this movement there arises,) finally, an action (of body).

482 Why a Self Cannot Be a Patient that Experiences the Results of Actions

(Nor could a person be a self because only a self can be a patient that experiences the result of an action and a person is a patient that experiences the result of an action, for) in what would a self's experience of the result consist? (It surely would consist in) a perception (of the result); but a self cannot (be said to) perceive (anything), since we have already refuted the view that it possesses a consciousness (of an object).53

4.83 Why, Without a Self to Distinguish Them, Sentient Beings Accumulate Merit and Beings Without Sentience Do Not

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(They object that) if there is no self, why do not beings without sentience, (which lack a self,) accumulate merit and demerit, (since sentient beings, which in our view also lack a self, accumulate merit and demerit)?

(But we believe that) beings without sentience (cannot accumulate ment and demerit because they) lack the support (required) for the feelings (which are the results that arise from accumulating merit and demerit). The supports in question, as we have already stated, are the six (internal) bases of perception.54

4.9 How, Without a Self, Actions Can Produce Their Results

If there is no self, (the Vaisesikas object,) how can an action that no longer exists produce a result in the future? (Let us reply, first of all, With the question that) if there is a self, how can an action that no longer exists produce a result in the future?

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supports the merit or demerit (which is produced by the action and directly causes the result). But, as we have already pointed out, a self cannot support them, (since it does not support them in the way a wall supports a picture or a plate supports a piece of fruit.) 55 Therefore, (since a result is produced,) it must be produced from the merit or demerit without (a self as) a support!

(Secondly,) we do not claim that an action which no longer exists can produce a result in the future. (Our view is that) a result arises from an action because of a development peculiar to the continuum of the action.

In the same way, (for instance,) a fruit (arises) from a seed. We say that the fruit arises from the seed, but not that it arises from a seed that no longer exists or that the fruit arises directly from the seed itself. The fruit arises from the seed because of a development peculiar to the continuum of the seed: the seed produces a sprout, the sprout a stem, the stem leaves, and the leaves the flower, (which is the development that produces the fruit). Although the fruit arises from the flower, we say that it arises from its seed because the seed has indirectly transmitted to the flower the power (to produce the fruit). For if the flower would not have obtained this power from the seed, it could not have produced a fruit of the same sort (that produced the seed that produced it).

Similarly, we say that a result arises from an action, but not that it arises from an action that no longer exists or that the result arises directly from the action itself. The result arises from the action because of a development peculiar to the continuum of the action. This continuum is the appearance of a sequence of minds which arises from the prior action, and a development in it is the production of a mind of a different character (in the next moment). Since (the mind with) the power to produce the result in the next moment is distinguished as the last development (in the production of the result), it is (called) the development peculiar (to the continuum of an action).

4.91 How Contaminated Actions Cause Rebirth

For instance, at (the moment of) death a mind that is burdened with attachment has the power to produce a new life. (This mind is a development peculiar to the continuum of a prior action.) Among the

various kinds ⁵⁶ of prior actions (which can give rise to this development), the powers of the weighty, the recent, and the habitual (to produce a new life) dominate those of other kinds. Thus it was said (by Sthavira Râhula, ⁵⁷) that "Among actions (which produce rebirth) in cyclic existence, those which are weighty produce their results first, then those which are recent, those which are habitual, and finally those performed at an earlier time."

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492 When Actions and the Minds that Motivate Them Lose Their Causal Power

These actions, which cause effects that require maturation, lose their power to produce such effects once they produce them. But the afflicted (minds), which (contaminate the actions they motivate, and in the next moment) produce (as) effects (minds) like themselves, lose their power to produce effects like themselves (when the afflictions are destroyed) by the antidotes (to the afflictions). The unafflicted (minds, which do not contaminate actions, but continue to produce as effects minds like themselves,) lose their power (to produce such minds in the next moment) when final release from cyclic existence is achieved, since (at that time) the continuum of minds is totally extinguished.

4.93 Why the Results of Actions Do Not Themselves Produce Further Results

An effect that requires maturation does not produce another effect requiring maturation in the way that an effect such as a seed produces another effect (such as a sprout). In the first place, not everything (that is an effect of a cause) is like the example (of the seed, which is said to produce a sprout, since not all effects are causes). Secondly, even in this example (of the seed) another effect (such as a sprout) does not arise again simply from the effect (in question, the seed), but from a special alteration produced (in the continuum of the effect) by a special (sort of) decay, for this (special alteration) is the (actual) seed which produces the sprout, not the other (seed, in whose continuum to the effect) is called a seed because it will give rise to the (actual) Analogously, (within the continuum of the aggregates one effect

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that requires maturation does not arise simply from another. For instance, within) a contaminated (continuum of minds, a) virtuous alteration of mind may arise from an effect that requires maturation, (but) only if it arises from a special causal condition (that affects the continuum of the original effect, a condition) such as (an action of) studying proper teachings, and a base alteration of mind may arise from an effect of this sort only if it arises from a special causal condition (that affects the continuum of the original effect, a condition) such as (an action of) studying improper teachings. In these cases another effect that requires maturation can again arise, but not otherwise. This is the similarity.

Alternatively, we may understand (why an effect that requires maturation does not by itself produce another such effect) in the following way. Just as a red keśara fruit, which is produced by a development peculiar to its continuum, arises from a mâtulunga flower which has been stained by a red dye, yet another (red keśara fruit) does not arise again from this fruit, (unless the flower that arises later in its continuum is stained by the red dye,) so from an effect requiring maturation produced by an action another effect requiring maturation does not again arise (unless its continuum has been altered by a special causal condition).

This is a coarse explanation, in accord with my (limited) understanding, of how (the) continua (of aggregates), when perfumed by actions of different kinds and strengths, give forth their characteristic results. This subject is understood (completely) only by the Buddhas. (For) it has been said, "An action, its course of development, the final state of its development, and the results of this state none but the Buddha knows fully and without error."

5 Concluding Verses

Those free of (the) blindness (of ignorance) achieve (release from cyclic existence) by perceiving this essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, (the teachings on selflessness that are) faultless because well-formed on the path of reason, and by rejecting the doctrines of Tîrthikas, who are blind (with ignorance) and put into practice, in various ways, false theories (of persons).

Selflessness is the only road to the city of release from cyclic

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existence; it is illuminated by the shining words of the sun, the Tathâgata, and traversed by a multitude of Âryas; but the poor-sighted (Vâtsîputrîyas and Tîrthikas) fail to see the (road of) selflessness that lies open (to all).

What little I have explained here (about selfless persons is drawn from the treatises on knowledge. It) is for the very wise. It is like a wound (that provides the opportunity) for poison to spread (throughout the body) by its own power. (Let this treatise provide the opportunity for the doctrine of selflessness to spread by its own power throughout the body of our spiritual community.)

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NOTES

Seeing (oneself as) a self (*âtmadṛṣṭi*) is, for Vasubandhu, a beginningless disposition of unliberated persons to believe that they are substantially real, i.e. that they possess natures of their own, irreducible to any nature possessed by the varigated physical and mental phenomena in reliance upon which they form this belief.

The text may be more literally translated as follows: "Is there indeed no liberation elsewhere than here? There is not. Why? Because of having entered into seeing a self." The additions made to my less literal translation above are drawn from Yaśomitra's commentary, which refers the initial question back to the last part of the last verse of chapter eight, in which Vasubandhu enjoins those who seek liberation to practice the leachings of the Buddha.

Although in this treatise Vasubandhu tends to use the term, "self" (âtman), as a lechnical expression for what the Tirthikas falsely believe to be a person, i.e. a permanent, partless substance, or for what the Vâtsîputrîyas call a person, i.e. a Substance whose existence is neither reducible to, nor ascertainable independently of, the aggregates, here it is used in a non-technical way. The above two technical senses of selfof self, respectively, the Tibetans call the gross and the subtle senses, and claim that, according to Vasubandhu, it is in the subtle sense of "self" that unliberated individuals see themselves as selves, while the Tîrthikas' notion of self is contrived. Vasubandhu represents the Vâtsîputrîyas as using "self" as a technical expression for what limbigant to the Vâtsîputrîyas as using "self" as a technical expression for what Tinhikas falsely believe to be a person and for what unliberated individuals see hemselves to be, while using the term, "person" (pudgala), to refer to what they themselves by the service of t themselves believe a person actually to be. Because Vasubandhu believes that a person, as person, as conceived by the Vâtsîputrîyas, is a self, he will, when criticizing their lick, often references New, often refer to what they call a person as a self. Finally, since in Buddhist supplying self. schiptures "self" and "person" are used interchangeably for something whose existence vasubandhy by Vasubandhu believes to be irreducible to that of the aggregates, Vasubandhu will, specially with typicially when commenting on such scriptures, often follow the scriptural usage, although in other comments on such scriptures, often follow the scriptural way so that though in other contexts he tends to use "person" in a non-technical way so that he can say that he ^(Sa) in other contexts he tends to use "person" in a non-teenment vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's argument assumes that if there is a referent for the term, "self" (or Person"), it must be one or more of the bases upon which we refer to it. Since the

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only bases of reference for the term he can find at a given time, using direct perception and sound inference, are the aggregates, and the person is conventionally conceived to be the same over time, the referent of "self" (or "person"), he concludes, must be the continuum of these aggregates, which are bound together into a continuum by causal ties. Direct perception (pratyakṣa) and sound inference (anumâṇa) are two of the three sources of knowledge (pramâṇa-s) recognized by Vasubandhu, the third being scripture (âgama). Yaśomitra claims that Vasubandhu does not here mention scripture because it is included within sound inference. P'u-kuang believes that Vasubandhu does not mention it because he is addressing this argument to the Tîrthikas.

⁵ Yasomitra suggests that Vasubandhu does not include a proof for the claim that the other cause is an organ of sense perception because it has been established by the great sages (maharsi-s) through one of the higher forms of knowledge (specifically, pranidhijnāna) and because it has not been disputed by anyone.

6 Yasomitra glosses vâtsîputrîyâ as âryasammatîyâh, but what exactly this gloss means is not clear, since the identity of the latter is a moot question. Both the former and the latter are often also called Pudgalavâdins, i.e. proponents of the view that persons really exist. Stcherbatsky and others tend to lump together the Pudgalavâdins discussed by Vasubandhu with those discussed in our other ancient sources, especially in the Therâvadin work, the Kathâvatthu. But the Pudgalavâdins discussed in the Kathâvatthu seem to be claiming, at least sometimes, that a person does not exist apart from the aggregates in reliance upon which it is named and conceived, while the Pudgalavâdins discussed by Vasubandhu consistently claim that a person cannot be said not to exist apart from such aggregates, since it could then be said to be the same as them. Stcherbatsky fails to distinguish these two claims not only in his footnotes, but also in his translation.

⁷ Both the Vâtsîputrîyas and Vasubandhu accept the Buddha's doctrine that persons are selfless. But the self the Vâtsîputrîyas claim we mistakenly suppose ourselves to be, according to Tibetan sources, is a partless, permanent phenomenon that can exist apart from the aggregates. They seem to believe that persons are irreducible phenomena, but cannot be said to be partless, permanent, or something other than their aggregates. Vasubandhu here means to call attention to their view that persons exist in a way other than he believes is sanctioned by scripture.

* Vasubandhu believes that what is substantially real (dravyasat) is an ultimate reality (paramârthasatya), which is a phenomenon with a nature of its own, and hence is not reducible to a collection of substances possessed of natures of different sorts. What is real in name or concept only (prajñaptisat) is a deceptive conventional reality (samvrtisatya), which appears to be an ultimate reality but is reducible to a collection of substances possessed of natures of different sorts. When a consciousness perceives a causally efficacious collection of dependently co-arising substances possessed of natures of different sorts, it produces in the next moment in the same continuum of consciousnesses another consciousness that grasps the collection as a substance, an entity that possesses a nature of its own by virtue of which the substances in the collection are unified as parts of a single substance. Since a name is given to the collection as a whole on the basis of this misconception, the collection, when so named and misconceived, is said to be real in name or concept only.

⁹ Jinamitra understood the Sanskrit text he possessed to mean: "Consequently, if a person is substantially real, it will possess a different nature (than they possess). So it must be said that it is other than the aggregates. If it is other than the aggregates in

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD

the way that each of them is other than the others, its causes should be explained." The Sanskrit text we have does not convey this meaning.

The Sanskin text and the Sanskin text are sansking to a verse by Dharmakîrti to yasoning the yason which is unaffected by rain or heat, would be show that a person is the world. P'u-kuang says that if a person is causally uncondi-

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Rocherbatsky mistranslates skandhân upâdâya pudgala prajñapyate, which I have translated as "a person is named and conceived in reliance upon aggregates," as "we give the name of an Individual to something conditioned by the elements." The source of this mistranslation would seem to be Stcherbatsky's belief that the theory of nersons discussed here must be the same as the Pudgalavadin theory discussed in the Kathávatthu.

Since all causally conditioned phenomena, even those not associated with a self. are included in the aggregates, the Indian Buddhists distinguished aggregates that are associated with a self (adhyâtmika) from those that are not. In his commentary on I. 39a-b. Vasubandhu explains that there are twelve elements (dhâtu-s) associated with a self, namely, the six kinds of consciousnesses of objects and their respective kinds of organs, and that the self with which they are said to be associated is in fact only the mind (citta) which is the foundation of the conception of an I (ahamkâra), not a substantially real person. The Vâtsîputrîyas, presumably, agree that these twelve elements are associated with a self, but would argue that the self with which they are associated is in fact the person whose inexplicable character they defend rather than a parliess, permanent, and independently existent phenomenon. Analogously, only those aggregates associated with a self are counted as the bases of reference for the name or concept of a person.

In Vasubandhu's commentary on I, 34d, what is "appropriated" (upâtta) is said to be what is grasped at (upagrhîta) by minds and mental concomitants (citta-s and caitasika-s). The Vâtsîputrîyas, however, believe that there is a person that mistakenly appropriates the aggregates as possessions for use by a partless, permanent phenomenon which exists apart from the aggregates. It is this same person, in their view, that can learn to abandon the contaminated aggregates and free itself from suffering. More literally, "and exist in the present." The point would seem to be that the Valsiputriyas believe that the aggregates in reliance upon which a person is named or conceived are those that exist at the very moment the person is being named or conceived, not those that exist at the very moment the person at the per

According to Yasomitra this example is used by the Vâtsîputrîyas as part of an explanate of the vâtsîputrîyas a explanation of how a person is substantially real. But in section 2.1, paragraph 2, Vasubandia. Vasubandhu represents them as denying that a person is either substantially real or real in name and concept only. Perhaps Yasomitra attributes this view to them under the assumption that their theory of persons commits them to it. I shall take his comments in comments, in any case, to mean that their analogy is used as part of an explanation of how a person really exists.

Yasomitra tells us that their view is that a person is named and conceived "in the lines with their view is that a person is named and conceived "in the lines with their view is that a person is named and conceived "in the lines with the lines wi reliance upon what it appropriates for itself" (svam upâdânam upâdâya), just as a fire inplications of the reliance upon the fuel it ignites. If we may take the full implications of this comment seriously, they claim that a person really exists because is an appropriator or acquirer of aggregates. In other words, they seem to believe that a person must really exist because it is an agent of the action of appropriating the agencial services because it is an agent of the action of appropriating the services because it is an agent of the action of appropriating the services because it is an agent of the action of appropriating the services because it is an agent of the action of appropriating the services are also account to the action of appropriating the services are also account to the action of appropriating the agencies are also account to the action of appropriating the action of action of actions action actions are actions action actions action actions action actions action actions action actions action actions actions actions action actions actions actions actions action actions actio aggregales. But since it cannot be said to be or not to be something other than what it appropriates, it is like fire, which also really exists as an agent and yet cannot be said to be or not to be something other than the fuel it ignites. Stcherbatsky, I believe. mistranslates Yasomitra's comment, that a person is named and conceived in reliance upon what it appropriates for itself, as the claim that the existence of a person is "conditioned by the existence of its own causes - the elements."

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16 P'u-kuang says that the Vâtsîputrîyas believe that since fuel does possess heat, the fire cannot be said to be other than its fuel, and that since an agent cannot be the

same as its patient, the fire cannot be said to be the same as its fuel.

¹⁷ The Vâtsîputrîyas would seem to believe that since a person's aggregates are merely a collection of causally related momentary phenomena, they lack the unity and identity over time required of a person as conventionally conceived. In other words. they seem to be claiming that the reduction of a person to the aggregates, which lack the nature required of a person, is tantamount to the denial of a person's conventional existence. On this interpretation, they are claiming that Vasubandhu's reductionist theory of persons is a disguised version of the nihilistic extreme.

18 Following Yasomitra and Fa-pao, rather than P'u-kuang, who attributes what is expressed in this and the next two sentences to the Vâtsîputrîyas, I attribute it to Vasubandhu, who is giving reasons why the Vâtsîputrîyas cannot identify fuel and fire with what is commonly called fuel and fire. Stcherbatsky and Poussin follow P'u-

kuang's interpretation.

¹⁹ Among the eight elements from which bodies are composed are the four primary elements (mahâbhûta-s), called fire, air, water, and earth. These are momentary elements which in combination enter into the constitution of every body. Each of these has its own defining characteristic (laksana) by which it is known, fire by heat, air by motion, water by cohesion or attraction, and earth by hardness or repulsion. The remaining four, called the secondary elements (bhautika-s), are the momentary elements that comprise what we call the sensible qualities of such bodies, and they are perceived, respectively, by sight, smell, taste, and touch. The defining characteristics of the four elements are themselves counted as objects of touch. If and when a body makes a sound, it will also contain momentary elements that comprise its sound. Every body is composed of at least the first eight.

Here I follow Stcherbatsky in interpreting Vasubandhu as representing the Vâtsiputriyas' claim, that a fire is the heat present in ignited flammable materials, as equiva-

lent to the claim that it is the element called fire.

21 Stcherbatsky's translation obscures this point because it attributes to the Vâtsîputrîyas the view that a person does not exist unless its aggregates exist. Vasubandhu in fact represents them as claiming that a person cannot be named or conceived unless its aggregates are present, not that it cannot exist if they do not exist. They reason, it seems, that if a person cannot exist unless the aggregates exist, it must cease to exist when they do, and since, when the non-cyclic existence of a person is achieved, the aggregates cease to exist, the liberation of a person would be its extinction. The Vâtsîputrîyas try to avoid this problem, it seems, by claiming that it cannot be said that a person does or does not exist unless the aggregates are present.

²² See section 2.21, paragraph 2.

23 Literally, "It has already been said that if fire were something other than fuel, fuel could not become hot. What does this 'hot' mean?" Stcherbatsky and Poussin interpret the first sentence as the Vâtsîputrîyas' attempt to deny that they are committed to a real difference between fuel and fire. However, Vasubandhu has just argued that

their identification of fire with the fire element, and of fuel with the other three eletheir identification in the ignited materials, entails that fire and fuel are other than one another. why would they reply that they have already argued that fire and fuel are not other why would die another, since such a reply would merely show that their prior statement is inconsistent with the account of fire and fuel they have just given? It seems better to suppose that Vasubandhu here is simply giving a third argument against the identificasuppose that the fire element, and fuel with is co-existent elements, in ignited ma-

18 Stcherbatsky believes, in line with his interpretation of this and the previous paragraph (see fn. 23), that in this sentence the Vâtsîputrîyas are claiming that there is no problem with the view that the fire element is other than the other three elements, since the fuel can become hot by combining with the fire element. He then interprets the next sentence as Vasubandhu drawing the conclusion, from their explanation of how fuel can become hot, that they have identified both fire and its fuel with the ignited materials. However, the use of atha punah in the next sentence strongly suggests that an alternative account of fire and fuel is being presented.

35 Stcherbatsky is alone in supposing that in section 2.3 Vasubandhu is claiming that the Valsiputriyas must accept the idea that a person belongs to a fifth category of objects of knowledge, and that the Vâtsîputrîyas reject Vasubandhu's claim by arguing that a person cannot be so classified. The Vâtsîputrîyas' classification would seem to indicate that when they say that a phenomenon is inexplicable (avaktavya) they mean that it is unclassifiable either as a causally conditioned phenomenon or as a causally unconditioned phenomenon.

My additions are meant to show how Vasubandhu arrives at this final conclusion. lis doubtful, however, that the step supplied would be accepted by the Vâtsîputrîyas, for whom a person neither is nor is not the same as the aggregates, either individually or as a collection.

The extensive additions to the argument in this section are based on the commenlary of Yasomitra.

According to Hsüan-tsang, who is followed by Poussin, the thought expressed in this sentence is that the Vâtsîputrîyas err when they say that an organ of sight sees a Person because then it must see a self "in" (yu) what is selfless, since a visible form, which is what is seen by means of an organ of sight, is selfless. But the Sanskrit text we have says, and this is confirmed by Yasomitra's commentary, that the erroneous implication of the Vâtsîputrîyas' statement is that we see a self "by means of what is selless" (and this is confirmed by rasolititals confirmed by selless" (anâtmanâ). So the error thought to be entailed is that the organ of sight is not selfless. My addition to the translation is meant to give a reasonable sense to the argument.

Yasomitra says that these examples are meant to illustrate that a person is real in name or concept only both at a given moment in the continuum of the aggregates and also from moment. also from moment to moment. Fa-pao says that both together illustrate that a person is nothing but its aggregates.

See section 2.6, paragraph 1.

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Poussin follows the interpretative translation of Hsüan-tsang, who makes the earlier of aggregation of the burden, since they are et of aggregates the carrier of the burden and the later set the burden, since they are contaminated by the earlier. The Sanskrit text and Yasomitra's commentary support the translation I have given. My completion of the quotation is drawn from the Ariguttara Nikâya, I, 22.

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33 Identified by Yasomitra.

- ³⁴ Here I use the better known title of this king, "Milinda," rather than "Kalinga," which is found in the text.
- 35 Identified by Yasomitra.

36 The story is told by Yasomitra.

³⁷ The reference, Yasomitra makes clear, is to the followers of Nâgârjuna's version of the Buddhist philosophy of "the middle way." It is not clear why Vasubandhu omits a discussion of their view that the aggregates do not really exist.

Vasubandhu after this point continues his debate with the Vâtsîputrîyas, here I end the second part of his discussion, which has considered the objections of the Vâtsîputrîyas in particular. Hereafter, having replied to the Vâtsîputrîyas' objections, Vasubandhu widens the discussion to a consideration of objections raised by Tîrthikas. Although the Vâtsîputrîyas may have been convinced by some of the objections of the Tîrthikas to reject the theory of persons held by the Vaibhâsikas and Vasubandhu, and so may have used some of these very objections, since none of the views expressed or implied by Vasubandhu's adversaries after this point presuppose a Buddhist framework of any sort, I shall suppose that the objections of the Tîrthikas are now to be taken up.

A sign that this change has in fact taken place is that the term "self" is hereafter used in place of "person" in statements of the opponent's theories and objections, and the Vâtsîputrîyas have to this point been represented as presenting and defending the view that a person, not a self, exists. Although he takes the Vâtsîputrîyas' theory that persons really exist to imply that a self exists and criticizes their theory on that basis, Vasubandhu is careful not to use the term, "self," in statements of their theory.

In his commentary on II, 36c, Vasubandhu rejects the Vaibhâsika view that there are special substances, called *prâpti* and *aprâpti*, the first of which binds causes and effects into a single continuum, and the second of which prevents them from being members of any other continuum. His own view is that the cause-effect relationships between the members of a continuum are sufficient to bind them together and prevent them from being members of other continua.

⁴⁰ Identified by Yasomitra as Vasubandhu's opponents here. Hsüan-tsang identifies them as the Sâmkhyas.

⁴¹ The verb, *vijânâti*, connotes an action performed by an agent, and for this reason, apparently, Steherbatsky translates it as "cognises." I prefer to retain in English translation its connection to the noun, *vijñâna*, which I translate as "a consciousness."

⁴² Stcherbatsky identifies these Tîrthikas as the Sâmkhyas.

The text used by Yasomitra seems to have contained "very intense" (patutaram) at this point.

44 The examples are from Fa-pao.

45 Identified by Yasomitra.

46 Identified by Yasomitra.

47 See section 4.4, penultimate paragraph.

48 From Yasomitra's commentary.

See section 4.41, paragraph 5.

50 See section 4.2.

⁵¹ Yasomitra refers us to Vasubandhu's commentary on I, 45, where it is said that the six internal bases of perception, i.e. the six organs of perception, are the supports of

their associated consciousnesses of objects, since the consciousnesses are different in character when their respective objects are different in character. Since a difference in character in an organ of perception will also produce a difference in character in the corresponding consciousness' mental concomitant of feeling, that organ can be said to be its support.

2 See section 4.41.

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- 55 See section 4.23.
- 54 See section 4.7.
- 55 See section 4.1.
- Here I read vividha for trividha because the Chinese and Tibetan translations seem to have assumed the latter, and this reading makes more sense of the thought of the passage.
- ⁵⁷ Identified by Yasomitra.

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JÑĀNASVARŪPA IS ĀTMASVARŪPA: ADVAITINS RESPOND TO RĀMĀNUJA'S CRITIQUE

INTRODUCTION

This is the first of two related articles dealing with the debate between the followers of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita concerning the nature of the Self. The present article discusses the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of consciousness and understanding of the meaning of the word "I". The forthcoming article, to be published in this journal, has its specific focus on the question of how these two traditions approach the issue of the existence of the Self during the state of deep sleep. In both of these articles I have principally drawn upon the primary sources: for the presentation of Advaita I have relied upon Śaṅkara and, to a lesser extent, Sureśvara; in the presentation of Viśiṣṭādvaita I have followed Yāmuna and Rāmānuja. The novel feature of these articles is that I have brought the debate up to the present. I have looked at the recent writings of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita scholars on these issues, as presented in modern Sanskrit philosophical literature.

The first of these modern authors is Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudevašāstrī Abhyankar (1863—1942), a renowned scholar from Pune. In 1918 he published an important work, Advaitāmoda, wherein, after presenting an overview of Advaita and Višiṣṭādvaita, he mounts a sustained critique of the arguments which Rāmānuja had advanced against Advaita.¹ Abhyankar had previously studied the Višiṣṭādvaita doctrines in detail: he had published an edition of the Śrībhāṣya and he had also composed a commentary upon the catussūtrī portion of the Śrībhāṣya as well as upon the Višiṣṭādvaita manual of teachings, Yatindramatadīpikā.² The Advaitāmoda was not left unchallenged. In 1940 a well known scholar from Madras, Uttamūr T. Vīrarāghavācārya, the ditions and commentaries, published a reply to the Advaitāmoda in a work titled Paramārthaprakāśikā.³ I shall draw upon the pertinent

lounnal of Indian Philosophy 17: 189—206, 1989.

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I have drawn upon the work of another recent author, Bellankonda Rāmarāyakavi (1875—1915), who wrote a number of Sanskrit works including a valuable commentary upon the *Gītābhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Most of his works were not published during his lifetime but in 1953 his major work was published, Śrīśaṅkarāśaṅkarabhāṣyavimarśaḥ⁴ This is an illuminating book for a number of reasons: it contains a cutting critique of Rāmānuja and his commentator Sudarśanasūri; it also provides a useful restatement of certain aspects of Advaita and it is written in a Sanskrit style which is both lucid and lively.

These articles concentrate on only one such point of contention, though a very fundamental one, the real meaning of the word "I". I have made considerable effort to present the ideas of both traditions with accuracy and clarity. I have not felt constrained, however, to pretend to be a neutral spectator in this debate and I have entered into the debate from time to time on the side of the Advaitin. I believe this is justified in the context of these philosophical articles. It should be remembered that Advaita and Visiṣṭādvaita are living traditions and the debate between them — on matters some of which are of fundamental importance — has continued up until recent times. I therefore consider that it is admissable, without compromising the demands of scholarship, to participate in the life of this debate.

I

Awareness

According to Advaita, the nature of absolute reality — which is designated in the Upanisads by such terms as Brahman and ātman — is of the nature of pure Awareness. The term "pure Awareness" is meant to indicate Awareness free from all objective factors and relations. Any predicative relation above and beyond the simple, non-verbal, yet immediate knowledge of Being, is not "pure Awareness". When all the objective conceptions of this or that are negated from I, the I that remains is identical to pure Awareness. According to Śańkara, in statements like "I am fat", "I am white", etc., a person superimposes the attributes of the body on the Self. So too, in statements like: "I am

deaf", "I am blind", etc. a person superimposes the attributes of the senses upon the Self. In statements which express desire, resolve, doubt and ascertainment, etc., a person superimposes the attributes of the internal-organ (antahkaraṇa) on the Self. Moreover even the ego, the individual "I" sense, — which is directly expressed in such statements as "I know", "I am going", etc. — is an attribute of the internalorgan and is superimposed on the Self who, as pure Awareness, is the "witness" of the ego. According to Śaṅkara, our entire ordinary relations (vyavahāra) are the result of a natural, mutual superimposition: the attributes of the body, senses and mind are attributed to the Self and the sentiency of the Self is attributed to the insentient body, senses and mind.⁵

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This pure Awareness, when conditioned by the internal-organ (sopādhikacaitanya), becomes the particularized awareness, the individual ego, who is directly evident in such statements as "I know", etc. This awareness is actually a form of mental activity (vṛttijñāna), it has a beginning as well as an end and the Advaitin makes no claim for its permanence. Thus there are "two types" of Awareness: pure Awareness, Brahman [the actual Self], and mental activity, which is figuratively called "awareness" because it is Awareness reflected in, or conditioned by, the internal-organ.

The Advaitin maintains that because nothing more can be predicated to Awareness apart from its Being, Awareness has no distinguishing characteristics, and in the absence of distinguishing characteristics no division can be established within Awareness. If Awareness has some property, like size or colour, then it is possible to distinguish this Awareness" from "that Awareness". But if Awareness has no such properties then it follows that difference cannot be established within Awareness. Advaitins maintain that Awareness is "not two" and hence is identical in all beings. Sankara, commenting upon the third pāda of verse nineteen, chapter five, of the Bhagavadgītā: "Since Brahman is without defect and equal", states:

Nor even [is Brahman] divided due to the differences of Its qualities, because consciousness is free from qualities. And the Lord will state (13.6.) that desires and because of having no beginning and because of being free from qualities. Nor even a telepre "ultimate particulars" (antya viśeṣa) which bring about distinctions in the

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Self, because there is no logical possibility of proving that they exist in relation to each body. 8

Sankara says that Awareness is without qualities because the Gītā itself (13.6.) teaches that: "desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, the aggregate [of body and senses], cognition, fortitude . . . is this field (kṣetra) . . .", that is, they are attributes of the body and its components (kṣetra) but they are not attributes of the Self. Śaṅkara also says that there are no "ultimate particulars" (antyaviśeṣa) — ultimate differentiating characteristics which, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, inhere in every atom making every entity discrete — which can establish a difference in the Self, Awareness, because there is no way to prove that such ultimate particulars exist. Hence Awareness has no essential distinguishing characteristics; it is therefore single in nature.

Visistādvaitins have a very different conception of the nature of Brahman and the nature of the self. They do not accept the existence of an attributeless Awareness which is the reality of everything and the true Self of all beings. For followers of Visistādvaita, Brahman means Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa: the personal Lord who possesses limitless auspicious qualities. The self is not pure Awareness (jñaptimātra), but the knowing subject (ahamartha)⁹, who is atomic in size and different in each body. Though souls are similar in nature, they have a unique individuality too subtle to express but which can be known by each soul itself.¹⁰

In the *Laghu* and *Mahāsiddhānta* portions of the *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja set out to refute the views of the Advaitins in order to establish the validity of his own position. As part of his refutation he seeks to demolish the very idea of a "distinctionless Awareness" as well as the conception that the Self could be mere Awareness. We shall commence our examination of Rāmānuja's arguments towards the end of his discussion of Awareness and follow the debate through the topic of the nature of the Self.

In order to prove that Awareness contains distinctions, Rāmānuja questions the Advaitin¹¹: "Is Awareness proved [to be existent] or not?" That is to say, is Awareness cognized or not? Rāmānuja says: "If it is proved, it must have attributes" because Rāmānuja has previously argued that all the means of knowledge, perception, inference and

verbal testimony, have as their object something possessing distinction. He then says: "If not, it must be bereft of existence like a sky-flower etc." Seeking to avoid both of these problems Rāmānuja's opponent replies: "Suppose that Awareness (samvid) is itself proof (siddhi) [i.e. the cognition of its own existence]." That is to say, if Awareness is just what is meant by cognition (siddhi) then both defects can be avoided. Because a cognition does not require another cognition in order to be revealed and so a cognition cannot be said to "possess distinction" since only what is an object of knowledge can be said to possess distinction. Nor can Awareness be said to be bereft of existence since it is identical to a self-revealing cognition.

Rāmānuja replies that if Awareness is the same as cognition, then Awareness must be said to have a locus and an object because a cognition is always relational: it belongs to someone and it has reference to something. The opponent then replies that the cognition belongs to the Self. Rāmānuja inquires: "And who is the Self?" The opponent says: "Have we not said [that the Self] is just Awareness." Rāmānuja then clinches the argument:

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True, it was said. But it is badly said. To explain: since the nature of proof [i.e. cognition] is that it belongs to some person and has reference to a number of objects, how can that awareness which [being cognition] is connected to both of those [the Person and the object] experience that it is the Self?

The opponent has said that Awareness is identical to cognition — which is always relational — and now the opponent says that the Self is Awareness. Therefore the Awareness which is the Self is relational, it must be an awareness which belongs to someone and be in relation to something. So how could an awareness which belongs to the Self be the Self?

How can the Advaitin respond to this dilemma? It is not difficult, because Rāmānuja has skilfully developed a sham argument. The Advaitin, as we have seen, upholds "two types" of Awareness: cognilional, and Awareness (vṛttijñāna) which is mental activity and always relational, and Awareness per se. The Advaitin would not, therefore, him do so. The conclusion which Rāmānuja develops cannot be seriously directed against the Advaitin.

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M. M. Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar wrote a critique of Rāmānuja's arguments against Advaita in his work *Advaitāmoda*. In his discussion of the passage we have cited, Abhyankar firstly reaffirms the distinction between cognitive activity and Awareness and he then attempts to prove the existence of a fundamental, distinctionless, Awareness:

The proof [i.e. cognition] which can be said to belong to someone and be in reference to something is a particular proof conforming to ordinary relations (*vyavahāra*). And the universal proof, which is the basis and life-giver of all particular proofs, that alone is Awareness. It does not depend upon a locus [i.e. it does not "belong to someone"]. Nor even does it depend upon determining [an object] [i.e. it is not "in reference to something"]. The Self is just Awareness which is universal. But Awareness is not an attribute of the Self. Since even the relation of location and located exists only in the state of the particular, therefore a relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be said in the state of the universal. And since distinctions are invariably preceded by their universal, the nature of the universal which has been spoken of must necessarily be adhered to and certainly cannot be denied.¹²

Abhyankar explains the Advaita distinction between cognitive awareness and Awareness *per se* as the distinction between the particular and the universal, i.e., what is most general. He argues that a particular is preceded by, i.e., presupposes, what is more general in nature. And so a particular awareness possessing distinction must be ultimately preceded by its universal which is Awareness free from particulars and without distinction. The inferential relation between the particular and its universal is a very important argument for Abhyankar and he employs it frequently. He has stated it succinctly in this manner:

Freedom from distinction is certainly established even by inference which is based upon the pervasion: "any particular has what is universal as its material cause. Just as pots and earthenware dishes, etc. have their material cause in clay which is their universal".¹³

The reasoning is that the material cause of any number of particular things must be inherently free from the attributes of those things. Clay, for instance, as the material cause of all clay objects, is inherently free from the particular attributes of those objects. "Potness" and "dishness" do not exist in the mere state of clay. The clay, too, has its own material constituents which are themselves free from clayness. And those constituents also have their universal — atoms and so forth — which are free from the attributes of their particulars. The limit of

such reasoning is that pure Being, pure Awareness, is the supreme limit of what is universal.

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This reasoning has its basis in the reasoning supplied by the celebrated "vācārambhaṇa" śruti of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. The term "universal" (sāmānya) to denote Brahman occurs in the Brahma-siddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra:

Because all differences are absorbed in It, It is described as a "universal"; as gold is indicated by the absorption of the differences such as bracelets etc. 15

Allen Thrasher (1978), in his work on the *Brahmasiddhi*, notes that Mandana's use of the term "universal" in this passage:

does not carry so much the meaning of an abstraction, a concept, as that of an ultimate material cause ... For him, a $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ is whatever is common to several things, whether one considers it abstractly, as in the case of $satt\bar{a}$, or concretely, as in the case of gold.

What Mandana means by the term "universal" is something which is common to a number of particulars — like gold to any number of gold omaments — and which continues to remain after the negation of the particulars. Abhyankar is using the term "universal" in the same sense as Mandana. To sum up the Advaita position: particulars have no independent existence apart from the existence of their material cause which is their "universal". Since particulars have no independent existence they cannot be absolutely real but can only be "apparently real" (mithyā) and so the universal is inherently free from the particulars.

Viśisiadvaita does not accept such reasoning. Uttamūr. T. Vīrarāghavācārya, arguing against the *Advaitāmoda* in his work *Paramārtha-prakāsikā*, writes that the inference: "any particular has its material cause in what is universal" does not establish something free from distinction:

Because what is established by that is just the distinction in the form of being the malerial cause of everything! 18

Judging from Vīrarāghavācārya's reply we can see that the Viśiṣṭādvailin does not admit the Advaitin's fundamental premise that only that
which has an independent existence can be truly real. The Advaitin

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views entities from a twofold perspective simultaneously: from the stand-point of the particulars and from the stand-point of their substratum, and considers that since the particulars have no independent existence apart from the existence of their substratum, the former cannot be fully real. The particulars certainly appear, but from the stand-point of the substratum they are not real and so they cannot bring about a real difference in the substratum. The clay pots, for example, are certainly real as particular forms when viewed from their own stand-point. But when one's consideration of the pots shifts to that of the clay, we see that the pots have no reality of their own, for their existence is dependent upon the existence of the clay. In fact, from the stand-point of the clay, there are no pots at all, there is only clay. The clay may have a variety of shapes and sizes but this variety does not bring about a difference in the clay. So it would not be correct to say that the clay has "a distinction in the form of being the material cause of all clay pots". Because the variety of pots does not cause a distinction in the clay since, from the stand-point of the clay, there are no independent entities known as "pots".

Visistādvaita does not accept this "two level" view whereby even though the particulars appear they are not ultimately real. That is why Vīrarāghavācārya argues that the inference would lead to "a distinction in the form of being the material cause of everything". However if the "everything" has no independent reality, then is it correct to speak of "everything" as though all entities were as real as their material cause? And if "everything" is not fully real, but only apparently real, then what is apparent cannot cause a real distinction in its substratum.

We shall examine another of Vīrarāghavācārya's objections to this inference. He argues that there is no rule that: "any particular has its material cause in what is universal":

because if that were the case, just as experience [i.e. Awareness] free from distinction is the material cause of the experience [awareness] associated with distinction in the form of a locus and an object, there would be the consequence of establishing "motion free from distinction" and "cooking free from distinction" as the material cause of the actions of motion and cooking which have distinction.¹⁹

Vīrarāghavācārya says that just as the Advaitin considers ordinary awareness, which is a particular type of mental activity, to have its basis in Awareness free from distinction, so too, particular activities

like motion and cooking, etc., should also have their basis in their own universal which must be free from distinction: motion which is free from distinctions and cooking which is free from distinctions. This altempt at showing the absurdity of the Advaitins argument is not above criticism. Viraraghavacarya uses the idea of universal as a mere abstraction: a particular action of motion would have as its universal the concept of motion in general, or a particular action of cooking would have the concept of cooking as its universal. These are merely abstractions, but they are not the material cause of the particulars. The statement: "any particular has what is universal as its material cause" has the intention of proving that the ultimate material cause must be free from distinction. So Viraraghavacarya's illustration of motion, etc., is not apt.

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Virarāghavācārya is intent on upholding the Viśiṣṭādvaita view of the reality of the particulars and so he is using the term universal as an abstraction from the real particular. But what the Advaitin means by universal is what remains after the denial of the particulars: because the particulars inhere in their universal and have no reality of their own apart from the reality of the universal, like the golden ornaments in relation to the gold. The various debates between Advaitins and Visiṣṭādvaitins about the nature of consciousness and the reality of the world hinge upon this fundamental disagreement about the reality or unreality of the particulars.

Rāmānuja denies the Advaitin's distinction between cognitive awareness and Awareness as such. For Rāmānuja, all awareness is relational:

awareness (anubhūti) is that which has, by its very existence, the nature of bringing some object into accord with ordinary relations in respect of its own locus. It is also known as "knowledge" [cognition] (jñāna), "comprehension" (avagati), "consciousness" it is well known to all as having the self as its witness: "I know the pot", "I understand this matter", "I am conscious of the cloth", etc.²⁰

The Advaitin, however, would say that Rāmānuja is describing only cognitive awareness, not pure Awareness. But the Advaitin must be lothe Advaitin there is no objective experience of "pure Awareness" experiences any object in the world, but there is the apprecia-

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tion of one's own fundamental Self as pure Awareness.²¹ So the topic must centre upon the investigation of the Self and hence the inquiry into the real meaning of the word "I" becomes the crucible in the following discussion about Awareness.

H

The Self

Rāmānuja presents, with admirable clarity, the Advaitin's understanding of the true Self:

In the self-consciousness "I know" there is a non-object portion (anidamanisa), which is homogeneous luminosity, the Awareness aspect, and that is the Self. In that same self-consciousness, the knowing subject (ahamartha) which is established in "I know" has the characteristic of an "objective element" (yuṣmadartha) since it is illumined by that Awareness; it is different from pure Awareness and is indeed an objective element.²²

The meaning of this passage is that the Awareness aspect of a person constitutes the Self while the empirical knowing subject is not the fundamental Self. This "Awareness aspect" (citpadartha) is further characterized by two statements which provide the reason why Awareness is the Self. These are: "non-object portion" (anidamamiśa) and "homogeneous luminosity" (prakāśaikarasa). "Non-object portion" means that Awareness cannot be objectified which is to say that Awareness has no "outwardness". Awareness, therefore, must be what is innermost (pratyak). The Self is that which is innermost and Awareness is the Self because Awareness is innermost. The fact that Awareness is innermost is evident because Awareness is "homogeneous luminosity" which is to say that Awareness is self-effulgent (svayamprakāśa). "Self-effulgent" means "luminosity not depending upon something else" (ananyādhīnaprakāśatva) and Awareness is selfluminous because it does not depend upon something else in order to shine, for everything other than Awareness shines only as an object of Awareness. So because Awareness is self-effulgent it is innermost and because it is innermost it must be the essential Self. However the knowing subject (ahamartha), which is directly evident in such expressions as "I know", etc., is not the essential Self because it has the characteristic of an "objective element" and it has this characteristic

because it is illumined by Awareness and therefore it is different from pure Awareness.²³

Let us see more clearly how the Advaitin analyses the meaning of the concept of I.²⁴ The word "I" has two meanings: a primary meaning (mukhyārtha) and an implied meaning (lakṣyārtha). The cognizer (pramātṛ) is the primary meaning and the "witness" (sākṣin) is the implied meaning. The witness consciousness is Awareness, so the implied meaning of the word "I" is just Awareness. In statements such as: "I know", "I see", "I hear", "I am happy", "I am sad", "I am fat", "I am thin" "I am a man", "I am a Brāhmaṇa", "I am a householder", etc., the primary meaning of the word "I" makes known the cognizer qualified by the superimposition of identity with the mind, intellect, sense organs and body. Thus the primary meaning of I in such statements is the cognizer, while the Self is the implied meaning of I.

The characterization of the I as having an "object portion", literally a "this" portion, and a non-object, i.e., a "not this" portion (anidamamsa) can be found in Śańkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī*:

The learned should renounce the "this" portion here in the I as not the Self. ["I" in the senlence] "I am Brahman" must be the remaining portion, in accordance with the above teaching.²⁵

So it is evident that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin has accurately presented the Advaitia view. Rāmānuja now seeks to refute this view. He says:

This is not the case. Just because it contradicts perceptual knowledge, which is by way of an attribute and the possessor of the attribute [as in the statement] "I know". 26

Rāmānuja argues that the Advaitin's view is contrary to our ordinary experience. In a cognition such as "I know", we experience that he knowledge ["know"] is an attribute of the I who possesses the knowledge.

In his treatment of this topic, Abhyankar restates Rāmānuja's own pūnapakṣa as the definitive position: "the knowing subject which is indeed an objective element." Abhyankar's reasoning for doing so is this:

the definition of an objective element in fact is just: "an objective element is what is stablished by a particular cognition".28

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What Abhyankar means by this definition is that anything having particularity, having a particular content and lasting for a particular duration, cannot be the Self because that particularity is *known*. Since it is known it must be an "objective element" and because it is objective it cannot be identical to the innermost Self. The Self has no "outwardness" and so has no particularity; hence the Self is simple Awareness, or Awareness in general (*jñānasāmānya*), but not any awareness which can be characterized as "such and such".

In any particular cognition such as "I know the pot", etc., the pot is the explicit object of Awareness while the I is also, to some extent, an object of Awareness. This is because the I is presented in the cognition along with the object of the cognition. The I is bound up, as it were, in the cognition itself and so in the statement "I know the pot" the I is also known along with the pot. The aspect of the I which is presented in the cognition as something known is the "this" portion of the I, while the remaining portion, the Being portion which is felt but cannot be expressed, is the "not-this" aspect and is the essential Self.

Vīrarāghavācārya takes issue with the Advaita view and with Abhyankar's explanation. The Viśiṣṭādvaita scholar seeks to uphold the ordinary conception of the self:

Because there is no authority for a twofold meaning of I. The I is known through ordinary usage in accord with ordinary relations. And since, with regard to that I, it is unreasonable to declare that something other has the meaning of I, therefore only the I which is established in the world should be accepted as the self.

And because this too: "an objective element is what is established by a particular cognition" is without authority as it is not established in ordinary relations since it is based solely upon faith in a statement originating from your own work.²⁹

Although the statement: "an objective element is what is established by a particular cognition" may be Abhyankar's own definition, it is not proper to criticize him on that account since his definition does not misrepresent the Advaita position. Vīrarāghavācārya principally argues through an appeal to ordinary experience: the Visistādvaita conception of the self is supported because of its agreement with ordinary relations (*vyavahāra*) while the Advaita conception is false because it does not agree with ordinary relations.

The crux of the argument comes to this: both Visistādvaitins and Advaitins agree that the Self must be what is innermost (*pratyak*). They disagree, however, about what is innermost. Advaitins consider

that simple Awareness is innermost and this is the implied meaning of the word "I". Visistādvaitins maintain that the knowing subject, the express meaning of the word "I" as directly apprehended in statements such as "I know", etc., is the innermost self. If we accept the position that the Self must be what is innermost, then we now have to investigale both claims as to what is innermost.

Rāmānuja presents this argument against the Advaitin:

If the express meaning of I is not the self, then the self would not be innermost. Recause what is inner is distinguished from what is outer by means of the I-cognition.

Rāmānuja says that the empirical I is innermost because the internal is distinguished from the external on the basis of the cognition "I". We may remark here that Rāmānuja's verse does not prove that the express meaning of I is the innermost Self. The express meaning of I, which is evident in such statements as "I see my body", "I see this pot", "I am happy", etc., is no doubt internal in relation to the physical body, sense organs and mental states, but it is not what is most internal because the express meaning of I is known to be "I" along with the object of the cognition. While the direct object of the cognition "I see the pot" is explicitly known, the I is also implicitly known because it is bound up in the content of the cognition itself. Because the express meaning of I is cognized as a mental perception, it is not the innermost Self.

Rāmānuja concludes the topic with the following statement. We shall quote this statement and then present a passage from Rāmarāya Bellankonda's Śrīśankarāśankarabhāsyavimarśah where he seeks to refute Rāmānuja's argument in favour of the Advaita view:

Rāmānuja:

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The meaning of I is established by the concept I. The meaning of you lie, an objective element is the object of the concept you. So the statement that the knower, who is established [in the statement] "I know", is an objective element, is a contradiction just like the statement "I know", is an objective classified the statement "my mother never gave birth to a child".30

Rāmarāya:

That too is not true. The word "you" occurring in the commentary of Śańkara, between the antibelween the spheres of the two concepts 'you' and 'I' [adhyāsabhāṣya]", makes known the meaning of the spheres of the two concepts 'you' and 'I' [adhyāsabhāṣya]", makes known the meaning of the word "this". So the meaning of I is that which is within the sphere of the concept are of the concept "I", the meaning of you is that which is within the sphere of the

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concept "this"; a thing which is an object of the idea "this" is certainly different from something which is an object of the idea "I". Even an uneducated person certainly knows this much! However [Advaitins and Visistadvaitins] are mutually opposed here: "But what is the object of the idea T and what is the object of the idea 'this'?" To explain. Is the physical body an object of the idea "this" or is it an object of the idea "I"? It cannot be the first alternative because there could be no cognition such as "I am fat". Nor can it be the second alternative because there could be no cognition such as "this body of mine is fat". Neither is the body the object of both ideas. because both ideas are mutually distinct and therefore one and the same thing cannot be the object of both ideas. And so the body has to be determined to be the object of only one or the other idea. When that is so, it is ascertained on the basis of śruti. reasoning and experience that the body is only the object of the idea "this". And it is therefore established that the cognition in regard to the body such as "I am fat", etc., is just an erroneous notion. Similarly, the sense organs, the life-breath, the mind and the intellect are only objects of the concept "this". So it is established that cognitions such as "I am one-eyed", "I see", etc., just constitute erroneous notions.

When it is so established, does the meaning of the word "thin", "goer" and "seer", etc., which is established by the concept I in such statements as: "I am thin", "I am going", "I am seeing", etc., belong to the meaning of the word "I" or to the meaning of the word "you" [not-I]? In the first case, what transpires is that you would either be one who holds that the body, etc., is the Self, or a Buddhist. In the second case, your statement ["I am thin, "I am going", etc.] would certainly be contradictory, like the statement "my mother never gave birth to a child".

Therefore as a person takes a rope to be a snake and a snake to be a rope, it is the case that on account of an erroneous notion a person takes the meaning of I to be the object of the concept you and the meaning of you to be the object of the concept I; therefore that erroneous knowledge cannot be acceptable here [in the investigation of the Self]. It cannot be objected: "I am a knower" is not an erroneous notion in the same way as "I am thin" is an erroneous notion. [reason] Because there is no distinction between the two cases. Just as the Self has the quality of being thin because of the superimposition of identity with the body, so too, the Self also has knowership on account of the superimposition of identity with the internal-organ.³¹

Rāmarāya's method of argument is a modern instance of reasoning based upon Śaṅkara's adhyāsabhāsya. Rāmarāya firstly expresses Rāmānuja's statement: "the meaning of I is established by the concept I", along the lines of Śaṅkara's formulation: "the meaning of I is that which is within the sphere of the concept I", and he then says that both the Advaitin and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin agree that a thing falls into one of these two groups: I or not-I. Now the question is: what falls within the sphere of I and what does not? If the body belongs to the sphere of not-I then a person would not make a statement identifying himself and the body as in "I am fat". But if the body belongs to the sphere of I then a person would not say "this body of mine is fat".

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Rámarāya argues that the body belongs only to the sphere of "this" hecause such a view is in conformity with statements in the sacred lexis as well as one's own reasoning, namely that the entire body can be objectified — either by oneself or by someone else — and also experience such as the recollection that while the body has undergone change over time the I has remained intrinsically the same; hence the body cannot be I. So the idea that "I am fat" must be an erroneous notion due to the mutual superimposition of identity between I-ness and the body, as well as the fatness which is a property of the body and I-ness. Similarly, he argues that the senses, the mind and the intellect all fall within the sphere of the concept "this": I know the condition of my senses, my state of mind and my knowledge and so they belong to the sphere of "this". Therefore statements showing identity with the senses and so forth such as: "I am one-eyed", etc., are erroneous notions based upon the mutual superimposition of identity between I-ness and the sense organ and I-ness and mental states, etc.

If what has been said so far is correct, then in statements such as "I am thin", "I am going", "I am seeing", do meanings such as being thin, being a goer and being a seer, etc., — which are presented in apposition with I - fall within the sphere of I or not-I? Rāmarāya argues that in all these statements there is a mutual superimposition of identity: for example it is correct that the body goes but is it correct to say that the I actually "goes"? The I has no movement of its own. But lo say that the statement "I am going" falls within the sphere of the I is lo identify the I and the body. Similarly, to say that "I am seeing" falls within the sphere of the I is to identify the I and the functioning of the sense organ, because those who are blind are certainly not thereby deprived of I. If Rāmānuja says that "I am going" and "I see", etc., fall within the sphere of I, then he is erroneously equating the body and sense organs with the I. If the Visistadvaitin says that "I am a knower" is not an error like "I am thin" is an error, Rāmarāya replies that the the Cases are not distinct. Just as the property of thinness is attributed to the L to the I as a result of a mutual superimposition between the I and the body, so too the property of knowership is attributed to the Awareness and ness due to the superimposition of identity between Awareness and the internal-organ.

Thus reasoning on the basis that the Self is what remains after the

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discrimination of all outward factors, the Advaitin says that even knowership is not innermost; simple Awareness alone is innermost and so simple Awareness alone is the essential Self.

NOTES

- * I would like to thank Professor J. W. de Jong and Mr. Jon Bader for their comments.
- Michael Comans (tr.) Advaitāmoda by Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar. A study of Advaita and Visistādvaita. Delhi. 1988.

2 Ibid., p. xiff.

³ U. Vīrarāghavācārya, *Paramārthaprakāśikā*. (no details of publication) 1940.

⁴ Bellankonda Rāmarāya, Śrīśankarāśankarabhāsyavimarśah. Guntur. 1953.

⁵ B. S. Śāṅkarabhāsya (Ś) Adhyāsabhāsya, p. 4-10, 14-16.

⁶ S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Vedāntaparibhāsā. Madras, 1971. p. 8. This Consciousness conditioned by the limiting adjunct of the internal-organ is further divided into three types.

⁷ Ibid., p. 8. jñānāvacchedakatvād vrttau jñānatvopacārah.

8 Bhagavadgitā (Śāńkarabhāsya), 5.19. p. 198.5ff. Ānandagiri says (p. 199.5ff.) there is the fault of mutual dependence in the attempt to prove the existence of ultimate particulars: (pratiśarīram ātmabhedasiddhau taddhetutvena tesām sattvam tesām ca sattve pratiśarīram ātmano bhedasiddhir iti parasparāśrayatvam) "to prove that the self is different in each body the existence of ultimate particulars is to be given as the reason, and in order to establish the existence of those ultimate particulars one must prove that the self is different in each body."

Śrī. B. para. 37. p.62., para. 39. p.67. ato na jñaptimātram ātmā, api tu jñātaivāham-

arthah.

- J. van Buitenen (ed. and tr.), Rāmānuja's Vedārthasangraha. Poona. 1956. para. 5.
- 11 Śrī. B. para. 36. p. 60ff. Aso cf. Siddhitraya (S.T.) p. 32.5ff. The explanations of Rāmānuja's statements are taken from the Śrutaprakāśikā. p. 144.15ff.

12 Advaitāmoda, op. cit., 3.98. p. 238ff.

13 Ibid., 3.50. p. 191.

14 Ch.U. 6.1.4-6.

15 S. Kuppaswami Sastri (ed.), Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Mandanamiśra with commentary by Sankhapāni. Delhi. 1984. 1.3. p. 37.

16 A. W. Thrasher, "Mandana Miśra's Theory of Vikalpa", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, XII, 1978, p. 142.

Brahmasiddhi. p. 157.14—21. Sankara, too, has used the term "universal" in the same sense. Cf.B.S. (Śāṅkarabhāsya). 2.3.9. p. 514.3ff.

18 Paramārthaprakāśikā, op. cit, Since this work may not be readily available, I have included the text. tāvatā sarvaprakrtitvarūpavišesasyaiva siddheh.

19 Ibid., p. 89.9ff. tathā satyāśrayavisayarūpavisesasahitānubhavaprakṛtitayā nirvišesanubhavavat savišesagamanapacanāditattatkriyāprakrtitayā nirvišesagamanapacanāditattatkriyāprakrtitayā nirvišesagamanapac anādisiddhiprasangāt.

» Śri. B. para. 36. p. 61. Also, S.T. p. 27.9ff.

Sn. B. Pana. 18,55, 1,1.4. p. 79.2ff. na hi śāstram idantayā visayabhūtam brahma

pratipipādayisati. kim tarhi? pratyagātmatvenāvisayatvayā ...

рганрук. В. рага. 37. р.62. Also S.T. р. 39f. 18ff.

²⁵ This reasoning is based upon the Śrutaprakāśikā. p. 147.5ff.

3 Śriśańkaraśańkarabhāsyavimarśah, op. cit., p. 84.24ff.

5 Upadeśasāhasrī. 1.6.v.6. The discrimination of the ego-portion from the Self is excellently discussed in the Naiskarmyasiddhi of Sureśvara.

¹⁶ Śri. B. para. 37. p. 62. Also S.T. p. 243.

- 3.102. p. 241.
- Paramārthaprakāśikā, op. cit., 120.8ff. dvividhasyāsmadarthatvasyāprāmānikatvāt. wayahārato lokavyutpattyā-avagatam yat ahamarthatvam tadapeksayānyasyāsmadarhalvarupataya nirvacanasya niryuktikatvena lokasiddhahamarthatvasyaivatmani svīkarvalvāt, dhīvišesasiddhatvam yuşmadarthatvam ityasyāpi kevalam bhavadbhāsyārambhavākvasraddhāmūlakatvena vyavahārāsiddhatavā prāmānikatvābhāvāc ca.

⁵⁰ Śri. B. para. 37. p. 63.

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³¹ Śriśankarāśankarabhāsyavimarśah, op. cit., p. 88.13ff. As this work may not be readily available I have included the text: tad apy asat. yusmadasmatpratyayagocarayor in Śankarabhāsyagatayusmacchabda idamśabdārthabodhakah. tathā ca ahampratyayagocaro 'smadarthah, idampratyayagocaro yusmadarthah, ahambuddhivisayad vastuna dambuddhivisayo vastu bhinnam eva. etāvad ajño' pi vedaiva kintu ahambuddhivisayah ka idambuddhivisayah punah ka ity atra tu vipratipadyante. tathāhi kim deha idambuddhivisaya utahambuddhivisayah? nādyah, sthūlo'ham iti pratītyayogāt. nantyah, mamayam dehas sthūla iti pratītyayogāt. nāpi buddhidvayavisayah, buddhidvayasya parasparam bhinnatvena ekasyaiva vastunas tadubhayavisayatvāyogāt. evam ca dehe nyatarabuddhivisayatvam eva niścetavyam, evam sati śrutiyuktyanubhūtibhyo deha idambuddhivisaya eveti niścīyate. tatra sthūlo'ham ityādipratītis tu bhrāntir eveti siddham, tathā, indriyaprāṇamanobuddhaya idampratyayavisayā eva. kāṇo'ham pasyamy aham ityādipratītayas tu bhrāntibhūtā eveti siddham. evam siddhe kṛśo'ham gacchāmy aham pasyāmy aham ityādisu ahampratyayasiddhah kṛśo gantā drastā ca Padarhah kim asmacchabdartha uta yuşmacchabdarthah? ādye, tava dehādyātmavādibauddhatvāpatih, dvitīye, jananī me vandyetivat tavāpi vacanam vyāhatam eva. tasmād loko rajjum sarpam iva, sarpam rajjum iva ca asmadartham yusmatpratyayansayalvena, yusmadartham cāsmatpratyayavisayatvena bhrāntyā grhnātīti kṛtvā na ladbhrāntijnānam ihopādeyam, na cāham krša itivad aham jnāteti na bhrāntir iti vácyam, yatha dehatadatmyadhyasad atmanah krsatvam tathantahkaranatadatmyadhyasat jñatrtvam apīty aviśeṣāt.

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Rāmānuja (1967). Brahmasūtra-Śrībhāṣya with Śrutaprakāśikā. Edited by U. Vīrarāghavācārya. Madras: Ubhaya Vedānta Granthamala.

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A comparative table of Sa bcad of the Pramāṇavārttika found in Tibetan commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttika. Compiled by Yoichi Fukuda and Yumiko Ishihama. Studia Tibetica No. 12. Toyo Bunko, Tokyo, 1986. 146 pages.

Beside the well-recognized value for the student of Indian and Buddhist philosophy of the Tibetan tradition as the repository of Indian texts lost in the original Sanskrit but preserved in Tibetan translation in the bKa' 'gyur and bsTan'gyur, the usefulness of Tibetan exegetical works for the study of these Indian texts is now well established also. One particularly notable form of help offered to the scholar by the Tibetan commentators are their detailed topical outlines of major Śāstras known under the generic name of sa bcad. Such outlines sometimes constitute separate texts, but more usually they are incorporated as rubrics in a major commentary. Such a sa bcad, whether included in a large work or printed separately, is accordingly a kind of visayānukramanikā displaying analytically the structure and interrelationship of the topics or rubrics of a Śāstra.

The compilers of this volume have had the excellent idea of publishing the lopical outlines to Dharmakīrti's Pramāņavārttika incorporated in the commenlaries of six Tibetan masters of pramāṇavidyā. Three of them belonged to the tradition of the Sa skya school. The first is 'u yug pa Rigs pa'i seng ge (died in 1253), a disciple of Sa skya Pandi ta (1182-1251), who specialized in logic and epistemology and was responsible along with this teacher for the establishment in Tibet of the study of the Pramāņavārttika, and hence of the 'new tshad ma' in contradistinction to the 'old tshad ma' founded on the Pramaraviniscaya already translated by c. 1100. (See recently D. P. Jackson, The Entrance-gate for the Wise [Vienna, 1987], p. 133 ff.). The other two representatives of this tradition included in this volume are Go rams pa bSod hams seng ge (1429–1489) and Śakya mchog Idan (1428–1507). The remaining Masters included are all dGa' Idan pas (dGe lugs pas) and disciples of Tsong kha pa: rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432), mKhas grub dGe legs dpal by the shab Dar ma rin chen (1304–1432), included the shape of the Indian commentar. these commentators of course made extensive use of the Indian commentarial ladition, which they continued.

lounal of Indian Philosophy 17: 207–209, 1989.

8 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

This publication both facilitates the work of a scholar searching for the exegesis given by these scholars belonging to two main lines of the Tibetan logico-epistemological tradition on any given section of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and provides an overview of how these scholars have analysed this fundamental Śāstra into structured topics and rubrics. The tabular presentation in parallel columns conveniently shows how Dharmakīrti's work has been analysed in different ways.

Like many other scholars, the authors of this publication have transliterated the name 'u yug pa as 'U yug pa. However, since the vowel is neither the radical nor the initial letter, and since the 'a yig – the consonant transliterated by the apostrophe – is both the radical and the initial letter, it is therefore this consonant, and not the vowel, that has to be capitalized in any transliteration system (irrespective of whether this system capitalizes the radical or the initial letter). Such incorrect transliteration has the unfortunate effect of leading bibliographers and others to indexing a name like 'u yug pa under the vowel u (where it does not belong) rather than under the word-initial consonant, the only correct place for it.

This volume is a product of the project for the study of Tibetan language, religion, etc. being pursued at the Tokyo Oriental Library (Toyo Bunko) in collaboration with Tibetan scholars, the sole really effective way of undertaking such work. Attention should be directed especially to the authors' pertinent observations in their preface on what a sa bcad and the Tibetan exegetical tradition have to offer the modern scholar.

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sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka: bsTan 'gyur, Sems tsam [Cittamātra], Volumes 1–16, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, 1979–1981. sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka: bsTan 'gyur, Tshad ma [Pramāṇa], Volumes 1–#, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo, 1981–198#.

These volumes are the continuation of the facsimile reproduction of the sDe dge edition of the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur, or Śāstras in translation, the Madhyamaka section of which was previously reviewed here (Journal of Indian

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 1989.

Philosophy 9 [1981], 101–03). Preceding each volume there are to be found, just as in the seventeen earlier Madhyamaka volumes, extensive bibliographies giving details for each text about editions of the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese versions and about modern translations and studies in books and articles.

These highly useful bibliographies have been compiled for the Vijñānavāda volumes by N. Hakamaya of Komazawa University; and for the volumes of the logical-epistemological section they have been compiled by Y. Ejima, who was also responsible for the excellent bibliographies contained in the previously published Madhyamaka section. The Vijñānavāda section is now complete. Nineteen volumes of the Pramāṇa section have also appeared, and it is expected that the remaining volume containing Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya will soon follow.

Since this reprint is the most convenient of the reproductions of the Śāstras contained in the bsTan 'gyur by reason of the fact that it is a facsimile and contains valuable bibliographies, and also because of the handy format of the volumes, it is hoped that the editors and publishers will be able to bring out further sections. Specialists in Indian philosophy are indebted to them for these valuable publications.

D. . SEYFORT RUEGG

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
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A NEW PLAUSIBLE EXPOSITION OF SĀNKHYA-KARIKĀ-9*

0. The cosmogony of Sānkhya (= San.) thought, as is well-known, involves the postulation of two basic principles: one, called the Purusa, the essence of consciousness, which serves as an inspiring force through mere onlooking; the other, called trigunātmikā Prakrti, the primordial material cause of the Universe, consisting of three gunas (inter-twined substances): Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is from Prakrti that both the subtle psychic and the gross physical aspects of the universe evolve gradually. These evolutes are, according to Sānkhya, not absolutely new creations; their so-called creation or production actually involves mere 'manifestation' of what had already been present in the cause in an unmanifest (and hence, unrecognizable) form. This belief in the existence/subsistence of the product/effect even before its 'production' is called Satkāryavāda.

For proving this Sankhya theory of Causality, various reasons are put forth by Isvarakrsna (= IK), the author of the celebrated text Sankhya-Kārikā (= SK) in its verse No. 91 which thus becomes very important. Unfortunately, as regards its detailed meaning, differences prevail among the traditional commentators as well as the modern scholars. Hence the need for this paper.

1.0. We begin with Keith, the great western savant among writers on Sanskrit literature, who ('75:83) paraphrased the five Ablative phrases henceforth a-b-c-d-e) of SK 9 as follows (numbering mine):

(1) The non-existent cannot be the subject of an activity.

(2) The product is really nothing else than the material of which it is composed.

(3) The product exists, before its coming into being, in the shape of

(4) Only a definite product can be produced from each material.
(5) Only a definite product can be produced from each material. (5) Only a specific material can yield a specific result.

loumal of Indian Philosophy 17: 211-224, 1989. 8 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

- N.B. (i) While No. 1, 3 and 5 of these clearly correlate with reasons a, e and d respectively, 2 and 4 can at best be guessed as rewordings of b and c respectively.
 - (ii) That Keith intended to group e with b, and c with d, is clear from his following remark (ibid., 83—4): "The last four arguments, which are in effect but two, rest on the perception that in the product, the original material is contained [e-b], though under a change of appearance, and that definite materials give definite and distinct results [c-d]."

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1.1. Surprisingly, Garbe, Dasgupta, Hiriyanna and other writers on San. have not made any *significant* comments on the interpretation of this SK. It is a recent scholar, Larson ('69:78) who takes it up once more: "As Keith has suggested, these reasons can be reduced to three". However, it is only L's first group, a paraphrase of reason a, that agrees fully with point (1) in Keith. Reason b is translated by L. as: "because of the need for an (appropriate) material cause". Due to the addition of 'appropriate', b must belong, along with c and d, to L.'s third group, viz. "a specific cause is able to produce only a specific effect", as against the second which says: "The effect is made up of the same material as the cause" (cf. reason e of 9).

Thus the grouping of reasons in SK 9, as implied by L. (into a; e; b-c-d:), differs slightly from the one by Keith (into a; b-e; c-d).

1.1.1. L. has perhaps failed to notice — in any case, to note — that his sort of grouping was already made centuries ago by Vācaspati Miśra whose STK on SK 9 gives, only for reasons b and e, an introductory remark saying: "For this reason also (itaśca), the Effect should indeed be regarded as existent (even before the operation of the cause(s)". It explains reasons c and d as mere answers to possible doubts against b.²

Nevertheless, similar grouping does not necessarily imply similar interpretation also. Especially as regards reasons a and b, L. differs considerably from VM³, as will be shown presently.

2.1-2. L. (op. cit.), in his paraphrase of a: "Non-being obviously can produce nothing", obviously considers asat as referring to the (mate-

rial) cause. (So also Keith in 1.). Contrarily, VM sees here a reference to the Effect/Result, and explains: "If the Effect were non-existent before the operation of the Cause, it would never be brought into existence by anybody; for, 'blue' can never be made 'yellow' even by a thousand artists . . . in fact, what is not existent is never found to be either manifested or produced." 4

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- 2.3. All other Sanskrit commentators also concur with VM on this point. Only GBh. explains rather vaguely; but the example it gives thereafter is clearly for asat as the Effect: Asato'karaṇaṁ, tasmāt sat kāryam. Iha loke asat-karaṇaṁ nāsti. Yathā sikatābhyas-tailotpattiḥ... Paramārtha and Māṭhara also give the same example, whereas layaM. cites *the hare's horn', a total non-entity, as the impossible Effect; and SKC cites *'a man's horn', following SPS 1.114.
- 2.4. From the above, it will be clear that the main difference as regards reason a is about taking asat as referring to the Cause (as per L) or to the Effect (following VM and other commentators). Our opinion on this point will have to be deferred until 3.7.2.1.
- 3.1–2. Turning now to reason b ($up\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$ - $grahan\bar{a}t$), we find that Keith saw it as almost the same as e (vide his reasons 2 and 3 in 1.0, supra). L's transl. is: "because of the need for an (appropriate) material cause." The addition appropriate is tantamount to saying specific or competent / efficient and hence, makes b almost the same as d which, on L's own reckoning, says: "because something can only produce what it is capable of producing". Is IK, then, guilty of giving the same arguments repetitively in a single verse? Before accusing him of this fault, let us first look into the interpretation of b by others:
- 3.3. We begin with VM who, like L., had grouped b with c-d. But he differs from the latter radically in its interpretation which goes thus: Upādāna-s are causes, and their grahana means (their) relation [!] to the Effect. So, (in its totality, b means): because there is a [definite] The Cause becomes productive of the Effect [only] if [it is] related to with that Effect. And, a relation [to the cause] is not possible in the

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case of a non-existent Effect. Therefore [Sat-kāryavāda must be accepted]".6

- 3.3.1. While the argument given here by VM is quite convincing, his rendering of grahana (= lit. the act of holding or of knowing) as sambandha (a relation) is neither apparent nor simple appealing.
- 3.3.2. Besides, S. S. S. Sastri ('48:23, fn. 1) finds one more fault with it, viz., that "The idea he (= VM) propounds [here] is incidental to, and included in, the ground $sarva-sambhav\bar{a}bh\bar{a}v\bar{a}t$ (i.e. c) . . ." Perhaps someone may try and defend VM here by pointing out that he had already seen the possible connection, and hence interpreted c, not as a separate argument, but as an answer to a possible query (against b) viz.,: "why should the Effect not be [regarded as being] produced by its causes without being related to them?". The answer as per VM's interpretation of c, would be: "In that case, every Effect would arise from every cause [without restriction], because all Effects would be equally related [to the cause]. But such is not the case . . . "8"

Against the above, an opponent might aver that a Cause produces only that Effect for which it is efficient ($\acute{s}akta$); and hence, the observed restriction of production of Effects can be justified even when they are regarded as unrelated to their causes. It is as a refutation of this argument against b-c that d is understood by VM, who says: That efficiency of the cause, if [operative] with regard to all Effects, will lead to the same anarchy as pointed out in c; if, however, it is regarded as operative with regard to only the possible ($\acute{s}akya$) Effect, then, some relation must be admitted [between the Effect and the efficient cause]. And, to be so related, the Effect must exist even before production

The above ingenious linking of c-d with b, however, remains questionable due to VM's queer interpretation of grahana in b.

3.3.3. Moreover, VM's explanation of b has the further drawback of being virtually included in reason e: Kāraṇa-bhāvāc-ca, which, as per VM himself, says: "because the Effect is [almost] identical with the cause". He proves this on the basis of the following points intended to serve as probans in Negative (avīta / vyatireki) inferences: (i) The Effect subsists in the Cause just as a characteristic quality subsists in a

substance (tad-dharma-tvāt); (ii) The Cause and Effect are related to each-other as the material cause (*Upādāna*) and its Effect (*Upādeya*); (iii) No separation or conjunction (aprāpti or sarīyoga) accrues between the two; (iv) The Effect [-including the waste products, if any-] weighs exactly the same as the material cause. (VM then indulges in some wrangling -jalpa- which we need not go into here.)

What is important to note is that, among the four points adduced by VM for justifying reason e, (ii) is practically a repetition of his paraphrase for b (vide fn. 5). Hence, approval of the latter will also amount to attributing SK 9 (and its composer IK) with the fault of unnecessary repetition.

3.4. Ought we, then, to join S. S. S. Sastri (op. cit.) in translating b as "since there is recourse to the (appropriate) material cause"? (N.B.: recourse to is closer to grahana than L.'s need for: vide 3.1-2, supra.).

In the footnote, Sastri tells us that this interpretation is implied in GBh. (The term *appropriate*, though not used therein, is suggested esp. by the example given: "In this world, a man selects the material cause of that which he desires to have: one desirous of curds selects milk and not water. Therefore the Effect exists") 10.

Sastri finds this "the most obvious interpretation [of b]", being "simpler or more apparent" than that given by VM. He, however, admits its disadvantages also, viz., that "apparently the same idea is repeated in $\frac{\hat{s}aktasya}{\hat{s}akya-karan\bar{a}t}$ " (cp. here our objection in 3.1—2, supra).

Nevertheless, Sastri instantaneously tries to save the above situation by pointing out a minor difference between the two, viz, that b 'emphasizes the adequacy of the cause to the effect", while d "looks to [i.e. stresses?] the adequacy of the effect to the cause".

Viewed closely, however, this is more a matter of difference in words than in actuality (cf. here No. 4 and 5 under 1.0, *supra*); and hence, the disadvantage of this interpretation indicated above remains virtually the same

Let us, therefore, scan other (minor) commentaries in the hope of finding something useful, per chance:

35. Unfortunately for us, most of them give nothing beyond a re-Wording of GBh on b. Of these, Māthara-vṛtti¹¹ and Suvarṇa-saptati-

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śāstra¹² paraphrase upādāna rather loosely as nimitta; but SKC¹³ correctly renders it as the inherent (material) cause . . . JayaM.¹⁴ tries to derive that meaning etymologically: "Whatever [material/substance] is taken for what [particular Effect], that is its upādāna (= material) cause; e.g. sesamum for oil, milk for curds. If oil and curd were not present here (= in the respective cause), then how is it that selection (grahaṇa) of that particular material cause of either is made by people desirous of these [products]? . . ."

Evidently, this explanation by JayaM. is in consonance with the one by GBh. One wonders, therefore, how TGM ('72:64) states just the opposite: "Jaya [!] and V. (= VM) understand grahaṇa as sambandha because of the relatedness [!] to the material cause"! . . . Actually, it is the YD that seems to agree with VM when it says: "By $up\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$, we refer to the $K\bar{a}rana$ (= material or inherent cause), such as yarn . . and the Effect is non-different from it . . . This $K\bar{a}rana$ becomes connected with $K\bar{a}raka$ -s (= incidental i.e. efficient and non-inherent causes of that product) . . . Hence it can be said that there obtains a relation, with the Effect itself, of [all] the $K\bar{a}rakas$ which (-or rather, because they-) are connected with its $K\bar{a}rana$." 15

From this, it can be seen that YD, which must be **earlier** than VM's STK (cf. YD:1967:xv), had in mind a more comprehensive argument, as an explanation of b. It held that the Effect is *related*, *directly* to its inherent cause, and also (related) *indirectly* to its non-inherent causes. Hence, even before its production through the joint operation of all these, it must be existent in some form . . . However, *grahana* is here taken as *sambandha* just as in STK. Hence, the faults pointed out in 3.3.1, *supra* accrue to YD's explanation also.

3.6. Having surveyed all available commentaries on SK 9, let us now view the corresponding San. aphorisms traditionally attributed to Kapila: (i) SPS 1.114 (nāsad-utpādo, nṛśṛṅga-vat): "There is no production of the non-existent, as is the case with *a man's horns." This obviously conforms to VM's interpretation of asat as the non-existent Effect (vide supra, sec. 2). (ii) SPS 1.115 (: upādāna-niyamāt instead of -grahaṇāt in SK 9b): "On account of the restriction of the material cause." SPBh 16 sees in this a reason for 1.114: "There prevails a restriction of Effects in regard to the material cause, viz.,

that a pot is produced only in [the place of i.e. from] clay, and a cloth only in ... yarn. This will not obtain in case of the view that nonexistent Effects are newly produced [from material causes] . . . (iii) A proof for 1.115 in turn is seen by SPBh in 1.116.17 The proponent gives a reason for [believing in] the restriction with regard to the malerial cause . . . If no such restriction prevailed, then all Effects would be possible [from all causes] at all times and places" (cf. SK 9 (1. (iv) SPS. 1.117 (= SK 9 d) is believed 18 to give an independent reason for rejecting the production of a non-existent Effect: the main characteristic of a material cause, from the view-point of brevity etc... may be said to be its "being possessed of the capacity to produce the [nossible] Effect" and this 'capacity' is none other than the would be/ huure / imminent state (anāgata-avasthā) of the Effect [which must, therefore, be existent in that state]. This also proves that production is possible only of what exists already [in an unmanifest form], and not of something totally non-existent. (v) SPS 1.118 (= SK 9 e) is again regarded as an independent reason by SPBh 19: Kāranabhāva is here taken to mean non-difference of the Effect from the Cause even before production. This relation cannot obtain if the Effect is non-existent at that time, when the Cause is definitely existent . . . As proof of the said non-difference, SPBh adduces mere scriptural testimony; 20 it does not indulge in any logical proofs as is done by STK (vide supra, 3.3.3).

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3.6.1. A quick review of SPS and SPBh 1.114—18 noted above, reveals a grouping of the five reasons of SK 9 into a-b-c; d; e. The linking together of e as a reason for e, and e for e, has become possible mainly on account of the replacement of grahaṇa in/of SK 9-b by niyama here. No Mss. of the SK is reported to provide the latter reading; and niyama cannot be taken as a direct meaning or synonym of grahaṇa; therefore, the relevant SPS and SPBh cannot be utilized for arriving at a correct interpretation of SK 9 (— esp. 9 b), as e it stands. Aniruddha's vṛtti on SPS does not help either. It curiously e in e

^{3.7.} The only way left to us, then, is to try an independent interpreta-

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tion, keeping in view all those noted earlier but not being prejudiced by or against any of them . . . As a right approach towards the correct appraisal of SK 9, let us begin by taking note of its textual context, esp. its link with what precedes it.

3.7.1. In SK 8, we were told that Avyakta (= unmanifest) Prakrti is imperceptible to us, not because of its non-existence, but owing to its extreme subtleness. For, although not perceived directly, it can certainly be comprehended ($k\bar{a}ryatah$ =) through [inference based on] its products, viz., Mahat etc., which have characteristics either similar to Prakrti or dissimilar . . .

To this, an opponent might object, pointing out that a product/ Effect can at best indicate the existence of a cause from which it originated; it cannot indicate the qualities of the cause also . . . The San. may dispute this point, saying; The World is found to consist of things characterized by sound etc., which are but modifications (vikāra-s) [of subtler entities] possessing as their nature [the quality to arouse] diverse degrees of pleasure, pain and delusion. It follows, then, that the ultimate material cause of all these must also contain the essence of pleasure etc; and that primal cause is, verily, what we call Prakṛti consisting of three guṇas.²¹

However, the idea of identical nature of the Cause and Effect might not be agreeable to opponents of San. Some Buddhists, for example, hold that a positive entity like a sprout is the outcome of the destruction of a seed; and destruction (= pradhvamsa) is a negative thing, a non-entity... The Nyaya-Vaiśesika-s, being empirical realists, hold that the Effect is something which was not perceived and hence, non-existent before production, when the Cause was, no doubt, existent. This fact too, goes against the postulation of identity (-and hence, of an identical nature-) of the Cause and the Effect ... The Kevalādvaitin, again, postulates a difference of yet another sort: What appear as Effects are but illusory super-impositions (upon an existent Cause), they being neither actually existent, nor entirely non-existent ...

These three views, it may be noted, have given rise to three different theories of causality, viz., the *Abhāva-kāraṇa-vāda*, if we may so call it, of the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists; *Asat-Kāryāvāda* of the Ny-V.; and the *Vivarta/Māyā-vāda* of Śāṅkara Vedāntins (= Saṅkarites) ... None

of these is acceptable to the San. thought-system which propounds, instead, a fourth doctrine called *Satkārya-vāda* (vide *supra*, **0**). It is to prove or justify this San. theory that SK 9 is introduced by IK (= Iśvara-Kṛṣṇa).

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3.7.2. Now, as is well-known, a systematic and fool-proof establishment of a particular theory, esp. in Philosophy, involves not only the evidence propounding one's own view, but also some valid arguments refuting other contrary views in order to show the superiority of one's cherished views. As such, both these may well be expected in SK 9 ... None of the interpretations available so far can boast of bringing out both Khandana and Mandana from this SK. Although VM has tried to incorporate a refutation of alien views in his STK, he has appended it piece-meal: Once, before quoting SK 9, and again, immediately after quoting it. The former of these is faulty in that it rejects opponentviews on grounds that they cannot prove the Pradhana (= Prakrti) postulated by the Sānkhya-s: as though it is binding on all to accept this San. postulate! The refutations given later do provide better arguments, but these are not derived from wordings in SK 9 itself (except in case of the Ny-V. view). Hence they create an impression that IK had not attempted to refute other opponent views, and that, his SK 9 is faulty in this respect . . . Our interpretation of SK 9, however, will demonstrate that this is an undue imputation on/against IK (= İśvara-Kṛṣṇa).

3.7.2.1. Reason a: asad-akaraṇāt can yield two meanings:

a(i) Asat-kāraṇa-akaraṇāt (= ajananāt): because a non-existent Cause cannot be credited with doing (i.e. producing) anything (:cf. supra 1.0, 1.1); e.g., one cannot expect anything to ensue from a sky-flower which is an entirely hypothetical thing, a non-entity. So also, the absence or destruction (abhāva or nāśa) of anything is a non-entity according to all Indian thought-systems except the Ny-V., but hat system does not matter here; for, the view being refuted by interpretation (i) of a is not that of Ny-V., but the one held by some seed, and so do other products arise from destruction of their causes. Against this, reason a (i) avers that the real Cause of a sprout is verily

a positive entity: the seed: whose components, when subjected to constant contact with water, moist soil, etc, become activated, resulting in the swelling of the whole seed, the development of the germ, and the consequent change in the shape, structure, etc. of the seed as a whole 22 , which (change) we perceive and call a transformation (= $parin\bar{a}ma / vik\bar{a}ra$) of the cause into the Effect. Similar is the case for all other products also.

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- a(ii) Asat-kārya-akaraṇāt (= ajananāt): This second rendering of reason a counters the Asat-kāryavāda of Ny-V. Cf. here the one and only interpretation given for a by all the Skt. comms. (vide supra, 2).
- **3.7.2.2.** Coming to reason **b**, we propose to avoid all complications and see *grahaṇa* in its well-known senses of 'taking' and 'knowing' and add merely a colourless word: 'existent'; b would then mean: "because an *existent* material cause is indeed *taken* (in cases of volitional production) or *known* (in cases of involuntary natural production)".
- 3.7.2.3-4. The above may be taken to imply that any *existent* Cause gives rise to *any* effect whatsoever. This alleged fault can be countered by c and d if explained as follows:
- (c) "because there is no production or possibility (sambhava) of all (i.e. any Effect whatsoever) [from any existent material cause]"; and (d) "because a material cause having the potency (śakta) [to produce a particular product] actually brings about only that [product] which is probable (śakya)." Since this implies some relation with the Effect prior to its tangible production and that presupposes its existence, we can say that c, clarified further by d, precludes the undesirable contingency suspected above; this pair of negative positive arguments thus serves as complementary to b (vide 3.7.2.2), allowing the retention of the prevalent meaning(s) of grahana therein, and rendering unnecessary its far-fetched interpretation as Sambandha or an addition of the qualifier 'appropriate' before upādāna (vide supra, 3.3 and 3.4—5 resp.)

Further, c-d can also be taken to provide further refutation of opponents' views in the following manner: (c) If production of a positive entity was possible from a mere absence/negation $(abh\bar{a}va)$ of itself or of the material cause (: following the Ny-V. and Buddhist

views resp.:), then, since the negation of many things is available at each place, all these should have the possibility of production at all places; but facts prove to the contrary . . . (d): Moreover, a competent Cause produces only a possible Effect for which it has a potency. Hence, it is wiser to accept the Satkāryavāda of San. rather than take to the Ny-V. or the Buddhist stand which leads to the absurd contingency implied by c. This is the suggestion . . .

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3.7.2.5. Reason e in SK 9 independently offers a further argument, invalidating the Ny-V. view on the basis of Kāraṇabhāva of the Kārya. Following GBh, most commentators see in it an implication that the Effect has the same nature or characteristics as the Cause. L. (69:178), however, takes a clue from STK and gives it a clearer wording: "The Effect is made up of the same [constituent] material as the cause, there being a difference only with respect to the appearance or modification of the material." While this paraphrase by L. is tolerably good and clear, not so his actual translation of e: "because of the nature of the cause (or, because the effect is non-different from the cause)"!

Can we not, then, find a translation closer to the original wording of e? We could even suggest a new one (thus): "because of [the effect] being or existing [before production] in the form of the cause". The implication is that, although undeveloped at that stage, the Effect must certainly exist even then. Thus, this rendering of e, besides being closely literal, provides a clear rejection of the Ny-V. stand. (However, this Kāraṇabhāva must not be taken to mean the tādātmya (= total identity)-relation postulated by Ny-V., as, that would leave no room for the different Saṁsthāna (= shape or form of appearance), Vyapadeśa (nomenclature) and Arthakriyā (= useful purpose) of the Cause vs. its Effect. Hence, Kāraṇabhāva can imply only the sameness of the constitutent material and non-separability with reference to the

(ii) Again, if the added clause in the above interpretation is omitted, then e will imply that even after production, the Effect is but a |developed| stage (bhāva) of the [existent] Cause; and as such, it too be acknowledged to be a real existent entity, just like the Cause This will counter the Kevalādvaitin's view that while the ultimate

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Cause of the Universe is a real existent entity (viz., Nirguṇa Brahman, all its so-called products have a merely illusory (= māyika or prāti-bhāsika) or verbal (vācārambhaṇa) existence verging on non-existence,

3.7.3. RÉSUMÉ:

A rapid review of the interpretation proposed above for SK 9 will reveal the following plus-points: (i) It provides the clearest exposition so far for each of the five reasons, esp. e and b, the latter having proved most difficult for all interpreters hitherto.

- (ii) It facilitates *smooth linking* and *progression* of thought, through subsequent reasons, towards the establishment of the *Satkārya-vāda* doctrine of Causation upheld by the San. system.
- (iii) Our explanations of the five reasons have the further merit of revealing a symmetrical pattern in SK 9: Negative arguments a and c, paired with their positive counterparts in b and d resp., and a very close link among all four of them. The fifth reason does not remain hanging either; for, it is viewed optionally as providing a further refutation of the Ny-V. view already countered in a-b-c-d. Thus our interpretations, as a whole, vouch for full justification of the author's separate mention of all the five arguments, simultaneously using their given order with advantage, for organizing them into significant interrelated groups. No other interpretation so far has achieved all this so very satisfactorily.
- (iv) Last but not least, the proposed interpretation very convincingly credits the Kārikā wordings themselves with accomplishing both *Khaṇḍana* and *Maṇḍana* towards the establishment of *Satkāryavāda*. No other available interpretation can boast of this quality (vide supra, 3.7.2).

NOTES

^{*} Paper presented at the Religion and Philosophy session of the 32nd AIOC held at Ahmedabad in 1985.

¹ Asad-akaranād upādāna-grahanāt sarva-sambhavābhāvāt/ Śaktasya śakya-karanāt kāranabhāvāc-ca satkāryam//

² Unfortunately, the translation of STK by Jha (Poona '65:42-53) gives numbers 1 to 5 to the reasons, thus creating the misguiding impression that VM had regarded all 5 reasons in SK 9 as independent.

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s STK 9 b. Upādānāni kāranāni, tesām grahanam kāryena sambhandhah. Upādānaih sanbandhād-iti yāvat. Strangely, Tha's tr. renders Upādānaih here as a singular number and even interchanges the Cases: "because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect"!

tetatus. Kāryena sambaddham . . . kāryasyāsato na sambhavati tasmād iti.

sK 9 c: Syād-etat: asambaddham eva . . . kasmān-na janyate (janyeta).

bid: Asambaddhasya janyatve . . . sarvam sarvasmād bhavet. Na caitad asti.

STK 9 d:Syād-etat: asambaddham api sat . . . śakya-karanāt" iti.

GBh 9 b: Iha loke yo yenārthī sa tad-upādāna-grahanam karoti; dadhy-arthī kinasya, na tu jalasya. Tasmāt sat kāryam . . . The transl. given here is from TGM (72.62); in his Notes on p. 63, however, he paraphrases b thus: "[since] there is a recourse to appropriate or specific material causes".

Mathara): Same as the first sentence in 10. Then: Tan-nimittam upadatte. Tad vathā . . . tadā dadhy-arthī udakasyopādānam kuryāt.

(Suvarna.): Yadi kaścit kāryam prārthayate . . . mahān-astīti.

¹³ (SKC): Upādānaṁ samavāyi-kāranam . . . na ca kurute.

(JayaM.): Iha yad-artham yad-upādīyate. . . . grahanam syāt.

¹⁸ YD (69:52): Upādānam-iti kāranam tantv-ādy-ācaksmahe. Tad-dhi tasya kārakair gliyate, abhisambadhyata ity-arthah. Tasmāc-ca nārthāntaram kāryam-ity-atah häranenäbhisambaddhänärn kärakänärn käryenaiva sambandho bhavatīty- adosah...

SPBh 1.115: Atra hetum āha . . . sa ca na sambhavati.

SPBh 1.116: Upādāna-niyame pramāṇam āha . . . ity-āśayaḥ.

SPBh 1.117: Itaś-ca nāsad-utpāda ity- āha . . . nāsata utpāda ity- arthah.

SPBh 1.118: Itaś-ca [nāsad-utpādah] kāraṇabhāvāc-ca abhedānupapattir . . . iti. Brhad-āranyaka Up. 1.4.7 and 5.5.1; Chāndogya Up. 6.2.1; and Maitrāyani Upanisad 5.2.

Cf. STK portion before quoting SK 9: Sukha-duhkha-moha-bhedavat-svarūpaparinama-śabdādy-ātmakam . . . avagamayati.

Cf. Sārabodhinī on SK and STK ('40:228): Bījāvayavā eva — iti bijāvayavasyaiva kāraņatvam nābhāvasyety- arthah.

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- [8] SK with Sānkhya-candrikā of Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha, 1953, Benares.
- [9] Sāṅkhya-kārikā (with STK and with Sārabodhinī of Siva-nārāyaṇa Shastrī thereon), 1940, Bombay (Nirṇaya-Sāgar).
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[14] Vijñānabhiksu-bhāsyānvitari Sānkhya-sūtram, 1965, ed. by Dr. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, Benares.

ABBREVIATIONS:

Comm. = Commentary; expl. = explanation; fn. = foot-note; GBh = Gaudapāda-bhāṣyam; GP = Gaudapāda; IK = Īśvara-kṛṣṇa; intpr. = interpretation; JayaM. = Jaya-Maṅgalā ṭīkā; L. = Larson;

Ny-V. = Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; resp. = respectively; San. = Sāṅkhya; Sec. = Section; SK = San.-Kārikā; SKC = SK-Candrikā; SPBh = San.-pravacana-bhāsyam; SPS = SP-Sūtram; STK = San.-Tattva-Kaumudī; Suvarna = °saptati-śāstra; TGM = T. G. Mainkar; VM = Vācaspati Miśra; YD = Yukti-dīpikā.

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LAUGĀKŅI BHĀSKARA ON INFERENCE

Problems of Generalizing Ideation in Comparative Light

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The last decades have witnessed a considerable increase of the critical literature on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic. To begin with, this is due mainly to the pioneering works of Randle, Ingalls, Vidyābhūsana etc., showing that cognitive logic of Navya-nyāya does not exclude interpretations along the line of the modern formal-logical tradition. Apart from this, the interest in Indian logic has been fostered by Th. I. Stcherbatsky's interpretive translations in Buddhist logic 1 remaining still unsurpassed as to their speculative achievements. They have convincingly proved that this kind of logic can, with equal success, be read from the viewpoint of the European transcendental tradition, rooted in the critical philosophy of Kant.

Yet, the most profound and natural reason why Indian logic gains in popularity with the Western reader - both philosopher and linguist, logician and interpreter is to be found in the very logical tissue pervading the whole infrastructure of Indian philosophy. If, on the other hand, we turn to the contemporary landmarks in its critical exposition, we should first mention the works of K. Potter, C. Goekoop, J.F. Staal, D. Sharma etc. as being very illuminative in this respect. Special attention is to be paid also to the publications of B. K. Matilal.² In my opinion, they happily combine the merits of a metaphysical approach, in its transcendental-phenomenological modification,3 with an always precise elaboration of the linguistic material.

It seems quite natural now that the main stress in the theoretical recapitulation of Indian philosophic and logical bequest has been laid, a matter of preference, on the examination of the tradition set forth by Gangesa. In this connection, no less important and instructive are the enquiries based upon the translation and analysis of the logical Works composed in the syncretic spirit of the late Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Seen from this point of view, much importance is given to the translation and interpretation of the Tarka-samgraha of Annambhatta.⁴ This 17th century compendium of logic and metaphysics was, until our

lournal of Indian Philosophy 17: 225–264, 1989. 8 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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century, put on the same level of popularity with the parallel manual of Laugākṣi Bhāskara. But, strangely enough, except for a German 1907 translation 5 and sporadic reference to the original work, the latter has not yet been translated as a whole. This justice, however, should be done to it. The silence over *Tarka-kaumudī* prompts us to show the actual place occupied by this master-work in the logical continuum of philosophic ideas.

If one takes for granted that Indian logic is a part of the general theory and methodology of cognition, one cannot help recognizing that the work of Laugākṣi Bhāskara creates a rather representative notion of the extension and tasks of Indian logic as developed in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is composed by an author with considerably wide philosophical interests. The dominant trend in his thinking is, however, epistemology combined with metaphysics. Apart from the Tarka-kaumudī, Bhāskara has left another three works: (1) Artha-saṃgraha, which is an introduction to the philosophy of Mīmāṃsā, (2) Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-prakāśa, being a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-manjarī of Jānakīnātha, and (3) Padārtha-manimālā-prakāśa on Jayarāma's Padārtha-manimālā.

There is no exact knowledge of the date of Laugākṣi Bhāskara. It could be supposed that he lived in the 16th or 17th century, insofar as, in § 28, there is a reference to Śūlapāṇimiśra who, in the opinion of Dvivedi, was identical with Śaṅkara Miśra. The latter is known to have lived at the turn of 15th century. Therefore, Bhāskara cannot be placed earlier than the 15th century. On the other hand, the structure and contents of *Tarka-kaumudī* are reminiscent of those proper to *Tarka-saṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa whose date is fixed in the 17th century. The author of *Tarka-kaumudī* does not refer to *Tarka-saṃgraha* which is mostly commented on in the literature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In both of them, however, we find the same formulations of some categories which makes us believe that they were composed approximately at the same time. These are the reasons why the creative period of Laugākṣi Bhāskara should be related to the 17th century.

Tarka-kaumudī is a manual of logic and metaphysics intended for the education of adolescents. Therefore, the level of the manual is sufficiently low to serve the purpose of introducing the complicated logical and metaphysical system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but, at the same time, high enough as to render it in some places quite unintelligible to the European public. In degree of complexity, *Tarka-kaumudī* approaches the *Upaskāra* of Śankara Miśra as to the theory of knowledge and ontology, while in the section on inference it reflects the logical culture of Navya-nyāya and resembles the sophisticated dialectic-logical style of Gadādhara. It is this section that is most difficult to translate.

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Formally, the structure of *Tarka-kaumudī* follows as a matter of principle the canon legalized by Praśastapāda in his *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*. Due to the increased influence of Nyāya, much attention is given to the means of adequate knowledge, their enumeration and definition which form the instrumental basis of the critical examination of *pramāṇas*. Besides, there is a separate paragraph on atoms which is not articulated both in the *Nyāya-kandalī* and *Kiraṇāvalī*. In accordance with the logical culture of the epoch, there are some paragraphs on the main types of argumental seemingness (§§ 33—37), on the inferential conditions (§ 38), on the adequacy of knowledge (§ 44) and the criterion of truth. The moral questions are introduced in close connection with the attempts to solve the problem of philosophical motivation as well as to expound the ultimate goal of categorial knowledge (§ 62).

The original text is lacking the numeration of the paragraphs. They are formed in the translation proceeding from the imparted holistic sense of the basic text with constant regard to the independence in the examination of categories. The explanations of some of the terms and their comparative analysis are given under the *Remarks* following the translation of any paragraph, together with various readings. Some additional light is shed on the categories and conceptions in the *Notes* which are common for the whole article.

The critical 1886 edition of Dvivedi has been taken as the basis of lanslation. As a rule, I tried to follow the main text, taking into account some important deviations in the other six readings, and leminological wealth of Indian philosophical language. However, the specific difference of this translation is that I treated the text not as a

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philosophically oriented indologist but rather as an indologically oriented philosopher whose basic interests are deeply rooted in the transcendental-phenomenological tradition. This is the reason why the text should be read together with the explanatory remarks and notes, Without doing so they seem to have, in some cases, predominantly esoteric significance. Above all, this applies to the paragraphs on perception, which are not represented here, and inference. The most important thereof, § 30, had been the subject of discussion with Prof. Dr. Morgenroth during my stay in Berlin.7 I would like also to thank Prof. Dr. R. P. Srivastava for looking into the whole translation of Tarka-kaumudī. The rendering of the main technical terms is in accordance with the established practice (see the translations of D. H. H. Ingalls, B. K. Matilal, M. K. Gangopadhyaya, etc.), except for those cases where I tried to substantiate an independent meaning of the term differing from the terminology already in use. For that reason, and for the sake of adequacy, the meanings of all Sanskrit terms appearing in the translation are consulted and respectively put into consonance with the technical dictionary of Sanskrit logical language, the Nyāya-kośa.

The main goal set forth by the present translation of the logical part of Tarka-kaumudī is neither informative, nor educational with regard to the Indian logical tradition and the modern culture of thinking. The implementation of such a task would require a comparative analysis of Tarka-samgraha, Sapta-padārthī, Bhāsā-pariccheda, Nyāya-sāra, Upaskāra, Nyāya-līlāvatī and many other works and commentaries of the syncretic period which, in one or another form, discuss logical questions characteristic of the logical competence of Tarka-kaumudi. Such a kind of investigation would enormously widen the extension of the present work and, in the final analysis, would bring, it seems, nothing new for the specialists in the literature of Nyāya-Vaiśesika. Judged from this point of view, my task was rather modest, but far more risky, viz., to produce a translation of a scholarly text systematically representing the fundamentals of logic, and to demonstrate the points of contact as well as the possibilities of a comparative examination of the Eastern and Western transcendental-logical tradition where by transcendental logic I shall understand the study of instruments of

objective knowledge from the point of view of consciousness. Here the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl will play the role of tarkappatiyogin due to some basic considerations:

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- (l) Both phenomenology and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika present a kind of epistemological project of logic which, in many respects, is quite different from the traditional formal logic with its pansymbolic drive;
- (2) The main thing bringing the transcendental phenomenology and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika close together, is the intention to create a kind of universal organon for overall revision of human knowledge. In both cases, it should be used as an instrument in a phenomenologically pure field;
- (3) This calls for some reductivist procedures. Within the framework of phenomenology they assume the form of, to put it roughly, psychological and transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika they come to be exhausted by the precise co-relation of descriptive-enumerative methods (uddeśa) and the methods of specific determination (laksana);
- (4) As a result, there arises the possibility of unbiased, voraussetzungslos descriptions of the cognitive phenomena. Within the confines of transcendental phenomenology this possibility comes to realization by means of phenomenological Erfahrung combining the critical advantages of transcendental idealism and material contemplativity of the consequent rationalism brought to the point of identity with the consequent empiricism. As for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the selfsame synthesis (of course, in a different terminological, conceptual and socio-cultural setting) comes about with the help of the so-called "critical examination" (parīkṣā). Laugākṣi Bhāskara says on this account: "The critical examination is a procedure fruitful both in relation to coherence and non-coherence between enumeration and definition".8 In other words, the critical examination rests upon the potential of Wesenschau or generalizing ideation, brought about by the first of the above mentioned procedures, and on the concretizing realization of the cognitive object proposed by the second type of procedure. The enumeration here is not simply a quantitative method of defining the nature of

object, it is not a purely empirical procedure in the sense of vulgar, plain empiricism. Enumeration is, at the same time, a kind of *Wesenschau* because it deals, as a matter of fact, with essences, to wit, "enumeration is marking of the characterized with the help only of what determines the general notion of the characterized".

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Proceeding solely from the criteria of cognitive adequacy accepted in phenomenology and Indian philosophy, there would be no trace of similarity between transcendental phenomenology and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. To a much greater degree, the phenomenological views on epistemological adequacy are symmetrical to those of Mīmāṃsā. There is no secret in the fact that it is the representatives of the said school that regard knowledge as a veridical criterion of itself. To quote again Bhāskara: "According to the followers of Mīmāṃsā, with the risen knowledge of water etc. by means of a distant perception, here/the adequacy/is only immanent (svata); for instance, the one looking for water acts in defining the adequacy in the form of objectivity of knowledge (arthajñānatva), for, the apprehension of that adequacy is present even in the grasping of knowledge, because of the realization (upagama) of adequacy as immanence (svatatva), i.e., as 'apprehensivity grasping the knowledge' (jñānagrāhaka-grāhyatva)". 10

As a matter of fact, the position of Husserl is quite similar to the main tenets of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine. The founder of phenomenological philosophy claims that only internal experience provides absolutely veridical knowledge, and that the "apprehensivity grasping the knowledge" possesses the nature of phenomenological evidence, resp., "evidentness", which does not depend on the forms of its existential relativization. Examined from this point of view, the criterion of cognitive adequacy should be defined as predominantly immanent.

Now, the externalist position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the question about the criterion of truth is in full accordance with the realistic metaphysics of the school. Objectively existing things are doubtless in their metaphysic reality. This claim would prompt any phenomenologist to define Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as an example of uncritical metaphysics of objective reality. This, however, is a rather superficial assertion. For anyone familiar with the epistemology of the syncretic school it is

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utterly clear that the truthfulness, or adequacy of knowldge (prāmānya) is nothing more than its functional characteristic accessible in the cognitive synthesis of perceptual and inferential elements, in the dialectical unity of perception and inference, material multivariety and formal regulatives. Truth, or totality of objective epistemes (here one can translate arthajñānatva as objective knowledgeness also), which is depicted by Bhīmācārya as "immanent relation" (svarūpasambandha), is in a sense supersensuous, that is, beyond the senses (atindriya). In the opinion of Laugāksi Bhāskara, it is not perceived immediately, the truth is always through something else. It is supersensuous not only because we lack the senses capable of grasping it but also because the reality of truth is ultimately proved not by the sense-organs but rather by the practice itself. It is the practice that should be defined as that kind of "supersensuous" criterion which stands above the evidence of the senses, and which preconditions the internal structure of any cognitive process. Knowledge, says Keśava Miśra,11 is acquired by means of sense-perception, in the processual unity of ātman, manas, the sense-organ and the object, but its real veritability is demonstrated only by inference. The reality of knowledge is inferred from the positive practical result, that is, from the successful practical activity.

Inference, hence, is not simply a logical construction answering the requirements of reason. To a much greater extent, it is a universal means for rationalization of practice, playing a considerable part in the transformation of the successful practical activity into "fact of consciousness" having the status of a priori material evidence. In phenomenology, this process assumes the outlines of the so-called generalizing ideation. It proceeds from the experience-data, reaching, in the final analysis, the structures of transcendental consciousness. In most cases this is done not without the help of reduction. From this slate onward, however, reduction, as an instrument of pure cognition, does not lead to some new, deeper and deeper transcendental structures. On the contrary, it brings the phenomenological observer to the reign of the protopredicative facts (Tatsache, lit. — deed-thing) of the So-called Lebenswelt, that is, to the practical relations constituting the Unreducible basis of any transcendental subjectivity.

Despite all concrete differences existing between phenomenological

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philosophy and that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, both of them are, as a matter of fact, unanimous in believing that it is the transcendentally interpreted inference that should be regarded as the only instrument of adequate knowledge capable of creating a double transition, or, to put it more philosophically, transcensus in two basic directions. First, transcensus from the protopredicative, or even fore-predicative structures of practice to the material a priori revealed in the phenomenological Erfahrung;¹² it is at this stage of cognitive purity that the greatest part of the processes of generalizing ideation should take place; as a rule, they lead — by means of the extraordinary perception of the type of sāmānya-lakṣaṇa — to the possibility of warranting the methodological rear of the second transcensus, namely, from the general notion to the singular concretenesses and therefrom to the successful practical activity.

In both cases, inference appears at the centre of all philosophic problems concerning the relationships between successful practical activity and the acquisition of adequate knowledge. The purified, and as a matter of fact reduced 13 structure of syllogism, the negative attendants of the inferential process in the forms of argumental seemingness (hetvābhāsa), as well as the examination of the interconnection between conditionality and inferentiality, are those necessary theoretical, methodological and transcendental (in the above sense of transcensus) instruments which guarantee the "ideation" of practical knowledge actualized by the conditions of life.

Another highly important similarity between epistemological projects of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and phenomenology consists in the application of a typically rationalistic criterion of the truthfulness of knowledge, that is, the destruction of doubt in the veridicability of the cognitive data and creation of the necessary prerequisites of the evidently inferential knowledge. It is not by haphazard that Laugākṣi Bhāskara terminates the analysis of every paragraph on the seeming grounds with the phrase declaring their being preventive in relation to the evidently inferential knowledge (sākṣād-anumiti-pratibandhaka). As an illustration of the last assumptions I would like to adduce the following text from Tarka-kaumudī:

"In the apprehension of adequacy as being only immanent, that is, as something immediately known from the apprehension of knowl-

edge, there would be no doubt in the adequacy — that is, whether my knowledge of water is adequate or not, — due to the incompatibility of doubt and certainty. Yet, it cannot be said that with the subjectification of doubt there does not exist apprehension of knowledge, too. This is/ because of the impossibility of a double doubt in the absence of adequacy, representing the substratum of knowledge with the /simultaneous/ non-apprehension of knowledge, i.e., due to the foundedness of the knowledge about the substratum in the doubt. Therefore, with unknown substratum of the height existing in the distance, there is no doubt whether it is a pillar or a man. Hence, adequacy in knowledge should be defined only through something else (parata).

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And so, with the appeared here unprecedented knowledge of water etc., actualized by the life-conditions, one acts even being in doubt as to the adequacy. My knowledge of water, generated afterwards in discovering water, is adequate due to the /cognitive/ generativity of successful practical activity. It is said that adequacy as unprecedented knowledge, actualized by life-conditions, is verified by /inference/possessing /only/ exclusion. In the presence of /many times/ repeated, actualized by the life-conditions knowledge, adequacy comes to be defined before practical activity with the help of a possessing concomitance /inference/. /The appeared/ there second etc. knowledge of water is also adequate due to the homogeneity with regard to the original knowledge of water generating a successful practical activity". 14

Cognition, thus, is adequate only when it gives rise to successful practical action or, at least, when it is homogeneous with such kind of knowledge. Taken in itself, this circumstance points to the fact that practice is not an absolute criterion of truth in the sense that it shouldn't be always referred to. Uddyotakara 15 was, perhaps, one of the first to note that adequacy of knowledge and practical activity are, as a matter of fact, in a situation of mutual implication; adequate knowledge leads to adequate action while adequate action is a condition for achieving adequate knowledge.

In this situation it is exceedingly important to solve the question of providing an adequate instrument for warranting the coherence of the context. In the opinion of Udayana, 16 cognition of the true nature of

things is adequate knowledge, and the means of such cognition adequate means of knowledge. The goal of true knowledge is to grasp things in their objective interconnection, in the complex of their immanent properties (svarūpa), in their relations to the subject of cognition, ontological independence and causal determinance. Cognition is closely tied up to the examination of causal relations, while adequate cognition, or simply truth, is a reflection of the mutual penetration of a great deal of causal relations. This precisely is the objectivity of truth. The cognitive content, reasons Mandanamiśra. owes its existence not only to the object of knowledge but also to a whole set of factors which, in their totality, form a causal complex. When we actualize a kind of reflexive emphasis on some additional moments in the causal complex, or the very centre of it gets shifted under the influence of objective factors, it could so happen that the object may rise before consciousness in a totally new light. Hence, concludes Mandanamiśra, the categories of "cognitive material/resp. content/" and "object of knowledge" are not equivalent. 17

This conception brings us close to the phenomenological theory of knowledge proper to Max Scheler. 18 Both of them substantiate the ontological point of view in treating the intentional work of consciousness. It should be said, however, that the above differences are not simply differences between object and subject-matter of cognition. The questions concerned here are, in the first place, pertaining to a superrealistic theory of knowledge. It pictures the cognitive object as a constantly varying totality of objective and veridical images of reality. Any one of them, at the proper time, may play the role of adequate cognitive material. The intentional theory of perception which is latent in Nyāya-Vaiśesika 19 finds its adequate expression in the theory of knowledge altogether. The ensemble of objective and true images of reality can be represented as a multifarious structure of contentified intentional horizons²⁰ of consciousness. Its function here is to thematize one or another cognitive material /content/ in close dependence on the activity of subject or the objective disposition of ontological factors.

If one erroneously takes the truth to be monophonic, forever fixed to only one of the sectors of objective reality opened up before consciousness, then the logic of mere formalism would require us to

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declare the other onto-logical sectors both untrue and non-existent. Formalism, in its very nature, does not allow of different, not to speak of dialectically contradictory, explanations of reality. The actual pray of this non-allowance is not only cognition but also reality itself. For, in the final analysis, the ultimate goal of cognition is the successful practical activity for the sake of transformation of reality. Practical transformation, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is the ultima ratio of inferential knowledge.

TARKA-KAUMUDĪ, pp. 10-16 (§§ 30-38: Anumāna-nirūpaṇa).

§ 30. INFERENCE

Now the inference will be represented.

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Inference ²¹ is the instrument of inferential knowledge ^{a)}. ²² And it is knowledge of pervasion, /for/ it is said: "smoke is pervaded by fire". Its implementation is a third visualization ^{b)} of the mark, /for/ it is said: "the hill is possessed by smoke pervaded by fire". /Question:/ In what sense "third"? — /Answer:/ Now it will be said. *Firstly*, the cognition of the pervaded smoke is due to the repeated observation of the co-existence of fire and smoke, as for instance, in the kitchen etc. Secondly, there follows a remembrance of that by means of pervadedness /of the smoke/ in the observation of the smoke over the mountain etc. Thereafter, only here, that is, with the general notion of pervaded smoke, /there is/ visualization in the following form: "it is given /a mountain/ possessed by smoke pervaded by fire". Thereby its third-ness is explained.

Inferential knowledge is knowledge of the "marker" (lingin) generated by the knowledge of mark, as for instance, the knowledge of the mountain possessed of fire follows the knowledge of the smoke over the mountain. Mark (linga) is what has locality and pervasion. It can be asked, what is pervasion? — Here /the following/ should be said: Pervasion (vyāpti)²³ is to have a common substratum with the probandum (sādhya)^{c)}. And it functions as a ground, /to wit:/ "the mountain is possessed of fire, because of its being smoky", etc., due to the existence of the instance of the mountain is possessed of smoke, story of the mountain is possessed of smoke, "the mountain is possessed of smoke,"

because of its fireness", etc., for, there is no rule /holding that/ where there is fire, there is /also/ smoke, due to the absence of smoke in the fireness of the glowing iron ball to the observation of concomitance between ground and *probandum*, accompanied by the absence of knowledge about deviations /from that invariable concomitance/, contributes to the apprehension of pervasion.

/Question:/ How this?

/Answer:/ In the following way^{g)}. Deviation (*vyabhicāra*)²⁴ is variability characterized by the absence of *probandum*; due to the absence of pervasion in the cognition of that deviation, the absence of this here is the cause /for the apprehension of pervasion/. Yet, the observation of the co-existence between ground and *probandum* is the cause here — by means of their /logical/ concomitance and exclusion.

What is then locality?

Locality²⁵ is substratal variativity²⁶ of superposition, while superposition^{h)} is /constituted by/ the absence of certainty in the *probandum*, which /absence/ is determined by the lacking desire to infer. And this is also in the *locus*, i.e., in the mountain, etc., because of the absence thereⁱ⁾ of certainty as to the *probandum*, specified by the lacking desire to infer. The presence of desire to infer comes to be verified as existent with regard to the certainty of *probandum*, that is, in the mountain, etc., due to the rise of the inference "the mountain is possessed of fire, due to the smoke". As for the identity of superposition (*pakṣatā*), the property of being specified by the lacking desire to inferⁱ⁾ is here a specification of the certainty of probandum^{k)}. And so, superposition here is attributed to the absence of certainty in the probandum, specified by the lacking desire to infer.

Remarks:

(a) The MS. referred to by Dvivedi as C reads "anumitipramā" which is a good substantiation of the fact that inferential knowledge is not only knowledge but to a much greater extent adequate knowledge.

(b) Proceeding from the specific technical language set forth by the logic of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is more than difficult to render proper translation to the word parāmarśa. In his Logic, Language and Reality, Matilal defines it as a premise giving rise to inferential knowledge, which may be of the form, "the hill has smoke which is pervaded by

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fire", or "there is smoke, which is pervaded by fire, on the hill"; these forms precondition the concrete *modi* of inferential knowledge-episode: "the hill has fire" or "there is fire on the hill" (p. 391). When considered from the point of view of etymology, the word parāmarśa can be translated as *harm*, attack, intervention. Trying, however, to combine the component parts of the word to produce a new, philosophical meaning — parā means back, backward, aside, foreward, while the verb *marś* means to touch, regard, examine —, one is bound to translate the term as retrospection. This term gives a comparatively adequate account of the procedure with the help of which one is supposed to lay bare the demonstrative power of *linga*. This is effectuated in three logical steps:

(1) Induction;

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- (2) Exemplification;
- (3) Deduction.

Such, intuitionist in its essence, interpretation of parāmarśa corresponds basically to its explanation presented in Nyāya-kośa. To begin with, parāmarśa is expounded as mental contemplation of the pervaded with regard to the local variability (vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttitvadhāh), that is, visualization of the mark, resp., the smoke, in accordance with the state of modification of the locus, or, to put it differently, in accordance with where the observer sees the smoke — be it on the hill, or over the volcano, or in the kitchen etc. The second definition of parāmarśa, as compiled by Bhīmācārya, states the epistemological reality of that term which comes to be represented as knowledge of locality specified by pervasion (vyāptiviśistapakṣa dharmatājñānam). For more about the controversy over parāmarśa see the Nyāya-kośa, pp. 437—39.

Anyway, if we try to put into practice, that is, to employ the interpletation of parāmarśa as retrospection in the field of transcendental logic, with particular reference to what Husserl thought of the subject, we would be confronted with some serious difficulties. Whereas induction and exemplification can definitely be depicted in terms of retrospection, deduction — though based upon the retrospective logical present of inference rather than to its intentional prehistory. Why, in translating parāmarśa, I would prefer the term interventional parāmarśa, I would prefer the term interventional parāmarśa.

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tion whose differentia specifica is "directed vision", or simply, visualization. Intervention here denotes the rise of logically active contemplation (whose deepest nature is the phenomenological Erfahrung) directed towards manifestation of a definite mark in the field of its substratal and local (pakṣadharmya) determinance. In such a case, inference comes to be totally realized within the confines of three basic relations:

- (1) Relations of iteration, tracing the instants where there is invariable concomitance between the mark and its substratum;
- (2) Relations of temporal presentification, i.e., contemporalization (cf. Vergegenwärtigung) of the already established positive definitiveness of both major and middle terms (roughly, pakṣa and sādhya) with regard to probans (sādhana).
- (3) Relations of logical pervasion, where the mark is fixed as a kind of intentional correlate of the property subject to demonstration.

It is in the third case that the mark does actually intervene into the logical space of inferential structure occupying, as a matter of fact, one of them. Thus, the transition is brought to an end, from the modus of sense-validity to the modus of logical certainty.

(c) A and B omit "sādhya" (probandum).

- (d) A and B read only "niyamatvāt" (due to the lawness, because of the rule.
- (e) A and B read "vahnimattve" (in the fireness) instead of "vahnisattve" (in the existence of fire) used in the main text and omitted here.
 - (f) A adds "tathāya" (for instance).
 - (g) D adds "ucyate" (it is said).
- (h) Pakṣatā is to be interpreted as the totality of possible positions (pakṣa) occupied by the known substratal bearers of the mark in question. As far as the above totality is an infinitely varying multitude (resp., set) of members, to any one of which the substratum together with the mark (say, fire together with smoke) pervaded by it can really or potentially belong, position-ness, that is, pakṣatā of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can be taken to be analogical to the notion of superposition in the modern quantum mechanics and quantum-mechanical cosmology.

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As a matter of fact, the literal translation of paksatā, if one takes for as a matter paksa is locus, viz., position, is precisely superposition. Thus, the variety of possible, or real, positions is quite analogous to the logical space of the superposition denoted by the term paksatā. The logical intervention, alias visualization, should be compared then to the act of measuring causing the collapse of the superpositional reality of substratal correlates intentionally related to parāmarša. The nse of the inference "the mountain is possessed of fire, due to the smoke, etc." is but reduction of the wave-function of paksadharmatā. Thereby, the real — or possible — variety of loci characterizing the demonstrated subject, i.e., the substratum of mark, is actually reduced to unequivocal postulation of probandum conceived in the modus of certainty. This kind of interpretation of paksatā is supported by at least two important definitions presented in Nyāya-kośa. The first one describes paksatā as the general notion of being the property of dubious probandum (samdigdhasādhyadharmatvam) with regard to its locus. The second definition is still more explicit: general notion of dubious demonstration by means of the general notion of what possesses the probandum (sādhyavattvena samdihyamānatvam). For further information see Nyāya-kośa, p. 415.

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(i) Instead of "niścayasya tatra" (of certainty there), A continues with "niścayasyetaratra" (of certainty hic et nunc).

(i) A, B, C and E read "viśiṣṭasādhya" (specified probandum). Now the clause assumes the following form: "As for the identification of locus, the specification certainty of probandum is specified here by the lacking desire to infer".

(k) In order to be adequately and thoroughly realized, the inferential situation, or rather procedure, cries for activation of consciousness posited in the modus of certainty. To bring consciousness into that modus is possible only through corresponding activation of the inferential power of intellect. This comes about in a typically phenomenological way — by putting into brackets the property of being specified by the lacking desire, resp., Einstellung, to infer (anumitsā-inhaviśisiatvam). In this context, the term niścaya denotes surety, similar to the phenomenological concept of "primordial belief". 27

§ 31. TYPES OF INFERENCE

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Inference is of three kinds — possessing only concomitance, possessing only exclusion, ²⁸ possessing concomitance and exclusion.

Possessing only concomitance (kevalānvayin)²⁹ is that /inference/in which there is only concomitant pervasion. It is said, for instance, "pot is nameable, due to its knowability". Here, pot is the locus, nameability — probandum, and knowability — ground. Within it, there is only concomitant pervasion; where there is knowability, there is also nameability, as for instance in /the case of/ the cloth^{a)}. /There is/ however not an excluding pervasion, as /for instance/ where there is absence of ground, there is also absence of probandum; due to the universal existence of nameability and knowability, as well as due to the fact that the absence of probandum is well known, etc.

Possessing only exclusion (kevalavyatirekin)³⁰ is that /inference/ in which there is only excluding pervasion. It is said, for instance, that the living body is animate, because of its possessing breath, etc., and other /similar examples can be cited/. The living body here is locus, its animation — probandum, its possessing breath etc. — ground. Within it, there is only exclusive pervasion. It is said that where there is absence of breath etc., there is also absence of animation, as for instance /in the case/ with the pot etc. /There is/ however not a concomitant pervasion, /for/ it is said that animation is /only/ where there is possession of breath etc. /and not where there is living body, i.e., organic body/. /This is so/ due to the absence of demonstrative example, /i.e./ due to the fact that only the animate body is the instrument of locus, as well as due to the non-existence of ground and probandum elsewhere.

Possessing concomitance and exclusion (anvayavyatirekin)³¹ is that /inference/ in which there is concomitant pervasion and excluding pervasion. It is said, for instance, that the mountain is possessed of fire, due to the smoke etc. Mountain is locus here, its fireness — probandum, and the smoke etc. — ground. Within it, there is concomitant pervasion; it is said that where there is smoke, there is also fire, as for instance, /in the/ kitchen etc. Similarly, there is also excluding pervasion, too, /because/ it is held that where there is absence of smoke, there is also absence of fire, as for instance, the water, the big pool etc.

Within the /relations of/ concomitance, the pervaded (vyāpya) is regarded as probans (sādhana), while the pervading (vyāpaka) — as grobandum (sādhya). Conversely, b) the absence of probandum /is to be regarded as/ pervaded, and the lack of probans — as pervading. Examined in this manner, the truth about pervasion gets clear.

Among the three /kinds of inference/, that possessing concomitance and exclusion demonstrates its probandum to be existent just in five forms.³² These five forms are (1) locality, (2) existence in similar locus, (3) distinction from a dissimilar locus, (4) undisproved objectness, and (5) non-existent counterposition.

Locality (paksadharmatva) is the substratal variability of the superposition.c

Similar locus (sapaksa) is what has a definite /i.e., certain/ probandum. Here, the existence of similar locus is a cognitive criterion.

Dissimilar locus (vipaksa) is what has the absence of definite /i.e., certain/ probandum. Here, the distinction from dissimilar locus is a cognitive criterion.d

Undisproved objectness (abādhitavisayatva) is e the ability to annihilate /or: to cause the absence of/ the inadequate probandum by means of another instrument of the adequate knowledge.

Non-existent counterposition (asatpratipaksatva) is voidness of another ground demonstrating the absence of probandum.

These five forms are in /the ground/ possessing concomitance and exclusion, /say/ the smoke etc. proving the /existence of/ fire. In the /inference/ possessing only concomitance, there is no distinction from the dissimilar locus, due to the non-reliability (aprasiddhi) of dissimilar loci. In the /inference/ possessing only exclusion, there is no existence in similar locus, due to the non-reliability of similar loci.

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- (a) A substitutes "ghaṭa" (pot) for "paṭa" (cloth).
- (b) A and B read "anyatra" (elsewhere) instead of "anyathā" (the other way round, conversely).
- (c) Pakṣadharmatva is equal to pakṣadharmatā. See the explanation under § 30, h.
- (d) A adds "vrttitvam pramānā". In other words, the ability of a given locus to differentiate from another locus, possessing a substratum

endowed with some contrary properties, is already in itself an instrument of adequate cognition.

(e) A adds "bhāvatvam" (being).

§ 32. STRUCTURE OF SYLLOGISM

The threefold inference is also of two kinds, namely, for one's own sake $(sv\bar{a}rtha)^{33}$ and for the sake of the others $(par\bar{a}rtha)^{34}$

Svārtha is the ground of inferential knowledge for oneself only. Parārtha is applied as a syllogism (anumānavākya) provided with five members to enlighten others after having inferred /for ourselves/ the fire from the smoke.

The five members are (1) assertion, (2) ground, (3) example, (4) application, (5) conclusion.

Here, the assertion $(pratij\tilde{n}a)$ is pointing to the probandum in the locus. It is said, for instance, that the mountain is possessed of fire.

The member (*hetu*) is an expression in the fifth case a pointing to the reason; it is said, for instance, "due to the smoke".

The example (udāharaṇa) is a proposition pointing to the pervasion. It is said, for instance, that what has smoke, has /also/ fire.

The application (upanaya) is a proposition pointing to the locality of ground specified by pervasion. It is said, for instance, that this /mountain/ has also smoke pervaded by fire.

The conclusion (nigamana) is a proposition orienting towards undisprovability and non-contradictoriness /of the assertion/. It is said, for instance, that because of that, /the mountain/ is possessed of fire. According to the ancients, the corpus of conclusion is "so, because of that", while that of application — "and so, that".

Within the possessing /only/ exclusion, the assertion and ground remain the same, while example, application and conclusion are different; as for instance, "the living body is animate, due to its possession of breath etc." here /should be continued/ so: "what is not animate, does not possess breath etc., as for instance, pot; and this /pretended/ living body is not possessing breath etc., therefore, it is not such".

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Remark: (a) Pañcamyanta, i.e., Ablative.

§ 33. EQUIVOCAL GROUNDS

Now, the seeming grounds 35 /will be explained/.

The seeming ground (hetvābhāsa) is what has the condition of argumental seemingness; /it is/ a property of the object of knowledge preventing either the inferential knowledge or its instrument. They are five: (1) equivocal, (2) contradictory, (3) concurrent, (4) untenable, and (5) disproved.

Here the equivocal (anaikāntika) 36 /ground/ is a deviation /resp., fault/. It is said that it is threefold ³⁷ — too general, too specific and not possessing constraints.

Here too general (sādhārana) 38 is a modification of similar and dissimilar loci; as for instance, the mountain is possessed of smoke due to the fire. For, fire is both in similar locus /say/ in the kitchen, and in dissimilar locus /say/ in the glowing iron ball. This /ground/ is common /to both of them/. Its cognition prevents the apprehension of pervasion by means of a variety a) of knowledge about deviation, due to the object-productiveness of deviation as form of variability in different loci, /as well as/ due to the universal reliability of the nonrise of grasping the pervasion when there is knowledge about deviation.

The too specific (asādhāraṇa) 39 /ground/ is a modification of the locus, existing in the distinction from similar and dissimilar loci; as for instance, "sound is eternal, due to soundness", because soundness is distinct from a similar locus, like the sky, and from a dissimilar locus, the the pot etc., and is present in the sound as in /its own/ locus. This the specific /ground/. Its cognition prevents the evidently inferential knowledge.

/Question:/ In what way?

/Answer:/ In the following way. For, sound-ness is not a ground Possessing concomitance — due to the absence of demonstrative example. It has, however, exclusion, /and/ is proved in the absence by of that property in the own substratum, which ground comes to be

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excluded by what possesses the stated property^{c)}. Just like the smoke, excluded by what has the absence of fire, i.e., by the water of the lake etc., demonstrates in the own substratum, that is, in the mountain etc., the absence of absence of fire^d, i.e., /the presence of/ fire, so the sound-ness, excluded by what has eternality etc., e.g., the sky, would prove the non-eternality that is, the absence of eternality in the own substratum, i.e., in the sound. Similarly, it is said that, excluded from a dissimilar *locus*, e.g., from the pot etc. as possessing the absence of eternality, /it/ would even prove the absence of absence^{e)} of eternality, i.e., the eternality, in the sound as in the own substratum. And not in one place, because of the contradiction of the two possibilities, that is, the eternality and non-eternality in the sound^{f)}. It is said, therefore, that given the present knowledge of specificity /of ground/, the *probandum* cannot be inferred within the framework of sound-ness.

The /ground/ not possessing constraints (anupasaṃhārin)⁴⁰ is a content-extensional localizer. It is said, for instance, that everything is eternal, due to the knowability /of all things/. What does not possess constraints here is the ground, i.e., the knowability, because everything is locus. The knowledge prevents the grasping of pervasion, due to the pervasion's dubitability consisting in the absence of certainty as to the co-existence, /proved/ by the absence of observational basis /to assume/ co-existence as a factor for grasping the pervasion^g in the locusness of everything.

Remarks:

(a) C adds "visayatayā" (by means of objectness). Then, the whole clause should be translated as follows: "Its cognition is preventing the pervasion by means of objectness /taken/ as a variety of the deviation of knowledge in the form of variability in different loci".

(b) A, B and D read "yo yadvato vyāvrttah" (what has the basis is

excluded).

(c) A, B and D read "tadabhāvam" (Acc., the absence of that).

(d) A, B and D omit "vahnim" (the fire).

(e) A reads "nityatvābhāvam" (the absence of eternality), the double negation here is omitted. B reads "anityatvābhāvam" (the absence of non-eternality), again, the double negation is cancelled. Laugākṣi Bhāskara presents a good example of the dialectical under-

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standing of the double negation proper to the syncretic Nyāya-Vaišeṣika. In this case E and C read "sādhyābhāvābhāvam" (absence of the absence of probandum).

(f) C and E read "pratiyogyabhāvayorekatra virodhāt" (due to the contradiction of the two /put/ in one place correlative negations).

(g) C and E read "niścāyaka" (certificative, the factor of certainty).

§ 34. CONTRADICTORY GROUND

Contradictory (viruddha)⁴¹ is the ground pervaded by the absence of probandum. It is said, for instance, that this is a bull because of its horseness. Where, however, their is horseness, there is /also/ absence of cowness, and here horseness is contradictory ground, due to the existence of pervasion between absence and probandum. And this cognition is evidently preventing the inferential knowledge, because of the non-rise of certainty as to the cowness, present in the cognition of horseness, pervaded a) by the absence of cowness in the locusb).

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- (a) A, D and F read "vyāptyā" (by means of pervasion).
- (b) A, B, D and F omit "pakse" (in the locus).

§ 35. CONCURRENT GROUND

Contrary locus (pratipakṣa)⁴² is /related/ to another ground demonstrating the absence of probandum. Possessing that is the concurrent (satpratipakṣa)⁴³ /ground/; e.g., the mountain is possessed of fire, due to the smoke, /just like/ what has hearth; /or/ it has the absence of fire, because of its possessing stones, /just like the place/ possessing wall. Here the concurrence is attributed to the alternative demonstration of the absence of probandum from the one as well as from the other ground. It is said that mountain has smoke pervaded by fire, and slone-consistency^a) pervaded by the absence of fire, /which grounds are rival/ because of their mutual prevention and due to the absence of inferential knowledge /ensuing/ even from one /of the grounds/ present in both kinds of visualization /i.e., logical intervention of the

Remark:

(a) A, B, D and F omit "pāṣāṇamayatva" (general notion of something consisting of stone, stoniness).

§ 36. UNTENABLE GROUND

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Untenability is a property of the object of knowledge, preventing the logical visualization. What possesses that is an untenable (asiddha)⁴⁴/unfounded argument/. It is threefold — substrately untenable, immanently untenable, and untenable with regard to pervadedness.

Substrately untenable (āśrayāsiddha)⁴⁵ here is a localizer possessing the absence of what determines the *locus*; as for instance, sky-lotus is fragrant, because of its lotusness, i.e., due to the general notion of a lotus born in a lake. Here the skyness in the *locus*, that is, in the lotus, does not exist as determining the superposition, and /therefore/ lotusness is a substrately untenable ground. Such cognition is preventing the logical intervention (i.e., visualization). It is said that skyness does not exist in the lotus, due to the non-rise of the logical visualization "the sky-lotus has lotusness pervaded by fragrance" in the cognition /of the object/. Its /non-rise/ is due to the disappearance of the connection between skyness /and the fragrance/ in the lotus.^{a)}

Immanently untenable (svarūpāsiddha)⁴⁶ /ground/ is a correlate of the absence found in the locus. It is said, for instance, that the lake is substance, because of smoke. Smoke, here, is an immanently untenable ground, /for/ it is said that there is absence of smoke in the lake, that is, in the locus. Such cognition is also preventing the logical visualization. It is held that there is no smoke in the lake, because of the non-rise of the present in the knowledge logical visualization "the lake is possessing smoke pervaded by substanceness". Its /non-rise/ is due to the disappearance of the connection between the smoke /and the substanceness/ in the lake

Untenable with regard to pervadedness (vyāpyatvāsiddha)⁴⁷ is the ground possessing the absence of what determines the pervadedness. It is said for instance, that the mountain is possessed of fire, because of the golden smoke. Here, however, it is held that there is no goldness intended in the smoke by the general notion of what determines /i.e., of the delimitor of/ the pervadedness, /hence/ the smoke is a

ground untenable with regard to pervaded-ness. This cognition is also preventing the logical visualization. It is said that there is no goldness in the smoke, because of the non-rise of the present in the knowledge logical visualization "the mountain is possessed of smoke pervaded by fire". Its /non-rise/ is due to the disappearance of the connection between goldness /and the fireness/ in the smoke.

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(a) After skyness A inserts "hetu". Then the whole expression—
"gaganīyatvahetvasambandha""— should be read as "the connection between skyness and ground", i.e., between skyness and fragrance, as far as the latter performs the functions of ground. (The correct insertion is "nīyatvahetusam").

§ 37. DISPROVED GROUND

Disproved (bādhita) 48 /ground/ is a localizer characterized by the absence of probandum. It is said, for instance, "fire is cool, because of the category", as the possessing water a). However, the categoriality here is a disproved ground, because of the establishment, by the tactile sense-organ, of the heat, that is, of the absence of coolness in the locus, or, in other words, in the fire. Such cognition is evidently preventing the inferential knowledge. It is held that there is no coolness in the fire, because of the obstacles present in the knowledge concerning the adequacy of the empirical constatation of that absence, i.e., non-rise of inferential knowledge, e.g. /the conclusion/, present in the knowledge, about the coolness of fire.

These are the seeming grounds. 49

Remark:

(a) One of the characteristic qualities of water is coolness as concrete modification of *sparśa* (touch). As for *jalavat*, used in the lext, the term denotes the sum-total of all the objects possessing the qualities of the metaphysical substance "water". Hence, the "possessing water" is a transcendental category denoting any class of empirical objects characterized by the qualitative and dynamic attributes of the substance of water. Let us concede that the description of the real

objects by means of arbitrary categories is a rather sufficient ground for ascribing to them a set of properties, resp., qualities, which are not inherent in their own nature. Then, applying the category "jalavat" to any fiery substance, we are forced to admit that it will turn into a kind of substratum, or subject, bearing the quality of coolness which flows from the application of *jalavat*. Criticizing that type of ground, the logic of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika paves the way to the establishment of a noncommitted philosophy of nature and, as a matter of fact, renders quite impossible the logical examination of arguments resembling on the whole the notorious ontological proof for the existence of God. On the other hand, this way of methodologically proceeding is comparable to what Husserl thought to be a *voraussetzungslose Philosophie* based on the true empirical enquiry into the well-founded phenomena of consciousness.

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§ 38. CONDITION

/Objection:/ There is a seeming ground which, apart from this, is conditional, due to the defectness of the ground, and because of the condition. Then, why are they /the grounds/ only five?

/Answer:/ This is not the case, because of the absence of defectness of ground, due to the condition. /This fact is proved/ by the absence of instrumental or cognitive-inferential preventive ability of the knowledge about condition, /which is characteristic/ only of the knowledge about deviation etc.

/Objection:/ Then how is it that condition is mentioned in the inference of air?

/Answer:/ Its being mentioned there is through the applicability of the knowledge about some deviation.

/Question:/ What is then condition?

/Answer:/ It will be said.

Condition $(up\bar{a}dhi)^{50}$ is what does not pervade the *probans*^{a)}, existing /at the same time/ in the pervasive capability of probandum. It is said, for instance, "in the fire possessed of smoke, the wet fuel /is condition/". It gets pervading /with regard to/ *probandum*, that is, the smoke, due to the truth "where there is smoke, there is also wet fuel". It, however, is non-pervading /with regard to/ the *probans*, b) because

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of the untruth "where there is fire, there is also wet fuel". /This is not the case/ because of the absence of wet fuel with regard to the existence of fire in the glowing iron ball, too. Similarly, it is said that killing animals for sacrifice is an unworthy deed, just like the killing outside the pray-offering, because of the general notion of killing. Here the prohibition /of killing outside sacrifice/ is a condition. It, however, is pervading /with regard to/ probandum, i.e., the unworthy deed c), because of the truth "where there is unworthy deed, there is also prohibition", and non-pervading /condition with regard to/ the general notion of probans, that is, to the general notion of killing, because of the untruth "where there is general notion of killing, there is also general notion of prohibition", due to the non-existence of prohibition with regard to the general notion of killing concerning the killing constitutive of the locus. In the same way, it is held that the son of Mitra, present in her womb, is dark, just like the observable six /other/ sons of Mitrā. Condition here is the vegetable diet /during the period of pregnancy/, and not the general notion of the /ground/ untenable with regard to pervadedness, due to the absence of vegetable diet /as a condition for/ the existence of darkness in the raven, for, the darkness of raven etc. is provable only as divergent /as to the vegetable diet/.

This is the representation of inference.

Remarks:

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(a) A reads "avyāpyakatvamupādhiḥ" (condition is the general notion of non-pervading).

(b) The term used in E is "sādhanavahneh" (of the fire as probans).

(c) A closes the whole sentence by the expression "general notion of unworthy deed" (adharmasādhanatva). Apart from this, the term adharmasādhanatva might be denoting demerited goal, demerited means, etc.

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One should note here the attempt to interpret visayatā as a kind of intentionality pertaining to the states of jñāna (see The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 8). To any knowledge, or state of cognition, there is an object to be directed toward, and this state of object-directedness is called visayatā. And yet, I cannot agree that "pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, though they are mental states, do not have any visayatā at all...They are mere feelings without any self-transcendental reference" (Ibidem). First of all, they are not mental states, i.e., do not belong to the qualities of the metaphysical substance of manas, though it is manas that apprehends them. Secondly, they also have some kind of visayatā, and this is proved by the fact that, to begin with, they are directed toward particular events and circumstances related to particular pleasure and pain, desire and aversion. In this respect there is no difference between phenomenological theory of psychological feelings whose immanent nature is to be directed toward, and the Nyāya-Vaiśesika psychological metaphysics of ātman as Possessing intentional qualities. On the other hand, Kaṇāda is quite explicit in defining the self-transcendental character of the five beginning with pleasure (sukhādi) qualities ol ālman, to wit: "... sukhaduhkhecchādveṣaprayatnāśca cātmano lingāni" (Vaiśeṣika-Sura III. 2.4.). To be sure, they possess the kind of intentionality Husserl used to teler to as backward intentionality, that is, from the objects, qualities and states to the transcendental Self as the absolute bearer of intentional acts of consciousness. That's why the five sukhādi should ultimately be defined as self-transcendental; not only as referring to my personal Self (pratyagātman), but with no less validity as pointing to the other Self (parātman). "Activity and inactivity — says Sankara Miśra — are specific modi of effort generated by desire and aversion. They are fruit-bearing as to acquisition of boon and avoidance of non-boon, and, apart from this, are characterized as lenzed as generated by 'corporeal action of definite direction' (cestā). Therefore, when We see directed action in /some/ other body, we infer the other Self. The directed action is generated by effort due to the general notion of directed action, similar to my directed my directed action. And this effort is generated by atman because of the general notion of att. notion of effort, similar to my effort, etc." (Upaskāra III. 1.19).

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⁵ Die Tarkakaumudī des Laugākshi Bhāskara. Aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt von E. Hultzsch. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Bd. 61, 1907, S. 763-802.

6 "Indian logic" — writes B. K. Matilal — "imbibed an epistemological character which was never removed throughout the history" (Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic, p. 36). As for the definition of logic, one should not be surprised to find out that both Indian and European logic are, to use the classical definition, sciences concerning the forms of thinking. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that, keeping in mind the concrete historical differences between these two kinds of logic, the phenomenological description of the extension and scope of Indian logic is a necessary prerequisite for defining the adequate nature of what we call Indian logic. It is the science of the nature and forms of inference, the goals of inferential knowledge, structure of syllogism, the main types of argumental seemingness and the role of inferential condition. Of course, the tasks which are solved by it are far more extensive. This is the reason why, in some relations, I would take the chance and the onus of proving that Indian logic fulfils the tasks of European transcendental logic. The similarity between them gets more obvious when taking into account the fact that both of them are closely related to the analysis of logical and metaphysical dimensions of perception. For more about this see my Theory of Inference in the Philosophy of Indian Atomism (Perceptual Synthesis and Architectonics of Syllogism). — In: Logical Concistency and Dialectical Contradiction. Symposium held in Sofia, 13–17 Oct. 1986. Sofia: BAN, 1988, pp. 185-198.

We have also consulted the edition of Kāsinātha Pānduranga, The Tarka-kaumudī of Laugāksi Bhāskara. Edited by K. P. Paraba. Third revised edition. Bombay:

Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1907, 20 p.

8 Tarka-kaumudī, p. 21.

9 Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 18. See also *Tarka-bhāṣā*, pp. 59-60. 11 See Tarka-bhāṣā, pp. 60-62.

12 The correct implementation of the so-called phenomenological-psychological reduction genetically preconditions the rise of a new type of cognitive state which is opposed both to the natural and the rise of a new type of cognitive state which is opposed both to the natural and scientific knowledge, resp., attitude. It is denoted by Husserl as "phenomenological arms and scientific knowledge, resp., attitude. It is denoted by Husserl as "phenomenological experience (Erfahrung)" and is to be localized within the framework of internal experience (Erfahrung)" and is to be localized within the framework of internal experience. Its main characteristics are two. First, imme-

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the presence /givenness/ of the material of phenomenological Erfahrung. The things the present there without the help of whatever symbols, signs, pictures etc. phenomenological Erfahrung, therefore, is purely asymbolic. Second, phenomenological Erfahrung is purely immanent. Husserl distinguishes between two basic types of immanence: (1) real, or merely psychological immanence where the object is experienced as present there together with its individual characteristics and the possibility of error, and (2) pure immanence "in the sense of self-givenness conpossibility of the evidence" (Edmund Husserl. Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen. — Husserliana, Bd. 2. Den Haag, 1958, S. 5.). It is the second type of immanence that is achieved by means of phenomenological reduction. Phenomenological Erfahrung, however, is to be defined as immanent not only because it is exclusively internal but also because it does not transcend what is given in the experience. both in meaning and extension. This makes Husserl interpret phenomenological Efahrung as a necessary means for the realization of the essential cognition which is. in many respects, identical to the process of generalizing ideation.

13 The process of reduction of syllogism to the five-membered structure as fixed in the Nyaya-sutra came about by "gradual elimination and critical modification of some elaborate earlier model or models (with ten or more steps), which were presented in the earlier texts" (B. K. Matilal. Logic, Language and Reality, p. 5).

14 Tarka-kaumudī, p. 18.

15 Nyāya-vārttika I. 1.1.

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16 Nyaya-vārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi IV.2.29.

Mandanamiśra's Vibhramavivekah. Mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Itumslehre, von Lambert Schmithausen. Wien: H. Böhlaus, 1965, SS.166-168.

According to Scheler, the paramount being is divided into two - Dasein and Sosein. The latter is formed by the absolute images which are differently realized under the impact of the metaphysical Drive. This process brings them to relativisation due to which one and the same objective cognitive material can be perceived as dependent on a great deal of realizing factors. In their totality, they form a kind of causal complex. These problems are widely discussed in my Phenomenology and Melaphysics. Critique of Max Scheler's philosophia prima. Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1987, 222 p. (In Bulgarian).

The possibility of an intentional interpretation of pratyaksa as a kind of inference luminating the whole from grasping only a part of it is fixed in Nyāya-sūtra II.1.30: *Pratyaksamanumānamekadeśagrahanādupalabdheh" It is discussed by Vātsyāyana in

his comments on this as well as on the next two sutras, see Nyāya-bhāsya, pp. 74—76. As opposed to the so-called "empty intentions" which are devoid of any noematic correlates, the contentified intentional horizons constitute the confines of the noematically fall. cally full intentions delimiting the regions of being, that is, the formal ontologies of l^{ranscendental} phenomenology.

In the definition of inference, there are several terms which will be expounded further pale. further. Paksa is subject or locus about which something is to be proved. Paksadharma is a quality of paksa, as for instance the quality ensuing from the relationship between smoke and in paksa, as for instance the quality ensuing from the relationship between shoke and its locus, i.e., mountain. Parāmarśa is the knowledge about the property of being locally and the property of local and the property of local and the property of local and the property of local and the property of local and the property of local and the loca being locally related which is specified by the pervasion. Inference comes about with the third realization of paramarśa.

Nyaya-kośa presents four definitions of anumiti which are worth citing: (1) knowledge generated presents four definitions of anumiti which are worth citing: (1) knowledge edige generated by the knowledge of locality specified by the pervasion, (2) knowledge

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generated by visualization, (3) knowledge of the substratum, i.e., bearer of mark, which is generated by the knowledge of mark, and (4) knowledge which is instrumental in relation to the knowledge of pervasion (vyāptijnānakaraṇakam jñānam). See

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Nyāya-kośa, p. 26.

²³ Vyāpti is frequently defined as the presence of a common substratum with the absence of deviations (vyabhicāra), or as invariable concomitance of the mark and probandum without whatsoever deviations. It is this definition that is finally suggested by Gangeśa after having refuted some five other opponent's definitions of pervasion, as for instance, (1) non-variability of what possesses the absence of probandum, (2) non-variability of what possesses the absence of probandum, which is different from what has probandum, (3) presence of a non-common substratum with the mutual non-being of the correlating and and what has the probandum (sādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvāsamanādhi-karanyam), etc.

²⁴ "Vyabhicāra is violation of the relationship between cause and effect. This vyabhicāra is twofold — deviation from the invariant concomitance and deviation from the exclusion. Here the former is due to the absence of effect with regard to the existence of cause, while the latter is due to the absence of cause with regard to the

existence of effect" (Nyāya-kośa, p. 853).

²⁵ Paksadharmatā, or locality, should be defined as presentness (vartamānatva) in the subject, resp., locus, of pervasion, or, in other words, paksa-dharmatā is the general notion of the property of being in the locus which property is inherent in the ground, that is, in the probans. It is, further, the local relation of pervasion. On the other hand, it has been stated that locality is the substratal variability of superposition, that is, of pakṣatā. This definition is also fixed in the Nyāya-kośa and explained as follows: "It is said that 'the mountain is possessing smoke pervaded by fire' is in the probandum, i.e., in the fire by means of smoke in the mountain, the locality here is of fire" (Nyā)ukośa, p. 418). As for the general notion of locus, or superposition, which has been the translation of the term paksatā in the text above, it has been unfolded by Gangeśa as being the general property of a dubious probandum (Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti-vivrtti, p. 1: sandigdhasādhyadharmatvam paksatvam). I would like to repeat once again that paksa is what ought to be predicated, therefore, in the common sense of the word, it is also subject whose relationship with the property to be proved is to be demonstrated by the syllogism. For more about this see *Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti-vivrtti*, pp. 18-19. The term vrttitva is repeatedly translated as variability or variativity. I prefer this translation in order to show the polyvariant nature of existence vittitva refers to. So, the definitions of vyapti given under Note 23 should be read as "non-existence of what possesses the absence of probandum" etc. And yet, it is not pure existence but rather a type of being which is close to the phenomenological comprehension of Dasein and Vorhandensein. Vrttitva is the existence we have at hand, therefore it is variable, changeable, full of modifications. Nevertheless, the ontological interpretation of vrititva should not be given too much credit for Vatsyayana determines vriti as a kind of jñāna (see Nyāya-bhāsya I.1.3). On the other hand, Bhīmācārya accounts for it as the general notion of being founded, i.e., ādheyatva, and as what possesses the general notion of being founded (Nyāya-kośa, p. 731), that is, ontologically founded.

27 The poetic sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of principles of the sets of The noetic acts of primordial belief set forth the intentional counter-object as something existent, possible or impossible, probable or unprobable. Yet, in any particular case, no matter whether the position is established or rejected, the noematic correlate comes to be positive. correlate comes to be posited as "existent" in an ideal sense, namely, as an immanent

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objectness. This phenomenological understanding of the way intentional states of consciousness have their objectness posited is highly reminiscent of the interpretation given to visayatā in the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaisesika (see the explanations under given to visayatā in the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaisesika, any state of cognition, moreover, any state of conscious, emotional and volitional life of ātman has its own objectness for the simple reason that it is a kind of intentional feeling in the broadest sense of the word. Any one of these intentional feelings has its own, particular way of relating to the objective inowledgeness (arthajñānatva) which, to take inference into consideration, is realized in one or another position, i.e., pakṣa. Within the world of sapakṣa, vipakṣa and pratipakṣa, pakṣa plays the role of the paramount position whose absence or presence is specified by respectively the lacking or the present desire to infer. Let us now turn to Husserl.

Every intentional feeling possesses the striking ability to refer to its object by means of theses (positions, settings). In a definite sense, they constitute it as an ideal objectness. Anyway, the totality of intentional theses is not arbitrary. It cannot be regarded as an unstructured additive whole devoid of any internal order and dependence between separately taken elements. There is among them one main thesis which pervades the rest of them and unites them acting as a kind of paramount intentional archon. In spite of its being one, the archontic thesis does not exclude of necessity the essential and generic differentiation making possible the specification of three basic types of intentional acts: (1) logical, which are brought about on the basis of doxic belief with its various modes and modifications; (2) axiological, having their own attentional modifications by visualizing some differing degrees in the essential and intentional analysis of the values; (3) practical acts of intentional feeling which are nothing else than the acts of moral consciousness.

The method of thetic setting divides consciousness into two spheres of operation: (4) the sphere of actual thetic consciousness, and (b) the sphere of potential thetic consciousness. Within the sphere of actual thetic consciousness, the real setting of intentional object comes about, or the transitions are marked leading to its actualization, while in the second sphere the intentional object is projected as a kind of Reulralized noema. In both cases, the positional-setting (actual and potential) acts of consciousness have as their deepest basis the modus of believing, or, to put it differently, the doxic statements. Trying to look for some intelligible parallels to this conception in the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśesika, one cannot help noting the similarity between the phenomenological concept of doxic statement, viz., thetic tonsciousness, and the Nyāya-Vaiśesika notion of cognitive decision, or, nirnaya. Even dymologically, it is a kind of conscious thetic visualization, to wit, *nih* is down, *naya* method, point of view or way of action, founding principle. Nirnaya then is just the method of thetic setting. "Nirnaya" — says Vācaspati Miśra — "is the knowledge of hulh (principal). hut (principal, methodological knowledge — tattvajñāna), /and/ even perceptual language generated by the functionalization of the senses. The transcendental [paramārthata] however /is achieved by/ thetic decision (vinirnaya) which means renainty in relation to the established before, by means of reasoning, truth. It is said that resultativity /of knowledge/ is nirnaya /following the application/ of reasoning as as perception etc." (Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tīkā, p. 43).

Those kinds of inference based upon grounds possessing only concomitance independents, of the European logical language. Those grounds possessing only exclusive exclu

sion can be compared to the generally negative judgements which have been subjected to conversion, as for instance All non-A are non-B, while the generally asserting state that All B are A.

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There are several definitions of *kevalānvayin*: (1) factor of what is to be proved as non-correlate of the absolute non-being; (2) unreal dissimilar locus, as for instance, knowable because of nameability; (3) factor of concomitant pervasion only, or factor of pervasion with regard exclusively to invariable concomitance; (4) that which is just concomitant pervasion, as for instance, the pot is nameable because of its knowability here knowability is kevalānvayin. See Nyāya-kośa, pp. 214-215.

30 Kevalavvatirekin is a kind of mark and of inference. According to Raghunātha Siromani, it is a factor of what is to be proved as possessing non-grasped concomitance and exclusion. On the other hand, it is unreal similar locus, and a factor of excluding only pervasion, or factor of pervasion with regard solely to exclusion. See

Nyāya-kośa, p. 212.

Raghunatha Siromani defines this type of mark as a factor of what is to be proved as grasped concomitance and exclusion. The second definition states that it is the ground of both similar and dissimilar locus, as for instance the possessed of fire is inferred from the smoke. The next one says that pervasion is both by means of concomitance and exclusion. The forth definition is still more concrete: - where there is concomitant pervasion, there is also excluding pervasion. See Nyāya-kośa, pp. 38-39.

32 The five names given to the different types of inference are very explicit. In the inference possessing only concomitance the third form is absent, for there is no dissimilar locus known. As for the inference possessing only exclusion, it is inapplicable with regard to the second form, for there are no similar loci in the kevalavyatirekin.

33 Svārtha is a type of inference whose purpose is not the rise of nyāya, or which is not regulated by some fixed rules. Being so, it is the source of knowledge (jnānātmaka) as well as the information about locality and pervasion. See Nyāya-kośa, p. 978. 34 It is also a source of knowledge and information about locality and pervasion. The inference for the sake of others is visualization of the mark and the instrument of inferential knowledge inherent in something else. See Nyāya-kośa, p. 439, Tarka-

bhāsā, p. 37, etc.

35 Seeming ground is that one which seems to be true.

36 Anaikāntika is the object of knowledge about locality generating doubt in the probandum, it is the ground of doubt in the probandum (Nyāya-kośa, p. 30). Sādhārana is a seeming ground which is common both to sapakṣa and vipakṣa. So for instance, fire can be found in the mountain and in the kitchen (sapaksa) as well as in the glowing iron by the glowing iro in the glowing iron ball (vipakṣa). Asādhārana is a ground which can be found neither in sapaksa nor in vipaksa, but only in the space of paksa. Anupasamhārin is the ground which has no positive and negative instances for proving or disproving the assertion. It encompasses all the things that can be found in paksa and leaves no room for illustrative demonstrations. It is impossible to find out such a place which would be independent of paksa and demonstrating, at the same time, some kind of pervasion between mark and probandum. If, for instance, I would take the chance of saving that the whole Universe in the same time, some time, saying that the whole Universe is illusory due to its being momentary, no one would find out any similar or discipling find out any similar or dissimilar locus possessing pervasion of the mark and the probandum, for all possible objects are within this Universe. To quote Sankara Miśra, "it is said, that the dubious (sankara within this Universe. To quote Sankara matives of

"it is said, that the dubious /ground/ is the one generating doubt in the alternatives of

existence and non-existence of the probandum in the locus. And it is dubious due to the observation of too general property, or because of the observation of too specific property, or on account of co-existence (sāhacarya) of probandum and its absence in property, the grounds with regard to the same locus. The first /ground/ is equivocal-too general, the second, however, is equivocal-too specific, while the third one is not possessing constraints" (Upaskāra III.1.15).

Bhimacarya subsumes sadharana under the class of vitiated grounds (dusta-hetu).

For further information see Nyāya-kośa, pp. 916-917.

Asādhāraņa is a ground which is different from sapakṣa and vipakṣa. The other explanations of Nyāya-kośa, pp. 91-92, are similar to those given in the Tarka-

Among the five basic definitions adduced by Bhīmācārya I would like to point out the fourth one defining anupasamharin as a kind of hetu devoid of illustrative example both concomitant and excluding (Nyāya-kośa, p. 22) - "everything is nonelemal because of knowability", knowability, being the ground, cannot be illustrated with regard to concomitance and exclusion because everything here is the most

universal class, without any constraints.

4 Contradictory ground differs substantially from the too general, for, in the former, there is a constant pervasion between hetu and the absence of probandum, while in the latter there is a common substratum between them, i.e., the too general ground is simänädhikaranya as regards hetu and sädhyäbhäva. In other words, with regard to sadharana, hetu can be found also, but not only, in places where the absence of probandum is stated, whereas, with regard to viruddha, hetu is found exclusively in those loci which are characterized by the absence of probandum, hence, hetu and sàdhyābhāva are always in a state of constant pervasion.

⁴² All explanations of *pratipaksa* represent it as pertaining to the sphere of contradictory inference. First of all, it should be related to the ground visualizable by initial confusion of the contradictory pervaded or to the visualization of contradiction (virodhi). The second definition represents pratipaksa as the other alternative of contradiction (vipratipatti). It follows that the contrary paksa is a contradictory paksa,

see, for instance, Nyāya-kośa, p. 489.

Salpratipaksa is an example of vitiated ground which is the object of visualization aimed at the constatation, resp., verification of probandum, which comes about simultaneously with the visualization aimed at the establishment of the disproved. Apart from this definition of Raghunātha Siromani, there is another, still more elaborate definition stating that satpratipaksa should be understood as the object of establishment, by the general notion of what possesses the pervaded, of that absence as a factor of the grasped non-adequacy, which comes about at the time of the establishment, by the general notion of what possesses the pervaded, of probandum as the factor of non-grasped non-adequacy. And lastly, satpratipaksa is that whose other ground is proving the absence of *probandum*. About the explanations of these definitions see Nyāya-kośa, pp. 865–867.

According to Upaskāra III.1.17, the untenable ground is to be attributed to the non-valid knowledge generated by the pervaded locality of mark. Nyāya-kośa, p. 95, produces the first pervasion or locality, that is produces the following two definitions: (1) what is not pervasion or locality, that is unlenable, and (2) asiddha is a ground which is devoid either of pervasion or of locality, as for locality, as for instance, the pot is substance due to the audibility, etc., where

addibility etc. is untenable ground. Didhili (cited in Nyāya-kośa, p. 116) gives a good example of a phenomenological

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description of the ground untenable with regard to substratum. It is defined as the form which, in a controversial apprehension, is not a differentiator of a definite locus by means of objective intentionality of knowledge. And this form is (1) untenable specific locus as differentiator of superposition, (2) locus possessing the absence of differentiator of superposition, and (3) absence of differentiator of superposition in the locus

46 Immanently untenable is that ground which is not to be met in the substratum or

that hetu which does not exist in the locus. See Nyāya-kośa, p. 974.

⁴⁷ Untenable with regard to pervadedness is that ground which is not to be met in the pervasion, or, to be precise, where no pervasion is met, and that ground which is devoid of differentiator with regard to the pervadedness of probandum (see Nyavakośa, p. 771). This ground is a factor for the non-apprehension of pervasion due to the non-grasping of pervasion, or to the absence of pervasion, as well as due to both Hence, concludes Sankara Miśra, the division of untenable ground is mainly due to the absence of a proper argument etc. It, however, can be divided in thousand other ways by means of such manifestations of division as inconsistent specification. inconsistent specified, inconsistency of both, doubtful inconsistent specification, doubtful inconsistent specified, doubtful inconsistency of both, etc. In any one of the cases there should arise a lack (viraha) of tenability (Upaskāra III.1.17).

48 Bādhita is a seeming ground whose characteristic is to be a localizer possessing the absence of probandum, or that whose absence of probandum is certified by another

means of adequate knowledge. See Nyāya-kośa, p. 555.

⁴⁹ The seeming grounds can be subdivided into the following three groups:

A. Vitiating the pervasion (vyāpti). Such are

1. Sādhārana — hetu is common to sapaksa and vipaksa.

2. Anupasamhārin — hetu is only in the paksa.

B. Vitiating the logical visualization (parāmarśa). Such are

Āśrayāsiddha — paksa is non-valid.

4. Svarūpāsiddha - hetu is not in the paksa.

Vyāpyatvāsiddha — hetu is non-valid.

C. Vitiating the inferential knowledge (anumiti). Such are

6. Asādhārana - hetu is not in sapaksa or in vipaksa.

7. Viruddhi - hetu is in the absence of sādhya.

8. Satpratipakṣa — the absence of sādhya is demonstrated by another ground.

9. Bādhita — the absence of sādhya is demonstrated by another instrument of adequate knowledge.

50 Bhīmācārya produces a rather extensive analysis of *upādhi* (see *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 155-161) whose gist consists in the understanding of *upādhi* as what exists in the places where there is probandum, and as non-pervading in relation to hetu.

TARKA-KAUMUDĪ, pp. 10-16.

(§ 30)

Athānumānam nirūpyate. Anumitikaraņamanumānam. Tacca dhūmo vahnivyāpya iti

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vyaptijnanam. Vahnivyapyadhumavanayamiti tṛtīyalingaparamarśo vyaparah. Tṛtīyatvam kathamasyeti ceducyate. Mahanasadau dṛṣṭante vahnidhumayorbhuyah sahacaradarśanadvyapyatvena dhumajñanam. Talah parvatadau dhumam dṛṣṭva vyapyatvena tatsmaraṇam dvitīyam. Talastatraiva vyapyatvena dhumasya paramarśo vahnivyapyadhuma-vanayamityevam rupo jayata iti tṛtīyatvam tasyeti bodhyam.

Lingajnānajanyam lingijnānamanumitih. Yathā parvatādau dhūmajnānanāntaram parvato vahnimāniti jnānam. Vyāptipakṣadharmatāvallingam. Nanu keyam vyāptiriti ceducyate. Avyabhicaritasādhyasāmānādhikaranyam vyāptih. Asti cedam parvato vahnimāndhūmavattvādityādisaddhetau yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatra vahniriti niyamasya sattvāt. Nāsti cedam parvato dhūmavānvahnimattvādityādyasaddhetau yatra yatra vahnistatra tatra dhūma iti niyamasyāsattvāt. Taptāyahpinde vahnisattve'pi dhūmāsattvāt. Vyabhicārajnānavirahasahakṛtam hetusādhyasahacāradarśanam vyāptigrāhakam.

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Hetoh sādhyābhāvāvavadvṛttitvam vyabhicārastajjñāne sati vyāptigrahābhāvāttadabhāvastatra kāraṇam. Hetusādhyasahacāradarśanam tvanvayavyatirekābhyām tatra kāraṇam.

Kā punah pakṣadharmatā?

Pakṣāśrayavṛttitvam pakṣadharmatā pakṣatā cānumitsāvirahavisiṣtasādhyaniścayābhāvah. Asti cedam parvatādau pakṣe'numitsāvirahaviśiṣṭasādhyaniścayasya tatrābhāvātparvatādau sādhyaniścaye satyapi
satyām cānumitsāyām parvato vahnimāndhūmādityanumānasambhavāt.
Tatra pakṣatāsampattaye'numitsāvirahaviśiṣṭatvamṣādhyaniścayaviśeṣanam.
Tathā cānumitsāvirahaviśiṣṭasādhyaniścayasya tatrābhāvātpakṣatā.

(§ 31)

Taccānumānam trividham. Kevalānvayi kevalavyatirekyanvaya
yatireki ceti.

Yatrānvayavyāptirevāsti tatkevalānvayi. Yathā ghato'bhidheyaḥ prameyatvāditi. Atra ghaṭaḥ pakṣastasyābhidheyatvaṃ sādhyam. Prameyatvaṃ hetuḥ. Tasminyatra yatra prameyatvaṃ tatra tatrābhidheyatvaṃ yathā paṭa ityanvayavyāptirevāsti. Na tu yatra yatra sādhyābhāvastatra tatra hetvabhāva iti vyatirekavyāptiḥ. Abhidheyasya prameyatvasya ca sarvatra sattvātsādhyābhāvāderevāprasiddhatvāt.

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Yatra vyatirekavyāptirevāsti tatkevalavyatireki. Yathā jīvaccharīram sātmakam prānādimattvādityādi. Atra jīvaccharīram pakṣastasya sātmakatvam sādhyam prānādimattvam hetustasminyatra yatra sātmakatvābhāvastatra tatra prānādimattvābhāvo yathā ghaṭādāviti vyatirekavyāptirevāsti. Na tu yatra yatra prānādimattvam tatra sātmakatvamityanvayavyāptirdṛṣṭāntābhāvājjīvaccharīramātrasya pakṣīkaraṇāt. Anyatra ca hetusādhyayorevāsattvāt.

Yatrānvayavyāptirvyatirekavyāptiśca nigadyate tadanvayavyatireki. Yathā parvato vahnimāndhūmādityādi. Atra ca parvataḥ pakṣastasya vahnimattvaṃ sādhyaṃ dhūmāditi hetustasmin yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatra vahniryathā mahānasādāvityanvayavyāptiḥ. Evaṃ yatra yatra vahnyabhāvastatra tatra dhūmabhāvo yathā jalamahāhradādāviti vyatirekavyāptiścāsti.

Anvaye sādhanam vyāpyam sādhyam vyāpakamisyate. Sādhyābhāvo'nyathā vyāpyo vyāpakah sādhanātyayah. Vyāpyasya vacanam pūrvam vyāpakasya tatah param. Evam parīkṣitā vyāptih sphuṭībhavati tattvata iti.

Trayāṇām madhye yo'nvayavyatirekī sa pañcarūpopapanna eva svasādhyam sādhayati. Tāni pañcarūpāṇi. Pakṣadharmatvam. Sapakṣe sattvam. Vipakṣādvyāvṛttiḥ. Abādhitaviṣayatvam. Asatpratipakṣatvam ceti.

Pakṣatāśrayavṛttitvam pakṣadharmatvam.

Niścitasādhyavānsapaksah. Tatra vidyamānatvam sapakṣa sattvam. Niścitasādhyābhāvavānvipakṣaḥ. Tatrāvidyamānatvam vipakṣādvyavrttih.

Pramāṇāntareṇāpramitasādhyābhāvakatvamabādhitaviṣayatvam. Sādhyābhāvasādhakahetvantaraśūnyatvamasatpratipakṣatvam.

Etāni pañcarūpāņi vahnisādhakadhūmādāvanvayavyatirekiņi vidyante. Kevalānvayini vipakṣādvyāvṛttirnāsti vipakṣāprasiddheh. Kevalavyatirekiņi sapakṣe sattva nāsti sapakṣāsiddheh.

(§ 32)

Trividhamapyanumānam dvividham. Svārtha parārtha ceti. Svasyaivānumitihetuh svārtham. Svayam dhūmādagrimanumāya param bodhayitum pañcāvayavopetamanumānavākyam prayunkte tatparārtham.

Pańcāvayavāstu pratijñāhetūdāharaņopanayanigamanāni. Tatra pakse sādhyanirdeśah pratijñā. Yathā parvato vahnimāniti. Pancamyantam hetupratipādakam vākyam hetvavayavah. Yathā dhūmāditi.

Vyaptipratipadakam vacanamudaharanam. Yatha yo yo dhumavansa sa vahnimān yathā mahānasa iti.

Vyaptivisistasya hetoh paksadharmatapratipadakam vacanamupanavah. Yathā vahnivyāpyadhūmavāmścāyamiti.

Abādhitatvāsatpratipakṣitatvatātparyakam vākyam nigamanam vathā lasmādvahnimāniti. Tathā cāyamityupanayasya tasmāttatheti nigamanasya śarīramiti prāñcah.

Vyatirekini pratijñāhetū tulyāvevodāharanopanayanigamanāni tu bhidvante. Yathā jīvaccharīram sātmakam prānādimattvādityatra yatsātmakam na bhavati tatprānādimanna bhavati yathā ghatah. Na cedam jīvaccharīram prānādimanna bhavati tasmānna tatheti.

(§ 33)

Atha hetvābhāsāh.

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Anumititatkaranānyatarapratibandhakajñānavisayadharmo hetvābhāsatvopādhistadvānhetvābhāsah. Te cānaikāntikaviruddhasatpratipakṣāsiddhabādhitāh pañca.

Tatra savyabhicāro'naikāntikah. Sa trividhah sādhāraņo'sādhārano'nupasamhārī ceti.

Tatra sapakṣavipakṣavṛttih, sādhāranah. Yathā parvato dhūmavānvahnoriti. Vahnirhi sapakse mahānase taptāyahpinde ca vartate'tah sadhāraņah. Etajjñānam ca vipakṣavṛttitvarūpa-

vyabhicāraviṣayakatvādvyabhicārajñānavidhayā vyāptigrahe pratibandhakam. Vyabhicārajñāne sati vyāptigrahānudayasya suprasiddhatvāt.

Sapakṣavipakṣavyāvṛttatve sati pakṣavṛttirasādhāraṇaḥ. Yathā śabdo nityah śabdatvāditi. Śabdatvam hi sapakṣādgaganādervipakṣācca shaladervyāvrttam pakse sabde ca vartata ityasādhāraņam. Etajjñānam ca sākṣādanumitipratibandhakam.

Kathamiti cedittham.

Sabdatvam hi nānvayī heturdṛṣṭāntābhāvāt. Kim tu vyatirekī. Tathā ca yo heturyaddharmavato vyāvrttah sa svāśraye taddharmābhāva widhayati. Yathā dhūmo vahnyabhāvavato jalahradādervyāvrttah

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svāśraye parvatādau vahnyabhāvābhāvam vahni sādhayati. Tathā śabdatvam nityatvavato gaganādeh sapakṣādvyāvṛttamiti svāśraye śabde nityatvābhāvamanityatvam sādhayet. Evam nityatvābhāvavato ghaṭādervipakṣādvyāvṛttamiti svāśraye śabde nityatvābhāvabhāvam nityatvamapi sādhayet. Na caikatra śabde nityatvānityatvayoḥ sambhavastayorvirodhāt. Tasmācchabdatve' sādhāranatvajñāne sati na sādhyānumitiriti.

Vastumātrapakṣakopasaṃhārī. Yathā sarvaṃ nityaṃ prameyatvāditi. Atra sarvasyaiva pakṣatvātprameyatvaṃ heturanupasaṃhārī. Etajjñānamapi vyāptigrahe pratibandhakam. Sarvasya pakṣatve vyāptigrāhakasahacāradarśanasthalābhāvena sahacāraniścayābhāve sati vyāpteraniścayāt.

(§ 34)

Sādhyābhāvavyāpto heturviruddhaḥ. Yathāyam gauraśvatvāditi. Atra ca yatra yatrāśvatvam tatra tatra gotvābhāva iti sādhyābhāvavyāpteḥ heturviruddhaḥ. Etajjñānam ca sākṣādanumitipratibandhakam pakṣe gotvābhāvavyāpyāśvatvavattājñāne sati gotvaniścayāsambhavāt.

(§ 35)

Sādhyābhāvasādhakahetvantaram pratipakṣaḥ. Tadvānsatpratipakṣaḥ. Yathā parvato vahnimāndhūmānmahānasavat. Sa vahnyabhāvavānpāṣāṇamayatvātkuḍyavaditi. Atra ca dvayorapi hetvoḥ parasparasādhyābhāvasādhakatvānmithaḥ satpratipakṣatvam. Etajjñānam ca sākṣādanumitipratibandhakam. Vahnivyāpyadhumavānvahnyabhāvavyāpyapāṣāṇamayatvavāmśca parvata iti dvividhaparāmarśe satyekasmādapyanumiterabhāvātparasparam pratibandhāt.

(§ 36)

Parāmarśapratibandhakajñānaviṣayadharmo'siddhistadvānasiddhaḥ. Sa trividhaḥ. Āśrayāsiddhaḥ svarūpāsiddho vyāpyatvāsiddhaśceti.

Tatra pakṣatāvacchedakābhāvavatpakṣaka āśrayāsiddhaḥ. Yathā gaganāravindam surabhyaravindatvātsarojāravindavaditi. Atra cāravinde pakṣe gaganīyatvam pakṣatāvacchedakam nāstītyara-

vindatvam heturāśrayāsiddhaḥ. Etajjñānam parāmarśapratibandhakam. Aravinde gaganīyatvam nāstīti jñāne surabhitvavyāpyāravindatvavad-gaganāravindamiti parāmarśāsambhavāt. Etasyāravinde gaganīyatva-saṃbandhāvagāhitvāt.

Pakṣaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogī svarūpāsiddhaḥ. Yathā hrado dravyaṃ dhūmāditi. Atra ca pakṣe de dhūmasyābhāvo'stīti dhūmo hetuḥ svarūpāsiddhaḥ. Etajjñānamapi parāmarśapratibandhakam. Hrade dhūmo nāstīti jñāne sati dravyatvavyāpyadhūmavānhrada iti parāmarśasambhavāt. Etasya hrade dhūmasambandhāvagahitvāt.

Vyāpyatāvacchedakābhāvavānheturvyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ. Yathā parvato vahnimānkāncanamayadhūmāditi. Atra ca dhūme vyāpyatvāvacchedakatvenābhimatam kāncanamayatvam nāstīti dhūmo heturvyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ. Etajjnānamapi parāmarśapratibandhakam. Dhūme kāncanamayatvam nāstīti jnāne sati vahnivyāpyakāncanamayadhūma-vānparvata iti parāmarśāsambhavāt. Etasya dhūme kāncanamayatvasambandhāvagāhitvāt.

(§ 37)

Sadhyābhāvavatpakṣako bādhitaḥ. Yathā vahniranuṣṇaḥ padārthalvājjalavaditi. Atra ca vahnau pakṣe'nuṣṇatvābhāvasyoṣṇatvasya
lvagindriyeṇa niścayātpadārthatvam heturbādhitaḥ. Etajjñānam
sākṣādanumitipratibandhakam. Vahnāvanuṣṇatvam nāstīti jñāne sati
vahniranuṣṇa ityanumiterasaṃbhavāttadabhāvalaukikanirṇayaladvattājñāne pratibandhakatvāt.

Iti hetvābhāsāh.

(§ 38)

Nanūpādherapi hetudosatvātsopādhiko'pi hetvābhāso'stīti katham pancaiva ta iti cenna.

Vyabhicārādijñānasyevopādhijñānasyānumititatkaraṇānyatarapratibandhakatābhāvenipādherhetudoṣatvābhāvāt.

Katham tarhi vāyvanumāna upādhirupanyasyata iti cedvyabhitārajñānaprayojakatvena tatra tadupanyāsah.

Atha ko'yamupādhiriti ceducyate.

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Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ. Yathā dhūmavānvahnerityatrārdrendhanam. Bhavati ca tatsādhyasya dhūmasya vyāpakam yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatrārdrendhanamityasatvāt. Bhavati ca sādhanasya vahnervyāpakam yatra vahnistatrārdrendhanamityasatvāt. Taptāyaḥpinḍe vahnisattve'pyārdrendhanābhāvāt. Evam yāgīyā paśuhimsādharmasādhanam himsātvātkratubāhyahimsāvadityatra niṣiddhatvamupādhiḥ. Bhavati ca tadadharmasādhanasya sādhyasyavyāpakam yatra yatrādharmasādhanatvam tatra tatra niṣiddhatvamiti sattvātsādhanatvasya himsātvasyāvyāpakam yatra yatrahimsātvam tatra tatra niṣiddhatvamityasattvāt. Pakṣīkṛtahimsāyām himsātvasattve'pi niṣiddhatvasyāsattvāt. Evam garbhastho miṭrātanayaḥ śyāmo miṭrātanayatvāddrśyamānamitrātanayaṣaṭkavadityatra śākapākajatvamupādhiḥ. Na ca śyāmatvasya kākādau sattve śākapākajatvābhāvātsādhyāvyāpakatvam kākādivyāvṛttaśyāmatvasyaivātra sādhyatvāt.

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FORMAL AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS OF TIBETAN BUDDHIST DEBATE LOGIC

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What we shall term here "Tibetan Buddhist debate logic" or "Bsdus grwa logic", and which Stcherbatsky termed the logic of "sequence and reason" (thal phyir), was something very probably invented by the 12th century thinker, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169): one says "probably" because no work of Phya pa survives, and in fact at this stage we can only conjecture that it was he who was responsible for its invention in his proto-bsdus grwa texts, the "epistemological summaries" (tshad ma bsdus pa).2 From the fourteenth century on various schools, such as the Sa skya pa in particular, used debate-logic in their texts, but the foremost practitioners of this art were no doubt the followers of Tsong kha pa, the Dge lugs pa tradition.

This debate-logic format, which consists largely of series of consequences (thal 'gyur = prasariga) along the model of "... chos can ... yin par thal . . . yin pa'i phyir" (". . . the topic, it follows that . . . , because ..."), is what one typically associates with the elementary manuals on epistemology and eristics known as "Collected topics" (bsdus grwa), although it should be stressed that it is far from the exclusive confine of Bsdus grwa manuals: most of the principal Dge lugs authors, such as Rgyal tshab rje, Mkhas grub rje, Chos kyi rgyal mishan et al., regularly alternate between prose and debate-logic format in their more extensive commentaries on the meaning of canonical Indian texts.³ The actual Bsdus grwa manuals, though, seem 10 make their first appearance with the fifteenth century writer 'Jam dbyangs phyogs lha 'od zer (1429–1500), who wrote the Rwa stod bsdus grwa. Nonetheless, in terms of the concepts and terminology used, we see that almost all of Bsdus grwa's definitions and classifications were already given (in prose) in Tsong kha pa's (1357–1419) Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel and indeed most of the "lessons" do most likely go back to theories of Phya pa himself.4 Jam dbyangs phyogs lha 'od zer and other Bsdus grwa writers' contributions, thus, were doctrinally fairly unoriginal, but consisted in

loumal of Indian Philosophy 17: 265-297, 1989. 6 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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recording debates in a more formal, stylized, pedagogical manner, one which no doubt was closer to what transpired orally.

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Now, the term "Bsdus grwa" itself admits of a certain ambiguity. frequently being applied in a narrow sense to a group of texts containing in total approximately eighteen lessons (rnam bzhag), from an introductory lesson on colours (kha dog dkar dmar sogs kyi rnam bzhag) to the presentation of the apoha theory of meaning (sel'iug sgrub 'jug gi rnam bzhag'). "Bsdus grwa" does, however, also have a wider sense, referring to these "lessons" plus a work on the varieties of cognition (blo rigs) and one on the logic of valid and invalid reasons (rtags rigs).5 For our purposes, we will speak of "Bsdus grwa logic" as a type of logical idiom: it is of course typically found in Bsdus grwa texts, but it is also rigourously used in a genre of texts known as "word commentaries" (tshig 'grel), which paraphrase the verses of major Indian texts such as Pramānavārttika and Madhyamakāvatāra into debate-logic format. It was, and still is, a commonly accepted medium for student monks; no doubt at its best it contributed to a certain clarity; at its worst, it seems to have been used to give an appearance of rigour, dressing up dogma in the trappings of logic.

My proposal is a relatively modest one: to examine basic formal aspects of this logic such as quantification, variables and entailment and make some remarks concerning certain rather complicated semantical problems which arise in the interpretation of terms. Afterwards I shall bring out the classical character of this logic by examining a Dge lugs pa debate-logic treatment of the tetralemma (catuskoti), a part of Buddhist logic which is often taken as a prime candidate for a so-called deviant, or non-classical, logic. The examples and explanations below are based on an examination of a number of elementary texts including Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa, Rwa stod bsdus grwa, Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs, Bsdus grwa brjed tho of Ngag dbang nyi ma, the Bse Bsdus grwa of Bse ngag dbang bkra shis, as well as various Dge lugs pa commentaries which are in debate logic format or extensively use these means of expression.

A. BSDUS GRWA LOGIC AS A REAL DEBATE LOGIC

Dge lugs pa logic has by now received a certain amount of study, notably an early descriptive article by Sierksma, an M. A. and Ph.D.

thesis by D. Perdue, the articles in Japanese by S. Onoda and two informative recent articles by M. Goldberg⁸; in Tillemans (1986a), I attempted an analysis of intensional epistemic statements in this system. However, what has yet adequately to emerge from this mass of brute data is the general character of the system: here, modern interpreters have tended to abuse terms, such as "syllogisms" and "sets", borrowed from Aristotelian or modern symbolic logic, as if Bsdus grwa were somehow a fragment of an odd sort of deductive logic or set theory. In fact, as one immediately sees when one looks at the Tibetan texts, or even at the data which Perdue, Goldberg et al. give in a generally accurate way, the logic is through and through a set of rules for conducting a dialogue; this is an obvious fact, but it means that Bsdus grwa logic is not properly speaking a series of "proofs" (to cite Goldberg), "syllogisms" (to cite most writers on Indian or Tibetan logic), enthymemes or derivations.

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Indeed, recently we have seen a growing interest among logicians and philosophers in theories of argumentation and in so-called debate logics in their own right, an interest generally founded on the realization that argumentation, while it is to some degree translatable into formal logic, is not the same thing as doing derivations, and indeed that it exhibits fundamentally irreducible elements which deserve to be analysed without the distortions of translation into alien terms. J. Hintikka, E. M. Barth, L. Apostel, P. Lorenzen and numerous other philosophers writing in a wide range of languages have attempted to Provide analyses of rational argumentation which offer alternatives to translations into elementary first-order predicate logic, and indeed some writers, such as Lorenzen, have even reinterpreted this elemenlary logic in terms of a formalized dialogue logic. 10 It is not my intention to try to present the various currents in this new domain of argumentology", but suffice it to stress that the key steps which such theoreticians share is to conceive of argumentation and dialectics in lems of games, strategies, rights and obligations for the participants and finally, winning and losing. In short, to use Eric C. W. Krabbe's (1982) terms: If we present a logic in a "derivational garb", the Validity" of arguments will be defined as derivationally in some system; if we use a "dialectical garb", "validity" becomes the existence of a winning strategy in a dialogue-game. 11 Now it should be clear to anyone familiar with Bsdus grwa logic,

that the key terms such as 'dod ("I agree"), rtags ma grub ("the reason is unestablished"), khyab pa ma byung ("there is no pervasion"), ci'i phyir ("why?") and so forth embody a system of moves, responses, rights and obligations in a rigidly-structured game, a game in which certain strategies will lead to subvictories punctuated by the exclamation tsha and, eventually, to a final victory marked by rtsa ba'i dam bca' tsha, "tsha to [your] fundamental thesis".

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It is unnecessary to restate all the rules and procedures of this game - others have already done that. To make my point about the particular larities of a debate logic, suffice it to cite here the rules, rights and obligations governing "pervasion" (khyab pa = vyāpti), i.e. the entailment between the reason (rtags = linga) and the property to be proved (bsgrub bya'i chos = sādhyadharma). If a proponent presents a statement of the form a has property F because a has property G, his opponent is faced with three possibilities of which he must choose one: (i) he may say that he agrees that a has F; (ii) he may assert that a does not have G; (iii) he may assert that not everything which has G has F, i.e. For not all x: if x has G then x has F. Should he choose the third option, the opponent will then be summoned to show a counterexample (ma khyab pa'i mu), viz. something which has G but does not have F; if the opponent fails to give anything at all within a "reasonable" time period, or if the example turns out to be bogus, the proponent will have the right to assert that the pervasion does indeed hold.

While we obviously can translate debates about pervasion into a natural deduction system, where we speak of premises, universal instantiation, etc., and where truth is defined in the usual way relative to a domain of objects, this loses sight of the fundamental fact that debate is an activity, where the ontological question as to whether there is a counterexample or not is replaced by the practical activity of seeking and finding one. In short, a universally generalized conditional, "For all x: If x has G then x has F", is true in normal first order predicate calculus if there is no member of the domain which in fact has the property assigned to "G" but lacks the property assigned to "F". In a debate logic, one is allowed to assert the generalization if the opponent cannot follow a certain set of procedures and then find

a counterexample. We shall look at the details and consequences of this type of view of pervasion, below, but first of all, by way of a preliminary, let us take up the problem of quantification and variables.

B. FORMAL STRUCTURES

a. Quantification and variables

Firstly, it should be pointed out that the language used in debate is a rather technical, artificial form of Tibetan, and in this idiom we find an extensive technical use of pronouns in a manner which is analogous in the use of variables. Indeed, it has often been said that variables are artificial languages' analogue to the ordinary pronouns in daily discourse. In the case of Tibetan logic, however, this parallel between pronouns and variables is even more marked, for the Tibetan idiom is itself artificial and the pronoun khyod which is used as a variableanalogue does not have its ordinary sense of "you", the second person pronoun standing for people whom one addresses, but instead usually stands for inanimate things and notions. So without any more ado let us speak of khyod and its cousin chos de in such contexts as being, for our purposes, the variables in debate logic: khyod is used when one variable is all that is necessary, and chos de (lit. "that dharma"; that element") when a second variable is called for. Propositions are represented by de (lit. "that") as in de sgrub kyi rtags yang dag, "a valid reason for proving P". In most cases when a predicate is monadic, the variable khyod will be dropped as unnecessary and cumbersome: khyod can however always be explicitly added, if one wishes to do so, and the reasoning functions as if it were implicitly present.

(1) sgra chos can mi rtag ste (lit: "sound, the subject, is impermanent . . ."

could be phrased as

sgra chos can khyod mi rtag pa yin te . . . (lit: "sound, the subject, you are impermanent").

 $\int_{a}^{a} dy$ adic predicate such as "x is the cause of y" (khyod chos de'i

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rgyu yin) or "x is identical with x" (khyod khyod dang gcig yin), the variables must be used. (For more on the used of khyod, see S. Onoda [1979b].)

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Now the obvious question to ask is "What is the purpose of continually saying 'the subject' (chos can = dharmin) when stating propositions?" In fact, it plays a very necessary role, but let me bring this out in two steps.

First of all, "chos can" is not really a subject marker, but rather a marker of the topic under discussion. (Readers of Japanese when confronted with Bsdus grwa logic for the first time, invariably think of the Japanese topic-marker wa, and the analogy is apt.) In the usual sound-impermanent reasonings, "sound" is actually the subject, but if we take the Tibetan renditions of the classic Indian smoke-fire reasoning, viz. parvato vahnimān dhūmāt = du ldan la la chos can me yod de du ba yod pa'i phyir, we see immediately that in Tibetan the word "hill" is not a simple nominative as in Sanskrit, but rather has the la particle (viz. du ldan la la). To translate the Tibetan literally we would have: "On the smoky hill, the topic, there is fire, because there is smoke." It is apparent then that chos can = dharmin is indeed more like a topic-marker, rather than a marker of the grammatical subject.

This, however, is at most the beginning of an explanation. More interesting is to see the use of the marker "chos can" as indicating a special type of quantification. To see this more clearly, let us take a sample reasoning with khyod being used as a variable.

(3) bum pa chos can khyod khyod dang gcig yin te khyod yod pa'i phyir (Lit. "The vase, the topic, you are identical to yourself because you exist.") 13

This then is a statement of the form, F because G, and naturally the proponent can ask whether the corresponding generalization or pervasion holds. We shall represent this pervasion as a universal generalization, viz. a statement of the form (x) (if Gx then Fx) which one should read as: For all x: if x has G then x has F. (I should mention that quantification must range over existent and inexistent items — everything from vases to rabbit's horns. In another article I discuss the problems which this poses in the context of Indian Buddhist

logic and I refer the reader to the discussion there for precisions on this problem; for our purposes it is not necessary to enter into details again. If I Tibetan the pervasion of (3) becomes:

(4) khyod yod na khyod khyod dang gcig yin pas khyab (Lit. "If you exist then you are pervaded by being identical with yourself").

Formalizing things, we could represent the predicate "exists" by "E!" and thus come up with:

(5) (x) (if E!x then x = x). 15

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Now it should be clear that the variable *khyod* used in (4) also figures in the original reasoning (3). How then could we formalize (3) all the while showing *khyod* as being a variable? How, in effect, are we to make the phrase "the vase, the topic," (*bum pa chos can*) be anything more than a useless appendage followed by an unbounded variable x? The answer is to treat it as being a quantifier which binds variables in the usual way; however, instead of the usual existential and universal quantifiers, what is at stake here is what J. A. Faris (1968) terms "singular quantification". Consider the following:

- (6) Ollie loves Nicaragua.
- (7) Ollie is such that he loves Nicaragua.
- (8) Ollie, he is such that he loves Nicaragua.

If we treat the pronoun "he" in (8) as a variable then we can see that "Ollie," in indicating the pronoun's antecedent, is in effect binding the variable. Following Faris, sentence (8) could be formalized as:

(Ollie x) (x loves Nicaragua) Read: "Of Ollie as x, it so that x loves Nicaragua." ¹⁶

As Faris shows, this type of quantifier-matrix form for singular statements can be integrated into the fabric of first order logic without any special problems; in fact the main reason which one can see for doing it in modern logic is that it is horribly cumbersome and really do anything that individual constants don't already do.

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But in Bsdus grwa logic it does have explanatory power. Sentence (3) becomes

- (10) (the vase x) (x = x because E!x), or equivalently,
- (11) (the vase x) (if E!x then x = x).

From (11) we only need to change the quantifier to universal quantification to get (5). In short, khyod functions as a bound variable in both sorts of statements, the singular statements (3)/(10) and the universal statements (4)/(5): what changes is the type of quantifier which binds it. In the first case singular quantification is conveyed by the topic-marker, "chos can"; in the second case, universal quantification is conveyed by the idiom of "pervasion" ($khyab\ pa$).

A curiosity in Tibetan debate, which is worth mentioning as it brings out further the likeness between topic-markers and quantification, is the possibility of redundant quantifiers, that is to say, in this logic we can and frequently do find quantifiers which prefix formulae which have *no* variables whatsoever. The result is that the quantifier becomes redundant — just as can occur in modern predicate logic — because it fails to bind any variables.

In modern logic redundant quantification is a possibility, of course, but one of little practical importance. Not so for the Tibetans. To bring this out more clearly, let us look at the following examples:

- (12) (x) (If Robert Johnson sang "Crossroads" then Son House sang "Death Letter Blues")
- (13) (x) (if sound is impermanent then vases are products)
- (14) ([the] knowable thing x) (vases are products because sound is impermanent)

Obviously, for (12) to be true it is sufficient that either the antecedent ("Robert Johnson sang 'Crossroads'") be false or the consequent ("Son House sang 'Death Letter Blues'") be true. Similarly for the Tibetan-style example (13). It is interesting, however, to look at the manner in which this basically banal logical phenomenon presents itself in debate logic. Should an opponent assert the contrary of (13), the proponent will naturally say "Show me a counterexample", and here he will be asking for a statement prefixed by a topic-marker such

as in (14). It should be apparent that whatever topic the opponent might choose as a candidate for a counterexample will be ineffectual, for the statements "sound is impermanent" and "vases are products" will remain true. Failing to show a counterexample, the opponent has to accept the pervasion.

In cases such as (14) Tibetan debaters regularly say that the chos can is nus med ("powerless"), although I have never seen this parlicular term used in a text. At any rate, it is quite an apt description and brings out the element of redundancy in that the chos can is not the antecedent of any pronoun in the subsequent proposition: in our terms the quantifier is redundant because the proposition contains no variables for it to bind.

Finally, note that in (14) the topic given was "the knowable thing" (shes bya) but in fact it could have been anything whatsoever, although there is a type of practical convention among debaters which leads one to use "knowable thing" as a virtual powerless topic of choice which is immediately recognized as such by competent debaters familiar with the "code". This redundant quantification, I may add, is what is frequently chosen to dress up doctrinal propositions in the trappings of logical rigour, as we see in Dge 'dun grub pa's commenlary, the Dbu ma 'jug pa gsal ba'i me long, where there are elaborate debate logic paraphrases of the verses in the first five chapters of the Madhyamakāvatāra, chapters which concern essentially dogmatic subjects having little or nothing to do with logical argumentation. Typically, the powerless topic of such reasonings is represented by the knowable thing", which is followed by two complete sentences with no pronouns or variables, the second sentence ending in phyir and showing the reason for the first.17

b. Pervasion for Tibetan logicians and pervasion for Dharmakīrti

Al the risk of saying a few things which are becoming fairly wellknown by now, let us briefly look at the Indian Buddhist account of hyapti as represented by Dharmakirti; this provides a significant point of contrast to pervasion in Tibetan debate logic. 18 Specifically, two Questions need to be examined: (i) What is pervasion in the two logics? (ii) How is it established?

Now, for Dharmakīrti, the key point is that the implication between

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a reason (hetu) and a property to be proved (sādhyadharma) must be founded on a necessary connection (sambandha; pratibandha) between the terms, be this a causal connection (tadutpatti) or one of essential identity (tādātmya). If there is such a connection, then it is certain that the former term entails the latter and it is impossible that there be a counterexample.

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One might want to take "certain" and "impossible" in a suitably modal sense, one which is construed in terms of causal necessity or the necessity between two conceptually-fabricated distinctions (i.e. $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyalak\bar{s}ana$) of the same real particulars ($svalak\bar{s}ana$). Following this line, the temptation would be to say that for Dharmakīrti the terms F and G are in a relation of pervasion if and only if

(15) N(x) (if Fx then Gx)

where "N" is a necessity operator. In fact, though, it is not clear as to whether Dharmakirti means that, or whether his point is more of an epistemological one, i.e. that one cannot know or be sure about the truth of (x) (if Fx then Gx) unless one knows that there is a connection between F and G. I am of the opinion that the epistemological version is a more accurate account of Dharmakīrti's thought, although in the final analysis one probably has to say that epistemological and logical aspects were somewhat inadequately distinguished. At any rate, the key position which he is opposing is primarily a certain epistemological stance, viz. Īśvarasena's view that pervasion is based on "mere non-observation" (adarśanamātra) of a counterexample. More exactly, what this means is that one could assert (x) (if Fx then Gx) with no grounds other than not seeing something which had F but did not have G. So, to simplify things a bit, let us provisionally say that pervasion itself in Dharmakīrti translates into the same universally quantified formula as in Tibetan debate logic: the important difference, as we shall see, is in their respective justifications for asserting that there is pervasion.

In point of fact, in Dharmakīrti's epistemology it is quite complicated to establish the necessary connection justifying the assertion that there is pervasion. How is one to know that such a connection exists and hence that there can *never* be a counterexample? ²⁰ In *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 245—257 Dharmakīrti explains what later

became a standard account of the method to establish causal connections: Causality between A and its effect B is established when observations of (previously non-existent) B's are preceded by those of A's, and non-observations of A's are followed by non-observations of B's. As for tādātmya, identity, he argues in k. 258 that this sort of necessary connection is to be established by analysing whether the real nature to which the concepts correspond is the same or not, in short, a type of conceptual analysis. Here is k. 258 with Devendrabuddhi's introduction:

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Devendrabuddhi: "So indeed, the necessary connection between cause and effect is like this. The essential property ($rang\ bzhin = svabhāva$), i.e. the reason which is an essential property is as follows:" ²²

k. 258: "The necessary connection of the essential property is to be understood by considering the reason according to its [real] nature (yathāsvam), just like [the proof of identity (tādātmyasādhana)²³] between perishability and producthood which was previously explained." ²⁴

So much for Dharmakīrti's stance. Of course, this view about necessary connections, and in fact all the basic features of Dharmakīrti's logic, were known to the Tibetans and were held in reverential awe as the guidelines on how to do logic. But while that may be so, the logic which they often actually used, viz. the debate logic, was probably something which would have made Dharmakirti wince a bit, particularly as it comes very close to the accursed adarśanamātra method of establishing pervasion. If we refer to the rules and obligations of this debate logic, we see that if an opponent challenges a pervasion (i.e. asserts the contrary), the proponent will say "Show me a counterexample!" In other words, in an actual debate, necessary connections and that sort of thing play very little role: a pervasion is accepted when one cannot find a counterexample.²⁵ No doubt the mixture of Dharmakirtian theory and actual Tibetan debate is slightly schizophrenic, but it is probably true that the simplified approach to establishin. lishing universal generalizations is indeed what one finds most of the of Oxford in real arguments, be they among Buddhist logicians, members of Oxford debating unions or lawyers in an Assizes court. Alas, nobody caught in the rough-and-tumble of debate can take much time out to do conceptual analysis of necessary relations between terms.

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Surprisingly enough, not only is it so that *in practice* Tibetan debaters did not need to ascertain a necessary connection between terms in order to establish pervasion, but this necessary connection is not even a *theoretical* requirement. Let us suppose that we have a statement of a pervasion where we are sure that the antecedent is false, e.g. the antecedent could involve an item universally recognized as being inexistent, such as the barren woman's son, a rabbit's horn and the like. In that case it will be impossible to show a counterexample, not because of the barren woman's son's necessary connection with the term in the consequent (the barren woman's son isn't connected with anything at all!), but rather because there are no instances of such "sons". Once again, failing to show a counterexample, one must then accept the pervasion.

Consider the following formulae, the first representing a pervasion, the second showing the recognized fact that there are no rabbit's horns:

- (16) (x) (if x is a rabbit's horn then x is impermanent)
- (17) $\neg (Ex)$ (x is a rabbit's horn).

It should be clear that (16) follows from (17).²⁷ Indeed, given (17), the consequent of (16) could have been anything at all: so long as the antecedent remains "x is a rabbit's horn", the whole conditional will be true. This is in fact a version of the medieval logician's principle of ex falso sequitur quodlibet,²⁷ a principle which has its correspondent in Tibetan debate logic:

(18) ri bong rwa yin na gang dren dren yin pas khyab ("if something is a rabbit's horn then it is pervaded by being whatever one can think of")²⁸

The Medievals generally made a distinction between *consequentiae* whose antecedents were necessarily false (i.e. contradictory) or contingently false, a distinction which is not explicitly formulated in Tibetan debate logic, but the logical insight at stake here, while somewhat less elaborated in the case of the Tibetans, is turning on the same point.

Naturally, if a Tibetan has such a view on pervasion, exegetical problems will arise as to how he is to interpret Dharmakīrti's strictures concerning necessary connections. Their solution is to make a split between pervasion simpliciter, such as one might find in "consequences" (prasanga) used in a debate, and pervasion as the anvayavyāpti and vyatirekavyāpti in the context of the theory of the triple characterization (trairūpya) of valid reasons; it is only in the latter case that a necessary connection is required.29 Frankly, I do not know how a consistent Dharmakirtian would have to react to such a split, but I would go so far as to say that the Tibetans' separation of the formal notion of pervasion from its Dharmakirtian epistemological baggage does, perhaps, represent a certain progress, in that they explicitly developed precisely those cases which show that the logical problem of formulating what we mean by saying that a pervasion holds, is different from the epistemological problem as to how we can know or come to be sure that it holds.30

C. SEMANTIC ASPECTS

While the formal aspects of Bsdus grwa logic, such as those which I have discussed above, can be explained with a relative degree of clarity and rigour, the semantic problems of interpreting what the individual terms refer to in Tibetan arguments are often nightmarishly complex. Margaret Goldberg, in two recently published papers, had the courage and patience to try to disentangle and classify some of these problems. She noticed that there are a number of rules where One can predict certain results providing the case is a "normal" one, or in her terms, "providing no contradictory condition is present." 31 Prima facie this might seem to boil down to the simple tautology that cases are normal providing they are not odd and seemingly inexplicable able exceptions, but in fact there is more to it — she tried to give "cyceptions" some rules which would explain when some of these "exceptions" Occur. Unfortunately, much of her exposition is either an intrasystemic mass of data — largely correct, valuable, but as complex as the Bsdus gnya arguments themselves — or involves an imposition of some alien and ill-fitting concepts such as sets. I think that we can and

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should simplify things a bit by diagnosing a few ambiguities and equivocations.

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The basic problem in *Bsdus grwa* logic which guarantees "exceptional cases" is the ambiguity of the terms used as topics. Thus, e.g. almost all young Tibetan debaters end up scratching their heads in puzzlement at the following pair of statements:

- (19) shes bya chos can rtag pa yin ("knowable thing, the topic, is permanent.")
- (20) shes by a yin na rtag pa yin pas ma khyab, dper na gser bum chos can. ("If something is a knowable thing then it is not pervaded by being permanent, for example, the topic, golden vase") 32

The oddity is that (19) is saying that "knowable thing", taken as the topic, is permanent, while (20) means that not every knowable thing is permanent — vases are knowable but are not permanent.

Goldberg tried to explain cases such as (19) by "the rule that says that any entity which includes a mixture of permanent and impermanent instances is permanent". This is true, although it does not get us much further than merely repeating the intrasystemic reason which Tibetans themselves invariably give and usually do not understand either. Let us take up two more notions which she discusses.

- (21) mtshan nyid chos can mtshan nyid ma yin te mtshon bya yin pa'i phyir ("Defining property, the topic, is not a defining property, because it is the object of a defining property.")
- (22) mtshan nyid yin na mtshan nyid yin pas khyab ("If something is a defining property, it is pervaded by being a defining property.")³⁴

So, finally, what is going on here? First and foremost, we have the purely lingistic fact that Tibetan does not have a definite article and rarely uses the indefinite article or abstraction-designators such as the tva or $t\bar{a}$ which we find in Sanskrit. It might be objected straightaway that $tva / t\bar{a}$ do have their equivalent in Tibetan, viz. nyid, but while that is so for Tibetan translations of Indian texts, in indigenous

Tibetan logic, or in literary Tibetan which is not translationese, nyid is almost never used in this role. Nobody would say shes bya nyid chos can or bum pa nyid chos can.

If we do not use articles, it is of course difficult to know whether we should understand shes bya as meaning "the knowable thing [over there or "a knowable thing" or even "all knowable things" or "some knowable things". Lacking a distinction such as that between jñeya and jneyatva we do not know whether shes bya means "a/the/some/all knowable thing(s)" or "knowableness". This, then, is the first element in disentangling the "exceptions" in Bsdus grwa logic: in cases such as (19) the Tibetans are not meaning "an/the/some/ all A(s)", but rather are taking the term more in the sense of the property A-ness. More exactly speaking, it is we who have to take the term as meaning Aness: they fail to make the distinction. At any rate, once we make such a distinction, the paradoxical quality of asserting both (19) and (20) vanishes, for the paradox arises if we take shes bya as implicitly meaning "all knowable things" rather than knowableness. Certainly, in Tibetan logic substantives must often be understood as meaning "all ...", but there are many cases where we have to take the Tibetan term as implicitly meaning the abstract property in question.35

Now, it should be of some interest to know that this sort of ambiguity is by no means restricted to Tibetan logic: the Medievals had a similar problem in their theory of supposition (suppositio), a theory which I. Bochenski has termed "one of the most original creations of Scholasticism, unknown to ancient and modern logic".36 For us it is impossible and unnecessary to enter into the details of the complete theory, a well-developed doctrine on which almost every post-12th century logician had something to say. What is relevant to us, however, is the medieval logicians' attempts to explain the varieties of altribution and designation which one and the same substantive could have, and here a root cause of these logicians' problems seems also to have been that Latin too has no articles.

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If we take the theory as formulated by the 13th century writer, William of Shyreswood, the same term homo can be used to mean "a /some/all men", or "man" in the sense of the property or species, i.e. One can say homo currit, [omnis] homo est animal, or homo est species. The case which is of interest to us is the third one, where,

according to William, the term homo "simply stands for what is signified without referring to the things". This latter suppositio simplex pro significato sine comparatione ad res seems to have been somewhat controversial among the medieval logicians, but at any rate it was recognized that a term such as homo could in certain contexts refer to the property, or "variety" rather than any or all individual men: another term for this suppositio is manerialis, quia supponit pro ipsa manerie speciei ("manerial supposition because it stands for the very manner [specific character] of the species"). 38

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Let us now return to the pair of statements, (21) and (22). If we take the term $mtshan \ nyid$ as referring to the various entities which are themselves defining properties, then (21) will lead to the paradox that a /some/the/all things which are defining properties are not defining properties. However, taking (21) as a kind of suppositio simplex sine comparatione ad res, it asserts that being a defining property, or defining-propertyness, is not itself a defining property. To Sanskritize things, the point at stake is that laksanatva ("defining-propertyness") is something which can itself be defined, therefore, it is the object of a defining property ($mtshon \ bya = laksya$) and is not itself a defining property.³⁹

Curiously enough, although the Tibetans never developed a theory approaching the complexity of the Medievals' theory of *suppositio*, they do seem to be aware that a special type of reference is occurring when one uses terms as in (19) and (21). They will insist that what is meant is just "its own exclusion" (rang ldog) rather than the "exclusions of its bases" (gzhi ldog), thus making use of Tibetan (?) adaptations of the terminology in the Indian Buddhist theory of apoha, a theory which holds that the referent of any word is always some sort of exclusion ($ldog pa = vy\bar{a}vrtti$) of what is contrary.

Nonetheless, the use of the term "exclusions" is not of crucial importance for us: the real point at stake is whether a word is referring only to the general notion or property (i.e. rang ldog) or whether it is also in some way referring to the things which have that property (i.e. gzhi ldog), in other words what the Medievals termed respectively suppositio simplex pro significato sine comparatione ad res and will draw upon the terms rang ldog and gzhi ldog in an ad hoc fashion to explain away paradoxical cases (in that sense one could say

that they potentially have the conceptual machinery necessary to construct a theory of different sorts of suppositio), 41 there is no clear attempt systematically to explain and generalize upon the fundamental logical differences between such statements as bum pa lto ldir zhabs zhum chu skyor gyi don byed nus pa yin ("Vase[s] are bulbous, splay-bottomed [and] able to perform the function of carrying water" 42) and byas pa sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i rtags yang dag yin ("Product[hood] is a valid reason for proving that sound is impermanent"). 43 And yet, obviously, in the first case there must be references to actual vases in addition to the reference to the rang ldog, whereas in the latter it would be incoherent for the term byas pa to refer to actual products of causality such as seeds, sprouts and pillars — nobody would want to pretend that a pillar is a valid reason for proving that sound is impermanent.

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Ultimately we have have no choice but to diagnose ambiguities and equivocations, for if we remain rigourously faithful to what is written in the texts, the result will certainly be that we are saddled with a completely deviant and more or less incomprehensible logic of the sort which Goldberg, alas, accurately describes in her list of "puzzles". At any rate, we do not get far in our understanding by saying things like "the Dge lugs pas assume that there is an almost consistent universe", or by exaggerating the importance of a few Bsdus grwa brain-teasers so that we end up with a "unique non-Western formulation of topics related to set theory including logical antinomies similar lo Russell's paradox."44 In fact, it is probably fairer to say that the Dge lugs pa generally were hardly aware of the seriousness of inconsistency in a logic, largely because their debate logic was not sufficiently formalized so that this problem would arise clearly. What they were doing was nothing so elevated as the postulation of a "semiconsistent" universe: it was very often a matter of simply patching things up. In short, while it is not necessary to go so far as to say (as does Quine) that there can be no logics which really do deviate from the classical logical laws of contradiction and excluded middle, real deviation (if it occurs at all) must be justified with strong reasonings, otherwise it is better to explain away the anomalous phenomena as lesting on misunderstandings, equivocations, translational problems and the like.45

So much for the comparative philosophy approach to solving

logical anomalies which arise in articleless languages. There are other conundrums which arise because of the *apoha*-based view that entities such as *byas pa* "(product[hood]") and *mi rtag pa* ("impermanent"/" impermanence") cannot be identical (*gcig*) in some very strong sense of the term "identity". But I have developed these points elsewhere and will not again enter into the details of the Tibetan notions of identity. What is perhaps of interest as a final section to this article, is to look at how the Tibetans, used debate logic in their interpretations of a key Indian Buddhist doctrine, the *catuṣkoṭi* ("tetralemma"; tib. *mu bzhi*). For the sake of brevity, let me presuppose a certain familiarity with the broad outlines of the Indian Madhyamaka and restrict myself to the position of the Dge lugs pas without making comparisons with other Tibetan schools, who, it should be remembered, did have very different positions.

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D. THE CATUȘKOȚI AS SEEN VIA THE PERSPECTIVE OF DGE LUGS PA DEBATE LOGIC

A classic Indian statement of the *catuskoti* occurs in k. 21 of Chapter XIV of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*:

Existent, inexistent, both existent and inexistent, neither existent nor inexistent, that is the method which the learned should always use with regard to oneness and other such [theses].⁴⁸

As phrased in this way, we have denials that anything exists, is inexistent, is both or neither. The commentary of Candrakīrti makes it clear, however, that this tetralemma also applies to other dichotomies, such as one /many, and so forth — in other words, it can be generalized to apply to any proposition P, and not just to the usual context of "... exists", "... is inexistent", etc.⁴⁹ Ruegg (1977) p. 9 sums up the Mādhyamika use of this schema:

This type of analysis of a problem thus constitutes one of the basic methods used by the Mādhyamikas to establish the inapplicability of any imaginable conceptual position—positive, negative or some combination of these—that might be taken as the subject of an existential proposition and become one of a set of binary doctrinal externes (antadvaya).

While one might somehow find a way to rationalize this fourfold

negation, prima facie, it looks as if it would lead to a deviant logic, a fact which, of course, has not gone unnoticed by Western interpreters. If we take the negations of the four lemmas as being $\neg P$, $\neg \neg P$, $\neg (P \& \neg P)$, $\neg (P \& \neg P)$, then these four cannot be maintained together unless we grant that the negation operator is not that of classical logic: in other words, inter alia, $\neg \neg P$ cannot imply P, and other such classical laws cannot hold either. In point of fact, many Western interpreters are quick to say that the negation operator is not classical, that it is prasajyapratisedha, a type of negation which would not be bound by the law of double negation.

Now, indeed, in spite of Ruegg's excellent paper, the Indian catuskoti and prasajyapratisedha is, no doubt, a subject on which many writers will continue to seek interpretations, especially those who are philosophically cautious about embracing non-classical logics and negations. Fortunately, that problem need not be solved here; what is of interest to us now is the fact that the Dge lugs clearly felt the same sort of qualms about a literal interpretation of the tetralemma, an interpretation which would necessitate a non-classical view of negation. They avoid these unpalatable consequences by adding the qualification bden par grub pa ("truly established") - or equivalently, rang bzhin gyis grub pa ("established by own-nature") or don dam par ("ultimately") — wherever necessary to avoid paradox.50 This is in keeping with the fundamental view of Tsong kha pa that stalements in Madhyamaka arguments, in general, cannot be taken literally, but must be prefixed by a qualification which specifies exactly what it is that is being refuted (dgag bya). Failure to qualify yod pa ("existence"/"existent") as bden par yod pa ("truly existent") would, besides engendering paradoxes in catuskoti-style arguments, also lead lo a complete denial of conventional truth.

Consider the following passage from Se ra rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan's (1469—1546) Skabs dang po'i spyi don where the author first presents a literal version of the catuskoti, which he considers untenable. He then gives a duly qualified version:

'An opponent might say: "The ultimate mode of being is that all *dharmas* are not existent, nor inexistent, nor neither, for in the *sūtra* it is said that all tharmas are not existent, inexistent, both or neither, and the *Ratnakūṭa* [sūtra] states: 'kāṣyapa, saying that [a thing] exists is one extreme, saying that it does not exist is the

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other extreme. Abandoning these two extremes is the Middle path." [Reply:] This is incorrect for the following reasons: the meaning of the first scriptural citation is the point that all dharmas are not ultimately existent, [and thus] are not truly established nor are they conventionally inexistent, [and thus] established as being that lie inexistentl, nor are they truly established as being both ultimately existent and conventionally inexistent, nor are they truly established as being neither [ultimately existent nor conventionally inexistent]; the meaning of the second [citation] is to show that the view [that things are] truly existent is the view of permanence and that the view that they are conventionally inexistent is the view of annihilation. If it were not like this, then it would follow that all dharmas, the topic, are existent, because they are not inexistent.... Or, what is more, it would follow that all dharmas, the topic. are existent and are also inexistent, both and neither, because all dharmas are not existent, not inexistent, not both nor neither - the reason is what you hold."51

In fact, Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's qualified version is somewhat complicated to interpret. We might take "truly established" (bden par grub pa) or "truly" (bden par), "ultimately" (don dam par) as a kind of modal operator which we could symbolize by " \square ". Thus $\neg \square P$ means "it is not truly so that P". In that case, Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's version asserts: $\neg \Box P; \neg \neg P; \neg \Box (\Box P \& \neg P); \neg \Box (\neg \Box P \& \neg P)$. First of all, note that the third lemma, in particular, seems unnecessarily circumscribed, i.e. he could have simply said $\neg (\Box P \& \neg P)$: on either solution though, we see that the third lemma would not be a simple restatement of the law of contradiction, as it is in the literalist version. At any rate what concerns us most in Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's version is that no contradiction is derivable from the conjunction of the four negated lemmas. In simpler terms, to take his version of the Ratnakūta's famous pronouncement, the "Middle path" would be an assertion of an unqualified statement P; the "extremes" would be $\square P$ and $\neg P$; there is no contradiction in a formula which denies the "extremes" and asserts P. viz. (($\neg \Box P \& \neg \neg P) \& P$).

At this point, though, I should make an exegetical aside with regard to the interpretation of the negation of the second lemma, which, in Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, is to be taken as denying that things are completely inexistent. In other words, for Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, this comes down to the statement which we sometimes see in other Dge lugs pa texts that phenomena are gtan nas med pa ma yin pa ("not completely inexistent").52 Such a version of the second lemma seems to correspond with his interpretation of the "extremes" (mtha' = anta) which are to be avoided and indeed one finds no shortage of allusions to this idea in Dge lugs pa commentaries.

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Be all this as it may, the Dge lugs pa do in fact recognize two versions of the extreme of inexistence ($med\ mtha$ '): (a) "one which denies something legitimate" ($skur\ 'debs\ kyi\ med\ mtha$ ') — this is what Chos kyi rgyal mtshan is talking about; (b) "one which involves reification [of the negation]" ($sgro\ 'dogs\ kyi\ med\ mtha$ '). The latter type of $med\ mtha$ ' would be something like saying, "it is truly so that things do not truly exist", and its denial would therefore be, "it is not truly so that things do not truly exist", or in symbols, $\neg\Box\ \neg\Box\ P$. Note that here too, there is nothing contradictory about asserting ($\neg\Box\ P\ \&\ \neg\Box\ \neg\Box\ P$). What is significantly different from the denial of the $skur\ 'debs\ kyi\ med\ mtha$ ', however, is that $\neg\Box\ \neg\Box\ P$ does not in any way imply or contradict $P; \neg\Box\ \neg\Box\ P$ is compatible with P and also with $\neg P$.

Now, turning to the absurd consequences which Chos kyi rgyal mtshan maintains follow from the literalist position, we see further evidence that the debate logic which he is using gives results analogous to what one would expect from a classical propositional calculus. In other words, to use propositional calculus with the normal negation operator, we can tautologically derive P from $\neg \neg P$, and that is just what Chos kyi rgyal mtshan does. Indeed, debate logic analogues to the laws of double negation in classical logic are nicely described in Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa's treatment of negation:

The negation-of-not-being [an A] (ma yin pa las log pa) is equivalent to being [an A] (yin pa); the negation-of-being [an A] (yin pa las log pa) is equivalent to not being [an A] (ma yin pa); however many times one accumulates [occurrences of] negation-of-not-being, it is equivalent to one [occurrence of] negation-of-not-being; an even [occurrences of] negation-of-being [an A] is equivalent to negation-of-not-being; if a [term] has an odd number of [occurrences of] negation-of-being, it is equivalent to [the term with] one negation-of-being. 55

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Not surprisingly then, prasajyapratiṣedha, as explained in Bsdus grwa texts and in Tsong kha pa,56 turns out to be unexceptional and conforms to classical negation. In sum, one occurrence of a negation operator such as ma yin pa or the negative particle ma, mi, etc. in terms such as bum pa ma yin pa ("not being a vase"; "non-vase") or bden par ma grub pa ("not being truly established") will be counted as a prasajyapratisedha because no positive assertion about a phenomenon is implied. Two occurrences of ma yin pa or an occurrence of ma yin pa las log pa will be an implicative negation (paryudāsapratisedha).

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If we look at Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's rendering of the catuskoti, he has clearly taken pains to add bden par ma grub ("not truly established"), which is a prasajyapratisedha and implies no positive assertion at all. His exegetical weak point, however, is his denial of the second lemma, for he must accept that such a denial will imply the positive statement (i.e. $\neg P$ implies P): in that sense it is difficult for him to maintain that all the negations in the catuskoti are prasaivapratisedha.56 Furthermore, on Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's version of the catuskoti involving the skur 'debs kyi med mtha', there will be conventionally false existential propositions (e.g. "The Creator of the world exists") for which it will be impossible to negate all the lemmas: a Dge lugs pa could not say that the creator of the world is not conventionally inexistent, because the Creator would then have to exist. Thus, we have another exegetical problem in that we will not be able to apply the catuskoti to any proposition we like. A little reflection, however, shows that if we take the second lemma as being the sgro 'dogs kyi med mtha', the negation operator will still behave classically, but neither of these two exegetical problems will arise.

NOTES

¹ Stcherbatsky (1932) Vol. I, p. 58.

² On Phya pa and his oeuvre, see van der Kuijp (1978), (1983) chapter 2.

4 Cf. e.g. the full title of Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs: Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grwa'i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde'u mig las rigs lam che ba riags rigs kyi skor.

The principal doctrines were also elaborated in verse form by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje ngag dbang btson 'grus (1648-1722) in his Bsdus sbyor gyi snying po kun bsdus rig pa'i mdzod. Theories which specifically seem to be Phya pa's inventions, unbased on Indian pramāna texts, are the rdzas chos ldog chos rnam bzhag, viz. the lesson on substantial dharmas and excluding dharmas (see Onoda [1980] p. 385), and the lesson on ries 'gro ldog khyab, a systematization of the possible sorts of pervasions, which in spite of its name has little to do with the anvayavyāpti and vyatirekavyāpti of the Indian Buddhist logicians (see Onoda [1983] p. 437). Cf. also Ngag dbang nyi ma's remarks (p. 20) stating that Phya pa (= Cha pa) was responsible for rdzas chos ldog chos as found in Bsdus grwa: de dag la cha pa'i lugs kyi rdzas ldog zer / spyir rdzas chos dang ldog chos kyi don 'jog lugs dang mi 'dra // yin na'ang / cha pa chos kyi seng ges rdzas ldog gi rnam bzhag de dag rgyas par mdzad la / 'jam dbyangs bla ma phyogs lha'i 'od zer gyis / de dag ni gzhung gi go ba la dgag gzhi drug sgra thal 'gyur sogs dang 'dra ba'i phan che / zhes gsungs so //.

Indeed, after Tsong kha pa, we see Dge lugs authors regularly alternating between prose and debate-logic format in their more extensive commentaries on the meaning

of canonical Indian texts. Tsong kha pa may also have used it in his lectures, although in works written directly by him (i.e. not the lecture notes of Rgyal tshab and Mkhas grub), he does not seem to use it. See e.g. Mngon sum le'u'i tikā rje'i gsung bzhin in whas grub chos rjes mdzad pa. p. 529: rjes dpag tshad ma chos can / snang tshul phyin ci log gi blo ma yin par thal / yul gi gtso bo la snang tshul phyin ci log gi blo ma in pa'i phyir / 'khor gsum ga khas blangs tshul snga ma ltar ro /. Admittedly, it might well be Mkhas grub who put Tsong kha pa's thought into this form.

Cf. Dmu dge bsam bstan's brief biography of this author in *Tshad ma'i dgongs don* 'grel mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan = Yinmingxue gaiyao ji qi zhushi. pp. 373—374. Bse gag dbang bkra shis was a disciple of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus and was an abbot of Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil. Dates: 1678—1738.

The examples which I give from *Bsdus grwa* texts are not generally direct quotations, but are simplified versions of passages to be found in such texts and are completely typical of what transpires in actual debates. In controversial cases, I give passages on which my examples can be based.

See Sierksma (1964), Perdue (1976), Onoda (1979a), (1979b), (1980), (1982a), (1982b), (1982c), (1983), Goldberg (1985a), (1985b).

While predicate calculus, set theory, etc. can be profitably used on occasion in explaining structures in Bsdus grwa, we must bear in mind that these modern logic structures are at most approximate analogues of the structures in Bsdus grwa itself: in effect, we make a trade-off between the precision and facility gained in our explanations vs. the fidelity lost with regard to the actual Bsdus grwa argumentation. Goldberg, however, systematically blurs the distinction between a description of the debate logic and its possible analogues or translations into Aristotelian or formal logic. Cf. Goldberg (1985a) p. 157: "The theory of logic which I encountered deals with inferences as single syllogistic units. . . . The rules of inference of Detachment Modus Ponens), its contrapositive (Modus Tollens), and Substitution are known and used [*my italics] . . . Negation of implications, conjunctions, and disjunctions (including DeMorgan's Laws) are also known ... The Aristotelian techniques of direct proof, reductio ad absurdum (including reductio ad impossibile and consequentia mirabilis) and ecthesis are used routinely." ibid. p. 156: "The Dge lugs pa theories of formal logic are theories of predicate logic." ibid. p. 158: "Dge lugs pa logic presents ⁴calculus of arbitrary sets, properties and extensions ..." What does she mean by aying that all these things "are known and used"? They are never explicitly formulated nor, with perhaps the exception of contraposition, are they even discussed dearly. Of course, we can, if we wish, use this Aristotelian terminology for comparalive purposes, or we can even try to transpose/translate Bsdus grwa into such a logic. We could, with limited utility, do the same thing with regard to the arguments that Occur between lawyers, but it would be somewhat silly to say that debaters in courts of law know and use Aristotelian logic. As for the "Dge lugs pa theories of formal ogic" and the "calculus" of sets, etc., this falsifies the character of Dge lugs pa argumentation: there are no "theories of formal logic" or calculi, if she is using these tims in anything other than a very loose or solecistic manner. A few debate rules and obtain the solecistic manner of Venes drin brown gri and obligations are informally presented in the third book of Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa, but many are not explained at all — the student has to "pick them up" as best he can. For the problems in using the terminology of sets, see n. 44.

See the extensive chronological bibliography of research in this area in Barth and

See Krabbe (1982) pp. 126—127.

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12 The essential change of perspective which this way of doing logic brings out has been interestingly described by Barth in her introduction to Barth and Martens (1982) p. 6 as follows: "... the habit of logicians, old and new, of basing logic as well as their philosophy of language on some kind of "ontology" — that is to say, on things, properties and values that "are there", potentially or actually, in some "domain" or other — this habit should give place to a semantics in terms of the human activities of seeking and finding."

13 Cf. Rwa stod bsdus grwa p. 4a1 (= p. 7): de chos can / khyod khyod dang gcig vin par thal / khyod tshad ma'i gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir. yod pa ("existence") and tshad ma'i gzhal bya ("what is to be discriminated by a pramāna") are equivalent or

coextensive (don gcig).

14 Tillemans, "Some reflections on R.S.Y. Chi's Buddhist Formal Logic", in the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 11, 1 (1988) pp. 155-171.

15 Note that I'm fully aware of the fact that gcig is a much stronger sort of identity than what we represent by "=" (See Tillemans [1986a]), but for the moment nothing depends upon that fact: purists can, if they wish, understand "=" in a suitably Buddhist sense.

¹⁶ Cf. Faris (1968), pp. 4–9. Faris gives two possible translations of "(Claudius x) Fx": "Claudius x is such that x has F": "Of Claudius as x it is true that x has F". I would prefer not to introduce the potentially complicating phrase "it is true" and say

17 See for example Dbu ma 'jug pa gsal ba'i me long's explanation (p. 10a5-6) of the name of the fifth chapter in the Madhyamakāvatāra: shes bya chos can / sa de la sbyang dka' ba zhes bya ste / sa Inga pa la gnas pa'i byang sems bdag nyid chen po de lha'i bu'i bdud rnams kun gyis kyang sbyang dka'i sa las pham par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir / The verse on which he is commenting, viz. chapter V 1a-b, reads: bdag nyid che de bdud rnams kun gyis kyang // sbyang dka'i sa la pham par nus ma yin // Transl. de la Vallée Poussin (p. 512): "Dans la terre Sudurjaya, ce magnanime ne peut être vaincu même par tous les Māras". See also Dge 'dun grub pa's commentary (p. 2b3-4) to the oppening verses of Pramānavārttika's Svārthānumāna chapter, where Dharmakirti explains his own motivation in writing the work: shes bya chos can / dpal ldan chos grags bdag la rnam 'grel 'di ni gtso cher gzhan la phan pa yin zhes bsam pa'ang med de / skye bo phal cher phal pa'i bstan bcos la chags shing / legs nyes 'byed pa'i shes rab kyi rtsal med pas na legs bshad rnams don du mi gnyer la / de kho nar ma zad legs bshad la phrag dog dri ma dag gis yongs su sdang bar gyur ba des

For the history of *vyāpti* in Indian logic up to Dharmakīrti, see Katsura (1986a) and an English summary in Katsura (1986b).

On these terms see Steinkellner (1971), pp. 201—204. Stcherbatsky (1932), Vol. I p. 554 characterized *tādātmya* as follows: "the Buddhist law means reference of two different concepts to one and the same point of reality; the concepts are identical in that sense that one is included in the other."

One often finds, in the Dharmakirtian formulation of things, the stricture that one needs to have a bādhakapramāna (Tib. gnod pa can gyi tshad ma), a valid cognition whereby one can refute the presence of the hetu in non-sādhya. In effect this means knowing the truth of (x) (if $\neg sadhya(x)$) then $\neg hetu(x)$), viz. the contraposition of what needs to be shown. It is sometimes argued that the bādhakapramāna is the method for establishing pervasion in the case of the svabhāvahetu; the method of

FORMAL AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS

observations and non-observations is the method used in the case of the kāryahetu. This view on bādhakapramāṇa — as E. Steinkellner shows — does seem to have some textual support. However, such a position on the matter seems to me unlikely for two reasons: (a) Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika IV k. 258 explicitly says what the method is in the case of svabhāvahetu; (b) by means of a bādhakapramāṇa one only knows the truth of a proposition which is logically equivalent to the pervasion in question; this pramāṇa is not a method or how-to-do-it procedure for establishing the pervasion — it simply explains when one knows that the pervasion holds. For an example of the use of the bādhakapramāṇa, see Manorathanandin's commentary to PV IV, k. 27 translated in Tillemans (1987), "Pramāṇavārttika IV (2)".

The Buddhist theory of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), involving observation and non-observation, was elaborated according to a fivefold set of cognitions by Dharmottara and according to a threefold set by Jñānaśrimitra. Cf. Y. Kajiyama (1966) p. 113 and n. 305 and (1963).

¹² Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā 321a4: de ltar re zhig rgyu dang 'bras bu'i med na mi byung ba nyid yin no // rang bzhin te / rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs ni /.

¹³ See Manorathanandin's Pramānavārtikavrtti ad k. 258.

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¹⁴ My translation follows the Sanskrit. k. 258: nāntarīyakatā jñeyā yathāsvam* hetvapekṣayā / svabhāvasya yathoktam prāk vināśakṛtakatvayoh // *Read yathāsvam instead of Miyasaka's yathā svam.

From my observations and personal experience, I can affirm that the opponent in a Tibetan debate will have about fifteen seconds to come up with something or another, otherwise his audience will begin to clap their hands and jeer quite loudly and he will be forced to accept the pervasion in question.

To put things in the usual, but long-winded, fashion of predicate calculus: given the ruth of (17), the conditional (16) must also be true because no matter which individual constant β we substitute for the variable x occurring in (16), the formula rabbit's horn x/β " will be false and the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the whole conditional. See Mates (1972) for explanations, including the notation Φ α/β . A debate logic explanation is shorter: given an acceptance of (17), one will invariably fail to show a counterexample for (16).

Pseudo-Scotus' formulation was: ad quamlibet propositionem falsam sequitur quaelibet alia propositio in bona consequentia materiali ut nunc. See Kneale and Kneale (1962) p. 281. "From any false proposition there follows every other proposition in a material consequence which is good as things are now". "Good as things are now" is very roughly speaking the same as "contingently true", although cf. the Kneales' caution on p. 280

Sometimes one finds gang dren te yin pas khyab or gang dren dren. Eg. Yongs dzin bsdus grwa chung p. 20a6: dngos po'i spyir gyur pa'i dngos po yin na / gang dren dren yin pas khyab pa'i phyir /. ("... because if something is a real entity which is a universal of real entities, it is pervaded by being whatever one can think of"). Cf. the definitions of the anvayavyāpti (rjes khyab) and vyatirekavyāpti (ldog khyab) for proving sound's impermanence in Yongs'dzin rtags rigs (p. 5b; p. 24 ed. Onoda): in both cases, the definitions specify khyad mi rtag pa la 'brel.

We see that Dharmakīrti, when speaking about pervasions in consequences (prasariga), still insisted on there being a necessary connection. See Pramāṇavārttika ly, k. 12 and especially Manorathanandin's vrtti, translated in Tillemans (1986b). Goldberg (1985a) p. 172 et passim.

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32 Cf. Rwa stod bsdus grwa, p. 4a2 (= p. 7): shes bya chos can / dngos po ma yin par thal / dngos med yin pa'i phyir / ma grub na / de chos can / der thal / rtag pa yin pa'i phyir. ibid. p. 4a3: gzhi grub na rtag pa yin pas khyab zer na / gser bum chos can / der thal / de'i phyir. Note that gzhi grub ("established basis") is coextensive with shes bya.
33 Goldberg (1985a), p. 178. This is the principle which Tibetans routinely express by the formula . . . khyod rtag pa yin te khyod rtag pa dang gzhi mthun yod pa'i phyir.
34 Cf. Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa 'bring 11a1—2: kho na re shes bya'i mtshan nyid de mtshan nyid yin par thal / shes bya'i msthan nyid yin na mtshan nyid yin pas khyab pa'i phyir zer na ma khyab. ibid. 11b1—2: mtshan nyid chos can / mtshan nyid ma yin par thal / mtshon bya yin pa'i phyir /.

³⁵ A good example: In *Rtags rigs* one typically says *byas pa chos can sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i rtags yang dag yin*. ("Product, the topic, is a valid reason for proving that sound is impermanent.") In Sanskrit one would not say that *krta* or *krtaka* ("a/the/all product[s]") is the reason: rather the reason is *krtakatva* ("producedness"; "producthood"). But in Tibetan it would be silly to say *byas pa nyid chos can*, although

that is the point at stake.

36 Bochenski (1956) p. 162.

³⁷ Suppositio simplex pro significato sine comparatione ad res. Kneale and Kneale (1962) p. 252.

38 Translation is that of the Kneales, op. cit. p. 756, except that I would prefer

"stands for" for supponit instead of their "suppones".

Interestingly enough, there is a passage in Red mda' ba's commentary on the Catuhsataka chapter XV where the three defining characteristics (mtshan nyid) of conditioned phenomena are being refuted. In the course of the argument against laksana and laksya being one, Red mda' ba gives the absurd consequence that mtshan nyid mtshan nyid du mi 'gyur (p. 192), "defining character would not be a defining character." In fact, the sense is clearly that it would absurdly follow that things which are defining characters would not be defining characters. A good illustration of the ambiguity of terms in Tibetan.

⁴⁰ An example of the latter is *piper venditur hic et Romae* ("Pepper is sold here and in Rome"), where there is not just a reference to the variety or type of thing, but also

to the concrete pepper-corns which are actually sold.

41 For rang ldog and gzhi ldog, see the third chapter of Yongs'dzin bsdus grwa chung on ldog pa ngos'dzin. A good example of the use which the Dge lugs make of these terms is in the theory of apoha where they want to say that the likeness of the object which appears to the conceptual mind and is the meaning of a word is a conceptually created fiction, a sāmānyalakṣaṇa. However, that which has that likeness, viz. the svalakṣaṇa (i.e. the real particulars in the world), is not conceptually created. We find Bsdus grwa arguments on apoha such as the following:

bum 'dzin rtog pa la bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang ba chos can spyi mtshan yin. ("Appear[ance] as non-non-vase to the conceptual mind thinking about vase[s], the topic, is a sāmānyalakṣaṇa".)

khyod bum 'dzin rtog pa la bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang na khyod spyi mtshan yin pas ma khyab, dper na bum pa bzhin. ("If x is something which appears as non-non-vase to the conceptual mind thinking about vase[s], then x is not pervaded by being a sāmānyalaksana, for example, as in the case of a vase.")

Cf. Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa che ba, the chapter on apoha (gzhan sel). Note that bum

pa'i don spyi, the "object-universal of a vase", or the mentally-created likeness which is the basis for words and concepts, is explained in Bsdus grwa chung and che ba as bum 'dzin rtog pa la bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang ba. Lcang skya rol pa'i rdo je in effect explains the point brought out in the above two statements by using the terminology of rang ldog and gzhi ldog — the "appearance" itself (rang ldog) is the conceptually fabricated basis for applying mental and verbal conventions such as "ox", but the individual oxen which appear as non-non-ox are the gzhi ldog of this appearance and are svalakṣaṇa. Cf. Lcang skya grub mtha' p. 104 for a classic explanation of apoha à la Dge lugs pa: de ltar na 'di ba lang ngo / snyam pa'i blo'i tha snyad dang de ltar brjod pa'i sgra'i tha snyad 'jug pa'i gzhi'i rang ldog ni rtog pas btags pa tsam dang spyi msthan yin la / de dag gi gzhi ldog tu gyur pa'i ba lang sogs ni rang mtshan yin pas . . .

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Finally, it should be understood that Leang skya's explanation of apoha is largely based on Tsong kha pa's Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo, many passages of which he uses almost verbatim. Cf. A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar's Rang mtshan spyi msthan mam bzhag for a similar explanation, one which is more or less standard textbook lare.

¹² Cf. Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa chung p. 6a where lto ldir zhabs zhum chu skyor gyi don byed nus pa is also given as the defining property of vases (bum pa).

Gf. Rtags rigs p. 8b6; p. 31, ed. Onoda: byas pa sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i gnyis pa [i.e. sgra mi rtag par sgrub kyi khyad par ltos pa pa'i rang bzhin gyi rtags yang dag]. For the first quotation, see Goldberg (1985a) p. 177; for the second, see ibid. p. 153. The usual version of Russell's paradox arises in the context of 19th century set theory. Now Bsdus grwa is far from being a theory of sets, nor is it even likely that topic terms regularly refer to anything even similar to sets. This is easily seen by the following typical example: bum pa chos can bum pa yin te lto ldir zhabs zhum chu skyor gyi don byed nus pa yin pa'i phyir ("Vase, the topic, is a vase because it is bulbous, splay-bottomed and can perform the function of carrying water".) But the set of vases is not a vase, nor can it carry water. Of course we can force this into set theory, but that will necessitate big departures from what we actually find in the libetan

Goldberg (1985b) says on p. 295: "This entity [viz. rang ma yin pa] was not mentioned in my studies of Dge lugs pa logic but its existence is obvious from the Postulates". Disregarding the hyperbole and inexactitude of talking about "postulates" in Dge lugs pa logic, it is worth mentioning that it is really Goldberg who came up with this paradox of rang ma yin pa ("not being itself"), a paradox which is hardly clearly extractable from the Bsdus grwa arguments on rang ma yin pa'i ldog chos, etc. Granted, there seems to be something like a paradox in the latter arguments, but it is arrived at in an extremely roundabout and woolly way. Secondly, the terms rang ma yin pa and rang ma yin pa'i ldog chos suffer from a similar type of ambiguity as the cases which we saw above. If one felt less charitable one could, it seems to me, justifiably say that one does not understand what the terms mean and that the whole thing: thing is a type of pseudo-paradox. But taking a more charitable point of view, we could understand rang ma yin pa in the sense of the "property of not qualifying itself" or the "property of not being predicable of itself" — this, given what we saw previously about the ambiguities of terms in Tibetan, is probably a much more legitimate Possibility than something about sets. If we take that course, however, then rang ma yin pa looks like Russell's property of "impredicability": a property f that is not predicable of itself will be termed "impredicable", i.e. Impr(f) if and only if $\neg f(f)$. Let

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the property "impredicable" be f. Then Impr(Impr) if and only if $\neg Impr(Impr)$. See Copi (1971), p. 9. In other words, if there is a parallel with Russell, it is better understood as not being a version of Russell's set theoretical paradox, but as a paradox turning on properties. The inescapable impression which one gets from Bsdus grwa and Goldberg, however, is that the Tibetans did not have a clear awareness of such paradoxes, nor of their consequences; they stumbled onto something and then adopted a patchwork solution with the notion of rjes mthun pa ("semblant entities"). Coming up with explicitly formulated logical paradoxes is quite a different thing 45 Cf. Ouine (1970) pp. 80–87, or (1960) p. 387 where he gives the simplistic view that apparent logical conflicts are always results of mistranslation: "prelogicality is a myth invented by bad translators". Actually as Susan Haack (1974) shows. Ouine's position is not wholly consistent. If we adopt his views in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" that there is no fundamental difference between so-called "necessary" logical truths and factual truths, then it is theoretically possible that some circumstances would lead us to revise logical laws. This theoretical possibility is to be governed by his "maxim of minimum mutilation", which reminds us of the awesome consequences. See Haack (1974) chapter 2, for a discussion of the question, "Could there be good reason[s] for a change of logic?"

⁴⁶ Note that one could reproduce similar ambiguities in Chinese, and it would be interesting to see whether the Mohist logicians did have similar logical problems and how they solved them.

47 See Tillemans (1986a).

48 sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah / esa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādisu nityaśah //,

49 See the vrtti ad k. 21: ekatvam anyatvam ubhayam nobhayam ity ekatvādayah / etesv ekatvādiṣu pakṣeṣu vādinā vyavasthiteṣu sadasattvādyupalakṣito dūṣanakramah sudhiyā* yathākramam avatāryah /. *Better to read sudhiyā (= Tib. blo bzang pos) than svadhiyā, which is the reading found in Haraprasād Shāstrī and V. Bhattacharya. "Oneness, otherness, both, neither — that is what is meant by 'oneness and other such [theses]'. The person of excellent intelligence should systematically apply the method of refutation which was shown — i.e. existence, inexistence, etc. — to these theses concerning oneness, etc. which were established by the proponent." See Ruegg (1977) for examples from early Buddhism such as the finitude / infinitude of the world, its eternity / non-eternity, the soul's being different or identical with the body, etc.

Rgyal tshab in Bzhi rgya pa'i rnam bshad to CS XIV, k. 21 (Chapter XIV p. 12) adds the qualification bden par grub pa: mkhas pas bden par grub pa'i gcig nyid dang / gzhan nyid dang / gnyi ga dang / gnyi ga min pa sogs 'gog pa dag la rtag tu sbyar bar bya'i / . . . Note that Candrakīrti does not use this qualification here; nor does Dharmapāla in his Guang bai lun shi lun. Taishō XXX 1571.

shabs dang po'i spyi don p. 104a5-104b2 and 104b7-105a1; kha cig chos thams cad yod pa yang ma yin / med pa yang ma yin / gnyis ka yang ma yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin pa gnas lugs mthar thug yin te / mdo las / chos thams cad yod pa yang ma yin / med pa yang ma yin / gnyis ka yang ma yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin / gnyis yang ma yin / gnyis yang ma yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin / mtha' gcig go / med ces bya ba ni mtha' gnyis so // mtha' de gnyis spangs pa ni dbu chos thams cad don dam par yod pa ma yin pa bden par ma grub / tha snyad du med pa ma yin pa yang der ma grub / don dam par yod pa dang tha snyad du med pa gnyis

FORMAL AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS

ka yin pa yang bden par ma grub / de gnyis ka ma yin pa yang bden par ma grub ces pa'i don dang / gnyis pa'i don ni bden par yod par lta ba rtag lta dang / tha snyad du med par lta ba chad lta yin par bstan pa'i phyir / de ltar ma yin na / chos thams cad chos can / yod pa yin par thal / med pa ma yin pa'i phyir / . . . gzhan yang / chos thams cad chos can / yod pa yang yin / med pa yang yin / gnyis ka yang yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang yin par thal / chos thams cad yod pa yang ma yin / med pa yang ma vin / gnyis ka yang ma yin / gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin pa'i phvir / rtags khas /. The same passage in the copy of the Skabs dang po'i spyi don in the Tibetan collection of the Faculty of Letters of Tokyo University (pp. 89a6-89b3 and 90a1-2) shows no variants. For the quote from the Ratnakūta, see Kāśyapapariyartta 60 ed. Staël-Holstein: astīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntah nāstīty ayam dvitīyo 'ntah (/) yad etayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāsyapa madhyamā pratipad. 52 See eg. Kalff (1983).

See Tsong kha pa's Rtsa she tik chen, p. 15.

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4 Cf. Risa she tik chen p. 15 ed. Sarnath; vol. ba p. 10a2-3 (= p. 19); de la yang dag par yod pa tha snyad du yang mi srid pas yang dag par med pa tha snyad du yod pa'i phyir don dam par med ces pa med pa'i mthar 'dzin dang de ltar ma yin zhes 'gog pa med mtha' 'gog pa min kyang / dgag bya bkag pa'i med pa yang dag par yod do thes 'dzin na dngos po med pa'i mthar ltung bas de 'gog pa yang med mtha' 'gog pa yin no //. "Here, since true existence is impossible even conventionally, not being truly existent does exist conventionally. Thus it is not the case that [thinking] 'it is not ultimately existent' is grasping at the extreme of inexistence and that the negation 'it is not like that' is a negation of the extreme of inexistence. But if one thinks that the nexistence of the negandum which has been negated does [itself] truly exist, then one has fallen into the extreme of entities being inexistent, and thus the negation of that is the negation of the extreme of inexistence." For this "negation of a truly existent negation" in the context of the fourfold discussion of causality, see ibid. p. 47 (ed. Samath) et seq. which has the heading (sa bcad): rang bzhin med pa rigs shes kyis grub na bden par grub pa'i rtsod pa spang ba "Rebutting the argument that if one logically establishes that there is no svabhāva, then [this absence of svabhāva] is truly established." See also Ruegg (1983)'s summary of the Skal bzang mid 'byed (p. 226): Accordingly, when it is known that what is to be established in MMK I, 1 has the form of prasajya-negation (cf. 109a2), one understands that there is established the Pure negative determination of production in ultimate reality (don dam par skye ba mam par bcad tsam sgrub kyi) without there being an additional establishment of the existence of some (putative) ultimately real non-production (de min pa'i don dam pa'i skye med yod par mi sgrub pa) (111b2)."

Bsdus grwa chung p. 14a: ma yin pa las log pa dang / yin pa gnyis don gcig / yin pa las log pa dang / ma yin pa gnyis don gcig / ma yin pa las log pa du [ma] brtsegs kyang ma yin pa las log pa gcig pu dang don gcig / yin pa las log pa cha dang / ma yin pa las log pa don gcig / yin pa las log pa ya dang bcas na / yin pa las log pa gcig pu dang

don gcig yin pa'i phyir ro //.

See eg. Risa she tik chen pp. 39-41 (ed. Sarnath) and Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa che ba; gzhan sel dgag sgrub kyi rnam bzhag. For a general explanation of the notions at stake see Kajiyama (1973). Lately we have seen many modern writers explaining prasajya / paryudāsa in terms of "verbally-bound" or "nominally-bound" negations. laterestingly enough, this account fits badly with the Dge lugs explanations on the

⁵⁷ I deform things a bit here in speaking about "positive assertions" — more precisely,

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it is (psychologically) positive phenomena (sgrub pa = vidhi).

My thanks to Georges Dreyfus for confirming that the Tibetan debaters also felt that this potential exegetical problem would arise if one denied the skur 'debs kyi med mtha'. A solution seems to have been to take the denial as rang bzhin gyis med na med mi dgos pa ("it is not necessary that x is inexistent if x does not exist by its own-nature") instead of simply tha snyad du med pa ma yin pa.

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IBK = Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū, The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. JIP = Journal of Indian Philosophy.

WZKS = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.

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Yongs 'dzin phur bu lcog. Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs = Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grwa'i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde'u mig las rigs lam che ba riags rigs kyi skor. Included in Kelsang, T. and S. Onoda (1985). See also the critical edition by S. Onoda, The Yons 'dzin rtags rigs — A Manual for Tibetan Logic. Studia Asiatica no. 5, Nagoya University, 1981.

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SAMBANDHA AND ABHISAMBANDHA*

- 1.1. On the first page of his 1967 monograph Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar, J. F. Staal remarks: "The distinction which is relevant in the present context is that between sambandha 'the relation of one word to another within a sentence (as shown, e.g., by grammatical inflexion)' and abhisambandha, ānupūrvya or ānupūrvī the order or arrangement of words (as occurring in actual utterances)'.1 This distinction could be specified within a general theory of language; in India it served to delimit the scope of the science of grammar or vyākarana itself. For, though it is sometimes said that the Sanskrit grammarians were interested in grammar but not in syntax, it would be misleading to interpret this as asserting that they were interested in words (pada) and not in sentences (vākya) (cf. Renou 1960, 66; 1961, 129). It would however be correct to say that the Sanskrit grammarians were interested in sambandha and not in abhisamband[h]a, and accordingly in grammatical relations but not necessarily in word order."
- 1.2. It is evident from this citation as well as his remarks in the following pages² that Staal attaches considerable importance to the distinction between *sambandha* and *abhisambandha*. In the present paper I wish to contend that no distinction of the kind Staal makes exists, that the distinction had no role in delimiting the scope of Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) and that it is wrong to set up *abhisambandha* as a synonym of *ānupūrvī* and *ānupūrvya*.³
- 2.1. I do not know what the source of Staal's distinction is.⁴ The commonly used dictionaries of Sanskrit in general and of Sanskrit satras (the Vācaspatya, Sabda-kalpa-druma, Nyāya-kośa, Mīmāmsā-kośa, etc.), particularly of Sanskrit grammar (Abhyankar, Renou), do not contain any observations that will support the distinction. True, the ordinary Sanskrit term sambandha, basically meaning binding

^{Journal} of Indian Philosophy 17: 299–307, 1989. ¹⁹⁸⁹ Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. together, tying, connecting, relation,' can contextually mean 'grammatical relation, syntactic connection' and is naturally and frequently used in that sense, but no sense of *abhisambandha* distinct from this sense of *sambandha* has been noticed by the compilers of dictionaries and *kośas*.

- 2.2. Nor has Staal pointed out any passages in which sambandha and abhisambandha are juxtaposed and a distinction of their senses is indicated. If the two concepts were important, one would expect them to be set apart at least in a passage or two in the long and rich tradition of linguistic theorizing and observations for which India is justly famous among specialists. On the contrary, we find that while explaining his Trikāṇḍī K 1.67, prāk samjñinābhisambandhāt samjñā rūpa-padārthikā, Bhartr-hari (V 1.67) writes yāvat samjñinā samjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na samjñipadārthikā and indicates that there is no significant difference between abhisam + bandh and sam + bandh. We also notice that Nāgeśa quite casually shortens Patañjali's phrase yathesṭam abhisambandhah to yatheṣṭam sambandhah in Uddyota 1.1.58.
- 2.3. The contexts in which abhisambandha or other derivatives of abhisam $+ \sqrt{bandh}$ (badh) occur do not support the distinction either. Whether one looks at the older uses such as śistāñ śistābhisambandhān mānino 'navamāninah (Mahā-bhārata 12.57.23) or baijikād abhisambandhāt (Manu-smrti 5.63) in non-technical contexts outside Grammar or at the occurrences in early commentarial literature of Grammar such as the Mahābhāṣya, B's Mahābhāṣya-tīkā or the Tripādī, and the Trikāndī or Vākyapadīya, one finds abhisambandha employed in the sense 'connection,' occasionally acquiring, on the strength of the context, a specific shade of meaning such as 'grammatical connection' or 'semantic connection.' 5 In fact, in sentences such as vyavāya-śabdasya pratyekam abhisambandhah 'The word vyavāya is connected with each (word preceding it in the compound at-ku-pvān-num-vyavāye of Pāṇini 8.3.6),' quoted in the St. Petersburg Wörterbuch, it is impossible to assign the sense 'word order' to abhisambandha. Generation of an imagined clarificatory construction like ad-vyavāye, ku-vyavāye, pu-vyavāye, ān-vyavāye, num-vyavāye ca is

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not what we normally mean by "word order." Such a generation amounts only to recognizing the intended relationships of words.

3.1. Perhaps Staal has inferred the distinction on the basis of two passages from Pa which are embedded in his presentation as follows:

P. 28: "We need not pay attention to the word order in the sūtra, says Patañjali, because: neha prayoganiyama ārabhyate 'restrictions on usage are not here clung to.' This he explains as follows: saṃskṛtya saṃskṛtya padāny utsrjyante. teṣāṃ yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati. tad yathā āhara pātraṃ, pātram āhareti 'words are generated in accordance with grammatical rules, but their order [abhisambandha] is free, as in āhara pātram and pātram āhara "fetch the bowl"' (ed. Kielhorn, I, 39, lines 18—9)."

P. 32: "...he [= Patañjali] quotes in support Kātyāyana's vārttikā [→ "rttika] ... imupūrvyena saṃniviṣtānām yatheṣṭam abhisambandhah śakyate kartum 'any desired order may be established between words arranged in a particular succession' (ed.

Kielhorn, I, 152, lines 24-5; quoted Renou 1957, 576).

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"The opponent raises a further objection: na caitāny ānupūrvyena samniviṣtāni 'but hese are not arranged in a particular succession'. To which the reply is: anānupūrvy-māpi samniviṣtānām yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati 'free word order may also be established between words not arranged in a particular succession'."

- 32. Here, Staal does not tell us why an etymologically probable meaning like 'connection' (grammatical or semantic) of the word abhisambandha would not fit the context why one has to accept order' as the meaning. Nor does he explain, in the case of the second passage, what essential difference there could be between grammatical or semantic connecting of words, on the one hand, and establishing 'desired order . . . between words arranged in a particular succession, on the other."
- 33. The context of the first passage is that of accounting for the order of words seen in Pāṇini's rule *vṛddhir ādaic* as Staal rightly explains; given Pāṇini's usual practice, one expects the rule to read adaij vṛddhih.

Pa's words relevant to our discussion are: prayoga-niyamārtham larhīdam syāt vṛddhi-śabdāt para ādaicah prayoktavyā iti. neha prayoga-niyama ārabhyate. kim tarhi. samskṛtya samskṛtya padāny laṣṛjyante. teṣām yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati. tad yathā āhara pātram, pātram āhareti.

The only explanation of this passage that would make a contextlally acceptable sense is: 'Or, this (thought of Pāṇini) that ādaic are

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to be employed after the word *vrddhi* may be for the purpose of restricting usage (i.e., for indicating to the reader that certain sequences are to be followed in the employment of derived expressions).⁷ [To this the response is:] Restriction on usage (or institution of a certain sequence) is not undertaken here. Sentence-usable words, which have undergone derivation, are released (made available) one after another. They come to be connected as desired as can be illustrated with *āhara pātram* and *pātram āhara*.'

In other words, the point of the passage is not the general one that there is free word order in Sanskrit, but the rather specific one that free word order is presupposed in Pāṇini's grammar⁸ and hence the specific sequence in *vṛddhir ādaic* cannot be used to infer that Pāṇini wanted to connote to his reader that the reader adhere to a specific sequence (or a set of specific sequences) in using the expressions the Aṣṭādhyāyī would derive. To attribute such an intention to Pāṇini would run counter to Pāṇini's presupposition. Hence, an explanation other than the one assuming a suggestive act of the described kind on the part of Pāṇini should be sought for the deviant order in *vṛddhir ādaic*. 10

- 3.4. If Pa's statement rested at asserting free word order in Sanskrit and did not make the further point that such freely ordered words come to be associated with each other as desired and that this is the way Pāṇini presupposes his grammar to function, Pa would have conceded the objector's point and accepted that the specific order seen in *vṛddhir ādaic* has no purpose (is the result of a whim) and that Pāṇini has deviated from his usual practice for no reason.¹¹
- 3.5. The preceding discussion should serve to establish that 'order' is not contextually warranted as a translation of *abhisambandha* in the case of the first passage from Pa quoted by Staal. That *abhisambandha* cannot mean 'order' in the second passage has already been indicated (3.2).¹² If its juxtaposition in that passage is to be proper, it must be something different from *ānupūrvya* which has a well-established and etymologically justifiable sense of 'order, a certain sequence, a sequential arrangement,' etc. Staal (p. 32) too apparently recognizes this and attaches the sense 'word order in general' to *abhisambandha*

SAMBANDHA AND ABHISAMBANDHA

in the case of the second passage. Then, however, his initial statement declaring equivalance of abhisaribandha, ānupūrvī, and ānupūrvya must be deemed to be ill-considered (see note 1). Also, the specific sense newly attached to abhisaribandha does not fit the first MB passage. A statement of the form "Of the derived words, word order in general comes about as in āhara pātram and pātram āhara" either does not make sense or can only be taken to mean that a grammatical or semantic relationship comes about among the words delivered by the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Furthermore, if there is no evidence to support the understanding of abhisaribandha as 'order' or 'word order,' there is even less evidence to support its understanding as 'word order in general,' unless "word order in general" is simply another way of conveying the notion 'a grammatical or semantic connection.'

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4.1. I suppose it is abundantly clear from the preceding paragraphs that no technical or grammatical distinction of any kind exists between sambandha and abhisambandha and that it is wrong to specify lack of interest in abhisambandha as something that had a delimiting influence on Grammar. It is more probable that the Sanskrit Grammarians, either beginning with Pāṇini or under the influence of Pāṇini, generally entertained a different notion of what Grammar was supposed to achieve, particularly about the kind of sentences Grammar was expected to derive (Aklujkar 1988: note 5), and that it is this notion which resulted in an absence of detailed and sustained studies of the phenomenon of word order.

4.2. The appearance of, and to some extent the preference for, adbhisambandha when its equally non-technical colleague sambandha can convey its meaning seems to be due to the sensitivity which early sanskrit authors had for the shades of meaning expressed by the upasargas or prefixes.

As the situation was probably perceived as one in which word 'X' lurned to thing 'x' or word 'Y' for effecting a connection, it was perhaps felt that an addition of the prefix abhi, which indicates 'facing' looking in the direction of,' was appropriate.

There is some evidence to this effect in Pa's and B's usage. A preference for abhisam + bandh, over the simpler sam + bandh, may

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be detected in the following sentences which are concerned with situations of identification and in which a movement or turning of the signifier toward the signified seems to have been presumed: nitvo hy arthavatām arthair abhisambandhah MB p. 1.7: etad iti cānenāsyam evābhisambadhyate TP on MB p. 1.61, āhnika 4 p. 142:

vo go-sabdah so 'vam pinda ity abhisambandhe sati V 1.55 prāk samininābhisambandhāt saminā rūpa-padārthikā K 1 67 so 'vam itv abhisambandho buddhyā prakramyate yadā K 2.40. so 'yam ity abhisambandhād rūpam ekīkrtam yadā K 2.128. venārthenābhisambaddham abhidhānam prayujyate K 2.160, śabdāntarābhisambandhenāgnir mānavako, gaur vāhīka iti V 2,251, nāvaśyam te 'bhisambaddhā śabdā jñevena vastunā K 2.333. yathaiva samudāya-sva-rūpasya samininābhisambandhah V 2.356, yadi samjñābhisambandhāt prān natvam tad alaksanam / athordhvam abhisambandhād anityatvam prasajyate // V 2.364, vrddhyādīnām ca śāstre 'smiñchaktyavaccheda-laksanah / akṛṭrimo 'bhisambandho viśesana-viśesyavat // K 2.369, samjñayā . . . samudāyo 'bhisambadhyate V 2.283, etc.

NOTES

* The main point of this article was briefly stated at the Sanskrit syntax session of the South Asia Language Analysis conference held at Ithaca and Syracuse in June 1987.

The few abbreviations employed in the body of the article are explained in the

bibliography.

Contradicting what he says here or extricating himself from a possible charge of contradiction, Staal makes the following remark on p. 32, while discussing Patanjali 1.1.58 (p. 1.152 lines 24-5): "The term *ānupūrvya* is here used to refer to a given particular succession of words; the term abhisambandha for word order in general

..." As I point out below in section 3.5., the distinction which Staal makes here between anupurvya and abhisambandha is as arbitrary as their synonymity which he proclaims initially.

"Taxonomy, in this sense, corresponds to the Sanskrit abhisambandha, and structural linguistics can in this sense be characterized by its insistence upon abhisambandha." P. 2.

- "... the distinction Du Marsais made between syntaxe and construction corresponds to the distinction of the Sanskrit grammarians between sambandha and abhisambandha." P. 13.
- "... the distinction between the relation of words in a sentence (sambandha), which certainly belongs to the deep structure, and the order of words of a sentence (abhisambandha), which may belong to the surface structure." P. 30.

SAMBANDHA AND ABHISAMBANDHA

1 have no difference of opinion regarding the other observations made by Staal in the passage quoted at the beginning.

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One of Staal's references on p. 32 may be taken by some as suggesting that Renou 1957: 57 is his authority for the distinction. However, as I point out in note 6, the distinction is not found in Renou and Staal's reference should be taken literally the way he makes it — as simply stating that the passage quoted by him is also quoted by Renou or as indicating at the most that he became aware of the passage through Renou's quotation.

Important MB passages containing abhisambandha are discussed below. The word is found in TP āhnika 1 p. 12, āhnika 4 p. 142, āhnika 7 pp. 303, 305, 306; and in TK V 1.55, K 1.67, K 2.17, V 2.17, K 2.40, V 2.40, V 2.128, K 2.160, K 2.186, V 2.204, V 2.223, K 2.246, V 2.251, V 2.270, K 2.329, K 2.333, V 2.356, V 2.364, K 2.369, V 2.383, V 2.391, K 2.432, K 2.441, K 2.460, K 3.75, and K 3.163. Not to belabour the point, only a few of these will be quoted at the end of this article.

The source referred to here is Louis Renou's Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit, Paris: Librairie Ancienne, Honoré Champion, Éditeur. In it, Renou explains abhisambandha as "connexion (d'un mot avec telle notion ou avec tel autre mot dans la phrase, etc.)" and translates the MB passage reproduced by Steel as "payer dec

la phrase, etc.)" and translates the MB passage reproduced by Staal as "pour des choses qui se présentent dans un ordre successif, la connexion entre elles peut être faite arbitrairement." From this, it is evident that Staal's understanding of abhisambandha is not derived from Renou. See note 4.

¹ (a) That is, the rule *vrddhir ādaic* would achieve *prayoga-niyama* by setting an example of itself, by being a *jñāpaka*, that is, by being suggestive, through its formal peculiarity, of a general principle presupposed by Pāṇini in his grammar.

(b) Kaiyata and his commentators (Nagesa and Annam-bhatta) do not reveal how exactly they interpreted the first sentence. They do not use any word like jñāpaka in their explanations which would support my explanation. The TP is unavailable for this portion. However, if Pa's remark is not interpreted in the way I suggest and is taken to mean 'Or, this (vrddhir ādaic or the specific order of words in vrddhir ādaic) would be for the purpose of restricting usage through a statement of the form 'adaic should be used after the word *vrddhi*," then it would not be even a tentative answer to the specified problem. If understood as applicable to the sūtra itself, it would amount to simply pointing out what we already know, namely that *ādaic* is used after widdhi in the sūtra; if understood as applicable to a sentence of the object language, what would be the justification for making a regulation like the following: 'If one wishes to use vrddhi and ādaic in a sentence, one should put ādaic after vrddhi.'? Is the pūrva-pakṣin so unsophisticated as to entertain the possibility that Pāṇiṇi may write rules about individual sentences? How would what he says be even an answer to the problem pointed out in the case of a sentence of the metalanguage? Even if it were to be applicable to a rule, would it not amount to an assertion without any supporting argument, to a restatement of the problem itself?

(c) The discussion in (b) should suffice to establish that the following translation by Abhyankar and Shukla (1987), and other similar translations, are not likely to be the use of the words 'vrddhi and ādaic in such a way that the words āt and aic i.e. ie before the word vrddhi."

This does not mean either that the freedom is absolute or that there are no preferred word order patterns.

9 As deduced by his commentators from a study of the Astadhyavi.

As corrollary of what I state here is that āhara pātram pātram āhara is primarily not an illustration of free word order in Sanskrit but of the peculiarity of generation of sentence constituents in Pāṇiṇi's grammar — of the thesis that Pāṇiṇi presupposes free order, that in Pānini's view variation in the placing of words has no bearing (of course, within limits) on words getting connected to each other.

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While stating that prescription of particular sequences of derived words is not undertaken in Panini's grammar, Pa must presuppose that there can be such a prescription — that there can be prayoga-niyama. He must, therefore, be said to have noticed — and this is no great surprise or an advance over his predecessors — the phenomenon of specific ordering of words. His comment cannot, therefore, be interpreted to mean that, in his view, there is no preferred or common word order in Sanskrit.

12 Cf. pātha-kramād ārtha-kramo balīyān iti yathestam atrābhisambandhah. Kaiyata 1.1.58, that is, on our second passage here.

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forthcoming.

B = Bhartrhari. Trikāndī or Vākyapadīya. I have reproduced the text of the Vṛṭṭi from my critical edition (under preparation) of the TK. Those wishing to verify my references to the V prior to the publication of my edition should consult the editions by K. A. Subramania lyer: (a) Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Vṛṭṭi and the Paddhati of Vrsabha-deva. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute. 1966. Deccan College Monograph Series 32. (b) The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Kāṇḍa II with the Commentary of Puṇya-rāja and the Ancient Vrtti. Delhi, etc: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983. I have followed the enumeration of kārikās in: Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya, Die Mūla-kārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen. Ed. Wilhelm Rau. Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH. 1977. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII, 4. Hence the numbers in my edition and those in the editions by Subramania lyer do not always match. However, they are not far removed from each other. See also "TP" below.

K = kārikā. See B.

MB = Mahā-bhāsya. See Pa.

Pa = Patañjali. Vyākaraṇa-mahā-bhāṣya, ed. F. Kielhorn. 1880—5. Revised third ed. K. V. Abhyankar. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

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TK = Trikāndī. See B.

TP = Tripādī or Mahā-bhāṣya-ṭīkā, published under the title Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā of Bhartṛhari. Eds. K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Part I and II, 1967—70. Postgraduate and Research Department Series. No. 8. y = Vṛtti, See B.

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REVIEW

The Kulacudamani Tantra and the Vamakesvara Tantra with the Jayaratha Commentary, introduced, translated and annotated by Louise M. Finn, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986.

Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ritual texts of medieval India, the agamas of Southern Saivism, the Pañcaratra samhitās, and the rich variety of tantras in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. The present book offers a translation of two Hindu tantras, both from the Kaula marga and both largely concerned with the practice of religion rather than the intellectual interpretation of those practices. Unfortunately it fails to live up to the high standards of scholarship that one has come to expect in the field and must be read with extreme caution. The book consists of a general introduction to the tantras, a brief introduction to the texts themselves, a short summary of some of the basic tenets of Kashmiri Saivism, and then the translations themselves. Appendices 1-3 contain data on inscriptions which mention goddess worship and on available images of the mātrkas and Mahisāsuramardinī, while a fourth appendix is a table of discrepancies between the Kashmir edition of the Vāmakeśvaratantra and other printed editions. The main difficulties with the book lie in the quality of the translations. The most serious problems arise in the translation of Jayaratha's commentary to the Vāmakeśvaratantra, and I shall begin my review with a discussion of a few sections of the commentary and their translations. I shall then consider Ms. Finn's rendering of the Kulacūdāmani which is in fact somewhat better than that of the Vāmakeśvara. I shall comment briefly on her introduction the course of my remarks on the translations of the two texts.

The Vāmakeśvaratantra exists today in several published editions, the most recent of which is an excellent edition by Vrajvallabha Dvivedi in the Yoga Tantra Granthamālā, vol. 1, Varanasi: Varanaseya Samskrta Visvavidyalaya, 1968. This edition includes two commen-

lournal of Indian Philosophy 17: 309-325, 1989. 9 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. taries, the *Rjuvimarśinī* of Śivānanada and the *Artharatnāvali* of Vidyānanda. It also contains a detailed and thorough Sanskrit introduction to the text written by the editor, which is unfortunately inadequately utilized by Ms. Finn in her own introduction. There is a third commentary that was published in 1908 in the Ananda Asrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 56. This is the *Setubandha* of Bhāskararāya, and was edited by Kāsīnātha Śāstrī Āgāse. The text that Ms. Finn has translated is the one that is published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies with the commentary of Rājānaka Jayaratha, edited by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri and published in 1945.

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The commentary of Jayaratha is considered by all authorities to be the earliest of all the extant commentaries, dating to the twelfth century, and Jayaratha is well-known in the tradition of Kashmiri Saivism as the commentator of that far more famous tantric work, Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka. But if Jayaratha's position in the tradition is relatively clear, the actual content of his thought is far less so and the first question that must arise is the very selection of Jayaratha's commentary for translation instead of the Rjuvimarśini or Artharatnāvali, for example, both of which are by comparison models of lucidity. Ms. Finn admits on page 42 of her introduction that "it is often difficult to follow the path of his invective"; indeed, Jayaratha frequently criticizes the views of opponents whose texts are lost to us today and given the abstruseness of the subject itself the text presents to begin with formidable difficulties for the modern translator or interpreter. The very choice of Jayaratha, then, seems to me to imply a desire not only to elucidate the text itself, which would be much more easily accomplished by translating any of the other available commentaries, but also a specific interest in Jayaratha's unique contribution to the exegesis of the Vāmakeśvaratantra. I believe that this is a very different study from a simple analysis of the tantra itself, and one that requires more and indeed different scholarship from that which Ms. Finn has given us. For one, in the obscure passages, the commentary on the first verse being a good example, Ms. Finn makes no effort to throw light on Jayaratha's remarks either by reference to his writings on the Tantrāloka, or by comparison with the other commentaries. She has also made no serious attempt in the introduction to identify Jayaratha's opponents. In her introduction Ms. Finn relies heavily on

extant scholarship in English, often uncritically so. Thus there is no effort made to identify the Allata against whom Jayaratha argues, although Gopīnātha Kavirāja in his short book, Tantra o Āgamaśāstrer Digdarśan, Calcutta: Samskrta Mahāvidyālaya Gaveşaņā Granthamālā, 25, 1963, refers to an Allata who was the founder of a sub-sect of the Kaul school known as the Sāmsārika school of Kaul Tantra (p. 43). It would be useful to know more about this Allata, for example, in order 10 understand Jayaratha's arguments against him. In her treatment of Jayaratha's sources Ms. Finn seems merely to have copied the list provided by the editors of the text edition she used, omitting numbers and 9 and reproducing even their typographical error, Vākyapadī instead of Vākyapadīya. She has also not listed this text among the exant texts in her note 112 on page 41. In fact the verse Jayaratha cites in his commentary to verse 4 is verse 1.118 in the Deccan College edition of the text. In addition, Jayaratha often diverges greatly from the other commentaries I have been able to examine, the Rjuvimarśini and Artharatnāvali; any study of Jayaratha's method of interpreting the text or his thought would be greatly facilitated by a discussion of the significance of those differences. Finally, Jayaratha often appears to be commenting on a version of the text that is not the same one available to the other two commentators, for example in verses 6-10. Any understanding of his contribution to the history of Kaula ritual and exegesis should take into consideration the transmission of the lext and its divergent versions. There is a far better study of Jayaratha and his intellectual contribution to Kasmiri Saivism in Navjivan Rastogi's recent work, Introduction to the Tantrāloka: A Study in Structure, published in 1987 from Motilal Barnasidass in Delhi. Chapter 3, pp. 87-153 is entirely devoted to Jayaratha and his commentary on the Tantrāloka, and discusses in some detail his method as a commentator and his opponents and sources. Particularly noteworthy is a section on the relationship between Jayaratha and Ksemarāja and Jayaratha's op-Position to much that Ksemarāja has to offer in his commentaries to various tantric works. Ms. Finn's introduction in failing to explore these issues with any sophistication fails as well to contribute to scholarship in this field. These are all general criticisms and in short re-Volve around the selection of an obscure text and general ways in which modern scholars can attempt to penetrate behind that curtain of

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obscurity. I turn now to more specific remarks about the text and Ms. Finn's translations of both text and commentary.

The date and provenance of the Vāmakésvara Tantra are both discussed briefly in the introduction, pp. 43-45. Ms. Finn concludes that the Vāmakeśvara is later than the Kulacūdāmani and that it probably belongs to the eleventh century. Ms. Finn rejects the evidence that Jayaratha gives for an earlier date (in his commentary to 1.88, p. 48 of the text). I believe she is too hasty in so doing and has considered only part of his remarks there. Jayaratha in fact explicitly savs that Iśvaraśiva, who is dated by modern scholars to the ninth century, was the expounder of the Śrīrasamahodadhi (sa eva śrīrasamahodadhiślokānām sāksāt pravartayiteti sarvatra avigītā prasiddhih.). Now as Dvivedi notes in his discussion of the date and provenance of the text in his Sanskrit introduction to his edition, pp. 8-9, the Rasamahodadhi was a commentary on the Vāmakeśvara Tantra (p. 8). If one accepts the ninth century date of Isvarasíva, then, it is necessary to assume that the Vāmakeśvara existed prior to the ninth century. Dvivedi also notes that Abhinavagupta does possibly refer to adherents to the text, calling into question Ms. Finn's assertion that Abhinavagupta does not know the text (p. 44). Finally Ms. Finn is basing her dating of both the Vāmakeśvara and the Kulacūdamāni on an hypothesis about goddess worship that requires more substantiation than she in fact gives. Ms. Finn believes that the Kulacūdāmani must be earlier than the Vāmakeśvara because it makes so many references to the Mātrkās and Mahiṣāsuramardinī, which she suggests were most popular in the seventh and eight centuries and then subsequently suffered a great decline (p. 27). Unfortunately her evidence is incomplete and ignores a temple like Jagat in Rajasthan, devoted to the worship of Mahisasuramardini and usually dated in the 10th century. A continuous record of inscriptions at the temple, the oldest of which is dated 961 A.D., attests to the continued popularity of Mahisasuramardini and her worship there (Krishna Deva, Temples of North India, Delhi: National Book Trust, 1969, pp. 35-36). Ms. Finn also sees in the Kulacūdāmani a closeness to Buddhism and in the Vāmakeśvara an "uncompromised Hinduism" (p. 45) which leads her to suggest the later date for the Vāmakeśvara and a ninth or tenth century date for the Kulacūdāmaņi. In fact again it is not difficult to question some of

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the evidence adduced to support this hypothesis. On pp. 30-31 Ms. Finn argues that the traditional siddhis of Hinduism were those of Patānjali's Yogasūtras, while only Buddhism had things like anjana. nādukā, etc. Since these are the siddhis in the Kulacūdāmani, she suggests that the text should be given an earlier date (pp. 30-32). In fact, to consider just one of these siddhis, the pādukāsiddhi, which enables an adept to traverse great distances in brief moments of time, is mentioned in Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, book 14, chapter 2 (translation by Dr. R. Shamastry, Mysore Printing and Publishing House, eighth edition, 1967, p. 460, reference from R. N. Saletore, Indian Witchcraft, Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1981, chapter III). Besides this early appearance of the pādukāsiddhi in a non-Buddhist text, it appears in Hindu texts of a late date as well. The Indrajālāvidyāsamgraha, edited Śrīnityabodhavidyāratna and Śrī Āśubodhavidyābhūshan, Calcutta: Vācaspatya Press, third edition, 1915, has several examples in the Siddhanāgārjunakaksaputa (p. 375) and the Kāmaratna, pp. 88 and 100. It is thus impossible to use the presence of these siddhis in a text to argue for an early or late date. Returning then to my original point, it would seem to me that Dvivedi offers the most coherent discussion of the date of the Vāmakeśvara as pre-ninth century, and that Ms. Finn's discussion of the dating of the Vāmakeśvara is weak. I have brought in her discussion of the dating of the Kulacūdāmaņi as well at this point since she is operating under a single hypothesis for the dating of both texts, and one which I think is in error. Finally as to the provenance of the Vāmakeśvara, Ms. Finn has little to offer in her introduction. Once again it is a pity that she did not make greater use of Dvivedi, who suggests that the text may have come from Odyanapitha (p. 9 of the Sanskrit introduction). It remains now to examine some of the translations in some detail.

The most obvious problems with Ms. Finn's treatment of Jayaratha's commentary are the looseness of the translations and her failure to adequately to consider the very specific context in which Jayaratha discusses the Vāmakeśvara verses, the texts he cites and their traditional interpretations. With regard to the first of these two points, Ms. Finn seems not to have grasped the structure of the commentary and often fails to see where the commentator is actually giving a precise and specific gloss. In many cases her translation seems to be not a

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translation at all but a summary of ideas she has gleaned from the commentary in a very general way. In fact Jayaratha is a master of organization, carefully selecting verses from other texts to bolster his. opinions, and it seems to me essential that a translation should convey a sense of the order and precision of the original. As to the second point, the specific intellectual framework in which Jayaratha is operating. Ms. Finn seems not to have handled the verses Javaratha cites to back up his interpretations with sufficient scholarly attention Thus she often mistranslates the verses, a number of which are from the İśvarapratyabhijñā, appearing not to have consulted the texts and their commentaries. In addition there are cases where a translation she offers may even be plausible by the dictionary, but is definitely wrong according to the technical interpretations Kashmiri Saivism provided for the terms she is rendering. I shall give some relevant examples of this from her translations that refer to terms used in Ksemarāja's commentary to the Svacchandatantra. In illustration, then, of the dangers inherent in a loose translation that does not represent adequately the structure of the original text and that fails to take into adequate consideration the context and intellectual mileu in which the author of a text is operating, I should like to discuss in detail Ms. Finn's translations of the commentary to two verses, 2 and 4.

The second line of verse 2 consists of a long compound which reads, *kālahallolollolakalanāśamakārinīm*, modifying the Great Goddess to whom the author of the text offers his reverence. The Goddess is said to bring about the stilling of something ending with the word *kalanā*, and reading back from the commentary I would venture to suggest that a rough rendering might be," who stills the process of particularization by means of the divisions of time which arise in the process of creation from the Highest Lord, who begins to manifest in himself creation, maintenance and dissolution, first all held in equilibrium in a steady state." Ms. Finn translates, "who stills the phenomenal distinctions arising in the vast wave of time progression," (p. 168), and it is instructive to ponder how she arrives at such a translation from her treatment of the commentary.

Jayaratha begins his discussion of verse 2 with a gloss of the compound in the second half of the verse. Throughout his commentary to the *Vāmakeśvara* he often adopts the procedure which he

employs here. He glosses specific words in the Vāmakeśvara verse and begins his gloss with a quote from another text to show that there is traditional authority for his interpretations. Jayaratha here opens with a quote from the Svacchandatantra, the text of which has been published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, edited by Pandit Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, 1921-1935. The organization of the entire commentary is in fact very precise. Jayaratha first gives this quote from the Svacchanda to open his gloss of the first term in the long compound, kālahallolullolakalanāśamakārinīm, of kāla. He then gives another quote from the Svacchanda to gloss the next term, hallola. This is followed by yet a third quote from the Svacchanda as an introduction of his gloss of the third term in the compound, ullola. There then follows his gloss of the word kalana, and finally his indication that the goddess is the stiller of those things, of the kalanās, that is that the relationship between the last two words in the compound is covered by having the second to last word in the genitive case. Jayaratha thus glosses four specific terms from the compound in the second half of the Vāmakeśvara verse. Let us see what Ms. Finn's translation conveys, then, of this basic structure to Jayaratha's commentary, and then let us explore how she deals with the quotes and interprets Jayaratha's text. I give below an excerpt from Ms. Finn's translation, which may be found on pp. 168-170 of her book. The lext in Jayaratha is pages 6 and 7 and I shall also give it below for those who do not have the text at hand and wish to follow my remarks. The excerpts include a small portion of Jayaratha's commentary beyond his gloss of the compound kālahallolollolakalanāśamakāriņīm that I intend also to discuss.

tasyāpyūrdhvam ameyas tu kālaḥ syāt parāvadhih /
nityo nityodito devi akalyaśca na kalyate //
sa cādhaḥ kalayet sarvaṃ vyāpinyādiṃ dharāvadhim /
tuṭyādibhiḥ kalābhiśca devyadhvānaṃ carācaram // (Sva.
11/311)
ityādinirūpitasvarūpasya kālasya yo hallolah
sa kālaḥ sāmyasaṃjñaśca (Sva. 11/309)
ityuktaprakarṣāprakarṣaśūnyasāmyātmakāvibhāgasvabhāvo
vasthāviśeṣas tasya ullollāḥ

aparaḥ soḍaśo yāvatkālaḥ saptadaśaḥ paraḥ/parāt tu paraḥ yaḥ kālaḥ sa priye asṭādaśaḥ prabhuḥ (Sva. 4/329) ityuktāni tuṭilavanimeṣadyātmakāni visphūrjitāni tairyāḥ kālanāstatadābhāsabhedāhitakramākramaprāyatayā avacchedās tāsāṃ śamakāriṇiṃ

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śūnyader māturbhātasya no sakṛt. (Īśv. Pra. 2/1/6) ityādyuktayuktyā parimitaśūnyādipramātṛtāvilāpanena sarvo mamāyam vibhava ityevam parijānataḥ / viśvātmano vikalpānām prasare 'pi vimuktatā (Īśv. Pra. 4/1/6)

ityādyanusamdhānabhājam anugrāhyajanam akhaṇḍaparipūrṇasamvidātmani akālakalite pare dhāmni viśrāmayantīm ata eva mahādevīṃ mahattvena aparicchinaparasaṃvidekaghanatayā dyotamānām

But above this in the highest reach there is a time which is not to be measured.

It is eternal (and) eternally arisen, Oh Goddess, and the unimpellable is not impelled.

By means of the various minute fractions of time, Oh Goddess!, it impels down below everything beginning with *Vyāpinī* up to the ends of the earth, and the path of moving and stationary beings. (Sva 11.311)

And so on. As for the "progresion of time" whose nature has been described (above):

It is time and is known to be (in a state of) equilibrium." (Sva. 11.309).

Its "vast wave" is a special state whose real nature is without distinctions, esentially equipoised and devoid of duration and non-duration.

The sixteenth division of time is apara and the seventeenth is para. And that which is higher than para, Oh Beloved, is the Lord and is the eighteenth. (Sva. 4.329)

And so on. She is the allayer of those "phenomenal distinctions" (predominantly sequential or non-sequential as pertains to the various manifestations) that are particularized by spurts (of time) described as being of the nature of *tuti*, *lava and nimesa*-.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Everywhere}}$ differences in manifestation (illumination) take the form of temporal succession.

From the void onwards, it is a fragmented light; to the shining Mother it is constant. (Iśw. Prat. 2/1/6)

In connection with what was said above, with the removal of the experiencing subjects classified as the void, etc., (it is evident that):

Even in the expansion of diverse entities from the universal soul, there is liberation for one who thus knows that "all this power is mine. (Isa. Pra. 4.1.6)

Hence the meaning of the verse is: I bow down to Her who brings that man, who is involved in the quest and deserving of grace, to rest in the highest and timeless state which is of the nature of unbroken, complete (and) supreme consciousness; who is the Great Goddess because of her preeminence and is luminous by virtue of being a single mass of unlimited supreme consciousness.

The first thing that is immediately apparent from reviewing Ms. Finn's translation here is that she has failed entirely to fathom the structure and organization of Jayaratha's commentary; she does not realize that he is glossing the words kāla, hallola, ullola, and kalanā. She admits this openly in note 75 when she says, "There seems to be no clear definition for the word hallola". In fact she then supplies her own definition taken from another commentary, probably the Rjuvimarśinī, and then offers for the two terms kālahallola together the phrase "progression of time." She further connects this "progression of time" with the quote from the Svacchanda, 11.309, but then lakes Jayaratha's paraphrase of that very quote with the term ullola, which she seems to be rendering "vast wave." Already there are several critical errors in her reading of the commentary. She has missed entirely the fact that Jayaratha does indeed gloss hallola, and she has applied his definition of hallola to the wrong word, to ullola. She has also entirely misconstrued the quotes and Jayaratha's paraphrase of the quotes, but I deal first with the basic structure and organization of the text. To proceed, the Svacchanda quote 4.329 next begins the gloss of ullola; it is the scriptural authority Jayaratha gives for the particular divisions of time advocated by the Kashmiri Saivites. Ms. Finn does not seem to understand what is going on here either;

she leaves this quote dangling, unconnected either with what follows or what precedes. The mistakes continue, but I would pause here to consider now her actual translations and misinterpretations of the texts.

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The Svacchandatantra chapter 11 concerns itself largely with a discussion of time, of creation, dissolution and the maintenance of the world (srsti, samhāra, sthiti). Time, in verse 11/311, the verse that Jayaratha in fact offers by way of explanation for the term kāla in the Vāmakeśvara verse 2, is in fact nothing but the highest Lord and he is said to be akalya, a term Ms. Finn translates as "unimpellable". He is also said to "kalayet" all beings, a term again which Ms. Finn translates as "impel". The commentary of Ksemaraja, I think, offers a different interpretation of these terms, and one that should not be ignored by a modern scholar without very definite grounds for doing so. Ksemarāja says for kalayet "antahprakāśaikātmyena sthitam bahir vaicitrasataih praksipati, bahirābhāsitam ca antah ksipati nānātvena ca pariganayati" (p. 167). Roughly translated, Ksemarāja says this: kalayet means that he takes what exists within himself as identical to consciousness and displays it outside himself in a multitude of different forms, and what appears outside himself he casts back into himself, and he causes things to appear as manifold. This in short is the process of creation according to Kashmiri Saivism, and Ms. Finn's translation does not adequately convey the fact that it is creation that is the subject of the verse. In addition, vyāpanyādim dharāvadhim just means beginning with vyāpanī and ending with the earth. That the subject of the verse is the Highest Lord is also not clear from Ms. Finn's translation, but it is perfectly clear from the commentary of Ksemarāja which defines the subject as "parapramātrrūpa", "the highest knower." Finally, it is worth remarking how close this verse is to the Vāmakeśvara, verse 2 we have been considering. The Svacchanda in fact here talks of particularizing things, colouring them with the moments of time, involving them in the process of time, the precise subject of the Vāmakeśvara verse.

Ms. Finn has also misinterpreted Sva. 11.309 and Jayaratha's paraphrase of the verse, which together constitute his definition of hallola. Ms. Finn has translated "prakarṣāprakarṣāśūnya" as "devoid of duration and non-duration." Now if you look at Kṣemaraja on this

verse (p. 166) he says clearly "yathā guṇānām sāmyam pradhānam, uthā sarvesām srstisthitisamhārakriyākalanābhāsānām yat sāmyam orakarsāpakarsaśūnyam vapuh tat sāmyam jñeyam." By sāmyam in the case of all the appearances involving the activities of dissolution. maintenance and creation of the worlds, one is to understand a balance, in which no one of these things is in excess of another, and no one in a lesser amount, just as the pradhana represents an equilibrium of the three gunas. To return to Jayaratha, then, hallola is a narticular state of the Highest Being which is characteristized by the fact that it has no division and is in a state of equilibrium. Furthermore that equilibrium is to be understood as an absence of excess or decrease in the terms of the Svacchanda verse cited. There may well be a misprint in Jayaratha at this point, "prakarsāprakarsaśūnya should probably be prakarsāpakarsaśūnya as Ksemarāja reads. In any case nothing of what Ksemarāja says is clear in Ms. Finn's translation, and she seems to have made an attempt to take a dictionary meaning of the words without any consideration of their specific context within the system of Kashmiri Sáivism and fashion a translation.

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The next major misunderstanding occurs in the translation of Jayaratha's gloss of the term kalanā. Jayaratha in fact defines kalanā as avaccheda, delimiting or particularizing. The phrase "kālakalanā" actually has a rich history in Kashmiri Saivism. We have just seen it in the Svacchandatantra, and it appears again and again in Abhinavagupta's commentaries to the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, book 2 on time (*Īśvarapraty*abjijñāvimarśinī, ed. Pandit Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. XXXIII, Bombay: Nirnayasagara Press, 1921, vol. 2). On page 5, in the commentary to *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* $\frac{2}{1/2}$, the term $k\bar{a}lakalan\bar{a}h\bar{i}na$ appears with reference to the absolute. An objector is permitted to argue that successive activity is not possible in the absolute which is pure consciousness and is not delimited by time. (Compare page 7 where Abhinavagupta says that the śakti is "untouched by time", "kālena asprstā.") Jayaratha is explaining kalanā in very much the same way as Abhinavagupta. He says that kālakalanā means to be delimited or particularized by time. He further explains what time is like and again without reference to Abhinavagupta and the Iśvarapratyabhijñā it is difficult to understand what Jayaratha intends. Abhinavagupta explains that activity involves successive

moments of time or successiveness when it is a worldly activity, but that the activity of the Highest Lord, the activity of vimarśa or selfreflection which is always present in God is eternal and non-successive because God admits of no distinction by time and the idea of successiveness involves separate instants of time. Activity in Kashmir Saivism is either sakramā, involving successive moments of time, or akramā, without succession (Vimarśini, pages 1-8). There is something else that is required in order to understand Jayaratha's gloss here of kalanā, and this is another doctrine that is unique to Kashmiri Saivism, the doctrine that time itself is nothing more than our perception of succession and that such a perception is the result of the fact that limited cognitions come and go. This doctrine is also discussed at length in the İśvarapratyabhijñā and the Vimarśinī. In fact, in support of this doctrine one might offer the very verse that Jayaratha will give from the Iśvarapratyabhijñā as he continues his discussion after glossing the long compound kālahallolollolakalanāśamakārinīm. It is verse 2/1/6. To anticipate, briefly, Kasmiri Saiva philosophy holds that time is one of the powers of the Lord, of infinite consciousness, who has the wondrous ability to manifest a variety of appearances. When the Lord manifests the appearance of pot, blue, a certain height, firmness, as all belonging together in the same locus, there is no cognition of time or of succession. But when he manifests autumn as totally separate from winter, or winter as totally separate from autumn, then there is the arising of a concept of successiveness which is the essence of time. In addition, when a single object which we recognize to be one object, appears as different to us, we understand that the object is changing through time, the young man is growing into the man, the child into the young man (Abhinavagupta, on Iśvarapratyabhijñā 2/1/5-7). The verse from the İśvarapratyabhijñā with which Jayaratha opens the next gloss of a term in the Vāmakeśvara verse, the word "mahādevī", explains very well what Kashimiri Saivism means when it defines time as by nature "successiveness", "krama", and derives this "successiveness" from the variety of limited object cognitions or individual manifestations of objects to the limited knower, "ābhāsabheda". "Ābhāsas" for the purposes of the present discussion may be defined as what we normally think of as ordinary object cognitions, and we have them sometimes and at other times do

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not. The commentary and the notes to the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* verse 2/1/6 further explain that these limited cognitions by their presence and absence create in specific situations a notion of time or succession of events for the limited observer, but never for the true self who always shines in its fullness and in whom all things rest.

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It is worth remarking at this point that Ms. Finn has misconstrued this verse entirely, reading "ākāra" or "form" for "ākara", "source", or as Abhinavagupta explains, "utpattinibandhanam", "cause of origin" (p. 19). The second half of the verse is also wrong. As Abhinavagupta explains such different cognitions which come and go are responsible for the perception of time, but limited cognitions occur only to the limited subjects and not to the unconditioned soul which always fully shines forth and thus admits in itself of no distinction of time. The word vicchinbhāsah is in the genitive; Ms. Finn reads it as a nominative and the subject of the sentence. She also seems to have forgotten the negative. I might add that such a mistranslation seems particularly unfortunate in as much as there is an accurate English translation of the İśvarapratyabhijña. I am referring to Dr. K. C. Pandey's translation in the Princess of Wales Sarawati Bhavana Texts, no. 84, Lucknow, 1954. And finally I must take note of the fact that this is not the only verse from the Iśvarapratyabhijña that Ms. Finn misunderstands; pages 156-157 of her translation contain other examples.

To return to Jayaratha, it should now be possible to understand at least somewhat better his gloss of *kalanā*:

tattadābhāsabhedāhitakramākramaprāyatayā avacchedāh: kalanā refers to the fact that time causes reality to be delimited, involved in its various divisions, and that time is understood as having the nature of a sequence or succession, which itself results from the variety of specific cognitions that any given observer has. Needless to say, this is entirely different from what Ms. Finn has given us.

It seems to me necessary to state that this kind of loose and incortect rendering of the commentary which I am here pointing out is the rule and not the exception in Ms. Finn's translations. If we continue with the commentary on verse 2, the verse from the *Īśvarapratyabhijña*, $\frac{2}{1/6}$, that I have already examined begins Jayaratha's gloss of the phrase "mahādevī" from the Vāmakeśvara verse. The Goddess is called "mahādevī", the "great Goddess", because she shines forth in

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her greatness, "mahattvena", which is glossed as her state of being the undifferentiated highest conscousness. This fact that she shines forth as the highest consciousness is in itself said to be so because she brings to rest in the highest state the aspirant who is worthy of divine favour and who possesses the awareness that the one with right knowledge is released even in the tangle of worldly affairs (another verse from the İśvarapratyabhijñā, 4/1/6) because he is able to fight the perceptions of the limited knower by such logical argumentation as is provided by the İśvarapratyabhijñā verse I have already discussed (2/1/6.) Again in Ms. Finn's rendering the relationship of the parts of the commentary to each other is lost. The first verse from the Īśvarapratyabhijñā, 2/1/6, is left isolated by Ms. Finn, when it is in fact carefully positioned in the commentary to illustrate the logic which allows an aspirant to achieve an awareness of the true state of the world; the next verse (4/1/6) is also not properly connected; it actually is offered by Jayaratha to describe the content of the aspirant's right knowledge. Ms. Finn misses as well that the greatness of the "great Goddess" is in fact explained specifically by Jayaratha as her shining forth as unbroken, unlimited consciousness. Her translation, "who is the great Goddess because of her preeminence and is luminous by virtue of being a single mass of unlimited supreme consciousness" is simply not what the text says here.

It is worth taking a brief look at the commentary to verse 4 and Ms. Finn's translation to establish clearly that this is not a question of style, a debate between literal translators and more free translators, but a question of accurately understanding and reproducing a given text passage. In the middle of page 176, Ms. Finn translates, "(and) because of her greatness, this self is continuously alight". In this view, her brightness is not like that of lightning, etc. (which comes) in sporadic flashes, (but) is an issuing stream of unceasing form shining with the glory that comes from the illumination of consciousness.

"What fresh manifestations can serve as proof for the primeval pramāt," whose nature is ever shining and inheres in every thought process?" According to this maxim, because proof does not apply to a sphere in which the matter in hand has no precedent, 'She is from the very beginning the self-evident Supreme Sakti and Mother known by (her) original title of Mahātripurasundarī.'

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In fact Jayaratha here is glossing the compound that appears at the end of the verse, "mahāśrīsiddhamātr kām", which might be translated in accordance with his gloss as "the mother, who is selfestablished because she always shines forth in her own completeness" (compare Finn, "The Goddess who is the sacred alphabet of great splendour"). The gloss is as follows: mahatyā 'sakrdvibhāto 'yamātmā'itidrsa (correct to itidiśā) vidyudādivat vicchidya vicchidva bhāsamānatvābhavādekarasatayā pravrttayā aviratena rūpena avabhāsamānayā samvitsphūranalaksanayā śriyā pramātari purāne tu sarvadābhātavigrahe / kimpramānam navābhāsah sarvapramitibhāgini // (Īśvarapratyabhijñā 2/3/16) ityādinayena apūrvārthavisayapramānāgocaratvād ādita eva svatah siddhām mahātripurasundaryādiśabdavyapadeśyām mātrkām parām śaktim. A rough rendering of the commentary might be as follows: The mother, known by such appellations as Mahātripurasundari, is the highest Sakti; by siddha is meant self-established from the very start since she can never be the object of a means of valid knowledge which takes as its object something not previously known. And in support of this is the argument of verses like this one:

With respect to the knower, who is unlimited by time, who is ever known and who embraces in himself all cognitions, how would a means of knowledge which reveals something new operate?' And she is established in all her brilliance, śriyā, which is defined as the lively effulgence of consciousness that shines forth without stop, that is always of the same unbroken essence because it does not stop and start like lightning; and this effulgence is great (mahatyā), as it is said, "The soul shines always in all its totality."

It should be abundantly clear that as she violates the structure of the text Ms. Finn also does violence to its meaning. Finally, it is worth remarking that mistakes in translating the commentary have led as in the case of verse 2 to mistakes in rendering the verse. There is yet another error in the translation of the verse. Ms. Finn translates "(And I give homage) to the triple worlds beautified by the moonlight of her syllable", but the word bhuvanatrayam is not an accusative and object of the verb vande at all; the first word in the verse, yadakṣarajyotsnā-manditam is a compound, and the verse is better rendered, "I praise the Goddess, by the moonlight of whose syllables the world is adorned" and so on

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While it would be possible to give further examples of this type, I suspect the above is more than sufficient to illustrate the problems with Ms. Finn's translations of Jayaratha's commentary to the Vāma keśvaratantra. I would add only a few other remarks. Ms. Finn seems unaware of the fact the "iti" is often used to mark a logical reason and need not always indicate a direct quote. This leads her to put quotation marks in inappropriate places and to miss again the logic and coherence of Jayaratha's arguments. Examples may be found on pages 168 and 162. The translation of Jayaratha's introductory śloka is also wrong; Ms. Finn has taken the present participle ābhāsayantī as the main verb and has missed the imperative astu. On page 168 at the top of the page her failure to see the structure of the commentary has led her to put the phrase "in order to demonstrate her effectiveness at difficult tasks" with the actions of the Goddess. I give her translation. "In this guru's opinion, having manifested samsāra in the form of that sixfold path, 'She causes it to disappear again of her own free will' in order to demonstrate her effectiveness at difficult tasks.

The (Lord) says:" verse 2).

In fact Jayaratha is explaining here the motivation for verse 2 and it is the author of the verse who wants to demonstrate the Goddess' ability to perform impossible tasks. A rough translation is as follows: "And the author of our text gives the next verse to illustrate how she performs seemingly impossible tasks like causing to become manifest the six-fold samsāra and then causing it to disappear when she so wills it, in a way described by the great teacher with the words, (here is a verse from Utpala I shall omit to save space).

If Ms. Finn's translation of Jayaratha, then, is seriously flawed, it remains now to assess her contribution in her translation of the Kulacūdāmaṇi. The Kulacūdāmaṇi is by far easier to handle than the Jayaratha commentary, and yet there are enough problems with that translation as well to warrant a warning to the unsuspecting reader. I give only a few in what follows. I return here to the pādukāsiddhi, which in the translation is page 129. In verse 21 pādukā is translated as "foot" instead of "shoe"; in verse 24 the nominative hastasthito becomes incorrectly a vocative; in verse 25 the sādhaka is addressing the pādukā, the shoe, as he did the stick above, and enjoining it to take him a vast distance as soon as he puts it on. The note that

pādukā is a name of the Goddess is thus totally out of place here. More seriously, the third chapter from verses 47 to 57 is incorrectly rendered. In verse 47 it is the sādhaka who should stand outside, and in verse 49 following the discussion turns to what happens if there is no woman outside the aspirant's family who is willing to participate in the ritual with him. In that case he is advised to take a woman from his own family. The translation misses this entirely. There are other such examples, but there is no doubt that there is also much that is of use in this translation. The scholarly apparatus here is also much better than in that of the Vāmakeśvaratantra. Ms. Finn has consulted other editions and made a careful effort to select the best reading of the text.

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THE BIOGRAPHIES OF SIDDHASENA

A Study in the Texture of Allusion and the Weaving of a Group-Image

(PART I)

Modern scholarship knows Siddhasena Divākara as an eminent philosopher and particularly as a gifted logician. If there is still considerable disagreement as to his exact dates, his precise sectarian affiliation and the extent of his writings, there is at least unanimity on this point: that Siddhasena, who was the first to compose a manual of logic for the benefit of the Jain community, can be regarded as an outstanding representative of the elitist intellectual tradition of classical India with its deep regard for erudition and its predilection for complex, difficult and never widely accessible writings. In fact there is much in Siddhasena's extant corpus that is still a mystery to modern investigators, and the poor state of transmission of his writings combined with the lack of a reliable tradition of commentaries upon them suggests that his contemporaries and those who followed immediately after him found him a daunting prospect indeed.1 It comes therefore as a surprise to read the biographies of Siddhasena that the Svetāmbara community has transmitted, for the Siddhasena of the biographies is mocked when he is at his most formidably intellectual and applauded when he is most down to earth, speaking to the masses directly, either in their own vernacular language or in the still more universal tongue of miracles and supernatural feats.

The deeds of Siddhasena are told in a number of medieval Jain lexts.² These include at least one collection of didactic stories dated 1134 A.D., the Akhyānakamanikośavrtti of Āmradevasūri, and the standard prabandha collections, the Kahāvali of Bhadreśvara, which remains unpublished but is said to date from the twelfth century A.D., the Prabhāvakacarita of Prabhācandra, dated 1277 A.D., and the Prabandhakośa of Rājaśekharasūri, dated 1349 A.D. His biography also appears in brief in the collection that has been published under the title Purātanaprabandhasamgraha, in the Prabandhacintāmaņi

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 329—384, 1989. 6 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. of Merutunga, dated 1304 A.D., and in the pilgrimage text, the *Vividhatīrthakalpa* of Jinaprabhasūri, dated 1333 A.D. It is also found in brief in the Jain recension of the *Vikramacarita*, the deeds of King Vikrama, a cycle of tales that was enormously popular in all of medieval India, and amongst Hindus as well as Jains.³

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Each of these texts is distinctive in style and tone. The Akhyānakamanikośavrtti is a Prakrit verse commentary that relates various stories to illustrate the Prakrit verses of the Akhyanakamanikośa. Written in the vernacular, the Vrtti tells these often well-known stories in a familiar and easy language. The Prabandhakośa, although written in Sanskrit prose, for the most part continues the familiar tone of the didactic story collections like the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti. Its language is conversational, its sentences are brief and its syntax is simple. The Sanskrit sparkles with vernacular expressions and there is considerable brisk and lively dialogue. The prose is highlighted by occasional verses, often in Prakrit and at times more complex than the prose itself. By contrast the Prabhāvakacarita is written in difficult Sanskrit verse, and is unlikely to have reached as wide an audience as the Prabandhakośa or the Ākhyānakamanikośa, if only because reading it requires a much higher level of sophistication and a high degree of education. The Vikramacarita and the Vividhatīrthakalpa belong once more with the Akhyanakamanikośa and the Prabandhakośa. The Vividhatīrthakalpa has sections in Prakrit and in Sanskrit; the section on Siddhasena is in simple Sanskrit, and the Vikramacarita passage is likewise in readily understandable Sanskrit.⁴ These texts then exhibit considerable stylistic differences. They also differ in language and thus in the overall medium through which they present their material, and we shall see that they often display as well significant differences in content, in the specific details of Siddhasena's deeds that they relate. Nonetheless they share one important feature that I would stress in my analysis of Siddhasena's transformation in the traditional biographies.

Siddhasena the philosopher appears in his traditional biography as repenting for his being overly fond of learning and of formal Sanskrit learning in particular, and his skill in debate is made the cause for much hilarity at his expense.⁵ In searching for a possible motivation for this radical transformation I should like to consider first the nature

of these texts in which the biographies of Siddhasena came to achieve written form and thus official sanction, to see if this might not provide gone direction to the course of this investigation.

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The first feature about these texts that I would mention is that they all belong to the Svetambara Jains and that all of them extend beyond the limiting confines of any one particular sub-group or gaccha within Svetambara Jainism. For example, in marked contrast to that other group of biographical texts from medieval Svetambara Jainism, the pattāvalis or gurvāvalis, which relate the deeds of a particular group of monks who all belong to a specific lineage or gaccha, the prabandhas extol the deeds of monks from a variety of different groups. For their part, the didactic story collections also use to illustrate their points the deeds of monks from many different lineages, and are often seemingly oblivious to the precise origin of a monk and neglect even to provide this information. To some extent this may reflect the fact that the stories predate the period of division into fixed lineages, but there would have been nothing to preclude the later insertion of such information, and one must conclude that its lack of prominence in these texts is meaningful.6 In addition, the prabandhas, in contrast to the pattāvalis and gurvāvalis, though sometimes compiled after those lexts, seem to have deliberately chosen to relate the deeds of monks who lived many centuries before the prabandhas were compiled, and thus were active before the period in which the Svetāmbara community began to experience its great fragmentation. Indeed these early monks were often incorporated into many of the different lineages, even those of mutually hostile groups; given the fact that the actual historical patriarchs lived so late in the tradition and there existed a need to create an unbroken line of succession back to the *tīrthaṅkaras*, or founders of Jainism, it was but natural that these early monks would be made part of a number of different lineages. In their very choice of subject, then, the *prabandhas* would seem to be concentrating on the lives of those monks who would have been most widely acceptable to Svetāmbara Jains regardless of any particular loyalty to a local group or gaccha. I should like to investigate here whether this concern for addressing a wide audience that extends beyond the dividing barriers of local affiliations might not in fact also account for the strange transformation of Siddhasena Divākara from philosopher

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into miracle worker. I should also like to see if there is anything about the way these texts relate their accounts of Siddhasena that likewise might be taken to imply such an aim of reaching the larger community and speaking directly to all the splinterings and fragments of that whole. I shall first describe briefly the nature of the medieval Śvetāmbara Jain community and then consider more specifically the *prabandhas* and the stories of Siddhasena.

The medieval Svetāmbara community was split into a number of different groups. In many cases the names of these groups reflect their local origins and strong local affiliations. The two major groups in Northwest India were the Kharataragaccha, mainly centered in Rajasthan and dating back to the eleventh century A.D., and the Tapāgaccha, which was centered in Rajasthan and Gujarat and dates to the thirteenth century A.D. Epigraphical sources reveal the names of scores of other local groups, most of which came to prominence sometime in the eleventh century or later.8 Relationships between these various groups were not always peaceful, and intense competition could and did break out between rival monks seeking royal patronage and local support. What divided these groups in terms of doctrine and ritual observance is not always clear to the modern historian; although there do exist records of debates in the various pattāvalis and there is the occasional polemical text, all of these accounts are clearly written with a noticeable bias and must be treated by the historian with care. Nonetheless what is undeniable from a reading of these sources is that local lineages of monks regarded themselves as standard bearers of a tradition that had somehow become corrupted by their opponents at other religious centers.9 Most often the points of difference would seem to have devolved upon the interpretation of scriptural passages dealing with ritual matters, and often with the proper deportment of a monk. Whatever the fine points were that held these various local groups apart from each other, and some of this information may in fact be lost to us, the available sources are nonetheless unanimous in painting the relationships between the groups as agonistic and marked by strident competition.

If the various accounts in the exclusively sectarian pattāvalis have any basis in reality, then it would also seem prudent to conclude that philosophy and philosophical argument and debate played a promi-

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nent role in that competitive atmosphere. It is this last observation that I find decisive for an understanding of the anti-intellectual bias of Siddhasena's biography and its devaluing of his contribution as a philosopher. Acuity in philosophical argument was clearly regarded by the authors of the pattavalis as a necessary gift for the monk who would see to it that his group prospered at the expense of rival groups by defeating their members in open public debate; at the same time. however, they show a definite reluctance to encourage monks to enter into debate unless first challenged, emphasizing the caution with which debate, and philosophy - for the two go hand in hand - must be regarded by those who would seek truth. Even in the aggressively sectarian first part of the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali, the section that was written by Jinapala, we read the admonitory words of the monk Jinapriya, warning against too great eagerness in seeking out debate. A local ruler has just proposed that the head of the Kharatara monks, the young Jinapatisūri, debate with a Digambara in his realm. Jinapriya explains that it is regarded as unseemly in his community actively to seek out an opportunity to debate. Monks in his community will of course fight back when attacked by those who make trouble, whether because they are overwhelmed with pride in their own learning or because they are intent on disparaging the true doctrine. One may see in Jinapriya's words an understanding of the danger that actively seeking debate is divisive and ultimately destructive for the community.10 This same text also makes clear that there is a major problem with philosophical argument and debate: it should in fact be possible for a skilled debater, someone who is learned in philosophy, to argue convincingly an incorrect position. Indeed a monk who has been challenged might be forced to support the wrong position in order to Prove himself greater than the challenger, and by implication, to prove his doctrine better than the false doctrines of his opponent. This is what happens in the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali to the child-monk Jinacandrasūri, leader of the Kharatara monks before Jinapatisūri. He is attacked by a rival Jain monk, Padmacandrācārya, who asks him what he has been studying. He answers that he has been studying the Nyāyakandali, at which point Padmacandra asks him if he has understood the Nyāya-Vaiśesika discussion of darkness as a quality, rather than as a substance, which is the Jain position. Jinacandra replies in

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the affirmative, only to then be asked by Padmacandra if he agrees with the viewpoint expressed in the Kandali. Jinacandra offers the iudicious reply that truth is in fact independent of debating position, and suggests that it is possible indeed to prove in debate the Nyāya-Vaisesika position. He challenges Padmacandra at this point, suggesting that he himself could do just that against Padmacandra.11 Padmacandra is furious and shouts that Jinacandra could never stand against him in a debate if Padmacandra were to put forth the position that darkness is a substance, leaving Jinacandra in fact to argue the Nyāya doctrine. Jinacandra's reply is particularly significant in light of the debate that will convert Siddhasena, a debate held not in the king's court as was usual, but in a village field. Jinacandra demands that they go to the king's court to hold the debate, for he says, "the forest is the battleground for animals and creatures that resemble them".12 It is, I hope, clear from these two anecdotes, that even in a text where a competitive tone dominates, debate and philosophical argument have a somewhat ambiguous position. It is to this point, the status of philosophy and philosophical argument in medieval accounts of monks, that I would now turn to see how it might provide some direction for an investigation of the radical transormation that the philosopher Siddhasena underwent in his biographies.

As in the story of Jinacandra, philosophical brilliance in religious biographies is generally regarded less as a means to achieve realization of the truth, which is accomplished instead through religious austerities, service of a guru and radical insight, than as a tool in a struggle with other contending groups. This is true even outside the pattāvalis of the various local Jain groups. There exist a number of texts that extol the deeds of the Vedanta founders, the philosophers par excellence in the Indian tradition, and it is clear that for these texts philosophical argument and philosophical acumen are really adjuncts in the competitive struggle between various groups. The ability to tangle with knotty and intricate problems of exegesis is above all a weapon in hostile encounters. In fact the Vedanta founders engage in a world-conquest, a digvijaya, similar to the world-conquest that kings must undertake, and in doing so they meet and best their rivals in a series of agonistic encounters that usually involve philosophical debates. Philosophy in these texts, then, is not so much a way to realize truth as it is a means

to propagate truth and that task invariably involves hostility and aggression.¹³

When we come back to the Jain *prabandhas* we see at once that their attitude towards philosophical argument is essentially the same. Philosophical debate is an agonistic contest and the stakes make it clear that it is a serious one indeed. Siddhasena wagers that he will become the disciple of the man who bests him in debate; the monk Bappabhaṭṭisūri participates in a debate in which the royal patron of the loser must surrender his kingdom to the patron of the winner; Jineśvarasūri bests Sūrācārya before King Durlabharāja on the agreement that the losers will be expelled from the kingdom, and Haribhadra engages in a debate where defeat means death to the loser.¹⁴

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Philosophy, in these texts, then, is closely linked with contests and with conflict. 15 It is this fact and the observation made above that the prabandhas seem deliberately to tell the lives of uncontroversial figures in the tradition that have led me to the ultimate conclusion that the traditional biographies have deliberately transformed Siddhasena from philosopher to miracle-worker because philosophers were potentially conflictual figures engaged in agonistic behaviour and emphasis on philosophy could serve as a reminder of the hostile relationships between the various Svetāmbara groups, while the Jain miracle-worker could bestow benefits on all his co-religionists regardless of their local affiliation. This is not to imply that the various prabandhas do not depict Jain philosophers debating with and defeating enemies; the prabandhas offer ample incidents such as the ones I have cited above, but the enemies are almost always external enemies, Buddhists or Hindus, and the overall picture of the monk in the prabandhas is very much like that of Siddhasena, as miracleworker and wandering ascetic, at times close to royal power and himself the very source of that power, and most importantly easily accessible to the majority of believers through the hymns he writes and the miracles he performs. 16 It is also true that monks in the more aggressively sectarian biographies like the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali are also regarded as miracle workers; the Kharatara accounts of its leaders sparkle with stories of miracles and marvelous deeds. What is different in those accounts, however, is that there is no devaluation

of philosophy or learning as I will argue there is in the *prabandha* accounts of Siddhasena.¹⁷

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My contention in the analysis of Siddhasena's biographies, thus, will be that the close association of philosophy and the philosopher with debate and conflict that we can observe in the traditional lives of the great philosophers, Hindu and Jain, and that perhaps reflects actuality as well as literary convention, provides a clue to an understanding of the radical transformation of Siddhasena in the traditional stories told about him. The work that modern scholars consider to be Siddhasena's main philosophical work, his Sanmatitarka, is nowhere mentioned in the biographies in the prabandhas and related sources. His other texts, all showing erudition and philosophical brilliance, are devalued as intellectual accomplishments and revalued as mantras, spells that when recited lead to miraculous results. His bravado performance in philosophical debate is made the occasion of a humorous parody of the entire intellectual tradition with all its elitist overtones, and the central event of his life becomes a penance that he must undertake because he is too committed to Sanskrit learning and wants to translate the Jain texts into Sanskrit, a penance that culminates in his celebration as a wandering ascetic and miracle worker. In their task of drawing together the many factions of the Jain community, the prabandhas chose to create an image of Siddhasena, the individual monk, and by metonymy of their community at large, that spanned bridges and glossed over the potential for quarrels. This image was of the monk as hymn-maker, story-teller and miracle worker, and their choice of these incidents in Siddhasena's life created an image of Siddhasena that was least controversial and of widest appeal. I shall also try to show that the way in which these incidents were related also helped achieve this end.

To anticipate some of these points that will be developed in detail below, the tradition tells of Siddhasena stories that were rich in resonances to the lives and deeds of other famous men, monks and kings, within the Svetāmbara Jain tradition and even outside the Svetāmbara tradition in the Digambara texts and in Hinduism as well. In short many of the stories told of Siddhasena are allusions; they are allusions to other similar stories told in the *prabandhas* themselves, which make these tales then internally allusive, and they are also

allusions to stories told in other traditions. 18 This complex network of allusion has the effect of leading the reader to assume a familiarity with the monk whose life is told; beyond the boundaries of limited local affiliations, through familiar stories the reader is encouraged to reach out and embrace the subject of the biography whose deeds he knows well in another, totally uncontroversial context. My contention will be that through a skillful interlocking of stories the tradition has created a biography of Siddhasena that subordinates the need to create a unique portrait of a single monk to an even more pressing need to create a group-consciousness that will appeal to a wide audience of believers. The resonances that particular events in Siddhasena's life have to other events in the lives of famous figures in the pan-Indian tradition or in the Jain tradition create for the reader a sense of deja-vu, a sense of being on familiar territory and a willingness to acknowledge the sanctity of the subject of the story without regard for or despite his particular local affiliation. Repetition of familiar stories and allusion will be seen as key devices in weaving a texture for Siddhasena's biography that includes some threads from everyone's skein. In unraveling some of that texture I shall begin with a discussion of the earliest biography of Siddhasena available to me, that in the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti, and a study of its elusive allusiveness, and proceed then to show how this process of balancing the need for an individualized portrait with the deeper need for creating an image of a monk that is recognizably acceptable to a wide group is continued in the later texts as allusions are expanded and developed. I shall then conclude with some general remarks on what this study of Siddhasena can tell us about the prabandhas as a group of texts, summing up the basic conclusions that I shall have reached.

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I. THE SVETĀMBARA BIOGRAPHIES OF SIDDHASENA: THE ĀKHYĀNAKAMAŅIKOŚAVŖTTI

There was in the city of Ujjain a Jain monk, learned in the Jain doctrine, the crest-jewel of the host of wise men, Vrddhavādin by name. Because he was overly proud of his learning he made a solemn oath that he recited before all and sundry, in a Sanskrit verse that went like this:

My cow's horn is the size of the pole that stands aloft in Indra's festival; fire is cold and wind is still; or if that doesn't suit you then name whatever impossible thing that comes to your mind. Vrddhavadin will declare it is true and who will dare to contradict him?

Now hearing these words that were so filled with pride, a Brahmin by name of Siddhasena, accompanied by his own disciples and bristling with anger, went out to meet Vrddhavadin to challenge him to a formal debate, thinking to himself all the while, "How dare he or anyone else pick a quarrel with the Brahmins?" Now no sooner had the Jain monk gone to some village or other than Siddhasena, thinking that he had conveniently vanished from the scene, pursued him at once. And as he continued in his wanderings the Jain monk was soon overtaken by the young Brahmin students. And they shouted out to him, "Hey you, in the white robe, where are off to? What do you mean by disappearing like that?" And the monk answered, "I haven't run off anywhere. After all what do I have to be afraid of"? And while they were talking in this way Siddhasena himself arrived on the scene. He said, "Fulfill that solemn oath of yours. Engage with me in a formal debate." The monk replied, "Let us go to the city in the presence of learned men." The other one answered, "No. Let the debate be held right here." And the Lord of Monks said, "But there are no learned men here who could serve as judges." And he said, "So, what about that? Debate with me right here." And the monk on his part countered, "Then let these cowherds and farmers be the judges and witnesses." And when the other had assented the cowherds and farmers were all called together by the monk. "He who loses will become the disciple of the one who wins." This is the solemn oath that was made by Siddhasena in the presence of all the farmers. When the King of Monks said, "You first state your proposition", then the Brahmin began to speak, using the Sanskrit language.

There is no such thing in the world as an omniscient being, for none of the five valid means of knowledge can grasp him. And therefore I say that he is the object of the valid means of knowledge that reveals non-existents, just like a lotus in the sky, which

Let me explain in greater detail.

An omniscient being is not perceived directly through ordinary sense-perception by anyone in this world. And because there is no inferential mark possible for him he is also not the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of inference of the object of is also not the object of inference. He cannot be grasped by the means of knowledge

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that operates through perception of similarities since there is nothing in the world that is similar to him. And that sun of the world, the illuminator of all things, cannot be known through the means of valid knowledge we call presumption which makes known something or someone without whom an impossibility would result, for in fact without him everything proceeds quite normally. Therefore it is obvious that the omniscient being must be the object of the means of valid knowledge which reveals only the non-existent. Give up at once your stubborn and wrongful insistence on his existence. All knowledge of religious merit and sin is to be had from the Vedas alone. And when the Veda is available to us all, of divine and not human origin and thus free from any flaw that might result from a human author, eternal, what need is there to go about imagining the existence of an omniscient being?

And for his part, the glorious Vṛddhavādin, having heard this argument to refute the existence of an omniscient being which was proposed there by that twice-born in a court where the judges were but farmers, spoke these words which were far more fitting to the occasion.

Good deeds and righteous living according to the true faith together are the lord of all creatures. Without them . . . (text is broken off at this point).

Through the power of such good deeds and righteousness men become blessed with fortune. What good is life if one is born in a land that the true doctrine has not reached? What use is a man who is but a burden to his mother the earth, who does nothing but eat and drink, who wanders again and again in this cycle of rebirths and who has not made the true doctrine his devoted friend?

After he had recited these verses the Lord of Monks then asked the assembled farmers who were the honored court judges of the debate, "Now you tell us whose words, his or mine, are true." They said, "Your words are like the nectar of the gods to our ears. But we didn't understand even a word of what that one muttered. What did he say anyway? We couldn't get a word of it at all."

Now the monk told them, "Listen, for this is the gist of what he said. He said that in your temple there is no Arhat." They said, "There is so. Why, we just prayed to him a little while ago. Even if our own father told us that we would say he lied. "And with these words they seized the Brahmin by the arms and held him fast. They said, "Come, so that we can show you the Arhat in the Jain temple." And they all shouted victory! victory! to that best Lord of Monks.

And the Brahmin, intending fully to make good the solemn oath he had made earlier, said, "I am your disciple. Ordain me as a monk."

And in this way Siddhasena was ordained by the Lord of Monks on an

auspicious day. And that great and noble man penetrated all the secrets of the true doctrine.

The monk installed him, who was filled with all good qualities, in his very own position, and Siddhasena then wandered as a Jain monk bringing glory to the most excellent teaching of the Jain sages.

In his wanderings all over the earth it happened to pass that he came to the city Ujjain. He heard people mocking the Jain writings because they were composed in Prakrit. He summoned the Jain monastic community and with hands folded in respectful submission he said these words to their head, "If the community so instructs me in its wisdom and graciousness then I shall put all the Jain writings into Sanskrit."

Now hearing these words the members of the monastic community went on to say this, "Never mind speaking such terrible words. It is unworthy of you even to think such a thought. For the very thought of such a thing demands a great penance."

Siddhasena then said, "I have committed a grave offense that requires a great penance. It is no longer proper that I should remain here. Let the community of monks show favour to me and name my penance through the practice of which I shall become purified."

And they gave as his penance that he roam twelve years, concealing his identity as a Jain monk, for this was the proper penance for such a sin.

Granted leave by the community of monks, Siddhasena, the Lord of Monks, concealing his true identity as a Jain monk, began to carry out his penance. And pure in mind and steadfast as he wandered the earth he thought, "How lucky are those best of monks, worthy of praise and honour in the three worlds, who do not step off the true path as I have. Ever resplendent in the glory of their perfect conduct, may they rejoice forever in the world."

And exactly at that time, when the full twelve years had passed for this man who had destroyed his sin by means of such pure thoughts, he chanced to arrive in Avantī. Mindful and heedful of the true doctrine he stopped at a temple to Śiva known as "Kuḍaṅgeśvara". He did not say a word of praise to the God there. The townspeople came to know this and they informed the king, "O Lord, there is an ascetic who hides his true identity who is staying at the temple Kuḍaṅgeśvara. He does not praise the God there." Hearing their words the king went there. He asked, "Who are you?" And the other answered, "I am a righteous man." Then the king

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said, "Why do you not praise the God here?" And the other gave his reply, "This God would not endure my praise." At this the king then said, That may be. Let us see. Praise the God. My curiosity is aroused." Thinking, "Let me cause the true faith to prosper here", he said, "Let me do so in the presence of everyone assembled here." And on the twelfth day after that, the whole town, including the king, gathered at the temple. And the Jain monk Siddhasena, having carried out the proper rituals of purification, remembering in his heart the Lord of the Jinas. began to sing praises with his thirty-two hymns of thirty-two stanzas each. Through her supernatural knowledge the protecting Goddess of the Jain faith knew that this was to be the occasion for a great triumph for Jainism, and in her devotion to the faith she arrived there. In the meantime out of the middle of the beautiful forehead of the God there suddenly began to appear an image of the Jina Pārśvanātha, calm and beatific in appearance, there at the end of all the thirty-two hymns. The people and the king all saw it and all attested that it was real. Seeing this miraculous event, this wonder that redounded to the credit of the Jain Faith, many people were enlightened. The cause of the true faith was greatly advanced 19

This is the account of Siddhasena in the Ákhyānakamanikośavṛtti. It begins in the time-honored style of all Indian story-telling by setting the scene and naming the main characters. The scene is Ujjain, a bustling and prosperous city in many Jain stories, and the main characters are the Jain monk Vṛddhavādin, whose name literally means, "the old debater", and a Brahmin Siddhasena. There is little by way of description in this opening. The city is merely named, unlike many other stories in which some adjectives, often in the form of long compounds, are provided. Similarly Vṛddhavādin is only briefly characterized as "the crest-jewel of the host of wise men". The text then moves quickly from such generalities to specifics. The narrator tells us that Vṛddhavādin is overly proud of his own learning and that he has therefore made the outrageous promise that he can prove in debate anything at all, even the most impossible of propositions. Vṛddhavādin is allowed to speak for himself at this point, and his challenge to the world is quoted in the form of a Sanskrit verse.

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The question of what language should be used by Jain monks is central to the story of Siddhasena, and it is worth remembering that Vṛddhavādin, precisely when he is said to be overcome by pride and suffering from

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haughtiness, speaks Sanskrit.20 The narrator's characterization of Vrddhavādin is at this point essential in guiding our perceptions of the role of Sanskrit and in making a negative evaluation of its use by the Jain monk, The narrator then resumes the story, introducing Siddhasena as a Brahmin, who has already achieved some eminence for his own learning, as we can infer from his having his own group of disciples (vs 4). More importantly, here too the narrator provides an explicit judgment of his character, suggesting that Siddhasena is also suffering from the sin of pride, in this case pride in his birthright, for he is described as being unable to stand the haughty words of the Jain monk and as reacting in anger to the very idea that anyone should challenge a Brahmin (vs 5). There is a significant omission here; nothing is said of Siddhasena's own learning or intelligence, though we have clearly been given to understand that Vrddhavadin is learned if arrogant. Siddhasena is also described at this point as acting rashly; he is gurumaratta (vs 4), unable to stand the haughtiness of the Jain, and in vs. 6 he hastily pursues him (jhatti dhāio tassa patthie). The narrator by skillfully employing a few carefully chosen adjectives and adverbs and skillfully omitting others has instructed us well as to how we should view both Siddhasena and Vrddhavādin. Vṛddhavādin is a great monk, although given to the sin of pride in his own prodigious learning, while Siddhasena is rash, not wise, and overly proud of being a Brahmin.

The contest between them will centre in fact on this last point: what is on trial is not simply one man and his religious affiliation, or any specific religious doctrine; what is in question is in fact all of traditional Brahmanical culture and learning, which are typified by Sanskrit and by the formal structure of argument in Sanskrit philosophy. We are at this moment in fact already prepared for the outcome. The only Sanskrit words in the text so far have been the outrageous challenge of Vrddhavādin, the product of his own overweening pride, as the narrator has distinctly informed us. Sanskrit culture, false pride in birth, conceit and arrogance over learning, all are embodied by the Sanskrit language and Sanskrit culture, and it is their defeat for which we have been carefully primed

After this brief but essential introduction by the narrator, which has lasted only six and a half verses, the story moves rapidly into dialogue. Most of the remaining forty-five verses will be direct speech between

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the actors in the story. The dialogue is even more clipped and sparing than the narration was; sentences are short, there are few if any compounds and those that do occur are short and readily familiar, such as "muninda" "Lord of monks", often used as an epithet for Vrddhavādin (vs. 13, for example). The pace of the action is further accelerated by the fact that the text uses pronouns instead of actual names. The names are longer, and where they do occur they arrest our attention by slowing the action. So for example, when Siddhasena has finished expounding his proofs for the non-existence of an omniscient being and Vrddhavādin returns to the limelight, he is introduced not as simply the monk, or that one, but as Sirividdhavāi, the "Glorious Vrddhavādin", creating a pause in the action and a noticeable emphasis.

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The dialogue continues for some time, with the narrator only appearing each time the speaker changes with the short phrase, "he said", or "that one said". The narrator then steps in as the debate reaches its climax. His remarks, though brief, are nonetheless once more highly significant in guiding our understanding and interpretation of the events. In verse 20 the narrator tells us that Vrddhavādin replies in a way that is halaharasahāe uciyam, "suitable in a court where the judges are farmers." His reply moreover is of a totally different nature from Siddhasena's argumentation; it has nothing to do with philosophy and does not attempt in any way to meet Siddhasena's arguments. Although the text is broken off at this point it is clear that Vrddhavadin offers to the farmers not philosophy, but simple gnomic verses in praise of the religious life. Were it not for the narrator's insistence that Vrddhavādin is correct in evading Siddhasena because he has taken into account the nature of his audience, we might be lempted to judge the debate otherwise.

The narrator intervenes again after Vṛddhavādin's speech has concluded, describing how the farmers shout victory to the Jain and grab Siddhasena to lead him off to the temple, and how Siddhasena intends to keep his own promise and acknowledge defeat. The narrator's remarks are still short through all of this and soon the individual actors in this drama are allowed to resume the burden of carrying the story as Siddhasena himself proclaims his desire to become Vṛddhavādin's disciple. We are then finally told something of

Siddhasena's intellectual gifts: he is in vs 28 said to have mastered all of the Jain teachings, sayalasiddhantapāragāmī, and he is a great and noble man, mahāsatta. Further, in vs. 29 he is bahugunaganaparikalja, endowed with many great qualities, these all standard terms to describe an outstanding monk.

The narrator then continues, setting the scene for the next major crisis in Siddhasena's life, just as he had introduced the first episode. In verse 30 in a remarkable act of symmetry we are returned to Ujjain. The narrator again explicitly provides us with the means to interpret what follows, exactly as he had in the debate. Siddhasena, he tells us, has heard people belittle Jainism because the Jain texts are written in Prakrit and not Sanskrit. We are also returned to the same issue that lay behind the debate between Siddhasena and Vrddhavādin, and we are told that it is not Siddhasena who doubts the primacy of the vernacular over Sanskrit. His own conversion to Jainism and to Prakrit culture was in fact successfully accomplished in the debate with Vrddhavādin. It is the urban populace who remain to be converted to the same truth.

It is important that Siddhasena's motivations are clearly stated by our author, who deftly intervenes at this juncture, for we shall see that the tradition did not always view Siddhasena's desire to put the Jain corpus into Sanskrit in the same light. The implication of the debate between Siddhasena and Vrddhavādin was profoundly anti-intellectual; cowherds and farmers are suitable judges of truth and Sanskrit argumentation is worthless in the face of simple Prakrit verses. Not all of our texts found this lesson so easily learned, and some permitted Siddhasena to continue from time to time to labour under the assumption that Sanskrit culture had merit, requiring him again and again to learn otherwise, a course of learning that finally culminates in this episode. Our narrator's comments, thus, are essential here in our reading of this version and we shall return to them again later.

After the narrator's stage-setting, we move immediately into direct discourse once more. Siddhasena summons the monastic community, offering to put the texts into Sanskrit, and is punished for his unspeakable suggestion. He is given the penance, and ultimately he performs the miracle at Avantī and converts the king and the populace. It is worth pausing to note that the king here is not named; other accounts

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will give him a very prominent identity as Vikramāditya, and Siddhasena's biography will circulate outside of the prabandhas in the cycle of tales associated with this king, and in two prabandhas, the Prabandhacintamani of Merutunga and the one included in the collection entitled the Purātanaprabandhasamgraha, events of Siddhasena's life will be found in the sections on Vikramaditya. The practice of sanctifying a figure or a holy site by telling a story in which a leading and well-known king plays a major role is a time-honored practice in the world of Indian religious story-telling, and the Akhyanakamanikosavrtti is unusual in allowing the king to remain anonymous.21 To conclude, then, in this episode in a close parallel to the episode of the debate, Sanskrit learning and Sanskrit culture make way for more popular forms of expression, here not gnomic verse but spectacular miracles. That Siddhasena's hymns of praise are themselves written in difficult Sanskrit is not mentioned, a deliberate omission, I would suspect, where the power of a sacred word is meant to transcend the very medium of language.

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I have taken this opportunity to examine the techniques used by Āmradeva in his account of Siddhasena because as we shall see other texts tell the same stories but with different techniques and with correspondingly different results. My ultimate interest is in the image of Siddhasena that each biographical account conveys, an image that is as much conditioned by such devices as authorial comment and the use of dialogue as it is by actual details in the story plot. I should like now to turn to a discussion of the individual stories that constitute this biography in and of themselves, to a consideration of their wider context within Jain religious tales and Indian narrative literature as a whole, before returning to the text of the Ākhyānakamanikośavṛṭṭi to see how these familiar themes have been manipulated by our author and how we thereby come to understand Siddhasena and the two major crises in his life which the biography relates.

II. SIDDHASENA'S CONVERSION TO JAINISM: COMIC INVERSION AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE

We have seen in the discussion above that the $\bar{A}khy\bar{a}nakamaniko$ - \hat{a}_{a} account of Siddhasena essentially consists of two parallel

episodes, the conversion of the Brahmin Siddhasena to Jainism as a result of a philosophical debate, and the expulsion of the Jain monk Siddhasena from the community for a period of twelve years, culminating in his performing a miracle in the Siva temple in Avantī. The parallelism of these two episodes, which look superficially to be totally distinct, consists first and foremost in their both revolving around the same issue, the primacy of popular culture, represented by the Prakrit language as opposed to Sanskrit, by certain literary forms such as gnomic verses as opposed to the formal argument of the inference, and by the universal language of miracles over the elite language of Sanskrit. In addition, both of these episodes share the important fact that each has a rich and recognizable context within the tradition of story-telling in Jainism and in other religions in India.

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Stories of conversion occur often in the Jain prabandhas. Indeed many of the monks who figure in these texts were not born into Jain families, but only later became Jains.22 At times the story of their conversion forms a central episode of the biography, while on other occasions it is simply mentioned and is not made part of the essential drama of the monk's life.23 Siddhasena's conversion is thus not a unique event in the world of these texts. In fact it has an extremely close counterpart in the story of the conversion of another famous Jain philosopher, someone who is similarly revalued in the traditional biographies as primarily a magician and not as the outstanding logician and philosopher that his writings tell us he was. This is Haribhadra, who before his conversion to Jainism is depicted as a buffoon, a comically arrogant Brahmin whose behaviour borders on the manic as he carries a shovel, a ladder and a net to seek out adversaries on land, at sea and in the air to defeat in debate.24 Haribhadra also wears shoes over his eyes to show that he does not need to see with his flesh and blood senses, having the inner eye of wisdom, and he covers his belly with a metal plate for fear it will burst with all the learning that it contains. Haribhadra becomes a Jain because he has made the rash promise that he will become the disciple of anyone whose words he cannot understand, and by chance he encounters a Jain nun who recites a Prakrit stanza from the Āvaśyaka on the Jain culture heroes. He admits his defeat at once and submits to the Jain faith.²⁵

Haribhadra, like Siddhasena, is thus not depicted as experiencing

any internal emotional or religious revolution; he has made a solemn oath that he respects. A second point of similarity between the manner in which the traditional biographies describe the conversions of Haribhadra and Siddhasena is that in each case the victor has employed a Prakrit verse. Haribhadra, the purohita of the king of Citrakūta, is as much the representative of Brahmanical culture as Siddhasena, and his defeat for failing to understand a Prakrit verse is as much the defeat of that culture as it is an individual defeat. The story of Siddhasena's conversion, then, with the arrogant Brahmin brought low by Prakrit verses, immediately calls to mind the conversion of Haribhadra. We shall see later that in some of the other versions of Siddhasena's biography additional episodes appear that greatly strengthen the connection between these two men. The prime difference at this point between their conversion stories is that the story of Siddhasena involves a more thoroughgoing rejection of Brahmanical learning, including philosophy as a whole, the very usage of philosophical argument, and the Sanskrit language. Much of this can be inferred from Haribhadra's biography; Siddhasena's story in its reproduction of the details of the debate between Vrddhavādin and Siddhasena makes it virtually explicit. Both stories also share a distinctly comic tone, and it is to this feature of Siddhasena's conversion that we must now turn our attention.

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If the philosophical debate is an even more familiar scene in religious biographies than the conversion scene, the debate held in a village with cowherds and farmers as the judges is most definitely an unusual event. In fact it is these very differences between the well-known debate and the debate in which Siddhasena engages that hold the surest clue to understanding the function of this episode in the biography.

The debate with cowherds and farmers as the judges represents a lype of comic inversion not uncommon in Indian folk literature, where for example we find fools mistaking a cow shed for the king's palace when they are on their way to present themselves to the king's court lo display their imagined talents. There is even a story in the Prabandhacintāmaṇi where a princess, who is overly proud of her learning, is punished by marriage to an ignorant cowherd. The cowherd eventually through a boon of the Goddess Kālī becomes

himself the great poet Kālīdāsa, in an episode that is full of rich humor.²⁷ Despite frequent assertions that humor in Indian literature does not seek to undermine traditional values or cause a reexamination of societal norms, this is exactly its function in the debate to which Siddhasena assents.²⁸

It is significant that in this version of the biography it is Vrddhavādin who proposes that they permit the cowherds and farmers to stand in the position of learned judges; it is almost as if by this act alone Vrddhavadin has won the debate, for he has perceived his opponent's weak spot. It is Siddhasena's very pride in his birth and in the trappings of Brahmanical culture that will cause his failure, for it is obvious to Vrddhavadin as it should be to Siddhasena, that Sanskrit learning will hardly impress these rustics. In addition Vrddhavādin knows equally well that Siddhasena's committment to Brahmanical culture will lead him to offer them formal arguments in Sanskrit that they cannot comprehend.29 In so doing, of course, Siddhasena is keeping to the conventions of the philosophical debate at the king's court; evidence from the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali tells us clearly that a debater was meant to speak correct Sanskrit. Thus Jinapatisūri upbraids the arrogant Padmaprabha who uses Prakrit verb endings instead of correct Sanskrit terminations, and himself so delights those assembled with his Sanskrit, "that their hair stood on end."30 There is a further irony in having the cowherds and farmers stand as judges to the debate, for not only are they uneducated and thus unsuitable to judge any intellectual contest, they are also not usually regarded as paragons of honesty. The Prabhāvakacarita has a telling remark in its biography of Haribhadra. When Haribhadra's disciple, who is locked in combat with a Buddhist, discovers that the Buddhist has in fact been cheating, he hurls at him this abuse: krstijanādhamā bhavantah, "You are worse than a farmer", vs. 111, page 69. The conditions of the debate between Vrddhavadin and Siddhasena make it a parody of the normal debate: the king's court has become the village field, and the learned judges are now unlettered villagers, peasants, who even if they had the schooling to comprehend abstruse arguments could not be trusted to hand in an honest verdict.

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subtlety; where the *Prabandhakośa* will heighten the mood of hilarity by enlarging upon the story of Vṛddhavādin's own conversion and career as a monk with its more humorous aspects, the *Ākhyānaka-maṇikośavṛtti* retains an air of seriousness. Vṛddhavādin is introduced in typical fashion with due respect, as the "crest-jewel of the host of wise men", and if his boast is ludicrous, it is understandable as the result of that surfeit of pride from which, the narrator informs us, Vṛddhavādin suffers. This is controlled humor, where the narrator is relying on our awareness of the comic inversion operating here to create the comic effects.

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The initial setting and conditions for the debate do not exhaust the potential for humor or comic inversion in Siddhasena's conversion. Cowherds and farmers as judges is not the only reversal in our debate. The account of this debate violates several other expectations that we have, both from this very story and from general experience with philosophical debates in other Indian literature. It was Vṛddhavādin's initial boast that he would prove in debate even the most impossible of propositions, but it is Siddhasena who sets forth his own position. The challenger has become the challenged in a reversal of the normal rules.

Suddhasena's position itself is not surprising; Brahmanical arguments against the Jain doctrine of an omniscient being are well-known from all periods of Indian philosophy. What is unusual is Vṛddhavādin's reaction to those arguments, and this provides the final reversal. The normal requirements of debate demand that the second debater refute in detail the specific details of the arguments that had been advanced by the first speaker. If we keep in mind that what is on trial here is not a given argument but the whole apparatus of elite Brahmanical culture, then Vṛddhavādin's reaction is fitting, not only as our text tells us, to the occasion of a debate where the courtiers are cowherds and farmers, but also to this hidden proposition. Vṛddhavādin replies not with any counter-arguments, as convention required, but with simple Prakrit verses, which he follows up immediately by a demand to know to whom victory has been awarded.

The response of the judges is also a humorous one: using a simple compound that parodies flowery Sanskrit locutions, they rather pompously declare that the words of the Jain monk were as "nectar"

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to their ears, tuha paḍhie sui juyamamaena siṃciyam amha, vs. 22, a somewhat surprisingly poetic statement for these illiterates. They continue in the second half of that verse with their verdict on Siddhasena, which returns to simple unadorned speech "And we do not understand a thing of what he said", eyassa santiyam puṇa na kiṃ pi amhe suhāvei. When Vṛddhavādin explains to them the point that Siddhasena has tried to make, they then grab Siddhasena and start to drag him off to the Jain temple to show him the Arhat whose existence he has tried to disprove. Again, the scene is rich in comic potential, the learned Brahmin being bodily carted off by the farmers, and there exists as well the less obvious humor of people arguing at cross-purposes and inhabiting totally different worlds. For Siddhasena surely never meant to imply that there was no statue in the temple of the Jains; he was criticizing the abstract conceptualizations that surround such images.

The final irony, of course, is that Siddhasena admits his defeat, proving once and for all that something other than a specific philosophy was at stake in the debate. What was at stake as we have seen was a world view and a culture, and the laughter we experience at Siddhasena's expense is a laughter directed at the larger group he represents, the dominant intellectual tradition of classical India.

The ultimate verdict in the debate, then, is given not only to Vrddhavadin and the Jains, but also to Prakrit or popular culture, to the world of the cowherds and farmers, whom religion reaches directly through simple poems, and through the performance of miracles. There is a distinctively anti-intellectual tone to all of this. Siddhasena is defeated precisely at that moment when he is doing what he did best in all of his writings: expounding philosophy in the elite and learned tradition of classical India. The image of the monk that we are forming begins to come into focus. Vrddhavādin is wise but with a wisdom that implies not great book-learning, but rather a sensitivity to the needs of the common people and an awareness of how to deliver religious instruction to its greatest effect. He is also psychologically quite astute, for his suggestion to Siddhasena that they permit the cowherds and farmers to act as judges seals the debate even before it has begun. In his turn Siddhasena, the arrogant Brahmin, employs the tools of his trade with absolutely no effect. In admitting defeat he

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acknowledges the limitations of the elite Brahmin culture. Siddhasena becomes a Jain monk as part of his defeat, with the implication that the Jain monk Siddhasena, like Vṛddhavādin, in his wisdom will espouse something distinct from philosophical learning, philosophical argumentation and skill in Sanskrit. But Siddhasena's ordeal is not quite over; if this is his installation as crown-prince, his actual enthronement must await one more trial.

III. SIDDHASENA'S EXILE: THE MONK AS KING

Siddhasena is expelled from the Jain community in Ujjain and given a penance that demands that he wander incognito for twelve years before he will be taken back into their fold and thus before he can resume his lawful office in which his teacher had installed him. The exact name of this penance is given in the Prabandhakośa and the Prabhāvakacarita as the pārāñcika penance, while the Ākhyānakamanikośa simply calls it the "highest penance", carimapacchittam.31 The pārāncika penance is known from the commentarial literature of the Svetambaras, and it is a twelve-year period of seclusion that is the maximum penalty under this, the most severe of all penances. It is important to note that there is no mention of any actual concealment of the monk's religious identity during the period in which he must stay away from the group, while such concealment is central to the exile periods of both Siddhasena and Samantabhadra.32 In addition, Siddhasena's penance in his biography also may be seen to bear some resemblance to the accounts we find in the texts on monastic discipline, in the fact that it ends with a miracle displayed for a king. The lexts describing the penance actually allow for its commutation at the request of a king who has been won over to the monk's cause.³³ At the same time, however, Siddhasena's expulsion from the community is given a significant twist, when to the usual punishment of physical separation from the group is added in all versions of his biography the condition that he travel incognito, never revealing that he is a Jain monk. To understand this addition it is necessary to turn from canonical commentaries to the broader category of story literature in India. Such a motif of a twelve-year exile, most often carried out incognito, is standard in stories of kings in classical Indian literature,

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and would no doubt have been known to any Indian reader or hearer of Siddhasena's biography, and have added a host of rich associations to his story. The exile of the king is a core episode in the Mahābhārata and occurs in countless other stories of kings in the epic and the various puranas.34 Scholars have interpreted the exile period as a kind of liminal stage in which the king is prepared for kingship, and have noted the association of the twelve-year period of exile with specific rituals associated with kingship in ancient India. For this discussion I would stress particularly that in the majority of these Indian stories of exiled kings there is a close association of exile with sin, usually a sin that is the result of some ritual impurity. Thus in many of the epic and puranic stories in which a king is exiled, the exile serves as a period of expiation rather than as a true rite of passage, and there is no marked change in the character of the king as a result of his exile. He simply emerges from his exile unstained, but without any other major discernible alteration. The period of twelve days is also the time period in the funeral ritual during which the disembodied soul emerges from a dangerous state of limbo and becomes a true pitr, or ancestor, instead of a disembodied ghost who is potentially dangerous to the living.35 During this period the ritual impurities that cluster around death are also removed through the performance of specific rites.

Siddhasena's twelve-year exile, then, carries with it a host of associations, all of which revolve around the notion of a dangerous liminal period which involves a temporary loss of identity and after which an individual resumes his true identity. Just as the king during this exile period travels incognito, without revealing that he is a king and devoid of any trappings of royalty, just as the dead soul during his twelve days has no body, no physical identifying features, so it is made a condition that Siddhasena will travel during this period without any of the distinguishing marks of a Jain monk, essentially incognito.

Beyond these resonances to many stories of kings in the pan-Indian tradition and resonances to ritual practices, both rituals of royal consecration and funeral rituals, the story of Siddhasena's exile is remarkably close to another story within the Jain tradition itself. This is the story of Samantabhadra, a Digambara Jain, whose biography first appears in the *Kathākośa* of Prabhācandra, a Digambara text that

A. N. Upadhye, its editor, would place in the last half of the eleventh century A.D.³⁶ In fact the Kathākośa story of Samantabhadra's miracle in the Siva temple at Benaras becomes the standard version of Siddhasena's biography. In the Akhyānakamanikośavrtti as Siddhasena completes his hymns of praise an image of Pārśvanātha emerges from the head of the God, making it clear that it is an anthropomorphic image. In the Kathākośa we shall see that Samantabhadra praises the linga and the linga splits, revealing an image of the Jain Tirthankara Candraprabha. This more violent miracle is the one that Siddhasena performs in all the other versions of his biography that are known to me; it happens in all the versions at the temple to Siva in Ujjain, the famous Mahākāla temple, and it is this more aggressive act that becomes emblematic of Siddhasena. In the Tapagaccha pattāvalis, for example, Siddhasena's name is often cited, despite the fact that he is not considered one of the Tapagaccha head monks, and after his name there is always some phrase saying that Siddhasena has rent in two the linga at Mahākāla and made manifest an image of the Jain tīrthankara Pārśvanātha.37

The close parallel that obtains between the stories of Siddhasena and Samantabhadra is not a unique case; the story of Haribhadra in the Śvetāmbara tradition, that monk to whose biography Siddhasena's biography shows so many other parallels as we said above, is also intimately related to the *Kathākośa* story of the famous Digambara philosopher Akalanka.³⁸ What is more difficult to establish in the case of Siddhasena is the relative priority of the accounts.³⁹ Because they both continued to circulate over the succeeding centuries and seem to have been aware of each other, I shall in fact treat them as contemporary and parallel stories, and consider them as each enriching the other by providing resonances and allusions and a deepening context for the exile and miracle that these biographies make so central in their accounts of these two monks. I give now a translation of the biography of Samantabhadra from the *Kathākośa* of Prabhācandra.

In South Kāncī, a certain great sage, the Glorious Samantabhadra by name, who was capable of explaining all the major scientific treatises, from those on logic to those on grammar, and who had carried out many difficult penances and religious observances, was now tormented by an affliction of the digestive system that had arisen

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on account of the force of his own grievous past deeds which were such that they led inexorably to his enduring much suffering. In his agony he reflected, "Tormented by this disease I shall not be able to do anything for the Faith. That is why I must certainly find some remedy to still this malady. And there is no other remedy for this sickness besides eating large quantities of rich and tasty delicacies. Since I cannot get such foods here, I must go wherever I can and I must assume whatever guise is necessary in order to get them."

With this determination he abandoned the city Kañci and heading north he came to the city Pundra. There he beheld a great hall for public rituals in the outer court of a Buddhist monastery, and thinking, "I will find a remedy for my digestive troubles in this place", he donned the apparel of a Buddhist monk. But because he did not obtain the necessary delicacies there that would cure his sickness, he left that place and heading north once more he wandered through many cities and villages until he came to the city Daśapura. And there he saw a grand monastery of the Vaisnavas which was thronged with crowds of monks bearing the marks of pious Vaisnavas, and these monks feasted on the most delicious foods that were given them by rich donors in deep devotion to their faith every day. He abandoned his Buddhist robes and assumed the guise of a Vaisnava monk. But because he did not get the very rich foods that would cure his digestive troubles there either, he left that place as well and wandering through many districts, towns and villages he came to Benaras.

In the course of his wanderings through the city, wearing all the marks of a Saiva ascetic, he beheld the divine temple to Siva that had been made at the command of the King of Kings, the Great King Sivakoti, and the temple was filled with eighteen kinds of rich and delicious foods that were being offered to the God. He thought, "Here I shall find a remedy for my digestive troubles." At this very moment it just so happened that he saw the offerings to the God being thrown away after the ceremony had been concluded. He chuckled and said, "Do you mean to say that there is no one here who has the ability to cause the God to come down into our midst and partake of the divine offerings that the King has had prepared with such great devotion?" Hearing these words the temple servants said, "Do you then, sir, have the power to cause the God to come down into our midst, that you

should speak such words?" And the ascetic replied, "I do indeed." Then the temple servants told the King, "Lord, there is a certain ascetic who, seeing the divine offerings being discarded outside the temple at the end of the worship ceremony to His Majesty's God has said, 'I shall cause the God to come down into our midst and partake of these divine offerings." Hearing this the King, his curiosity aroused, took with him the most delectable dishes, all sparkling with large crystals of sugar and dripping with sugar-cane juice, and a hundred pots filled to the brim with curds and ghee, and went there. And then the ascetic was told. "Please, sir, cause the God to partake of this food." Saying, "I shall do just that," he went into the temple, and having cleared the temple of all those present, he shut the door. And as soon as the door was closed in a flash he gobbled up all that food, and when he was done he opened the door and said, "You may take away the empty pots."

Now the King was greatly amazed by all of this and so each day he had more and more and richer and richer food prepared and sent to the temple. And when at the end of six months his digestive troubles had been gradually cured and he could eat normal food, then the ascetic no longer ate the food that the King sent. He left it totally untouched. Now the temple servants asked him, "Sir, Lord of ascetics, why does the marvelous meal the King has sent go uneaten?" He said, "The Lord has eaten his fill and is not hungry anymore. Now he is eating only small amounts." The temple servants relayed all this information to the King. And the King stationed a clever fellow by the conduit that carried water and old offerings from the temple and concealed him by covering him up with flower garlands. And that fellow saw the ascetic close the door and eat the food himself. And he told the King, "My Lord, the ascetic does not cause any God to come down into our midst and partake of the offerings. He just closes the door and eats them himself."

And when he heard this the King was angry and said, "O ascetic, you have told lies. You do not cause any God to come down into our midst and partake of the offerings. Not at all. You close the door and you eat them yourself. Why, you do not even offer a word of praise to the God."

Hearing this the ascetic said, "He would not be able to survive my

words of praise. Only that one who is free from passion and devoid of the eighteen sins could survive my words of praise. That is why I do not praise this God. Were I to praise him, then this God would crack right open." Hearing this the King said, "If he is going to crack wide open then let him crack right open. I order you to praise this God. Let us see your great powers." Then the ascetic said, "Tomorrow at dawn I shall show to you my great powers." And the King, saying, "So be it", threw the ascetic into the temple and had the place carefully guarded by rows of his best warriors, and groups of his elephants.

And while the ascetic was desperately worrying, thinking to himself, "I have rashly said something that can never come true. Who knows now what will happen to me," in the second watch of the night the protecting Goddess of the Jain Faith, Ambikā, sensing his dismay by a trembling in her own divine seat, came there and appeared to him in person. And she said, "O Blessed One, do not worry and be disturbed in your mind. Everything that you said will come true; when you recite the hymn of praise to the twenty-four *tīrthankaras* that starts with the words, 'By the One who is Self-existent, who works for the good of all creatures on earth,' it will all take place right before your very eyes." Saying this and rescuing the Blessed One from his troubles, she then vanished. And the Blessed One, filled with joy at having seen the Goddess, composed the hymn to the twenty-four *tīrthankaras*, and his mind dancing with bliss, his lotus-face abloom with joy, he spent the rest of the night in supreme happiness.

And the next morning at dawn, the King accompanied by all the townspeople, with great curiosity, came to the temple, ordered the temple doors opened and had the ascetic brought out of the temple. And as he came out they all could see that he was delighted at heart, his lotus face was abloom with joy, he was surrounded by an effulgent halo of light, and he radiated strength and power. Now the King thought to himself, "Today this ascetic looks as he never did before. For sure he will carry out his promise." And then the King said, "O Sir, O Lord of Ascetics, I order you to praise this God. Let us see your power."

And so the Blessed One began to recite the hymn that began with the words, 'By the One who is Self-existent, who works for the good of a eigh dark split the out, ther you mar

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In Kāncī I was a naked mendicant, my body smeared with dirt; in Lāmbuśa my body was all white;

In Pundrodre I was a Buddhist monk; in the city Daśapura I was a Hindu ascetic who ate fine foods.

In Benaras I became an ascetic, my body all white, shining like the moon;

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O King, whoever has the power, let him come forward and debate with me, the Jain, the follower of the doctrine of those who have freed themselves of their karmic knots.

Some time ago I sounded the drum in the middle of the city of Pāṭaliputra to challenge to debate whoever might be there; and after that in the country of Mālava, in the land of Sindhu, and in the district of Tḥakka, in Kāncīpura and in Vidiśā; now I have come to Karahaṭaka, which is crowded by many who think themselves so wise, fighters all of them; wherever I go I seek a good contest, O Lord of Men; like the meter of these verses, my step is jaunty and springy, like the step of a young panther eager for the hunt.

Having said these words, he abandoned his disguise as a Saiva monk, and revealed for all to see the marks of a Jain monk, including the small peacock feather that monks of his Faith were wont to carry. And defeating all those who held that reality was capable of being defined by any one given viewpoint by means of his own doctrine of the multiplicity of viewpoints, he greatly enhanced the prestige and the power of his own Faith.

Now in this instance he displayed steadfast and right faith by refusing lo praise a false God. And he displayed steadfast and right knowledge by defeating all of those who held to the correctness of single points of view in describing reality. Seeing this great miracle, the King Sivakoti and all of the people there came to have great faith in the Jain doctrine, and all of

them achieved great insight into the true nature of things. And the King became totally discenchanted with worldly power and worldly goods because the particular type of karma that had heretofore obstructed his taking the religious life was exhausted. And he abandoned his kingdom, practiced asceticism, mastered completely all the sacred texts, and then for the sake of those individuals who were either insufficient in intellectual gifts or who had too short a life-span, he condensed the great work of the teacher Lohācārya known as the Ārādhanā and which consisted of 84,000 verses, and composed his Mūlārādhanā. which consists of 84 aphorisms and 3,500 verses and begins with the words, 'the sign of an arhat'.

This biography of Samantabhadra is as interesting in its own right as the biographies of Siddhasena that I have set out to study. My comments here will be biased by the fact that my prime focus is Siddhasena and the manner in which he has been depicted in the Śvetāmbara tradition; I shall try to restrict my comments to those parts of Samantabhadra's biography that I feel are most instructive for the present study.⁴⁰

The very existence of this biography is significant to an understanding of the treatment of Siddhasena in the prabandha collections and related texts, first of all because it makes abundantly clear that at least one of the central events in Siddhasena's life after his conversion is not in fact unique to Siddhasena. There existed in medieval Jainism at least from the time of the eleventh century, and if one doubts the dating of the Kathākośa, then at the latest from the time of the thirteenth century when it is alluded to in an inscription, a common story of a Jain monk who is guilty of a sin and must expiate that sin by travelling incognito.41 At the end of his travels, he proves his purity by displaying miraculous powers. Aided by the protecting Goddess of the faith, he composes a hymn. Through the force of his words he then causes an image of a Jain tīrthākara to appear, either in a violent shattering of the Śaiva linga, as in the case of Samantabhadra, or a less violent manifestation from the head of an anthropomorphic image, as in the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti account of Siddhasena.42

Siddhasena's sin is explicitly named in the $\bar{A}khy\bar{a}nakamanikośavrtti$; falsely influenced by popular slander of the Jain texts which are written in Prakrit, he offers to rewrite them all into Sanskrit. Samantabhadra's sin is not explicitly named; he is suffering from a disease, and the text makes

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extre outse as is mani refer passi guise At th reade impo point had (can n Sama Wreck and v glorif bhaga this s under identi that a Jain n clear that the disease is a result of some bad karma he has accumulated. It is a common notion in Indian religious stories that certain disease are the result of sin. Leprosy, for example, is commonly regarded as the result of gross sin.⁴³

Exactly what happens to Samantabhadra during the course of his journey is also extremely important for us in reading the biography of Siddhasena, for the *Ākhyānakamaṇikośavrtti* leaves unstated much of the meaning of Siddhasena's exile, which I have hinted at in my reference to the twelve-year period of exile in other contexts as a liminal journey preparing the individual for the assumption of a heightened role in the community and for the assumption of his true identity. For this reason I should like to focus for a moment on how Samantabhadra's wanderings are treated in the *Kathākośa*.

The exact nature of Samantabhadra's journey is conveyed with extreme subtlety by Prabhācandra. Samantabhadra is introduced at the outset of this brief biography by name and with a few simple epithets as is usual at the very beginning of a story, and in precisely the same manner as in the Akhyanakamaikośavrtti. Thereafter Samantabhadra is referred to only indirectly; even the pronoun is left unstated in the passive verb construction that predominates. Not until he assumes the guise of the Saiva ascetic in Benaras is he again designated specifically. At this point he becomes known as "the ascetic", "yogin", and the reader is alerted to the fact that it is this guise that is especially important in the story and that will lead to the climax, for here at this point Samantabhadra seems to be emerging from a state in which he had only fluid, shifting and marginal identities to one in which we can now begin to localize him with more certainty. Finally, when Samantabhadra, desperate that he will not be able to fulfill his boast of wrecking the linga by his words of praise, is imprisoned in the temple and visited by the Goddess, we have his final transformation and glorification. No longer the "yogin", no longer just "he", he becomes bhagavān, "the Blessed One". Samantabhadra, then, starts out in this story with a distinct identity, a name and precise qualities; he undergoes a journey in which he seems basically without precise identity, known only by pronouns, donning and abandoning disguises that are alien to his true nature. He then resumes his true identity as a Jain monk at the conclusion of his journey, but it is clear that some

kind of a transformation has occurred. He is no longer Samantabhadra, the expounder of abstruse treatises, and the practitioner of penances, as we met him at the outset of the story; he is now the Blessed One, the reciter of hymns and the powerful magician, who with his words causes the false God to crumble and the true God to be manifest.

It seems at first glance possible that we might conclude that Samantabhadra in his journey has moved in fact from one image of a Jain monk, the monk as scholar and ascetic, to another, the Jain monk as miracle worker and spreader of the faith through his marvelous deeds and charismatic appearance. This is precisely the transformation that we have seen Siddhasena undergo in his biography. Siddhasena's conversion from the purely scholastic, the purely academic, began with his conversion to Jainism in his debate with Vrddhavadin. This movement from the elite culture to the world of Prakrit, of verses as opposed to philosophical argument, was only strengthened by the story of Siddhasena's penance and exile and his final apotheosis as hymn-maker and miracle worker. It is tempting to regard Samantabhadra's wanderings as an exact parallel, but I would argue that there is a crucial difference between the two stories and that a consideration of this difference is extremely revealing of what the Svetambara tradition is doing in its biographies of Siddhasena.

Samantabhadra's journey was the reverse of the royal journey in exile in the many stories of kings in Indian literature, for kings move from the city into the wilderness, while Samantabhadra and Siddhasena travel through the cities, which are not the normally sanctioned centers of activity for monks whose natural setting is the wilderness.44 Nevertheless, like those other journeys, it can be understood to involve not a realignment of values, but a reinforcement of clearly existing values, a period of preparation for the assumption of his natural position. There is between the starting point and the finishing point of this journey not a radical change in character, but a gradual revelation of inherent abilities, just as in the case of the young prince who born to kingship goes forth and emerges mature and capable of fulfilling that role. Samantabhadra, after he has become the "Blessed One", still uses his philosophical talents to defeat all the adherents of rival doctrines in debate. He still boasts of his talents as a philosopher and as a debater, in verses that are not entirely appropriate to the

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setting if one concentrates on detail, for they place Samantabhadra in the presence of a king at Karhataka and our story reaches its climax in Benaras, but the verses are neither sloppily nor gratuitously appended here. In fact without these verses the entire saga of the wandering and miracle would be incomplete, for the verses make absolutely clear to us that what has happened in these wanderings is what happens in other such journeys in Indian stories. The hero is prepared to accept the role ordained for him from the start. Samantabhadra began as an intellectual, an expounder of difficult treatises, and he remains an intellectual to the very end. He displays perfect knowledge as well as perfect faith. And in this he is in marked contrast to the Siddhasena of the Ākhyānakamanikośavṛṭti.

The Ākhyānakamanikośavrtti displays a profoundly anti-intellectual tone, as I have repeatedly stressed. Its treatment of the motif of exile and return is best understood as part of a deliberate attempt to create an image of the monk who is not intellectual, but is rather a thoroughgoing populist. If we return for a moment to the text of the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti, when Siddhasena is about to begin his journey, he too is introduced as learned in all the teachings, sayakasiddhantapāragāmī (vs. 28). At the end of his journey, however, there is no trace of that erudition. Like Samantabhadra he is aided by the presiding Goddess of the faith; like Samantabhadra he composes what the text regards as hymns, but which interestingly enough are often short philosophical treatises, and critical to my point, unlike Samantabhadra after his journey he does not engage in any debates or display the powers of his intellect. This journey has not led to any heightening of inherent powers or to a preparation for a state which at the outset was clearly defined. This journey, like the initial episode of the biography, the debate between the Brahmin Siddhasena and the Jain Vrddhavādin, is a kind of conversion, from intellectual to miracle-worker. The Svetāmbara account delicately alters a well-known motif to make a distinct point and create an unambiguous image of Siddhasena, the Jain monk. And that image denies categorically the function of intellectual activity in favour of miracles and the emotive religion of the hymn.

The story of Siddhasena, then, in its description of the exile of the monk draws on a theme that has many parallels in the Indian tradi-

tion. In this case it exploits this theme by changing it ever so slightly to serve its own ends. The theme of exile and return is employed by the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti with a twist: the journey is less a period of transition, an opportunity for the maturing of natural tendencies or the removal of some offending and ultimately adventitious sin, than it is a means of conversion and radical change. While it is obviously not possible to prove that readers or hearers of Siddhasena's story were familiar with the story of Samantabhadra, given the close relationship between the Kathākośa and the Śvetāmbara texts in other cases, I find that not an unlikely possibility; in any event readers would surely have been familiar with the exile motif in the lives of famous kings. The biography of Siddhasena depends for its effect on such a familiarity, in that it relies on our awareness of the important changes it makes in the commonly told story of kings in exile who return essentially unchanged but mature enough to assume their thrones. 45

In addition to the exile and return motif, both the biography of Samantabhadra and that of Siddhasena use other widely familiar themes and rely on other widely held beliefs to create an image of their subject that is believable and emotionally acceptable. Both rely heavily on universally held beliefs in the power of hymns, and both build on a tradition of miracle stories current in Hinduism and Jainism about extraordinary events that happen around a Saiva image as a result of reciting hymns and prayers to Siva. I would now like to look in brief at these topics to show how rich the context of these stories is and how deeply they are rooted in the pan-Indian tradition. For by employing such common themes these stories create a network of expectations and associations that contribute greatly to their own effectiveness.

III. THE POWER OF HYMNS AND THE MIRACLE AT THE LINGA: THE JAIN VERSION

Belief in the efficacy of the sacred word is as ancient as is religious speculation in India.46 It is as important in Jainism and Buddhism as it is in Hinduism, and in the medieval period it even led to the development and collection of independent miracle stories that describe the wonders that transpired upon the recitation of a certain verse of a

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certain text. In the Jain context this was most often the verse of a hymn, and we have an entire commentary to the famous hymn, the Bhaktāmarastotra, that is a collection of such miracle tales and is dated 1370 A.D.47 Similarly, from Hinduism we have such collections of miracle stories as the Gītāmāhātmya of the Padmapurāna, which relates a miracle story associated with the recitation of each chapter of the Bhagavadgītā.48 It is instructive to note that in the case of the Gītāmāhātmya, which is telling stories about a text that the tradition regarded as a philosophical treatise and one of the major sources of scholastic Vedanta philosophy, the miracle stories have absolutely no connection with the actual content of the text. The philosophical content of the text is totally irrelevant to the actual awe in which the text was held and which is conveyed amply by the miracle tales. In the Jain case it is also important to note that there is a criss-crossing of genres between miracle tales and biographies; the biography of Mānatunga, for example, occurs both in the commentary to the Bhaktāmarastotra as a miracle tale and in the Prabhāvakacarita as a biography. Likewise, the biography of Āryakhapatācārya appears in a variety of prabandhas and in the Bhaktāmarastotra commentary. It is not surprising, then, to see in the biographies of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena and other famous Jain monks great importance placed on the hymn and the power of the hymn to produce miracles. Biographies and miracle stories of hymns belong very much to the same religious world in medieval Jainism.

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Beyond drawing on a wide-spread belief in the miraculous powers of hymns, which in itself would have made these stories seem totally credible to a public that shared those beliefs, the emphasis on this motif has yet another function in our stories. The fact that Samantabhadra and Siddhasena perform such a miracle immediately places them in a recognizable context: they are now made members of a whole gallery of famous Jain monks who perform miraculous feats by reciting hymns. If my assumption about the biography of Siddhasena is correct, namely that the tradition was attempting through this biography to create an image of a monk that would be widely acceptable and uncontroversial, then surely it would have been useful to create for Siddhasena a community to which he could belong, thereby enabling the hearer or reader of his story to place him in a familiar and congenial

setting. By transforming Siddhasena's texts into miracle-producing hymns, when in fact they were in the main mostly philosophical texts and not hymns at all, the tradition has reinforced its transformation of Siddhasena from philosopher to miracle-worker, locating him squarely among other well-known figures who wrote hymns and performed miracles with them. ⁴⁹ The incongruity of changing the philosopher, who wrote meticulous Sanskrit and extremely difficult, terse and opaque philosophical texts, into the miracle-worker who uses those very texts as magic charms, is in part concealed by this ready familiarity of the context. The transformation is also facilitated by the very nature of the process of telling a miracle story about a text, where we have seen the actual content of the text was always largely irrelevant to its ability to give rise to supernatural feats. Siddhasena as hymnreciter and miracle-worker, then, is in good company and I should like to turn briefly to this company Siddhasena is now allowed to keep to

show how his biography can be read as replete with allusions to the

deeds of other similar heroes and how it is greatly enhanced by such

hints of participating in a larger, common cause.50

Siddhasena is closest to Samantabhadra, as we have seen, but there are also countless other Jains whose stories were well known and who recite hymns and make miracles. There is Manatunga, the author of the Bhaktāmarastotra, whom I have just mentioned. In addition there is a humorous story told of the monk Bappabhattisūri in the Prabandhakośa.51 Bappabhattisūri is locked in debate with the Buddhist Varddhakuñjara. His royal patron tires of the debate and tells the monk to put a hasty end to the proceedings. Bappabhattisūri summons Bhāratī, the Goddess of Knowledge, through a hymn of praise. The Goddess explains to Bappabhattisūri that the Buddhist had praised her over the course of seven births and she had rewarded him for his devotion with a magic pill which makes his arguments unbeatable. The Jain monk then upbraids the Goddess and accuses her of being anti-Jain, at which the Goddess relents and tells the monk of a ruse by which he can steal the magic pill from the Buddhist. In return she asks him for a favour: that he not teach anyone the fourteenth stanza of his hymn because she is compelled to appear in person to anyone who recites it. Bappabhattisūri agrees. In the Prabhāvakacarita biography of Abhayadevasūri, the Snake King Dharanendra makes the same

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regu sites the r pape a mo the a piou request and for a similar reason; he is weary of having to appear before wicked mortals, merely because they recite a hymn. In the *prabandhakośa*, again, the monk Bhadrabāhu also composes a hymn to help relieve the torments caused by Varāhamihira who has become a demi-god, a *vyantara*, and is tormenting the Jains. Similarly a central event in the biography of Āryanandila in the *Prabandhakośa* is Āryanandila's composition of the *Vairoṭhyāstava* or hymn to the Snake Goddess Vairoṭhyā, the recitation of which frees people from any threat from snakes.

There are many other monks in the Svetāmbara tradition who are famed for their hymn-making and the miracles that attend their words. Jinaprabhasūri, for example, is said to have written seven hundred hymns and to have made a vow that he would never eat without first reciting a new hymn to the Jain Goddess Padmāvatī, from whom he believed that he had derived his great wisdom. From the eleventh century onward Svetāmbara Jains composed hymns in great numbers.55 The pattāvalis of the Tapāgaccha of medieval Gujarat tell of numerous miracles that were the result of the recitation of a hymn. Mānadeva averts the plague by reciting a hymn to Śāntinātha. The same miracle is also attributed to Munisundarasūri. In fact, most of the monks in these pattāvalis are chiefly remembered for their composition of hymns.⁵⁶ Samantabhadra and Siddhasena belong clearly to the dominant stream in the medieval Jain tradition when they compose their hymns and use them to perform miracles. The episode of the hymn and its miracle is thus richly allusive, pointing outward from the biography of Siddhasena both to specific stories of Jain monks and to a whole world of popular belief and popular storytelling. It remains now to examine the miracle story itself and its equally rich but far more complex ramifications.

Magical manifestations at a *linga* or an image of Siva occur regularly in the puranic corpus of stories that celebrate particular holy sites and particular religious observances. While an exhaustive study of the miracle stories in the Saiva *purāṇas* is beyond the range of this paper, a few of these miracles should be mentioned as background to a more detailed discussion of the Jain appropriation of the theme of the appearance of a God at the *linga* in response to the prayers of a

pious petitioner.

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The Sivapurāna contains a section on the various jyotirlingas, the most famous Siva lingas according to this text. The story of the Bhīmeśvara linga, which appears as well in the Jain context makes an appropriate place to start.⁵⁷ Bhīmeśvara is in Kāmarūpa, or Assam, A demoness or rāksasī named Karkati has a son named Bhīma from the demon Kumbhakarna of Rāmāyana fame. The king of Kāmarūpa is an ardent devotee of Siva, but the demon Bhīma defeats him and has him imprisoned. The king continues fervently to worship Siva. He makes an earthen image of Siva to which he addresses his prayers. Now the demon is intent upon destroying Hindu worship, and his conflict with the king of Kāmarūpa is in fact a religious war. The Gods are aware of this fact and they all betake themselves to Siva and request that he destroy the demon. Siva instructs the Gods to go at once to the imprisoned king and reassure him that he will destroy the demonic oppressor. In the meantime the demon's followers report to Bhīma that the king is up to something suspicious and that he is always intently worshipping Siva. Bhīma decides to kill the king. There is a brief dialogue between Bhīma and the king, but Bhīma soon tires of talk and raises his sword to strike the image when Siva appears from it and strikes down the weapons that the demon throws at him. A fierce battle ensues, in which the demon is defeated. In commemoration of his miraculous appearance at that site and the defeat of the demon Bhīma, the Gods ask Śiva to remain forever at that place. Such are the origins of the sacred Bhīmeśvara.

In the Śivapurāṇa account of the origins of the sacred Nāgeśvara (chapters 29 and 30), a merchant worships an earthen image of Śiva that he has made after he has been imprisoned by a demon. The demon's followers inform him of the merchant's devotions and the demon comes to investigate. The demon orders his minions to slay the merchant, when suddenly an effulgent Śiva emerges from a depression in the ground near the image, in full splendour, accompanied by his own heavenly hosts and along with his divine abode. Śiva then slays the demon and proclaims the sanctity of the site where the miracle occurred: whoever worships there will become a cakravartin, a world emperor. He then makes a prediction about a particular king, associating the powers of the holy site with a well-known specific royal figure, a common feature of these accounts, as I have already noted.

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In the Skandapurāṇa, Jāṭeśvaramāhātmya which belongs to the Avantīkhaṇḍa, we learn of a King Vīradhanvan whose sins are numerous, from the murder of Brahmins to the slaying of cows. He is advised by the sage Vāmadeva to go to the Mahākālavana, a place that we shall see is central to all the other accounts of Siddhasena in the Svetāṃbara tradition and is in fact the exact location of his miraculous manifestation of a Jain tīrthaṅkara at a Śaiva liṅga. There he is told to sing a hymn to the liṅga that goes under the name Jāṭamaheśvara. As he sings his hymn Śiva emerges from the midst of the liṅga and the king is freed from sin. 58

In other accounts of miracles at *lingas* or Śaiva images the magical manifestation is not an anthropomorphized Śiva, but often a mysterious light into which the devotee then merges, achieving his ultimate religious goal and state of perfection, complete union with Śiva. ⁵⁹ Sometimes it is flames that shoot out of the *linga* and destroy the enemy of the pious devotee, but whatever the exact nature of the manifestation, it seems possible to describe a number of features that these stories have in common and that are relevant in a discussion of the context of the Jain miracles performed by Samantabhadra and Siddhasena.

In the majority of these stories the miraculous manifestation of Siva, whether in human form, or as light or flames, occurs as a response to the prayer of a devotee, usually a king. The God then rescues the devotee, either by slaying an enemy or by granting him final salvation and freedom from all of his sins. When we return to the stories of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena, the parallels are clear. Here the Jain tirthankara appears in response to prayer, specifically to a hymn; the tirthankara by his appearance rescues the devotee from the clutches of an enemy, for both Siddhasena and Samantabhadra by the time they perform their miracle are sorely pressed by the Saiva king whose God they have insulted; at the same time the tirthankara also grants the king present final salvation, for the miracle so impresses the king in both our stories that the king converts to Jainism, a sine-qua-non of achieving final salvation.

There is of course an obvious difference between the Jain stories of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena that we have been examining and these Saiva stories, and that is that in the Jain accounts the manifesta-

tion at the Saiva image or *linga* is not Siva at all but the representative of a rival faith and the ultimate result of the miracle is the displacement of Saivism by Jainism. Thus if the Jain stories carry with them rich resonances of these Hindu miracle tales, in this case both of them have changed a common theme for similar purposes. It is not difficult to imagine the effect created by using a motif so familiar in the world of Indian religious story-telling, with this time a not so subtle change. In fact these two Jain biographies are not isolated examples in the Jain tradition of the use of the theme of a miraculous manifestation at a Saiva holy site, so there are also numerous associations with other Jain stories as well as Hindu stories. I should like now to consider some of these other Jain stories in what follows.

Perhaps the story closest to that of the miracle of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena occurs as a minor episode in the biography of the Jain teacher Vīrasūri, recorded as far as I know only in the Prabhāvakacarita. Vīrasūri in the course of his wanderings comes to a temple in a village called Sthira (vs. 52). Now there dwells in this temple a demi-god or vyantara named Vallabhīnātha whose custom it is to take the life of anyone who dares to stop in his temple at night (vs. 53). Vīrasūri is able to endure all the torments the vyantara has in store for him and finally the vyantara admits defeat. In his amazement at Vīrasūri's steadfast and fearless endurance he tells the Jain monk how many divine and mortal creatures have met their end at his hands. His boast includes an account of something that had taken place in the eastern corner of India, in the town of Dakkari at a Saiva temple known as Bhīmeśvara (vs. 68). There he says he had refused to bow down to the linga and furthermore had treated it with great contempt by actually sleeping with his feet resting on the water basin that surrounds the linga. This is in fact exactly what Siddhasena himself does in the brief account of him included in the Puratanaprabandhasamgraha; it also recalls the contempt with which Āryakhapatācārya treats a yakṣa in the various accounts of that monk.⁶⁰ Now the king happens to come to the temple and observing his behaviour is struck with curiosity. He asks the vyantara if he refuses to bow down to the linga out of ignorance or because he is somehow unable to do so. The vyantara replies that dire consequences might ensue if he bows down to the linga. The king in disbelief urges him to bow down, which he agrees to

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do in the presence of all the assembled townspeople. Once they have gathered the action moves swiftly to the expected climax; the *linga* cracks wide open when the *vyantara* performs his obeisance (vs. 77). Overcome by the miracle the king accepts the *vyantara* as his God (80) as do all the assembled onlookers. The *vyantara* adds that he bound the *linga* with the cloth that he had used to tie his own legs during meditation and that it is still worshipped in that form today (82).

Readers of the *Prabhāvakacarita* could hardly have missed the allusion here to the miracle of Siddhasena. Moreover, since the *vyantara* as a result of his defeat by Vīrasūri becomes an ardent Jain, it seems also possible to appropriate this miracle story for our catalogue of accounts of miracles done by Jains at Śaiva temples, and to assume that similarly a reader of Siddhasena's biography, who was familiar with this history of Vīrasūri, could hardly have failed to note the coincidences between the two stories. It is difficult indeed not to regard these parallels as deliberate, drawing one story inextricably into another, creating in effect composites as well as individual portraits, and ultimately portraits of the tradition itself as well as its individual representatives.

There is another even better known example of a manifestation at a Śaiva shrine that redounds to the credit of Jainism and that was no doubt know to every reader or hearer of Siddhasena's miracle at least by the fourteenth century. This is the miracle that Hemacandra performs for the benefit of the King Kumārapāla. It takes place at the famous Śaiva temple of Someśvara and is in response to the King's desire to know the true religion and the path to release. Hemacandra instructs the King to worship the *linga* with incense while he himself sinks into deep meditation. From the *linga* emerges suddenly a great light and a tiny image of Śiva as an ascetic appears at the base of the *linga*. The King touches the image and verifies that it is real and not a hallucination; he then hears its advice about the superiority of the Jain doctrine.

The very same miracle takes place in a story told amongst the followers of the *Kharataragaccha* of a different monk and king. A King Borad in Ambagadh wants to see Siva in the flesh. The Jain monk Jinadattasūri agrees to help him realize his wish and accom-

panies him to a Śiva temple, where the monk tells the King to fix his eyes on the *linga*. Suddenly smoke begins to bellow out from the *linga* and Śiva appears before their eyes. Śiva asks the King what it is that he wants and the King replies that he wants release. Śiva tells him that he can only achieve final release by following the Jain doctrine and so the King converts. The date of his conversion is in fact given in the story as 1059 A.D.⁶³

Finally, the last such record of a manifestation at a *linga* belongs not to Jainism, but to Islam. A nineteenth century Gujarati text tells of a Muslim saint causing the *linga* at Someśvara to split open, revealing the form of a Muslim ascetic. No doubt, given the rich context that the miracle had in this region, the Muslim text depended for its effectiveness at least in part on all the associations it carried with it.⁶⁴

These accounts of the miracles performed by Jain monks and future Jain devotees at Śaiva temples provide a wider context for the stories of Siddhasena.⁶⁵ Other versions of Siddhasena's biography show a similar network of connections and associations, resonances from the biography of one Jain monk to another, which were in fact essential to the expansion of the biography. Additional incidents only enrich these associations and provide more cross-linkages in the texture of the biography, which depends for its effects on our understandings of these various contexts.⁶⁶

NOTES

The best review of all current scholarship on Siddhasena is to be found in A. N. Upadhye, Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra, Bombay: Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, 1971, which includes a bibliographic survey. In his own introduction to this work A. N. Upadhye has argued that Siddhasena belonged to the Yāpanīya Saṅgha, a Jain sect that was regarded by both the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras as heretical. Upadhye further suggested that this was why the traditional Śvetāmbara biographies of Siddhasena, which are included in the various prabandha collections and which will Sanmatitarka (page xv). It would of course be possible to account for the absence of traditional scholarship on Siddhasena's texts by the same assumption: Siddhasena convinced by Upadhye's arguments, however; in any case I shall try to establish in part of a more general denial of Siddhasena's gifts as a philosopher and is perfectly in keeping with the anti-intellectual tone of his biography. I shall further try to under-

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stand this tone in terms of the Svetambara community's efforts to create for themselves a self-image that would reach beyond various dividing boundaries and be uncontroversial and readily acceptable to as many fellow Jains as was possible.

Such an explanation is more in keeping with the observation that in a commentary to a Śvetambara canonical text like the Niśīthasūtra, the Sanmati is mentioned along with the Siddhiviniścaya with much respect as one of the texts that greatly furthers the cause of the Faith. In fact study of these two texts was considered so important that certain restrictions were relaxed in the case of a monk who sought to learn them. See the references to the Nisīthacūrni in Madhu Sen, A Cultural Study of the Nisītha Curni. Parsvanatha Vidyashram Series, volume 21, Amritsar: Sohanlal Jaindharma Pracharak Samiti, 1975, page 247, note 19. I would also add that it is not altogether impossible to explain Siddhasena's neglect in part by the difficulty of his texts and his originality; such a situation is possibly not unprecedented in the annals of Indian philosophy. Śrī Harsa was recognized by the Vedanta tradition as brilliant and as one of their own. Despite this his main philosophical text, the Khandanakhandakhādya, remained poorly understood and received relatively little attention from commentators. See my Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedanta: The Khandanakhandakhādya of Śrī Harsa, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978. Finally, it is worth noting that even several hundred years after his death and roughly during the time when many of the versions of his biography achieved their final written form, at least Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra, his manual of logic, was mentioned as one of the logic texts that Śvetāmbara monks studied. Such a reference occurs in the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali account of the Kharatara head monk, Jinapati. The text is edited in the Singhi Jain Series by Jinavijava Muni, volume 42, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1956, and on page 34 we hear of two monks who have studied the Nyāyāvatāra amongst other Jain philosophy texts.

Muni Jinavijayaji in his article, "Siddhasena Divākara aur Svāmī Samantabhadra", Jaina Sahitya Samsodhak, vol. 1, part 1, Mahavira Samvat 2446, p. 12, cites a number of commentaries on Siddhasena's works as evidence of the high regard in which Siddhasena was held at least amongst some members of the Svetāmbara community. At the same time, on pp. 10—11, he notes a number of authors who were definitely hostile to Siddhasena for what they viewed as his challenge to orthodoxy. They criticized him particularly for what they saw as his extensive reliance on logical argument as opposed to strict fidelity to the canonical texts. All of this suggests to me that the hostility to Siddhasena the philosopher that I am analyzing in the biographical tradition had deep roots within the Svetāmbara community and may reflect a widely held suspicion of creative and original interpretation of revealed texts.

I am indebted to the staff of inter-library loan at McMaster University and the L. D. Institute in Ahmedabad for providing me with a copy of Jinaviyaja's article and with much of the other material that I have used in my research. I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada that has enabled me to do my work. The grant, on religious biographies in Asia, is a joint project headed by Dr. Koichi Shinohara at McMaster University and includes Dr. Eva Dargyay from the University of Calgary. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Shinohara for his many insightful comments along the way and to Professor J. R. Hightower who read this paper and made many useful suggestions.

In addition to the list of texts that follows, Dr. Charlotte Krause in her article,

"Siddhasena Divākara and Vikramāditya", Vikrama Volume, Ujjain: Scindia Oriental Institute, 1948, pp. 213—280, page 217, note 1, lists the following works, none of which is available to me. Saṅghatilakasūri, Samyaktvasaptatikāvṛtti, Devchandra Lalbhai Pustakoddhara Series No. 35; Śubhaśīlagaṇi's Vikramacarita, edited Pandim Bhagavandas, Samvat 1996; Vijayalakṣmīsūri's Upadeśaprasāda, Rajanagara, 1938. In her note 5 to page 221 she gives the dates of these texts as follows: Saṅghatilakasūri, 1366 A.D.; Śubhaśīla, 1443 A.D.; Vijayalakṣmīsūri, 1787 A.D. To this list of sources could be added Devamūrti's Vikramacarita, composed around 1419 A.D. and discussed by H. D. Velankar, "Vikramāditya in the Jain Tradition", in the same Vikrama Volume, pp. 643—645 and 665—666.

³ On the Kahāvali see Dalsukh Malvania, "On Bhadreśvara's Kahāvali", Indologica Taurinensia, vol. XIII, 1983, pp. 77-95, and my comments in note 3 to my paper. "The Biographies of Arya Khapatācārya: A Preliminary Investigation Into the Transmission and Adaptation of Biographical Legends", in a volume on religious biography in Asia edited with Dr. Koichi Shinohara to be published by Mosaic Press shortly. This paper on Āryakhapatācārya deals with the possible relationships between the didactic story collections and the later biography collections or prabandhas, a subject that I will be treating here as well in my discussion of Siddhasena's biographies. I have also discussed the relationship between pilgrimage stories, particularly the Vividhatīrthakalpa, and the biographies of the prabandhas in a paper on Jain biographies of Nagarjuna included in the same collection. Unfortunately for the present investigation I do not have access to the Kahāvali and its biography of Siddhasena and have only an inadequate summary given in Upadhye, op. cit., page *37. For the other texts cited here I shall be referring to these editions. Prabhāvakacarita, edited Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 13, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1940. Prabandhakośa, edited Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 6, Santiniketan: Singhi Jaina Pitha, 1935. Purātanaprabandhasamgraha, edited Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 2, Calcutta: Singhi Jaina Jnanapitha, 1936. Ākhyānakamanikośa, edited Muni Shri Punyavijayji, Prakrit Text Socity Series, no. 5, Varanasi: Prakrit Text Society, 1962. Vikramacarita, edited Franklin Edgerton, Harvard Oriental Series, volumes 26 and 27, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926. Vividhatīrthakalpa, edited Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 10, Santiniketan: Singhi Jaina Jnanapitha, 1934. Prabandhacintāmani, edited Muni Jina Vijaya, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 1, Santiniketan: Singhi Jaina Jnanapitha, 1933.

Of these various versions I shall discuss in detail only those from the *Ākhyānaka-manikośavrtti*, *Prabandhakośa* and *Prabhāvakacarita*, which are in fact the main texts that give the complete biography. Information about the others will be found dispersed through the body of this paper and in the notes.

⁴ Vividhatīrthakalpa. pp. 88–89; Vikramacarita, Jainistic recension, section VII, page 251–254 in part I. translation

⁵ The exception to this statement is the biography in the *Prabhāvakacarita*, which occurs in chapter 8, "Vṛḍdhavādicarita", pp. 54—61, and I shall argue that it is the exception that proves the rule. As might be expected from my brief description of this text, the *Prabhāvakacarita* is a much more intellectually demanding text than the other collections of biographies and stories, and it displays far less hostility to book-learning than the other texts. I shall show later on that by skilful repetition and by careful alterations to certain scenes the *Prabhāvakacarita* is the only text that actually accepts Siddhasena as a scholar and seems comfortable with the image of the monk as both

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magician and prominent thinker. I should also like to note here that W. H. McLeod in his Early Sikh Tradition: A Study of the Janam-sakhis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1980, particularly chapter 2, pp. 8-14, has similarly concentrated in his approach to the Sikh hagiographies of Guru Nanak on the image of Guru Nanak, which he prefers to call the "myth", that lies behind the biography, in much the same way I am here trying to seek to identify the image of Siddhasena that emerges from his biography. The "image" or "myth" of Guru Nanak, is however, by comparison to that of Siddhasena unproblematic and readily accessible and comprehensible; that of Siddhasena, going against the impression gained from his works requires considerable thought to understand its rationale and the deliberate process by which it was created. Little work has been done on the various pattāvalis. The Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali has been mentioned above, in note 1, and a major collection of the pattāvalis of the tapāgaccha has been published under the title Pattāvalisamuccaya, edited by Munidarśanavijaya, Viramgam: Sri Caritra Smaraka Granthamala, 1933. Articles on the pattāvalis include the following. Johannes Klatt, "Extracts from the Historical Records of the Jains", Indian Antiquary, vol. 11, 1882, pp. 245-256. Dasaratha Sarma, "Gleanings from the Kharataragacchapattāvali", Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. 26, 1950, pp. 224-231. Dasaratha Sarma, "The Kharataragachapattāvali Compiled by Jinapāla", Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. 11, 1935, pp. 779-781. ⁷ On this process see Bhattāraka Sampradāya, V. P. Johrapurkar, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, no. 8, Sholapur: Gulabchand Hirachand Doshi, 1958, pp. 1-7. All of the various groups with one exception would seem to have placed utmost importance on the correct transmission of the teaching and thus on establishing the pedigree of an unbroken lineage. The one exception seems to have been the Lumpaka, founded in 1452 A.D. which denied any continuous tradition and regarded itself as based simply on written teachings, "kevalapustakamūlaka". See A. Weber, "Ueber den Kupakshakausikaditya des Dharmasagara, Streitschrift eines Orthodoxen Jaina vom Jahre 1573", Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, July 1882, page 807. This document also illustrates clearly how hostile the mutual relationships of these different Svetāmbara groups could be, a point to which we shall return below.

My information comes from Muni Uttam Kamal Jain, Jaina Sects and Schools,

Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 49-75.

There is to date no adequate study of the splintering of the medieval Svetāmbara community and what actually divided these groups from each other. Muni Uttam Kamal Jain's book cited above, Jaina Sects and Schools, Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1978 is useful and some information is contained in S. B. Deo, The History of Jaina Monachism from Inscriptions and Literature, Poona: Deccan College, no title page. There is also a multi-volume history of the Kharataragaccha, the Kharataragacchabrhaditihāsa. I have seen only the first volume of this work which is a translation into Hindi of the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali by Mahāmahopadhyāya Vinayasāgara, published in 1959. For information on the same phenomenon among the Digambaras see Bhattāraka Sampradāya, cited above, and Weber's article also cited above.

Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali, page 23, paragraph 45.

Kharataragacchabṛhadgurvāvali, pp. 20—21, paragraph 40. The text has a lacuna here, but the context makes clear what is happening.

"Jñāsyate Rājasabhāyām. Pasuprāyānam evāranyam ranabhūmih", page 21.

On the texts about the Vedānta founders and their essentially aggressive tone see my article, "Holy Warriors: A Preliminary Study of Some Biographies of Saints and

Kings in the Classical Indian Tradition", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 12, 1984, pp. 291–303. Specifically on debate in these texts see my article "Scholars and Wonderworkers: Some Remarks on the Role of the Supernatural in Philosophical Contests in Vedānta Hagiographies", *Journal of the America Oriental Society*, 105/3, July, 1985. On Haribhadra and his debate see my paper "Jain Lives of Haribhadra: An Inquiry into the Sources and the Logic of the Legends", forthcoming in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. On the origins of philosophical debate and its agonistic nature see J. C. Heesterman, "On the Origin of the Nāstika", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-Asiens*, 12–13, 1968–69, pp. 171–185.

¹⁵ In fact it would seem that debate was almost universally regarded as an aggressive act, even in texts that are not biographies of philosophers. In the *Dharmaparikṣā* of Amitagati, which is dated to 1014 A.D., we have the following description of a debate:

vacobhir vādino 'nyonyam kurvate marmabhedibhih/ yatra vādam gatakṣobhā yuddham yodhāh śarair iva

(chapter 3, vs. 25, edited with Hindi translation by Pandit Balachandra Shastri, Sholapur: Jain Samskrti Samrakshaka Sangha, 1978, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala volume 32, page 43.)

"Where fearless debaters debate with each other, their words deadly sharp and cutting, like so many steadfast warriors wounding each other with arrows meant to deliver a fatal blow."

This may be one reason for the anachronistic emphasis in the *prabandhas* on the Buddhist menace which I explained differently in my paper on Haribhadra cited above. In fact the resurrection of the Buddhist menace even in fiction could have provided a possible rallying point for Svetāmbara Jains who had become more accustomed to fighting amongst themselves. Such a contention is supported by a text like the *Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali* where the Buddhists are nowhere in evidence and the enemy is clearly the rival Jains who live in the temples, the various *caityavāsins*, against whom the Kharatara monks rose up.

17 I am preparing a study of the *Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali* and hope in the future to be able to discuss its particular conventions and patterns and compare them with those found in the *prabandhas*.

18 I borrow this term "internally allusive" from Robert Alter in his introduction to *The Literary Guide to the Bible*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, pages 13–14.

19 This is my translation of the text of the *Ākhyānakamaṇikośavṛtti*, pp. 171–172.

As in all the translations done in this paper I have taken certain liberties with the text while I hope not doing violence to its purport. My aim in each case has been to give a reliable translation that yet allows an English reader to appreciate some of the distinctive literary qualities of the biography. What is lost in all of these translations, regrettably, is the effectiveness of the fanciful switching of languages from Prakrit to Sanskrit, which carries with it a host of associations and meanings that are particularly important in these accounts of Siddhasena. I shall rely on my analyses to make these points clear.

In fact the question of what language a sacred text might use was debated not only through the medium of biographies such as this one. The Nyāyakumudacandra of Prabhācandra includes a defense of Prakrit against the non-Jain community, particularly the Mīmāmsakas, who argue conversely that only texts written in Sanskrit are

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unsuit ignora rejoin Sansk itself. in the authoritative and can lead to salvation. See the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, edited Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya, Manikchandra Digambara Jain Granthamala, 39, volume 2, Bombay, 1941, pp. 757—767.

Buddhists also raised the issue of the propriety of allowing sacred texts to be in Prakrit and came to a conclusion similar to that of the Jains. There is a famous passage in the Cullavagga which in some ways offers a Buddhist parallel to the story of Siddhasena. In my understanding of the passage, two Brahmin converts to Buddhism suggest to the Buddha that his teachings are being distorted as they are told in various local languages. For this reason they offer to put the Buddha's words into Sanskrit. The Buddha replies that they are fools even to conceive of such a thing and tells them that putting his teachings into Sanskrit would constitute a wrong-doing (Cullavagga, Nalanda Devanagari Pali Series, 1956, pp. 228-229). There is a remarkable volume of scholarship on the exact meaning of this passage, which has been much debated by Western scholars. There are also a number of interesting discussions of the use of vernaculars in Buddhism. See for example Lin Li-Kouang, L'Aide-Memoire de la Vraie Loi, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1949, chapter 4, pp. 163-228; Etienne Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, reprinted 1967, pp. 607-618. Most recently the Cullavagga passage has been discussed by John Brough and K. R. Norman in articles in the volume Die Sprache der Ältesten Buddhistischen Überlieferung, edited by Heinz Bechert, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Gottingen, 1980. See also Madhav M. Deshpande, Sociolingustic Attitudes in India: An Historical Reconstruction, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Karoma Publishers, Inc., 1979, pp. 40-56. All of these discussions, with the exception of Deshpande, unfortunately neglect the broader philosophical context of the debate over canonical or ritual language in India and I believe that this has led to some distortions in their interpreting the significance of Buddhist comments supporting the use of languages other than Sanskrit and indeed condemning the use of Sanskrit. Thus Lin understands the Cullavagga passage as intending to prohibit the fixing of any single language for Buddhism, ignoring in the final analysis the pointed hostility to Sanskrit displayed by the Chinese vinaya translations that he discusses (p. 225). Norman notes Buddhaghosa's praise of Māgadhī as the root language and the natural language as well as the language best suited for scripture, but he does not make any comment as to why Buddhaghosa might have understood that a scriptural language should also be a root language or a natural language (Norman, pp. 66-69). In fact the Brahmanical/Jain-Buddhist debate over scriptural language helps provide the answer. To the orthodox community only Sanskrit was suited for use in scripture in part because only Sanskrit as the root language was capable of making known its meaning directly. By contrast Prakrits make known their meaning only by indirect reference to this root language of which they are corruptions. In addition the very fact that Prakrits are corruptions of the primary language implies their inferior status and unsuitability for ritual or religious matters. As corruptions they are the result of ignorant misuse of the primary language. To all of this the Jains and Buddhists rejoined that in fact Prakrit is the natural language, the root language of which Sanskrit is the secondary derivative, thus turning the Brahmanical argument against itself. References to the various Buddhist, Jain and Brahmanical arguments are given in the excellent notes to the Nyāyakumudacandra. I have written in more detail on this subject in an article, "Buddhaghosa's Penance and Siddhasena's Crime: Remarks on Some Buddhist and Jain Atitudes Towards the Language of Religious Texts" to be published in a Festschrift for Dr. Yün-hua Jan edited by Dr. Koichi Shinohara and Dr. Gregory Schopen, forthcoming from Mosaic Press, Oakville, Ontario, Canada.

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Finally I would note that there is a Pali biography of Buddhaghosa, attributed to the Burmese monk Mahamangala of the thirteenth century A.D., that contains a story of Buddhaghosa that is very much the mirror-image of the Jain account of Siddhasena and his penance. Buddhaghosa must pay for an act of intellectual arrogance by journeying to Ceylon and translating the Buddhist texts that exist there in the vernacular, Sinhalese, into the dialect of Magadha, the Buddhist canonical language. For his part Siddhasena is expelled from the community of monks for proposing that he translate holy books from the vernacular into a canonical language. Buddhaghosa's penance is Siddhasena's crime. See the Buddhaghosuppatti, Or the Historical Romance of the Rise and Career of Buddhaghosa, edited and translated by James Gray, London: Luzac and Company, 1892, chapters 3-7. There are other parallels between this text and well-known Jain biographies. For example, chapter 5 in which Buddhaghosa witnesses an argument between two slave girls is essentially the same story as is told of Śrī Harsa in the Prabandhakośa, page 56. I have no concrete evidence that suggests that the Jain text was known to the Buddhist biographers, and at this stage in my research would only propose that such a story might have been commonly told to stress its hero's brilliance and gift with languages.

²¹ The Prabandhacintāmani of Merutunga has been edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 1, Santiniketan: Singhi Jaina Jnanapitha, 1930 and translated by Tawney, The Prabandhacintāmani or Wishing Stone of Narratives, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1901. Much has been written about the association of kings and monks, and the scholarly emphasis has been to understand the close association of kings and monks in religious biographies as a reflection of reality, of the fact that monks sought royal patronage and that kings and monks were essential to each other. This is essentially the thesis behind David Shulman's recent study, The King and the Clown in South Indian Myth and Poetry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. See also G. W. Spencer, "Religious Networks and Royal Influence in Eleventh Century South India", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 12, 1969, pp. 42-56, particularly page 48. I would prefer to view the frequent appearance of kings in religious biographies as literary devices and to stress the close parallels between religious biographies and other medieval religious tales such as those in the māhātmya sections of the major purānas, the Sivapurāna, Skandapurāna and Padmapurana, for example. Well-known kings also figure prominently in the vratakathā sections from these purānas, and a collection of late Buddhist vratakathās, the Vicitrakarnikāvadanoddhrta, preserved in Newari and translated into English by Hans Jorgensen, Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, Vol. XXXI, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1931, reveals the same phenomenon. I intend to make a detailed study of the way in which people and places are sanctified in stories in medieval India and hope to enlarge upon this idea in the future.

²² This is also true of Buddhist monks in the stories told of them in the Pali commentaries. These stories usually relate the deeds of the group of monks who lived during the time of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni, and the "conversion" scene is almost a type-scene in the sense in which that term is used of repeated episodes in Biblical narrative. The men in these stories, most often of high birth in Brahmin families and highly educated, become converted to Buddhism merely upon seeing the Buddha, whose charismatic presence produces in them a deep religious experience.

Sources for these stories include the Manorathapūranī on the Anguttaranikāya, the commentaries to the Thera- and Therigāthās, and the Apadānatthakahā. I borrow the term "type-scene" from Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, New York: Basic Books, 1981, pp. 49ff to emphasize that this should be regarded as a literary device rather than as a record of actual fact, as is sometimes done.

23 It is central in the case of Haribhadra, for example, whose biographies I have studied in an earlier paper cited above. By contrast, in the case of Mallavadin, the Prabandhakośa simply mentions that Mallavādin's mother became a Jain and had her son ordained as a Jain monk at the same time (p. 22, vs. 27-28). I have studied Mallavadin's biographies in my paper on Aryakhapatacarya cited earlier. In the Prabandhakośa (p. 26) Bappabhattasuri's conversion to Jainism forms a central part of his story, and takes place during his exile in an experience which brings him very close to his future royal patron. While a detailed comparison of how conversion is treated in the Jain prabandhas is beyond the scope of this paper, I would note that the conversion is often not necessarily described as the result of a deep religious experience. Often it is as we see it for Siddhasena, the result of the fulfillment of a rash and hasty promise.

²⁴ In fact this bizarre behaviour is not confined to Haribhadra. In the *Prabandhakośa* biography of the Digambara Madanakīrti, the arrogant Madanakīrti, armed with a spade, a net, and a ladder, and a host of disciples, sets out for the South against the explicit advice of his teacher in search of rival philosophers to defeat in debate (page 64). I would definitely consider the mention of Madanakīrti's equipment as an explicit allusion to the behaviour of the arrogant Brahmin Haribhadra. This must be seen as another example of the use of allusion as a kind of cross-referencing system which ultimately serves to build in the reader's mind a recognizable class of persons or objects. In this case the man who carries a ladder, spade, and net is identified at once as overweening, wrong-headed, and destined for a fall. I am in the process of translating the biography of Madanakīrti along with other biographies from the Prabandhakośa for a special volume that I am editing for the Journal of South Asian Literature, which will be devoted to Jain narrative literature.

²⁵ See my paper on Haribhadra cited above for details.

So in a story of three foolish brothers retold in the Bengali Satabarser Rūpakathā, edited Malayasankar Dasgupta, Calcutta: Book Trust, 1983, "Hattamālār Deśe", by

Kartikacandra Dasgupta, pp. 97-106.

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The story is the second episode in the cycle of Vikramāditya tales. It is discussed by Toshikazu Arai, "Jaina Kingship as Viewed in the Prabandhacintāmani", in Kingship and Authority in South Asia, edited by J. F. Richards, Madison: University of Wisconsin, South Asian Studies, 1978, pp. 80-81. Arai notes the anti-Brahmanical tone of the story and also raises the larger issue in his article of the Jain disdain for the elite Sanskritized culture of the royal court in general. I am somewhat less convinced by this overall argument; certainly such an attitude is not markedly in evidence in the Prabandhakośa and the Prabhāvakacarita.

On the general topic of humor in Indian literature see David Shulman, The King and the Clown, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, particularly chapter IV. See also Keith N. Jefferies, "Vidūṣaka Versus Fool" Journal of South Asian Literature,

vol. 16, 1981, pp. 61-73.

In the *Prabandhakośa* account of Siddhasena, p. 16, it is Siddhasena who suggests that the cowherds be the judges. In the Prabhāvakacarita account, biography 8, vs. 44,

page 55 it is Vrddhavadin who makes the cowherds the judges but only under duress. Siddhasena refuses to wait to conduct the debate in a proper place and Vrddhavādin is left no choice but to permit the debate to be conducted in such an unusual place and under such unusual circumstances.

30 Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali, page 26, paragraph 48.

³¹ Akhyanakamanikośa, page 172, verse 35; Prabandhakośa, page 18, line 19: Prabhāvakacarita, page 58, verse 118.

32 My information comes from S. B. Deo, History of Jaina Monachism, thesis approved for the Ph.D. at the University of Bombay, 1952, published by the Deccan College, Poona. My edition lacks the title page and exact details of publication. The discussion of the pārāncika penance appears on pp. 377-380 and is taken mainly from the Brhatkalpabhāsya, V, 5135-37, a text that is unfortunately not available to me. The comparison of Siddhasena's penance with that described in the bhasya raises the very interesting issue of the extent to which the behaviour of monks described in the prabandha biographies corresponds with the rules laid down for them in the canonical texts and their commentaries. It was, for example, forbidden for a monk to study at night (See Deo, p. 313). Nonetheless, in the Prabandhakośa account of Siddhasena we shall see Vrddhavadin keeping his fellow monks awake all night with his loud recitations. I hope some day to study this question in detail.

33 This is in fact what happens in the Prabhāvakacarita. See page 58, verse 119 where he is told that if he does something extraordinary in service of the faith the punishment will be commuted, and verse 121, where we are told that seven years out

of the twelve have passed when he comes to Ujjayini.

34 On the exile of the king for twelve years see David Shulman, The King and the Clown, cited above, particularly chapter V. See also Wendy O'Flaherty, Dreams, Illusions and Other Realities, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987, chapter 4. Both these scholars tend to stress the transformative powers of the period of exile; I shall place a different emphasis in my own analysis of the role of exile in most of these Indian stories of exiled kings, stressing the function of the exile as an expiatory period, much like the expiatory journey of the Gods Brahmā and Siva, who in a variety of stories in the puranas must undertake such journeys to remove major sins. It is certainly the case that among famous royal exiles Hariscandra, the Pandava brothers, and Nala have all committed ritual infractions. I use the term "liminal" in my discussion in loose borrowing from Victor Turner's many writings to underscore the fact that during the exile period normal rules are suspended, normal identifying marks are erased and striking reversals of status may occur. I feel that in the Indian exile stories for the most part the "liminal" stage is less a part of a rite of passage than a distinctively defined period of ritual expiation, and I recognize that the word "liminal" may carry associations that do not entirely apply in the cases I am handling. Nonetheless I find the term useful for discussion.

35 See Jonathan Parry, "Ghosts, Greed and Sin: The Occupational Identity of the

Benaras Funeral Priests", Man, new series, volume 15, 1980, p. 91.

Published in the Manikcandra Digambara Jaina Granthamala, no. 55, Bombay: Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 1974. Upadhye's discussion of the date is on page 28 of the English introduction. The story of Samantabhadra is pp. 8-10, story number 3. The most detailed discussion of this biography of Samantabhadra is to be found in an essay by Jugalkishor Mukhtar in Hindi that has been published in his edition of the Ratnakarandaśrāvakācāra, Manikcandra Digambara Jain Granthamala, 24, Bombay:

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Bharatiya Vidya Pitha, 1926. In his article, "Siddhasena Divākara Aur Svāmī Samantabhadra", cited in note 1, Muni Jinavijaya draws a number of close parallels between the position of Siddhasena within the Svetāmbara tradition and that of Samāntabhadra among the Digambaras. Both were the first in their respective communities to write in Sanskrit; both were the first to use logic and the tools of the Brahmanical intellectual tradition to justify Jain doctrines. See pp. 13—14. Muni Jinavijaya also notes that the Svetambaras and Digambaras valued both men equally for their accomplishments and bestowed on them the same honorific epithets (p. 20). See the Śrīpaṭṭāvalisamuccaya, edited Munidarśanavijaya, published in Viramgam by the Sricaritrasmarakagranthamala, 1933, page 46.

38 See my paper on Haribhadra cited above.

39 Mukhtar believed that the Kathākośa story of Samantabhadra and a reference to it contained in an inscription at Candragiri near Sravan Belgola that is dated 1128 A.D., and that in fact includes the verses that close the Kathākośa story, predated by a considerable span of time the first appearance of the story of Siddhasena. The inscription can be found in Jainaśilālekhasamgraha, part 1, edited Hiralal Jain in the Manikacandra Digambara Jaina Granthamala, vol. 28, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Pitha, n.d., no. 54, page 102. Mukhtar was not aware of the story of Siddhasena in the Ākhyānakamanikośavrtti, which was unpublished at the time in which he was writing, and which dates to the mid-twelfth century A.D. The Akhyanakamanikośavrtti indicates that the story of Siddhasena was known at least by the mid-twelfth century A.D.; it is thus no longer possible to agree with Mukhtar that the biography of Samantabhadra predates that of Siddhasena by such a long period of time. In addition, because of the problems of dating the Kathākośa and the inherent difficulty of assuming that the particular date of a written text implies the first occurrence of a story that might very well have circulated orally, I would prefer not to deal with the relationship between the biography of Samantabhadra in the Kathākośa and the biography of Siddhasena as an historical question. On the grounds of internal consistency there is reason to find the biography of Samantabhadra a more tightly organized and coherent text; the verse which causes the linga to split is perfectly appropriate to the task, talking about the rending of darkness bringing about the rending of the false God. This seems, however, not quite sufficient grounds on which to argue for the priority of Samantabhadra's story over that of Siddhasena. In any case, there is no doubt that as time progressed the Digambara story was greatly influenced by the Svetāmbara story of Siddhasena and other stories of similar miracles that are recorded in the prabandhas. The Kannada Rājāvalikathe which Mukhtar summarizes has the monastic community decree the punishment as in the story of Siddhasena current in the Svetāmbara tradition, and locates the miracle in a temple called Bhimesvara, the name of the temple where we shall see a demi-god or vyantara perform a related miracle in the *Prabhāvakacarita* (see the biography of Vīrasūri, number 15, page 130, vs. 88ff). It also corresponds to a folk tradition preserved in Gujarat which also tells of a cracked *linga*. The folk story comes from a place called Bhimnath and tells of how Bhīma tried to fool the pious Arjuna by having him worship at the wrong place. He makes a bogus "God" for Arjuna, a pot of leaves, and when he wants to show that Arjuna's worship was in vain he strikes the pot; but miraculously milk flows out of it. There is a linga underneath the pot and it is cracked from the blow. See Brenda Beck, Peter J. Claus, Praphulladatta Goswami and Kawahrlal Handoo, Folktales of India, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987,

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tale no. 93, collected in 1948. The *Rājāvalikathe* seems also to have assimilated certain elements from the story of Hemacandra's conversion of the king Kumārapāla that was popular in the Śvetāmbara community and which I shall also be discussing later in this paper. In the *Rājāvalikathe* Samantabhadra does not cause the *liniga* to break. His stare causes the *tīrthānkara* to materialize at the *liniga*, much as Hemacandra causes a tiny figure of Śiva to appear at the base of the *liniga* for King Kumārapāla. For details of Kumārapāla's conversion see G. Buhler, *The Life of Hemacandrācārya*, Singhi Jain Series, no. 11, English translation by Dr. ManIlal Patel, Saniniketan: Singhi Jaina Jnanapitha, 1936, chapters 5—7.

⁴⁰ In his detailed analysis of this biography that I cited above from the Ratnakarandaśrāvakācāra, Mukhtar follows the difficult path of trying to ascertain from the traditional accounts the exact events of Samantabhadra's life. Mukhtar found problematic the biography in the Kathākośa, which he knew in detail from its later, sixteenth century summary by Brahmanemidatta. Some of the points that troubled Mukhtar are the very points at which this biography diverges from the Svetambara biography of Siddhasena, and which are told differently in the later Kannada Rājāvalikathe, as Mukhtar noted and I have indicated in the previous note. These include the fact that Samantabhadra himself in this account decides to seek a cure for his sickness, when Jain monks should be indifferent to the body and should refuse medicine. Given the fact that the focus of Mukhtar's analysis was to determine the actual events in the life of Samantabhadra and that he started from the assumption that Samantabhadra was an exemplary monk, because he found Samantabhadra's action in this biography to be contradictory to the principles that ought to have governed the life of a monk, he then went on to discount its historicity. He preferred the later account in which the monastic community orders Samantabhadra to find a cure for his illness. Mukhtar also found difficult the fact that Samantabhadra in this account goes north, not finding the rich foods he needs in the south. He again preferred the Kannada account which set the miracle in Kāñcī. In a similar vein Mukhter analyzed the miracle itself, preferring the less violent version of the Kannada text to the Kathākośa version that I have translated here. Mukhtar's analysis is thus motivated by his deep regard for Samantabhadra, and his conclusions endorsing the historicity of the latest account of the monk's life with its likely late borrowings from the Svetambara stories are unacceptable to me. Nonetheless his article is invaluable in the information it contains about Samantabhadra from inscriptions and in the citations from various Jain texts which illustrate the high regard in which Samantabhadra was held in the Digambara

There has also been some work done on Sivakoti, his identity and his relationship to Samantabhadra. Sivakoti is known as the author of the *Mūlāradhanā*, but the veteran scholar Nathuram Premi in his article, "Ārādhanā aur uskī Tīkāye", included in the volume, *Jaina Śāhitya aur Itihāsa*, Bombay: Hemacandra Modhi, 1942, pp. 23–41, explicitly denied any possible connection between this Śivakoti and Samantabhadra. Premi also expressed the opinion that the story of Samantabhadra probably did not makes its appearance much before the *Kathākośa* of Prabhācandra. He based this on the observation that the story is unknown to Hariṣena who wrote his *Brhatkathākósa* in 932 A.D. Finally, Premi identified Śivakoti as a member of the Yāpanīya saṃgha, the splinter group regarded by both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras as heretical and to which Upadhye suggested that Siddhasena himself belonged, in his introduction to his edition of the *Nyāyāvatāra* cited above. It is tempting to see in the closely related

stories of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena a lost Yāpanīya tradition; Karahataka, named in the verse at the end of Samantabhadra's biography in the Kathākośa is considered by some scholars to have been the centre of the Yapaniya movement. The Yāpanīyas also seem to have been particularly devoted to the Tirthankara Pārśvanātha who figures prominently in the biographies of Siddhasena. In addition the Yapaniyas were also called "gopya" or "concealed", a title that would fit in aptly with both Samantabhadra and Siddhasena in their traditional biographies where they travel incognito. Unfortunately there is nothing substantial to support such an hypothesis, as attractive as it would be to discover remnants of a lost tradition, and it would be rash at this point to attempt to develop it further. Information on the Yapaniyas is found in another article by Nathuram Premi included in Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsa, entitled "Yāpanīya Sāhityakī Khoj", pp. 41-61. See also A. N. Upadhye, "Yāpanīya Samgha: A Jain Sect", Journal of the University of Bombay, vol. 1 issue vi, 1933, pp. 224-231 and "More Light on the Yapaniya Samgha: A Jain Sect", Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, vol. 54-55, 1973-1974, pp. 9-22. The information on the devotion to Pārśvanātha comes from "More Light", p. 18. On the term gopya see Premi, "Yāpanīya Sāhitya", p. 41. Karahatak is the centre of the Yāpanīyas according to the Digambara accounts of this group which are published by H. Jacobi, "Über die Entstehung der Svetämbara und Digambara Sekten," Zeitschrift für die Deutsche Morgenlands Gesselschaft, vol. 38, 1884, pp. 1-42.

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There is an inscription at Vindhyagiri dated 1398 A.D. that knows Sivakoti as the disciple of Samantabhadra. See *Jainaśilālekhasamgraha*, part 1, edited Hiralal Jain, Manikcandra Digambara Granthamala vol. 28, Bombay, n.d., page 198, inscription number 105. Given its late date it is more likely an indication of the popularity of the tradition transmitted in the biography of Samantabhadra than any concrete support of an actual historical relationship between these two men.

I would prefer to understand the presence of the King Sivakoti in the story as another example of a literary device that is common in Indian religious story-telling, particularly in those stories that tell of the efficacy or sanctity of a particular religious observance, or a particular holy place, or relate the deeds of a man whose holiness is being established. In these stories, as I have mentioned earlier in this paper, a well-known king regularly occurs in an intimate connection with either place, ritual or monk. If we accept that the conventions demanded that a king be influenced or in some way affected by a holy man in the account of the holy man's deeds, then the question of whether or not there is any evidence that a King Sivakoti was converted by Samantabhadra is neither a significant nor appropriate focus of further investigation.

On this inscription see the information contained in note 26.

The importance of violence in the sanctification of a holy site and the role of the violent wounding of the God in establishing a holy place, particularly the wounding of the linga, are central themes in South Indian accounts of the origins of holy sites. It is tempting to regard the Kathākośa account of the South Indian Digambara monk Samantabhadra's splitting the linga as reflecting Southern notions of the sanctifying force of wounding the God as opposed to the Northern Ākhyānakamanikośa account, in which there is no violence involved in the manifestation of the Tirthankara. On the South Indian tradition of the wounded God see David Shulman, Tamil Temple Myths: Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South Indian Saiva Tradition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, chapter III, section 2, "Milk, Blood, and Seed", pp. 93–110

⁴³ See the many stories in the *Skandapurāṇa*, *Tāpīkhaṇḍa*, which is a history of the Nagar Brahmins of Gujarat. In particular I would cite chapters 45, where the King of Ānarta, Bṛhadbala, is stricken with leprosy when he tries to steal a magic lotus from a lake; chapter 83, where the wicked Kung Venu contracts leprosy as a result of all ris wickedness, and chapter 32 where it is directly stated that leprosy is the result of killing a Brahmin in a previous life. King Aṃbarīṣa has a son in this chapter who has leprosy and is cured by holy water in answer to his father's prayers. Given the strongly Brahmanical bias of this text it is not at all surprising to see absolute evil equated in this way with taking the life of a Brahmin.

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⁴⁴ On kings and wilderness see the many comments in Shulman's book cited above and see as well, Nancy Falk, "Wilderness and Kingship in Ancient South Asia",

History of Religions, vol. 13, August 1973, number 1, pp. 1-15.

⁴⁵ On the relationship between the *Kathākośa* and the Śvetāmbara biographies see my paper on Haribhadra cited above. See also notes 36 and 39 on the Digambara assimilation of Śvetāmbara stories in the later biography of Samantabhadra in the Kannada *Rājāvalikathe*.

⁴⁶ It is the stock-in-trade of the *Brāhmaṇas* and lies behind all of Tantric worship with its emphasis on the recitation of *mantras* or sacred formulas. On the *Brāhmaṇas* see Wendy O'Flaherty, *Tales of Sex and Violence: Folklore, Sacrifice and Danger in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987, first published by the University of Chicago Press 1985. On the power of the *Rg-Vedic* hymns see the references contained in J. Muir, "On the Relations of the Priest to the Other Classes of Indian Society in the Vedic Age", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 2, new series, 1866, pp. 252–302.

⁴⁷ The text is edited by Professor Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia in the Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhara Fund Series, no. 79, Bombay, 1932. I have taken the date from the *Jinaratnakośa* of Hari Damodar Velankar, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1944, p. 287. I have discussed this text briefly in my paper on Ārya Khapaṭācārya cited above and drawn attention to the close connection between these miracle stories and the biographies in the *prabandha* collections. There are many other such collections of miracle tales associated with the *Bhaktāmarastotra*. Some are listed by Kamalkumar Jaina Shastri in his *Citrabhaktāmararahasya*, Delhi: Sri Kunthusagara Svadhyay Sadana Prakashan, 1977, p. 48.

⁴⁸ Padmapurāna, Uttarakhanda, chapters 171—188 in the Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, volume 131.

⁴⁹ The tradition also attributed the *Kalyāṇamandirastotra*, another famous Jain hymn, to Siddhasena. Modern scholars discount this attribution and the fact remains that a text like the *Ākhyāṇakamanikośavṛtti* is using Siddhasena's *Dvātriṃśikās*, his brief compositions of thirty-two verses which are in the main not hymns at all, as hymns. On these texts and on the attribution of the *Kalyāṇamandirastotra* to Siddhasena see Upadhye in his introduction to the *Nyāyāvatāra* cited above and particularly the bibliographical essay that he has provided.

or It is worth pausing to note that the transformation of philosopher to miracle worker, accomplished by turning philosophical text into magical formula, may in fact reveal a significant and unusual attitude towards books in general which is consistent with the overall anti-intellectual tone of these biographies. In the main, the prabandha collections tend to regard books as magical objects with supernatural powers, very much as the Padmapurāna treats the Gūā. Books are dangerous, and Gods or

Goddesses often reclaim them from unworthy mortals who would trifle with them, as in the biographies of Mallavadin, Siddhasena, Ārya Khapatācarya and Haribhadra. This forms a striking contrast with the respect for books not as dangerous magical devices, but as records of learning and repositories of authoritative proof for sectarian doctrines, an attitude which marks a text like the Kharataragacchabrhadgurvāvali, that distinctly sectarian collection of the biographies of the leading monks in the Kharatara branch of the Svetambaras. To the Kharatara monks books are essential; no philosophical debate can be held without a book, nor can monks even preach without a book to read from, as is clear in the biography of Jinesvara, pp. 1-8. In addition, rival monks seek to thwart the Kharatara monks by denying them access to books. and lay devotees are encouraged to spend money having texts committed to writing (biography of Abhayadeva, page 8) in contrast to the situation in the prabandhas, where wealthy lay devotees are urged to use their funds in the restoration of images and temples (the biography of Jīvadevasūri, *Prabandhakośa*, pp. 7–9, is but one example). Even divine messages may be conveyed in the Kharatara text in writing, rather than in sleep or through the direct appearance of the Gods as in the prabandhas (Jineśvara and the message from Marudevigani, pp. 5-6). I suspect that this attitude of the Kharatara biographies towards books and the written word is closely connected with their avowedly sectarian nature, and that the transformation of disputatious text into a magical object that occurs in the prabandhas may be further evidence that supports the hypothesis I am seeking to establish in this paper, namely that in the prabandhas we see a deliberate effort to avoid points of conflict and create images that appeal to all members of the wider community, beyond local and sectarian divisions.

51 Page 36.

52 Prabhāvakacarita, page 166, verse 166.

53 See page 4.

54 Page 7.

55 See the volume *Jaina Hymns*, Bombay: Shri Yasobharati Jain Prakashan, 1975, and its lengthy Hindi introduction on hymns in Jainism by Dr. Rudradeva Tripathi.

56 See the Pattāvalisamuccaya cited above, particularly pages 26, 40, 60.

⁵⁷ Sivapurāṇa, chapter 20, p. 710 in the edition of Ramatejashastri, Kasi: Panditapustakalaya, n.d. The Jain parallel is in the *Prabhāvakacarita* story of Vīrasūri, biography number 15, pp. 127—132. I shall return to it in some detail below.

58 Skandapurāna, Avantīkhanda, chapter 28, volume 5, pp. 325-330.

This seems to be particularly common in the miracle stories in the Skandapurāna, while the Sivapurāna tends to favour the direct appearance of the God in human form. See for example Kāśikhanda, chapter 73, vs. 97, and chapter 25 in the Avantikhanda, where such a magical appearance of light occurs twice in the story. I am using the Calcutta edition edited in the Gurumandal Series, published in the 1960s.

Puratanaprabandhasamgraha, page 10. On Āryakhapata see my book cited earlier

for references to the texts.

Despite the fact that it is somewhat anachronistic to consider this here in a discussion that has been based on the account of Siddhasena in the twelfth century $\bar{A}khy\bar{a}nakamanikośavrtti$, I do so for the sake of completeness. My information that the miracle Hemacandra performs to convert King Kumārapāla is not known before this time comes from the remarks made by Buhler in his volume on Hemacandra

which I have cited above. The Prabhāvakacarita which was written in 1277 does not relate the miracle. It is known to the fourteenth century Prabandhacintāmaṇi and the Kumārapālacarita of Jinamandana, the date of which according to the Jinaratnakośa is 1436 A.D.

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62 This is not the only instance in Jain religious biographies where Siva himself appears to an individual and is instrumental in leading him to accept the greatness of Jainism. This is a major theme in the biographies of Jineśvara. See Jina Vijaya Muni's detailed Hindi introduction to his edition of Jineśvara's Kathākośaprakarana, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 11, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1949.

63 The story is published by Agarchand and Bhanwarlal Nahta in the Hindi book Kharataragacchapratibodhita Gotra aur Jātiyām, Calcutta: Sri Jinadatta Śevasamgraha, V.S. 2000, p. 44.

64 For the account see Major J. W. Watson, "The Fall of Patan Somanatha", Indian Antiquary, vol. 8, 1879, pp. 153-162.

65 I restrict my comments to Siddhasena, since his biographies belong to the Svetambara tradition and it is safe to assume that these other stories belonging to the same tradition and often told in the same or in closely related texts would have been known to those who heard his biography.

66 My emphasis in the sections that follow will not be on the historical development of the biography. While this is in itself an interesting question, the evidence I have at my disposal does not permit a strict historical analysis. The Kahāvali of Bhadreśvara, which is said to belong to the twelfth century A.D., and is thus contemporary to the Ākhyānakamanikośavrtti, is unavailable to me, as are several other important sources that I have cited in note 2 above. From the inadequate summary of the Kahāvali that I have from Upadhye's bibliographical essay in his edition of the Nyāyāvatāra cited above, note 1, it would seem that the Kahāvali already includes several episodes that do not appear in the Akhyanakamanikośavrtti but that do appear in the later prabandha collections. These are Siddhasena's anticipating the greeting of the king and offering him a blessing, despite the fact that the king has not openly welcomed the monk, and his assisting a king with soldiers and money. See Upadhye, page *37. In addition, the Viśesacūrni to the Niśūthasūtra, composed in 676 A.D. by Jinadāsagani Mahattara, mentions in passing that Siddhasena studied texts like the Yoniprabhrtaka and obtained from them the ability to produce magic horses. I found this reference first in Charlotte Krause's aricle "Siddhasena Divākara and Vikramāditya", page 228, cited in note 2. The actual line in question may be found in the edition of the cūrni published in the Agama Sahitya Ratnamala, no. 4, edited by Shri Amar Chandji Maharaj, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982, volume 2, p. 281. A Siddhasena Ksamāśramana is often mentioned in the Niśītha as a commentator on the Niryukti verses. It is generally accepted that this is a different Siddhasena from Siddhasena Divakara, whose traditional biographies are the subject of this paper. On this point see Madhu Sen, A Cultural Study of the Niśītha Cūrni, Parsvanatha Vidyashrama Series, volume 21, Amritsar: Sohanlal Jaindharma Pracharak Samiti, 1975, p. 3, note 4, citing the opinion of Dalsukh Malvania.

ŚŪNYATĀ AND AJĀTI: ABSOLUTISM AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF NĀGĀRJUNA AND GAUDAPĀDA

'Absolutism' is a common designation of the Mahāyāna and Advaita systems of thought. It is a technical philosophical term that has a strong tradition in Western philosphical thought; in particular one thinks of the systems of Hegel and Francis Bradley. The term 'Absolute' itself derives from the Latin absolutus, to 'be alone' or 'cut off from', thus it is that which displays no relations, the 'non-relative'. The Absolute is the Unconditioned, the all encompassing reality. As such it would appear to be perfectly permissible to describe Advaita Vedānta as a form of absolutism, since Brahman is said to exhibit precisely these characteristics.1 With regard to the Mahāyāna tradition however, the designation of its philosophy as 'absolutistic' is problematic to say the least. Whereas the Advaitin sees Brahman as the Supreme Self (paramātman), Mahāyāna Buddhism denies any selfhood in relation to Nirvāna. Thus, accepting some form of absolutism may be a form of eternalism (Śāśvata-vāda). This paper is an attempt to clear up some of the problems in evaluating the philosophical relationship between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta.

In the history of Vedāntic thought it became a standard criticism of the Śaṅkarite school that Advaita was really a form of crypto-Buddhism, and many modern scholars have ventured to substantiate this claim by an analysis of the doctrines of Śaṅkara's paramaguru, Gauḍapāda, who, in his Gauḍapāda-kārikā, appears to exemplify not only the earliest formulation of advaita-vāda, but also the greatest propensity towards Buddhist ideas (particularly in the fourth chapter, often known as the alātaśānti-prakaraṇa). Any attempt to delineate the relationship between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta must take the question of Absolutism very seriously indeed. To show this I intend to examine the philosophical standpoints of the 'founding fathers' of Madhyamaka Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, viz Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, through their understanding of the notion of svabhāva, otherwise known as 'own (or 'self') nature', 'own being', 'intrinsic nature' etc.²

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It is widely known that this term is of supreme importance for Nāgārjuna's exposition of śūnyatā. The actual term and its related notions (i.e., nih/a/svabhāva) occur in 34 of the verses in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās, but the notion itself constitutes the main point of focus of the Nāgārjunian critique. It is because of this that śūnyatā is often declared to be synonymous with niḥsvabhāvatā. It is almost universally accepted that Gaudapada has been influenced, at least in terms of his argumentation, by the dialectical philosophy of Nāgārjuna. However, no one, to my knowledge, has attempted to delineate the relationship between these two thinkers in terms of their respective attitudes towards the question of 'intrinsic nature'. This is surprising, given that Nāgārjuna was the philosopher primarily responsible for replacing the traditional atman-anatman debate of the Vedantic and Buddhist traditions, with the wider notions of svabhavanihsvabhāva, and that, in doing so, he provided a new framework within which the debate could be structured.

The movement from the debate about 'self' to one of 'intrinsic nature' shifts the angle of the Buddhist critique from the Abhidharma denial of a personal self (pudgala-nairātmya), to the Mahāyāna denial of self pertaining to all factors (dharma-nairātmya). Gauḍapāda, as a post-Nāgārjunian thinker, as a potential crypto-Buddhist, and as a philosopher quite obviously steeped in (and indeed deeply influenced by) Mahāyāna arguments, surely must have taken the svabhāva-nihsvabhāva debate very seriously indeed. All four of the prakaraṇas of the Gauḍapāda-Kārikā address the problem of 'intrinsic nature' or 'own being'.' Of the four, the last has by far the most references to svabhāva and its related notions. This is hardly surprising given that the fourth prakarāṇa has the most overtly Buddhist tone to it, and constitutes virtually half of the entire text. Nevertheless the more 'Vedāntic' prakaraṇas do not ignore the notion. In its critique of 'creation' theories, the first prakaraṇa concludes that

I:9 bhogārthaṃ sṛṣṭir ity anye kriḍārtham iti cāpare / devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā spṛhā //

Creation [is] for the sake of enjoyment — so say some; others say for the sake of sport. This [must be] the very nature of the divine [for] what desire [is there] for the one who has obtained all wishes?

Svabhāva then, must be used in some sense by Gaudapāda in his attempts to establish the doctrine of non-origination (ajātivāda). To see how this is achieved we must first understand the notion of svabhāva itself. Verses 7—10 of the fourth prakaraṇa are a discussion of this very issue. Thus, kārikā 9 states that:—

sāmsiddhikī svābhāvikī sahajāpy akṛtā ca yā / prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvam na jahāti yā //

That should be known as nature which is permanently established, intrinsic, innate, not produced, [and] that which does not abandon its own nature.

This sets the tone for a proper evaluation of the notion of svabhāva, it is that which is 'intrinsic' to a thing. The term is virtually synonymous with svalakṣaṇa (own characteristic) since it is the svabhāva of a thing that demarcates it from all other things. The idea then is philosophically linked to the epistemological question of how one differentiates between 'things'. It is hardly surprising, then, that an advaitin such as Gauḍapāda should find the problem of svabhāva so interesting, given that advaita is a basic denial of difference. It is clear that the primary connotation of svabhāva is 'characteristic mark' or 'essential' nature. It is this 'essence' that is disputed by Nāgārjuna.

The MūlaMadhyamaka-Kārikā (MMK) begins with a critical analysis of causal conditions (pratyaya). Nāgārjuna opens his work with an emphatic denial of the origination of beings.

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana // No entities whatsoever are ever found originated from themselves, from another, from both nor causelessly.⁴

The Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa (GK:IV) says something similar to this in kārikā 22:—

svato vā parato vāpi na kincid vastu jāyate / sad asat sadasad vāpi na kincid vastu jāyate //

Nothing (vastu) whatsoever is originated either from itself or from something else; nothing whatsoever existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent is originated.

There has been a widespread acceptance of the similarity between these two statements as evidence for the acceptance of some form of absolutism, and as such both Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda are said to uphold the doctrine of non-origination (ajātivāda). V. Bhattacharya maintains that "It is to be noted here that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advayavādins or Buddhists expressing his approval.". Mahadevan agrees, stating that "The doctrine of non-origination (ajāti) which Gauḍapāda advocates is essentially a Mādhyamika view." S. S. Roy accepts this, claiming that "Those who maintain that Gauḍapāda is a Buddhist derive strength from the position that Gauḍapāda has deliberately voted in favour of Ajātivāda, which is entailed by Advayavāda."

Some scholars, however, have noted a difference between the doctrines in Buddhism and Advaita, albeit in the main to substantiate the traditional view that Gauḍapāda is not reliant upon Buddhist ideas. S. L. Pandey states that "Ajātivāda which is common to both Advaita and Buddhism is not the same in the two systems." In Vedānta ajātivāda is ". . . at once the negation of creation and assertion of the absolute reality. In Buddhism, however, it simply denotes the negation of creation.".8

Although such an awareness of distinctions is admirable, and while it is true that *Ajātivāda* can have various interpretations put to it, the tendency for scholars to label Indian philosophers with terms ending in '-vādin', can often be misleading. Pandey's interpretation of Śūnyatā does a great injustice to the Madhyamaka position, which is not a mere nihilistic denial of the world but rather the utilisation of a dialectical method aiming at a direct insight (*prajāā*) into the nature (or the lack of it) of both *asaṃskṛta* and *saṃskṛta dharmas*.

THE TWO TRUTHS

The MMK itself points out the importance of distinguishing between the worldly truth which is merely an indicator (*prajñapti*) and the full import of the Buddha's message. Thus MMK XXIV: 8—10 reads:—

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharma deśanā / loka samvṛti satyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ // ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayadvayoḥ /

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te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram buddhaśāsane // vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate / paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate //

The teaching of the *dharma* by the Buddhas rests upon the two truths: worldly conventional truth and truth from the ultimate [standpoint]. Those who do not discern the distinction between these two truths do not discern the profound truth (*tattva*) in the teaching of the Buddha. Without relying upon the practical, the ultimate is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, one cannot attain *nirvāṇa*.

Mervyn Sprung maintains that "Though the notion of two truths (satyadvaya) is implicit in Buddhism from the beginning, as it is in Vedānta and, indeed, in any philosophy or religion that holds to a norm distinct from the everyday, Mādhyamika alone makes the distinction into its crucial thought.". However, in the context of the Madhyamaka, it would be a mistake to take satyadvaya as anything other than a distinction between 'levels of meaning' (artha). The 'two truths' must not be seen in terms of two specific 'levels of reality', for to do this would be to undermine Nāgārjuna's denial of a difference between samsāra and nirvāṇa. Samvṛti-satya is the conventional and 'concealing' level of meaning, while paramārtha-satya is the supreme or 'ultimate meaning' (parama-artha). The distinction is semantic and not ontological. As such, the 'two truths' would appear to be equivalent to the Abhidharmic notions of nītārtha (ultimate or primary import) and neyārtha (secondary import).

Nāgārjuna accepted the practical distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, but this is essentially pragmatic and should not be taken to be a 'real' distinction. The emphasis placed upon the satyadvaya in Nāgārjuna's corpus of works has only perpetuated an understanding of śūnyatā as some form of absolute reality 'behind' its appearanes, when in fact his entire philosophy is an attack upon the acceptance of any distinctions whatsoever as absolute. This is understandable in the West given its philosophical background in the Absolutisms of Hegel and Bradley, but that does not make it any more excusable.

It is extremely misleading to understand Nāgārjuna as an absolutist, for his purpose is fundamentally to subvert all reliance upon any form of absolute; our grasping onto 'things' as 'real' is the very cause of our

sorrow and frustration. Nāgārjuna wishes to show that all *dharmas* lack an intrinsic nature of their own (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). This is the Madhyamaka interpretation of dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); all *dharmas* are empty of own nature and so cannot be seen as self-sufficient 'absolutes'.

24:18 yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyataṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //
That which is dependent co-origination we call 'emptiness'.
That is a useful indicator; that itself is the Middle Path.

Śūnyatā is dependent co-origination because it is the denial of own being (niḥsvabhāvatā). This denial of self-sufficiency is the corollary of the interdependent nature of dharmas (pratītyasamutpāda), for all existent things depend upon other factors for their existence. At this stage in the dialectical (prasanga) process, dependent co-origination is to be understood as the reliance of all compounded factors (saṃskṛta dharmas) upon other factors (parabhāva); thus, pratītyasamutpāda is an exclamation of the contigency of all existents. But to take this as a final position (siddhānta) is inappropriate since it has already been shown in MMK 15:3 that:—

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kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati / svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate // In the absence of an 'own being' how can there be an 'other being', for 'other being' means the 'own being' of 'other being'.

The problem then is that this 'other being' (parabhāva) itself has no 'own being' (svabhāva) since all dharmas are interdependently originated. Thus, the assertion of universal interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda), by subverting the notion of 'own existence', also subverts itself. Thus, MMK 15.4—6 completes the prasaṅga critique:—

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām rte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ / svabhāve parabhāve vā sati bhāvo hi sidhyati // Without 'own being' and 'other being' how can there be 'being'?

For 'being' is established only when there is 'own being' and 'other being'.

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Bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati / bhāvasya hy anyathā bhāvam abhāvam bruvate janāḥ // If there is no establishment of being, non-being is not established either, for it is change of being that people call non-being.

svabhāvam parabhāvam ca bhāvam cābhāvam eva ca / ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvam buddhaśāsane //
Those who see own being, derived being, being, and non-being - they do not see the truth in the Buddha's teaching.

The refutation of the concept of 'own being' then is the most basic 'definition' of Śūnyatā, and it is on this initial level that Śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda are to be identified. This is precisely because "own being' not being found, 'other being' is not found" (avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate, MMK 1:2). Thus, upon analysis, even the notion of dependence is subverted, since having given up any own being there is now no 'self-sufficient' to be dependent upon. The dialectical process, once begun with the denial of self-sufficiency (pratītyasamutpāda/niḥsvabhāvatā), unceasingly leads to a comprehensive demolition of even the idea of 'interdependence'. Thus the following equation can be formulated from MMK 24:18:—

pratityasamutpāda = Sūnyatā = prajñapti = The Middle Path

Nāgārjuna rejects all metaphysical speculation (including the assertion of any form of absolutism); as such, the designation of his thought as 'śūnyavāda', or any other similar doctrinal epithet (such as ajātivāda for instance) is not strictly applicable to the import of his arguments. Nāgārjuna denies that he is making any statement (pratijñā); clearly Śūnyatā is not to be understood as a doctrine. It is conventional-talk, useful merely as an indicator (prajñapti).

ed.

13:8 sūnyatā sarvadrstīnām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ /
yeṣām tu śūnyatā dṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire //
Emptiness was proclaimed by the Conquerors as the
relinquishing of all views, but those for whom there is a
view of 'emptiness' are declared to be incurable.

22:11 śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet / ubhayam nobhayam ceti prajñaptyartham tu kathyate // Neither 'empty' nor 'non-empty' should be declared, nor both nor neither, but they are said for the sake of an indicator.

Although Nāgārjuna uses the term *dṛṣṭi*, to show that Śūnyatā is not a view, vāda would have been just as problematic; the realisation (prajñā) of 'emptiness' is an insight beyond the disputations of the vādin; this will become clearer when we come to deal with the theory of non-conflict (avirodhavāda) that is found in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (GK). It is unlikely that Nāgārjuna would have accepted the title of śūnyavādin, (unless etymologised to mean 'one who declares all doctrines to be empty'). In this respect, as we shall see, it is even more misleading to call Nāgārjuna an ajātivādin, because it is clear that he denies any 'unborn' substratum underlying the world.

Reading 'nihilism' or 'absolutism' into Nāgārjuna's philosophy is tantamount to seeing Sunyata in terms of one of the extremes that its upholder so expressly denies. It is not so much the case that Nāgārjuna upholds ajativada, but rather that he denies 'jati' and 'ajati' as appropriate designations.

ŚŪNYATĀ AND THE DENIAL OF DIFFERENCE (BHEDA/DVAITA)

The denial of own being is fundamentally based upon the realisation of anātman, the no-self of all dharmas, and is the logical extension of the Buddha's exposition of the lack of abiding self, which was understood by the scholars of the Theravāda school, etc., as the denial of a personal self (pudgalanairatmya), and extended later by the Mahāyāna to refer to all dharmas (dharma-nairātmya). Thus Śūnyatā is the anātmatā of all dharmas. Śūnyatā dialectic subverts the attempt to codify and analyse dharmas; clearly this is an attack reaching the heart of abhidharmic speculations. One cannot talk about either an unoriginated or an originated reality. In fact even the term 'reality' (tattva) is, strictly speaking, inapplicable since Nāgārjuna subverts the distinction between so-called reality and illusion. In this respect it is interesting to note the following observation of Streng's,

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The grammatical character of Nāgārjuna's use of "emptiness" is revealing in that it is always used adjectivally. "Emptiness" is always the emptiness of something; or "emptiness" is always the predicate of something e.g., co-dependent origination of existence or the highest knowledge of no-self-existence. 10

It is clear then that what we have here is not a reification of "emptiness", which indeed would be an alternative form of absolutism, but a practical technique, rather like the later Zen koans for the direct realisation of enlightenment (prajñā).

In his critique of the concept of own nature (svabhāva), Nāgārjuna undermines the conception of 'boundaries'. In the context of Buddhism the most fundamental 'boundary' is that between saṃskṛta (compounded) and asaṃskṛta (uncompounded) dharmas. To promote the universality of Śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna subverts this fundamental abhidharmic distinction,

7:33 utpādasthitibhangānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam / saṃskṛtasāprasiddhau ca kathaṃ setsaty asaṃskṛtaṃ // With the non-establishment of origination, duration and destruction the compounded does not exist; and if the compounded is not established how will there be an uncompounded?

Streng suggests that:-

Nāgārjuna's denial of distinctions correlates with the Buddha's opposition to theoretical speculations. The distinctions, claims Nāgārjuna, are not conducive to the cessation of ignorance and craving because they suggest that what is distinguished has some kind of intrinsic reality which "marks" it off from something else. In practical life it is necessary to recognise that a chair is not a table, that a gold coin is not the same as clay, and that a merchant who cheats is not identical with one who does not. However, a person who does not slip into the error of regarding these practical distinctions as ultimate facts is able to see that there is indeed neither one absolute substance nor many individual substances.

The declaration that all *dharmas* are empty, amounts to a universal application of *anātmatā*. Denying any notion of an abiding self or 'nature' involves a denial of duality (*dvaita/dvaya*) and difference (*bheda*); if all *dharmas* are empty of self-nature, there can be no boundaries between one *dharma* and another. Thus, "What indeed is

'that', what is 'another' (kim tad eva kim anyat, 25:23). Even the fundamental distinction between samsāra and nirvāṇa is subverted:—

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25:19 na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇaṃ /
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇaṃ //
Of saṃsāra, there exists no feature that distinguishes it
from nirvāṇa.
Of nirvāṇa, there exists no feature that distinguishes it from
saṃsāra.

This is not an identity of the two, for Nāgārjuna has already been at pains to show that there is no *dharma* that can be identified to begin with; it is rather the denial of a distinction between *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta*. Thus, the next stanza describes the relationship between these two in terms of their 'delimiting boundaries' or 'limits' (koṭi),

nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ saṃsāraṇasya ca/ na tayor antaraṃ kiṇcit susūkṣmam api vidyate // The extreme limit of nirvāṇa is also the extreme limit of saṃsāra; there is not even a subtle something between them.

At times this can appear reminiscent of the non-dualism of the Vedānta school. Certainly the tendency to interpret Madhyamaka as an absolutistic system has contributed to a confusion between the fundamental conceptions of these two traditions. Both Mahāyāna and the Advaita Vedānta deny that ultimate reality can be understood in terms of duality. In the former this amounts to a subversion of the notion of separate self-sufficiency (niḥsvabhāvatā), whilst in the latter, non-difference is a proclamation of the reality of the non-dual substratum underlying all appearances.

In an analysis and a rejection of the various theories of causality on offer, Nāgārjuna argues that they all presuppose a substantialist (svabhāvatā) view of reality, in other words, all views are guilty of what might be called the 'Fallacy of Reification'. This is the tendency of language and its users to 'objectify' concepts, creating the illusion that the world of our experience is made up of real, unitary and self-sufficient substances. The result is prapañca, the incessant proliferation of concepts. The experience of a manifold world of boundaries and

distinctions is caused by our attachment to the idea of a fixed nature (svabhāva) to the internal world of one's own 'self' and to the 'external' world of objects and other people (bahirdhādhyātma). It is important to understand that niḥsvabhāvatā is a denial of self in both of these realms and not just a denial of a personal self. This is the import of the Mahāyāna doctrine of dharma-nairātmya. As such, the saṃsāric world of suffering exists for as long as there is an adherence to a view of 'self' (both internally and externally) and liberation is the cessation of all such conceptions (vikalpa/prapañca). Thus MMK 18:4—5 states:—

mamety aham iti kṣine bahirdhādhyātmam eva ca / nirudhyata upādānam tat kṣayāj janmanaḥ kṣayaḥ // karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ / te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate // When 'mine' and 'I' have stopped there is neither an outer nor an inner self as well and there is a cessation of acquiring; with that there is the ceasing of birth. On the ceasing of the karmic defilements, there is release. The karmic defilements exist for the one who constructs them (vikalpataḥ). These defilements result from conceptual proliferation (prapañca), but this conceptual proliferation ceases with emptiness.

Compare this with a similar acceptance of egocentricity as the root cause of the manifold world in Gauḍapāda-Kārikā (GK) II:16 and IV:55, 56:—

jīvam kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān / bāhyān ādhyātmikāmś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmṛtiḥ // The jīva (individual being) is first imagined, and then separate things, an outer and inner self; as one knows so does one recollect.

yāvad dhetuphalāveśas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ / kṣīṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ // yāvad dhetuphalāveśaḥ saṃsāras tāvad āyataḥ / kṣīṇe hetuphalāveśe saṃsāro na prapadyate // As long as there is attachment to cause and effect, so long

does it arise; when the attachment to cause and effect ceases there is no arising of cause and effect.

As long as there is attachment to cause and effect, so long is samsāra spread out; when attachment to cause and effect ceases one does not attain to samsāra.

For Advaita Vedānta, the primary cause of bondage to samsāra is ignorance (avidyā) of the basic non-difference of Ātman and Brahman; attachment to an individualised ego (jīva) is a gross error, for in reality the aspirant must realise that he or she is identical with the universal ground of being (sat). Thus, a substrative metaphysics (sadadhisṭhāna-vāda) is a fundamental presupposition of the school, rooted as it is in the acceptance of Ātman, as the non-dual reality. Debate within the Vedānta school concerned the status of Brahman as the efficient and material cause of the universe. For the Mahāyāna Buddhist, samsāra is not supported by anything other than the interdependence of its own constituent factors (i.e., pratītyasamutpāda). The introduction of a universal substratum would lead to the subversion of both the dynamics of inter-dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) and the denial of own-being (niḥsvabhāva). MMK XXII:16 is quick to point out that:—

tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tatsvabhāvam idam jagat / tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idam jagat // Whatever is the own being of the Tathāgāta, that is also the own being of this world. The Tathāgata is without own being, this world is without own being.

The belief in some form of 'self-sufficient' existent, in other words the adherence to some form of absolutism, is precisely the focus of Nāgārjuna's incisive arguments. Because he is attempting to bring out the absolutistic implications of all doctrines, it is not surprising that Nāgārjuna's works seem preoccupied with the terminology of absolutism. It is this feature above all others that has contributed to the misinterpretation of Śūnyatā as the unconditioned reality.

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE

The philosophical basis of Gaudapāda's ajātivāda is elucidated in GK II:6 (and again in IV:31):— ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat

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tathā, "That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is equally so in the middle.". This is precisely because (GK III:21):—

na bhavaty amṛtam martyam na martyam amṛtam tathā / prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati // The deathless cannot become subject to death, similarly that which is subject to death cannot become deathless. The becoming otherwise (i.e. change) of nature in no way occurs.".12

This principle is quite obviously shared by Nāgārjuna in his examination of Own Being (svabhāva) and lies at the basis of the philosophies of both thinkers. Thus MMK XV:8 declares that:—

yady astitvam prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā / prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jatūpapadyate // If there were existence by nature, then there would not be its non-existence, for a change of nature does not occur.

The problem of the apparent incompatibility of the notions of 'intrinsic nature' and change is the primary impetus and starting point for both Nāgārjuna's philosophy and the many philosophies of absolutism both East and West. Thus, the 19th century English Absolutist Francis Herbert Bradley explains the basic problem in the following manner:—

Something, A, changes, and therefore it cannot be permanent. On the other hand, if A is not permanent, what is it that changes? It will no longer be A, but something else. In other words, let A be free from change in time and it does not change. But let it contain change, and at once it becomes A¹, A², A³. Then what becomes of A, and of its change, for we are left with something else? Again, we may put the problem thus. The diverse states of A must exist within one time; and yet they cannot, because they are successive. Thus, it is required that A must change; and, for this, two characters, not incompatible, must be present at once.¹³

However it would seem that change has to occur in A at some point; Bradley thus continues:—

... this is clearly impossible, for what could have altered it? Not any other thing, for you have taken the whole course of events. And, again, not itself, for you have got itself already without any change. In short, if the cause can endure unchanged for any lof] the very smallest pieces of duration, then it must endure for ever. It cannot pass into the effect, and it therefore is not a cause at all.¹⁴

It is clear that the same perplexity spurred Nāgārjuna on to a denial

of the reality of both 'self-nature' (svabhāva) and 'other nature' (parabhāva); if there is no 'own nature' how can there be 'other nature'? 15. The difference between Nāgārjuna and the Absolutist is that while the former maintains that the self-contradictory nature of change points to the impossibility of a fixed nature to anything, the latter relegates 'change' to the realm of appearance, declaring that reality is thereby the unchanging basis to these appearances.

NĀGĀRJUNA'S CRITIQUE OF ABSOLUTISM (SVABHĀVAVĀDA)

Both Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda use the analogies of dream and illusion to explain the world of change:—

MMK 7.34: yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaram yathā / tathotpādas tathā sthānam tathā bhanga udāhṛtam // Like an illusion, like a dream, like a castle in the air, thus is origination, thus is duration, thus is destruction declared.

GK II:31: svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaraṃ yathā / tathā viśvam idaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ //
As are seen dream and illusion and a castle in the air, so also is this whole universe seen by those well-versed in the Vedāntas.

The similarity between these two verses may be taken as strong testimony indeed for the argument that Gauḍapāda has 'borrowed' from the MMK, and certainly it is difficult for any but the most partisan scholar to deny the influence of Buddhist ideas on the Gauḍapāda-Kārikā. However, unlike Gauḍapāda, Nāgārjuna does not uphold ajātivāda, the doctrine of non-origination, simply because the true import of śūnyatā is declared to be a denial of all views including the absolutistic view that all things exist in some unoriginated form.

In MMK XXIV:1—6 Nāgārjuna gives objections to śūnyatā which seem to display an absolutistic interpretation of it. These objections are turned back upon the pūrvapakṣin (svabhāva-vādin) who is said to be guilty of "attributing your errors to us." ¹⁶ These objections are doubly important for they not only allow us to provide an appropriate

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appraisal of the *non-absolutism* of Nāgārjuna, they also allow us to further evaluate the *ajātivāda* of Gaudapāda which appears to bear a remarkable resemblance to the logical consequences of what Nāgārjuna calls the 'non-empty' (aśūnya) or substance view of reality (svabhāva-vāda). Thus MMK XXIV:20.ff. states that:—

If all this is non-empty, there exists no arising and no ceasing . . . How can that which exists by its own being come into existence? Hence for him who rejects emptiness, there is no production . . . If the self-existent exists, the following of the path does not occur; if that path is followed, your self-existent is not found. When there is no suffering, origin and cessation, where will the path lead to through the cessation of [that] suffering? If incomplete knowledge is due to own being, how [will there be] complete knowledge? Is it not the case that own being is fixed? As with complete knowledge, so are elimination, realisation and development not admissible, nor are the four fruits. How would it be possible for one who holds onto 'own being' to obtain a fruit, already obtained through own being? No one will ever do right or wrong. What action of the non-empty could be done, since own being cannot be made? You reject all worldly practicalities when you reject the emptiness of dependent origination. According to 'own being' the world would be unoriginated, unceased, unchanging and free from varying conditions. 17

Nāgārjuna maintains that the only way to account for change is to understand that there is no abiding self-nature or essence to any factor of our experience; thus, one should understand that there is no dharma that can be pinpointed, since all dharmas arise inter-dependently:—

yah pratītyasamutpādam paśyatīdam sa paśyatī / duḥkham samudayam caiva nirodham mārgam eva ca // He who sees dependent origination sees suffering, [its] origin, [its] cessation and the Path. 18

Attempts to see some form of ajātivāda in the śūnyatā of Nāgārjuna are guilty of misreading the emptiness of all *dharmas* as some form of absolutism, when in fact the 'no-view' of emptiness is actually an attempt to liberate oneself from belief in an absolute. Elwin Jones puts this particular point well:

The prime target of Nāgārjuna's criticism seems to have been the predisposition, whether of common sense or of philosophical speculation, to view the existing as somehow absolutely existing. If, however, something exists absolutely or really, then it has to be permanent and unchanging, and so *never* nonexistent; otherwise, it cannot have a real nature of being existent.¹⁹

THE GAUDAPĀDIAN RESPONSE

The consequences of a substantialist view of reality, far from being seen as criticisms, are accepted as logical facts by Gauḍapāda. Thus in GK II: 32 we read:—

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ / na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā //
There is neither cessation nor origination; no one in bondage, no one aspiring, no one desirous of liberation, no one who is emancipated — This is the Highest Truth.

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Gauḍapāda inverts Śūnyatā by maintaining that reality must have inherent nature (svabhāva); as such he can be seen as the archetypal aśūnyavādin. He re-examines our common sense notion of reality and maintains that for something to be real it must be unchanging. He maintains, contrary to Nāgārjuna, that reality is svabhāva precisely because it MUST have a 'nature' in order to be reality. Ajātivāda then is the assertion of a fixed ultimate reality based upon the principle that nature cannot change (prakṛter na anyathābhāva).

AJĀTIVĀDA AND THE THEORY OF NON-CONFLICT (AVIRODHAVĀDA)

The dialectical critique of causality, formulated in the MMK and adopted in the GK, draws attention to logical discrepancies in the causal theories of satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda. Gaudapāda has shrewdly picked up on the Mādhyamika critique, and accepts that the problem of change subverts the Vedāntin's reliance upon satkāryavāda. However, this is not an acceptance of the Buddhist position. A recourse can be made to the Vedāntin's substrative metaphysics by the acceptance of satkāraṇavāda (the doctrine of the sole reality of the cause) as the logical consequence of a dialectical analysis of satkāryavāda. This step marks the beginning of the vivarta tradition in Vedānta. Whether it is philosophically sound to maintain a substrative line, given that the manifold which is to be supported is denied, is a moot point. One's answer to this question will decide which side of the fence one stands on in the Buddhist (anātman/nihsvabhāvatā) — Vedānta (ātman/svabhāvatā) debate.

Gaudapāda declares in the *Advaita-prakaraṇa* (*GK:III*), that *ajātivāda* is the supreme view of reality, because it does not conflict with other dualistic views. Thus, kārikās 17 and 18 state that:—

svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino niścitā dṛḍham / parasparaṃ virudhyante tair ayaṃ na virudhyate // advaitaṃ paramārtho hi dvaitaṃ tadbheda ucyate / teṣām ubhayathā dvaitaṃ tenāyaṃ na virudhyate // The dualists are firmly convinced in the establishment of their own conclusions and contradict one another; but this [view] does not conflict with them. Non-duality is indeed the ultimate reality; duality is said to be a differentiation of it. For them [the dualists] there is duality both ways; therefore this [view] does not conflict [with theirs].

Traditionally, the verses are explained as pointing to the fact that Gauḍapāda upholds dvayasatya and as such accepts the conventional truth (samvṛti-satya) of duality, but his final position is that ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya) is non-dualistic. Having examined the basic presuppositions of Gauḍapāda's doctrine, we are now in a position to see precisely why ajātivāda is not in conflict with other views. If one accepts the self-contradictory nature of dualistic theories of causality, as do both Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, then all such views are to be rejected as ultimately invalid.

Following the arguments of MMK XXIV etc., it becomes clear that some form of absolutism (ajātivāda) is a logical consequence of a svabhāva view of reality (which amounts to all views of reality since all views presuppose 'own being' in some form).

For both thinkers, the *prasanga* method of dialectical critique establishes *ajātivāda* as the final position (*siddhānta*) of all doctrines of 'own nature' (svabhāva). For Gauḍapāda, this shows that the fundamental presuppositions of all dualistic theories logically result in non-dualism. All diverse objects appear only because they have an unborn intrinsic nature (*ajātisvabhāva*) to support their manifestation. Thus Gauḍapāda states that "there is no doubt that in the waking state the *non-dual appears as the dual*" it is only by virtue of non-duality (*advaya*) that entities are imagined. "The entities exist as the non-dual as it were." For both thinkers, all views presuppose 'own being'

(svabhāva), and thus necessitate the acceptance of an 'absolute' and unchanging reality. They both readily accept that all views entail absolutism; for Nāgārjuna the contradiction between the premise and the conclusion is grounds for the rejection of the entire schema of svabhāva-vāda, while for Gauḍapāda it is the final vindication of absolutism, since all roads lead to Advaita.

Perhaps it would be useful to retrace the logical steps in Nāgārjuna's argument:—

A. 'Own nature' cannot change - prakṛter na anyathābhāvo (15:8)

B. Emptiness is the relinquishing of all views — Śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām niḥṣaraṇaṃ (13:8)

...C. Non-emptiness is the characteristic of all views — aśūnyatā = sarva dṛṣṭṇṇām.

D. Emptiness is a denial of 'own nature' - Sūnyatā = nihsvabhāvatā (13:3)

 \therefore E. Non-emptiness is the acceptance of an 'own nature' (24:20f), $a\dot{s}\bar{u}nyav\bar{a}da=svabh\bar{a}vav\bar{a}da$

Thus,

From C and E we can deduce that:

F. All views presuppose an 'own nature', sarvadṛṣṭiṇāṃ = svabhāvavāda

From A and E (or F) one can conclude that:

G. All views presuppose a fixed 'own nature', (24:38), sarvadṛṣṭṇṇaṃ = svabhāva = ajātivāda

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Nāgārjuna clearly divorces Śūnyatā from the theories of other schools, which are characterised by the acceptance of 'own being' (svabhāva); this is shown by his eagerness to describe all views as aśūnyavāda. His grounds for doing so are elucidated in MMK 24: 20ff, and they are that all views, when dialectically analysed, lead to absolutism (ajātivāda). Gauḍapāda's grounds for the acceptance of ajātivāda are precisely the same insight, that all views entail it. It is at this fundamental level that we appear to encounter the root of the distinction between the ātman and anātman traditions.

SUMMARY

Gaudapāda, whilst accepting much of the argumentation and style of Nāgārjuna's philosophy,²² aligns himself firmly with the ātman/

svabhāvatā tradition of Vedānta; his view of ātman is inspired by an absorption of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. For both Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda, the basis of both the Madhyamaka and Advaitic perspectives is the impossibility of change (na anyathabhāva). For Nāgārjuna this entails nihsvabhāvatā, for Gaudapāda it means absolute svabhāvatā. Both accept that the belief in an 'own nature' (which amounts to all views of reality) entails a non-active, unchanging absolute. Nāgārjuna takes this as grounds for a rejection of svabhāvatā, Gaudapāda accepts this as proof of its reality. The real dividing line between the two thinkers is on the question of the necessity (or not) of even positing a 'nature' to things. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of an underlying and unchanging substratum behind all manifestations, Gaudapāda argues that for there to be an appearance there must be a thing that appears. It is this point, the debate over ātman (svabhāva) or anātman (nihsvabhāva) at its most fundamental level, that is the real dividing line between the philosophies of the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntin

NOTES

¹ A common name for Śankara's doctrine is *kevalādvaita* — the non-dualism of the alone; this conforms very nicely with the Latin derivation of the English term 'absolute'.

² As is the case with the translation of all technical terms from the original Sanskrit, one has to be aware of the loss of some of the meaning by the utilisation of one fixed English equivalent. In this case the use of own, self or intrinsic 'nature' palpably fails to display the connection of the term svabhāva with the question of being itself (bhāva). Thus, I have adopted the policy of freely rendering svabhāva as 'intrinsic nature', 'own nature', 'own being', 'self-establishment' and 'self-sufficiency' etc., according to the context, in order that the wide connotations of this term will be taken on board by the reader. That this is fair can be ascertained from the fact that in virtually all cases these terms are exchangeable without a change in meaning.

³ Svabhāva and the related notion of prakṛti (nature) occur in the following verses of the Gaudapāda-Kārikā:— I: 23, II: 34, III: 32, IV: 7—10, 23, 29, 57, 81, 86, 91—93, 98.

⁴ MMK I: 1

⁵ Vidhushekara Bhattacharya (1943), The Āgamaśāśtra of Gauḍapāda, p. 107.

⁶ T. M. P. Mahadevan (1954), Gaudapāda: A Study in Early Advaita (Madras Univ.), p. 188.

⁷ S. S. Roy (1965), The Heritage of Śańkara (Allahabad, Udayana Publications), p. 15.

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- ⁸ S. L. Pandey (1974), Pre-Śamkara Advaita Philosophy, p. 323.
- 9 M. Sprung (1979), Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters, from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.), p. 15. 10 F. Streng (1967), Emptiness: A Study In Religious Meaning (Abingdon Press), p. 159.
- 11 Ibid., p. 52.
- 12 See also GK IV: 7 and 29.
- ¹³ F. H. Bradley (1893), Appearance and Reality (Oxford, Clarendon Press), p. 40.
- 14 Ibid., p. 51-2.
- 15 MMK XV: 3.
- 16 MMK XXIV: 15.
- 17 MMK XXIV:
 - 20. yady aśūnyam idam sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayah /
 - 22. svabhāvato vidyamānam kim punah samudesyate / tasmāt samudāyo nāsti śūnyatām pratibādhatah //
 - 24. svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate / athāsau bhāvyate mārgah svābhāvyam te na vidyate #
 - 25. yadā duhkham samudāyo nirodhaś ca na vidyate / mārgo duhkhanirodhatvāt katamah prāpayisyati #
 - 26. svabhāvenāparijāānam yadi tasya punah katham / parijñānam nanu kila svabhāvah samavasthitah #
 - 27. prahānasāksātkarane bhāvanā caivam eva te / parijñāvan na yujyante catvāry api phalāni ca //
 - 28. svabhavenādhigatam yat phalam tat punah katham / śakyam samadhigantum syāt svabhāvam parigrhnatah //
 - 33. na ca dharmam adharmam vā kaścij jātu karisyati / kim aśūnyasya kartavyam svabhāvah kriyate na hi //
 - 36. sarvasamvyavahārāmś ca laukikān pratibādhase / yat pratītyasamutpādaśūnyatām pratībādhase #
 - 38. ajātam aniruddham ca kūtastham ca bhavisyati / vicitrābhir avasthābhih svabhāve rahitam jagat #
- 18 MMK XXIV: 40.
- ¹⁹ Elwin W. Jones "Buddhist Theories of Existents: The System of Two Truths" in M. Kiyota (ed) (1978), Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu), p. 12. 20 GK II: 33:-

bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitah / bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā //

And this is imagined to be the non-existing entities themselves by means of the non-dual. The entities exist as the non-dual as it were. Therefore there is auspicious

²¹ GK III: 30 — advayam ca dvayābhāsam tathā jāgran na saṃśayaḥ.

²² This is not to mention the debt that Gaudapāda owes to the Yogācāra school in the development of asparśa-yoga as the experiential and epistemological corollary of ajātivāda.

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THE THEORY OF THE SENTENCE IN PŪRVA MĪMĀMSĀ AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Recent work by Mark Siderits on the abhihitanvaya- and anvitabhidhāna-vādas — the Mīmāmsā theories of how words in sentences combine to produce a sentence meaning - has suggested certain ways in which they might be relevant to contemporary Western philosophy of language. In the present study I would like to present a somewhat different view of how they are relevant. While Siderits sees the importance of the Mīmāmsākas, in particular the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas, to lie in their development of a sense-reference distinction, I see it to lie more just in their discovery that the meanings of words change from sentence to sentence. I begin from scratch with a general summary of the abhihitanvaya and anvitabhidhana positions, even though Siderits has done an admirable job of expounding the texts. This will allow me to bring out more clearly than others have done what I take to be the basic insights of the two positions.² Also, there is a need to rectify Siderits's under-appreciation of the abhihitānvaya (Bhātta Mīmāmsā) view. More detailed discussions of textual passages, however, especially of Parthasarathimiśra's Vākyārthanirnaya, on which I base many of my findings, are relegated to the notes. Then, in the second part of the paper, I make a modest attempt to apply the fact that the meanings of words change in different contexts to an issue in modern Western philosophy of language - the analysis of intensional sentences.

I

The Mīmāmsā concern with the semantics of sentences stems from the concern with the eternality of language. On the Mīmāmsā view, if the Veda is to be considered authoritative (pramāṇa) it must be seen not to originate from human beings or even God (apauruṣeya). This requires in turn that language be seen as in some sense eternal (nitya), for the Veda consists of language. In the first pāda of the first

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 407—430, 1989.

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adhyāya of the Mīmāmsā Sūtra it is established that words, their meanings, and the relation between word and meaning are eternal (1.1.12-23). But of course the Veda is not just a bunch of words; it consists of sentences. It is argued then that sentences, which are made up of words, derive their authority from those words. This is established in Sabara's commentary (ad 1.1.24) in response to a prima facie position to the effect that there is no way to explain how the comprehension of sentence meaning is derived solely from linguistic factors. Each word in a sentence cannot give the sentence meaning individually, for the latter is understood only when all the words have been heard. On the other hand, the collection of words could not designate the sentence meaning, because many sentences we encounter are new. In the case of a new sentence we could not have learned from past usage the correlation of the collection of words with a meaning. Nor can the meanings of the words effect awareness of the sentence meaning; for words designate universals and the meaning of a sentence is a particular, complex state of affairs. And there is obviously no necessary connection between any single word meaning and a particular sentence meaning; for a word is used in many sentences meaning many different things. Thus, according to the pūrvapakṣin, sentence meaning does not emerge naturally from the constituent words themselves or their meanings. In the case of Vedic sentences it must either be somehow man-made (krtrima) - that is, presumably, established merely by convention - or else altogether without basis and delusory (vyāmoha).3 In view of the Mīmāmsā claim that the Veda has no author, the first alternative is just as threatening to the authority of the Veda as the second.4

In answer to this challenge four basic possibilities are considered in the Mīmāmsā discussions of sentence meaning: (1) the *sphoṭa-vāda*, according to which the real cause of cognition of sentence meaning is a single, undivided, abstract linguistic entity (the *sphoṭa*) which is manifested serially by the audible syllables; (2) the *antyavarṇa-vāda*, according to which a valid cognition of sentence meaning is delivered by the last syllable of the sentence together with the memory impressions of all the previous syllables; (3) the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*, which states that the words of a sentence first indicate their separate meanings and then all these meanings combine to give the sentence

meaning; and (4) the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, which holds that each word individually gives the entire sentence meaning by indicating its own meaning qualified by the meanings of the other words with which it occurs. The expression abhihitānvaya means, then, 'the association of meanings already indicated [separately by the words of the sentence]' — this is considered the cause of sentence meaning in that view. Siderits renders, happily, abhihitānvaya as 'designated relation.' Anvitābhidhāna — 'related designation' in Siderits's terminology — means 'the indication of a meaning [by a word] as related [to the meanings of the other words in the sentence]' — this is thought to be the real cause of sentence meaning in the anvitābhidhāna view. The Mīmāmsā philosopher defends the possibility of deriving sentence meaning from words by developing either one of these two latter alternatives while rejecting the first two.

Both Mīmāmsā positions depart from certain basic observations. The first of these is: the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence obviously depends in some way on understanding the meanings of the words that comprise it, because we only know what the sentence means when we know what the words mean. Otherwise, people who did not understand the meanings of the constituent words of a sentence would still get the sentence meaning - which never happens. And it cannot be the case that for every grammatical sentence we learn a corresponding sentence meaning. That would be impossible, because there are too many grammatical sentences — an infinite number in fact. Another basic observation — already noted by Sabara, as we have seen — is that we are able to cognize the meanings of sentences we have never heard before. This also suggests that sentence meaning is derived somehow from word meanings. Word meanings are knowable, because they are finite, but they can be combined in an infinite number of ways. We get new sentence meanings from those combinations.5

What, then, is the abhihitānvaya position? The tenth century Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā philosopher Pārthasārathimiśra, besides noting all the reasons for rejecting the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, says the abhihitānvaya-vāda accords with experience. What is the experience he is talking about? It seems to be this: If I pronounce any sentence — for example, "The beautiful, sweet-voiced, silk-clad birds moving about in the lotus forest seem to dance" (a popular Mīmāṃsā example) — the hearer,

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when he hears the first word, understands its meaning; and when he hears the second, he understands its meaning, and so on for each of . the words in the sentence. Having heard all the words and understood their meanings, he immediately comprehends the sentence meaning. Sentence meaning directly follows comprehension of all the word meanings, so it would seem - just from our experience - that the word meanings are the cause of the sentence meaning. Again, we get the meaning of each word as we hear it. Each word indicates its meaning as it is pronounced. These meanings stay in our mind until all the words of the sentence are heard. Then, when the last word is heard, we understand what the sentence means. In this way we can understand very long sentences, even discourses. We do not remember every word the speaker says, but the meaning of each word is somehow registered, and these assemble together at the end. After hearing the last word of a sentence of discourse we are typically unable to go back and recollect all the words. It is the meanings we reflect upon in understanding what was said - they must be the cause of sentence meaning.7

The above is essentially Parthasarathi's statement. The Nyaya philosopher Jayantabhatta, in his exposition of the debate about sentence meaning in his Nyāyamañjarī, adds another point: We feel that words have discrete meanings, that their meanings are of a definite extent. One word in the above sentence, say 'dance,' refers to a particular kind of action, another word, 'birds,' refers to a particular kind of substance. To be sure, words are never employed in isolation; they always occur together in sentences, for the purpose of referring to concrete, complex states of affairs. But through āvāpa and udvāpa - adding or taking away a word from a sentence to alter its meaning - we are able to analyze out their discrete meanings, and that suggests that their original capacity to signify is with reference to simple or "pure" meanings, as opposed to complex ones. Now if, as the anvitābhidhāna-vāda suggests, a verb indicated an action together with a substance, and a noun indicated a substance together with an action, then their meanings would be roughly the same, not distinct. Moreover, we believe that the meaning of a word remains constant throughout all its uses, and that we can identify it. But according to

the anvitabhidhana-vada it is always shifting. 'A bird' means at one-time a-bird-sitting-on-a-branch, again a-bird-singing-in-the-spring, or again a-bird-flying-in-the-air. You cannot really ever pin down the meaning of a word. But that is contrary to our intution. Every word must have some constant, basic meaning.8

A third basic notion of the abhihitānvaya-vāda is that meanings (artha) - let us say here "ideas" - themselves have the capacity to associate together. The standard example is from Kumārila. Someone sees a vague white shape in the distance; he hears neighing; and he also hears the sound of galloping hooves. As a result he receives the complex idea, "A white horse is running." The various ideas 'whiteness,' 'horse,' and 'running' are combined together in a single cognition, but in this case none of them individually is conveyed by a word, nor is their relationship. So it is not necessarily through any capacity of words that ideas or meanings associate together. Rather, they do so of themselves. Therefore, once the meanings of words in a sentence are brought to mind by the words, they naturally combine together to produce a cognition of the sentence meaning, which is a complex state of affairs. 10 The fact that only certain ideas associate together — the fact, e.g., that when I happen to be looking at a cow standing in the pasture and someone says, "A horse is running," I only get the cognition of a running horse and not some cognition combining ideas got from what he said and what I see (say, "A cow is running," or, "A horse is standing") — this has to do with the fact that ideas conveyed by words tend to associate together only with other ideas conveyed by words occurring within the same sentence, that is, roughly, only ideas from the same source associate together.11

In sum, the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* presents us with the following straightforward picture: The meanings of words are discrete concepts; the several words occurring in a sentence successively indicate their own, individual meanings; these meanings then combine more or less automatically to produce the sentence meaning. As such, the theory captures certain intuitions we have about language. But other intuitions, apparently in conflict with these, are captured by the *anvitābhi-dhāna* theory.

The heart of that theory is awareness of the fact that the sentence is

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the unit of linguistic communication. We always speak in sentences: We learn language from people using sentences. As a modern philosopher would say, only by uttering a sentence can one make a move in a "language game." A word never functions by itself to communicate anything. If I were to say just "cow," you would receive no information from my utterance. Only if "cow" occurs in a sentence, such as, "Bring the cow" — or in a context where such a sentence is understood — does it convey information. So the meaning of the word 'cow' is dependent on its occurrence together with other words in a sentence. Words do not mean anything — that is, nothing is really intended by them — just by themselves. This is a point stressed by various Western philosophers, too — Frege, the later Wittgenstein, and Quine.

This fact can be approached in other ways. Jayanta asks, what is a sentence, after all? (for here we are talking about the theory of sentence meaning). He answers, after Sabara, that it is not considered to be just a bunch of words, but a bunch of words which together indicate a meaning — samhatyārtham abhidadhati padāni vākyam.12 That is, we feel that a sentence is a group of words functioning somehow as a unit to produce a single effect — the sentence meaning. Now the idea that each word in the sentence separately indicates only its own meaning does not jibe with this impression. Here we get the picture of each word in the sentence standing on its own, like a series of stakes. But a more appropriate analogy (Jayanta's analogy) of how words functions together in a sentence is that of several stones supporting a pot. A single stone cannot support the pot all by itself; it requires the presence of the other stones. It makes an individual contribution to the supporting of the pot only insofar as it supports it together with the others. So a word in a sentence designates its individual meaning only insofar as it designates the sentence meaning together with the other words. This insight, indeed, is held in common with the sphota-vādin. The difference here is that the anvitābhidhānavādin feels that it is possible to an extent to identify the individual contributions words make.

But the *abhihitānvaya-vādin* pointed out that we have an intuition that the meaning of a word remains constant throughout all its uses. It does not totally change every time we use it. Here, while the *anvitā-bhidhāna* theorist agrees with this — the meaning of a word remains

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basically the same — he stresses that the meaning of a word is qualified (viśista) by its context. Perhaps the best way to see this is

Tom opened the door.
Sally opened her eyes.
The carpenters opened the wall.
Sam opened his book to page 37.
The surgeon opened the wound.

As Searle says, the literal meaning of 'open' is the same in each of these five sentences, but it is understood differently in each. "In each case the truth conditions marked by the word 'open' are different ... What constitutes opening a wound is quite different from what constitutes opening a book, and understanding these sentences literally requires understanding each differently, even though 'open' has the same basic semantic content throughout." \[^{14}\] So we can say here that it appears that the basic meaning of the word 'open' is made specific by the words with which it occurs — and that, together with the claim that this specific meaning is what the word designates (abhi \sqrt{dha}), is the gist of the anvitabhidhāna-vāda.

Lest one think that this is only a property of verbs — "action words" — and not other parts of speech, consider how the word 'green' refers to quite different colors in the phrases 'green apple,' 'green eyes,' 'green water,' 'green grass,' and 'green face.' Or, consider the adjustments in the meaning of 'soft' in 'soft mattress,' 'soft peach,' 'soft glove.' 15

Is this also a phenomenon of nouns? Perhaps we can detect subtle shifts in the meaning of the noun 'cat' in the following:

The cat is on the mat. The cat scratched the dog. The cat loves milk.

In one sentence a cat is considered as a mere physical object, in another as an (unpredictable) animal with claws, and in the third as a domestic pet. Yet if the meaning of 'cat' does change in these sentences, it changes very little. That may have something to do with why we consider a cat a more solid, real kind of thing than the color green. Nevertheless, we also have such sentences as,

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The porcelain cat broke when it fell off the shelf.

Unless one is ready to argue that we have to do here with a homonym, which is implausible, it seems that one must admit that the meanings of nouns, too, can alter significantly from context to context. Consider also the series: 'front door,' 'car door,' 'cat door;' 'jogging shoe,' 'snow shoe,' 'horse shoe,' etc. Isn't it correct to say also of 'door' and 'shoe' in these expressions that, although the basic meaning of the word is the same, it is understood differently in each case?

Thus, it seems that the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* is more adequate to some aspects of our experience of language than the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*.

(Modern philosophers have noticed that even extra-syntactic factors can modify the meanings of words — as happens, for example, with indexical words such as 'I,' 'here,' 'now,' The basic semantic content of the word 'I,' no doubt, remains the same throughout its uses, and yet the reference of the word 'I' varies — not according to the other words it occurs together with, but according to the person who utters it.)

But it can be asked here: Isn't this "basic semantic content" or "literal meaning" which remains constant just the universal? And isn't the qualification that it undergoes just a result of the specification of the universal through interaction with the ideas indicated by the other words in the sentence? Why do we have to assume here that the words themselves refer to this qualification? Can it not take place just as a result of the combination of the word meanings after they have been presented by the words? In other words, do we really need to move beyond the *abhihitānvaya* theory to explain this?

Here the anvitābhidhāna theorist insists on what I take to be his main point, viz., that they feel that words are expressive. They have a unique power to give us an awareness of things that does not depend on perception, inference, or implication. We hear a sentence and immediately get an idea of a certain complex state of affairs — even one of which we have no previous experience — and we feel that the words are responsible for this. In other words, śabda — language — is a separate pramāna or means of knowledge. Now in what does this expressive capacity of language consist? Does it consist just in the words indicating their separate individual meanings? Here the anvitā-

bhidhāna theorist argues that words do not really designate (abhi \sqrt{dha}) their individual meanings, they only remind us of them. When we learn language a correspondence gets set up for us between each word and a basic semantic content. These two things become associated in the mind. Subsequently, when we encounter one, we naturally remember the other. So a word is not expressive insofar as it presents its simple individual meaning; it is only a reminder of that. Its expressiveness must rather consist in the designation of this meaning in relation to other meanings. ¹⁶

But even if it is granted that words do designate their individual meanings (for the thesis that they are just reminders is hard to establish, I think, and Śālikanātha, e.g., does not insist on it) - even granted this, says the anvitābhidhāna theorist, you still cannot adequately account for the common intuition that it is the words that are responsible for our idea of what the sentence means. The abhihitānvaya theorist was confident that once simple meanings or ideas are made present to the mind - whether by words or some other means - they will associate together automatically. But the anvitābhidhānavādin argues that this in fact never happens. Although words may not be involved, the awareness of a complex state of affairs will always be brought about, through various pramanas, by the combination of complex ideas, not simple ones. Śālikanātha demonstrates this in a penetrating discussion of Kumārila's example of the running white horse. The perceptions of whiteness, neighing, and hoofbeats yield. either by inference or implication, complex ideas of 'a galloping horse' or 'a white horse,' from which one arrives at 'a galloping white horse.' One never has a case of the simple, unconnected ideas 'white,' 'horse,' and 'running' combining together of themselves. 17 Therefore, since simple meanings do not combine together by themselves (pramānas will be involved), yet at the same time, because we feel that language is responsible for their combination and not some other pramāna that when some one says, "A white horse is running," the meanings of the words are brought into combination by the fact that he said it because of all this, words must designate not simple individual meanings but meanings related to other meanings.18

Let the above suffice as an outline of the *anvitābhidhāna* theory. The main points are: (1) Words do not mean anything by themselves. They convey information only insofar as they function together with

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other words. (2) Although their semantic content remains the same through all their uses, it is also qualified to a certain extent. (3) Since the designative function of words carries all the way through to the sentence meaning, it cannot stop just with the indication of simple meanings, because meanings do not combine of themselves.

Before going on to consider how all this relates to Western philosophy a few critical remarks are in order. How are we to decide between the abhihitanvaya- and anvitabhidhana-vadas? It often seems that the dispute between them is just quibbling about the meaning of the term 'cause.' Both theories want to account for what causes our awareness of sentence meaning. If one defines 'cause' as the factor that immediately precedes an effect, then it would seem that the abhihitanvayavāda, as the theory that claims that the awareness of sentence meaning is caused by awareness of word meanings, is correct. For, indeed, the adherents of both theories admit that our awareness of the individual meanings of words immediately precedes awareness of sentence meaning. If, however, you define 'cause' as the initial impetus toward the realization of an effect, then the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, as the theory that claims that sentence meaning is caused by words, is correct. Neither partisan would deny that words initiate our eventual awareness of the meanings of sentences. So, the debate, looked at in this way, is without much substance. Each side is right or wrong depending on one's definition of causality.

At the same time, a more substantial difference between the two theories may be seen in how each accounts for language as a distinct pramāṇa. It is fundamental to Mīmāṃsā that language produces an awareness of states of affairs (or of prescriptions or prohibitions) by virtue of a unique capacity of its own, without depending on knowledge provided by other means. The authority of the Veda, which pronounces on matters not accessible to the senses and which has no author whose intentions could be inferred as the meanings of its sentences, rests on this principle. Now, on the anvitābhidhāna-vāda it is clear how words carry all the way to sentence meaning, viz., by their own power to designate their meanings as qualifed by other meanings. But on the abhihitānvaya theory this fact is not so well secured. The meanings of words, once designated by the words, are supposed to

assemble into a complex meaning automatically by themselves. But, one suspects, together with the Prābhākara, that other cognitive processes would in fact have to be involved, that separate, unconnected ideas can assemble together in the mind of the hearer only insofar as he consults other things he knows about the world, through other means of knowledge. Thus, on the abhihitānvaya-vāda the force of words can be usurped by other pramāṇas. But this evaluation is made only on the basis of the premise that language must be a separate pramāṇa. If one does not accept that premise, as indeed it seems most modern philosophers would not, then there is no clear criterion for choosing between these two theories.¹⁹

Indeed, I believe that it is more important to see what the anvitabhidhāna- and abhihitānvaya-vādas have in common. Both understand the function of words in sentences in basically the same way. According to both - even, in spite of appearances, to the Bhatta - the meanings of words change as they are used in sentences. That is to say, the meaning of a word, once it is brought to mind by the word, interacts with the meanings of the other words. The Prābhākara says this by claiming that a word designates its meaning as qualified by the meanings of the other words in the sentence. The Bhātta says this by claiming that, after the meaning has been designated separately by the word, it combines with the other meanings to imply the specific state of affairs (the particular) in which it (as a universal) inheres. Thus, on both theories, no word really in the end - once our awareness of the sentence is complete - will mean the same thing in one sentence as it does in another. To be sure, the anvitābhidhāna theorist puts more emphasis on this fact insofar as he claims that the word designates this context-adjusted meaning, whereas the abhihitanvaya theorist puts more emphasis on the fact that the meanings of words remain basically the same from sentence to sentence by insisting that the ownmeaning of a word interacts with other meanings only after being designated by the word (cf. above, Jayanta's appeal to our intuition that the meanings of words do remain constant). But as I see it, this is no more than a difference of emphasis, having to do, as suggested above, ultimately with matters that are of importance only to Pūrva Mīmāmsā. It is just this insight, common to both schools — that the

meaning of a word is never quite the same in any two sentences—'that I take to be the point about the Mīmāmsā discussion of sentence meaning of most relevance to Western philosophy of language.²⁰

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How does the Mīmāmsā theory of the sentence relate to Western philosophy of language? Here, again, I must provide some background.

Western philosophers and linguists have, like their Indian counterparts, sought to explain how the meanings of sentences are derived from their component words. But the motives behind the discussion have been quite different. There is no concern on anyone's part to establish the eternality of language. It goes almost without saying among modern philosophers and social scientists that language is entirely a human phenomenon, an institution established through convention.

The concern with sentence meaning in the West, rather, stems from considerations of symbolic logic. Symbolic logic was created as an artificial language in which logical and mathematical proofs could be formalized. Now, the validity of a proof depends on the meanings of the statements which form its premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion. A formally valid proof consists of a set of statements for which there is no interpretation of their meaning such that the statements which comprise its premises are true and the statement which is its conclusion is false. So, in evaluating proofs symbolic logic must have a way of determining the exact meanings of statements. This is done by specifying at the outset the denotations of all names and predicates in the artificial language and, by recursive rules showing how the meanings of complex expressions are built up from the meanings of their parts, the meanings of all possible combinations of names and predicates. Thus, symbolic logic involves the assumption that the meaning of a statement is determined by the meanings of its parts. Although symbolic logic was orginally devised as an artificial language for expressing mathematical notions, it is based on principles taken from natural language, and it is usually considered to represent clearly the workings of natural language, so that it is believed by some

that if you want to make the logical structure of a sentence in natural language explicit, you should translate it into a corresponding sentence of symbolic logic. In this way, the idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its words has become a basic assumption of the modern study of natural language.

However, there are certain situations recognized by philosophers where it does not appear to be the case that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts.²¹ One such situation is indirect discourse, where the meanings of the words of a sentence embedded in a 'that'-clause are not necessarily the same as when the sentence stands by itself as an assertion. Consider for example the two sentences:

Mr. Smith is an honest man.

and

2. The judge believes that Mr. Smith is an honest man.

The dependent clause following 'that' in 2 is formed of the same words as sentence 1, yet it has different logical properties. Existential generalization is valid for 1 - if it is true, then it is true that there is some man who is honest. Also, the substitution of other expressions referring to the same object will preserve truth value in 1 - e.g., if Mr. Smith is an honest man, and Mr. Smith is Mary's father, then "Mary's father is an honest man" will be true. But neither of these conditions holds for sentence 2. So the problem is, if the meaning of the whole is a function of the meanings of the parts, and if the relevant parts in 1 and 2 - the words which make up the clause in question — have the same meanings, then how can it be that that clause in 1 and 2 has such different properties?

The well-known explanation offered by Frege is that the referents of words change in intensional sentences (sentences such as 2 above). Whereas ordinarily in extensional sentences (such as 1) a word refers to an object, in intensional sentences it refers to its customary "sense," the concept or the "mode of presentation" of the object (referent) by the word. Substitutivity in intensional contexts is not possible without changing truth value because, while, for example, 'Mr. Smith' and 'Mary's father' usually refer to the same thing, the ideas associated

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with those expressions are quite different, and it is the latter which become the referents here. On the other hand, Frege suggested that existential generalization is not a proper inference in the case of intensional sentences because the phrase of the 'that'-clause is not a proposition but only the name of a proposition. (A proposition can be the direct object of certain verbs such as 'believes,' 'thinks,' 'says,' etc., and when it occurs as such it is not asserted but only referred to by a name — a name made out of the very words usually used to assert the proposition.) Since the proposition is not asserted, the person who utters it is not committed to its truth, and so it would be wrong to infer from his statement that there is in fact some thing which has the properties which the proposition, taken by itself just as an assertion, ascribe to it.

Philosophers after Frege have criticized and yet built upon his ideas, but to discuss all the theories, even Frege's in any detail, would take us too far afield. What I wish to suggest is that the Mīmāmsā understanding of how the meanings of words change in different contexts offers a somewhat different and, perhaps, more satisfactory approach to the phenomenon of intensional sentences than Frege's (though of course this specific problem is not anywhere discussed in Mīmāmsā literature).

Before considering the qualification of meanings in intensional sentences, however, let us return to consider - as we did above in discussing the anvitābhidhāna-vāda — how the meanings of nouns are qualifed by adjectival constructions. It is well known that adjectives are noun "modifiers," that they serve to make the meanings of nouns specific in certain ways. But it is not often noticed that some adjectives modify the meanings of nouns so as to make them almost inapplicable. Consider such adjectives as 'so-called,' 'fake,' and 'artificial' in such phrases as 'the so-called philosopher,' 'the fake driver's license,' 'artificial flowers,' etc. These adjectives render the basic meanings of the nouns they modify applicable only in an analogous sense to the things being talked about - an analogous sense, I stress, which is not another fixed meaning of the nouns, but apparently just the result of adjectival modification.²² Note further that the adjective 'so-called' renders the noun it modifies "referentially opaque," that is, it indicates not only the thing but also the word that

has been used to talk about it. Thus, in constructions with the adjective 'so-called' the noun cannot necessarily be replaced by another that usually refers to the same thing.

While the things referred to by the nouns in the above examples can at least be said to exist even if they are not authentic instances of the noun sategory, other kinds of adjectives render dubious the very existence of the referent of the noun, e.g., 'presumed,' 'hypothetical,' 'reputed,' 'supposed.' Still other adjectives, e.g., 'illusory,' 'imaginary,' and modifying phrases such as 'which he dreamed about' serve to deny outright that there exists any concrete referent of the noun.

Now there seems to be no reason why intensional sentences should not be viewed as continuous with the above phenomena. One need only accept that the meaning of a noun can be qualified not just by an immediately preceding adjective or modifying phrase but also by the whole sentence in which it is used. Once again, the problem of intensional sentences with reference to the example given above is: How is it that the logical properties of the phrase "Mr. Smith is an honest man" in 1 and 2 are so different (you can have existential generalization and substitution for 1 but not for 2) if the meaning of the whole is a function of the meanings of its parts and if the words in 1 and 2 — let us consider in particular 'Mr. Smith' — have the same meanings?²³ The Mīmāmsaka's answer to this question would be that, while the meaning of 'Mr. Smith' in 1 and 2 is basically the same, it is nevertheless qualified in 2 so as to give rise to the unusual properties noted. After all, 'Mr. Smith' in 1 occurs simply as the subject of the predicate 'is an honest man,' while it also stands in relation to the phrase 'the judge believes' in 2. The contribution of the phrase 'the judge believes' to the meaning of 2 is to render uncertain the existence of any referent of 'Mr. Smith,' just as the adjectives 'presumed' or 'hypothetical' in noun phrases do for the nouns they modify. Thus, existential generalization from 2 is not permissible. Moreover, 'the judge believes' renders the words that form its complement referentially opaque - that is, they potentially serve to indicate the very words in which the judge's belief is formulated - similar to the way in which the adjective 'so-called' affects its noun. Therefore, 'Mary's father' may not necessarily be substituted for 'Mr. Smith,' even though both usually refer to the same person.

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In other words, we could say that in 1 and 2 the expression 'Mr. Smith' has different meanings. Similarly, 'cat' has different meanings in . "The cat is on the mat" and "The porcelain cat broke when it fell off the shelf." But these meanings are variations or qualifications of a single, identical, basic meaning. The qualification is brought about — I, though not the Mimamsaka, would say that this is brought about in the mind of the hearer, consulting his knowledge about the world — as a result of the influence of the meaning of the whole sentence on that of the individual expression 'Mr. Smith' or 'cat' which partly comprises it. In 2 this qualification is so drastic as to involve a change in the usual properties and implications of the meaning of the expession 'Mr. Smith,' in particular, that there corresponds to it a physically existing referent which is independent of how anyone conceives it.

The spirit of this solution — the details of which still have to be worked out — is of course quite similar to that put forward by Frege. But there are differences. First, in this view the peculiarities of intensional sentences are seen as related to a larger phenomenon, viz., the qualification of meanings by context in *all* discourse. Thus, this solution of the problem of intensional sentences is less *ad hoc* than Frege's, which seems designed to deal with only this one problem. Second, the Mīmāmsā solution also offers a way of understanding the transition from a *de dicto* to a *de re* interpretation of an intensional sentence, that is, of how in certain circumstances (when Smith exists) 2 can be interpreted to be a sentence *about* Mr. Smith and not, as Frege paradoxically suggests, only about the *sense* of the expression 'Mr. Smith.' For in this view 2 would still be about Mr. Smith insofar as the *basic meaning* of 'Mr. Smith' in this sentence is the same as in 1.

Indeed, in general, this solution does not suggest that in intensional sentences the usual sense of a word becomes its referent. Here, I see no reason not to accept Siderits's proposal that there is a sense-reference distinction in Mímāmsā: the meaning of a word is its sense; the particular thing in which the universal, as the meaning of the word, inheres is its referent.²⁴ But, then, according to Mīmāmsā the sense of the word 'cat' is the universal 'cat-hood,' and it is hardly plausible that the universal 'cat-hood' becomes the referent of the word 'cat' in an intensional sentence such as, "Joe believes that the cat died." Rather,

the Mīmāmsā position seems to imply just that, in any kind of sentence, the sense of a word, its meaning, is always specified or qualified in some way to determine the referent — the specific thing that is being talked about — in conjunction with the other words of the sentence. Precisely how it is determined, I would suggest, is something only our experience of the world tells us, case by case. But it need not be strictly a concrete, physical entity — it could be a conceptual one. Indeed, it seems that for sentences like, "Unicorns do not exist," it is most accurate to say that the word 'unicorn' has no referent. (It could hardly be 'unicorn-ness.') Nevertheless, even here the sense of the word still functions to determine precisely what kind of thing does not exist.²⁵ In any case, the sense *per se* does not become the referent.²⁶

In conclusion, I suggest that the Mīmāmsā insight that the meanings of words change as they are used in different sentences offers an interesting, new angle on an important issue in Western philosophy of language. Thus, I would emphasize this feature of Mīmāmsā thought over the discovery of a sense-reference distinction, which is old hat to modern philosophers. Nevertheless, nothing I have said vitiates Siderits's findings. There is indeed something akin to a sense-reference distinction in Mīmāmsā. But I would also stress that in Mīmāmsā the referent of a word — as, once again, the object that is being talked about, the particular in which the universal expressed by the meaning or sense of the word inheres - emerges from the interaction of the meaning of the word with other words. The referent of a word, thus, changes somewhat from sentence to sentence. That is to say, it is not even the same type of thing in every case. And I believe that that is a slightly different understanding of reference than is found in modern Western philosophy of language.

ABBREVIATIONS

MSBh	Mīrnāmsādaršanam with Śābarabhāsya and Prabhābhidhāvyākhyā of
	Vaidyanāthaśastrī, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, no. 97 (Poona, 1973)
NM	Nyāyamanjarī of Jayantabhatta, Kāshī Sanskrit Series, no. 106, (Varanasi:
	Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series, 1971)
NRM	Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathimiśra, Gaekwad Oriental Series, no. 75
	(Baroda, 1937)

Prakaranapañcikā of Śālikanāthamiśra, Benares Hindu University Darśana PP. Series, no. 4 (Varanasi: Benares Hindu University, 1961)

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ŚV Ślokavārttika of Kumārilabhatta, Prācyabhāratī Series, no. 10 (Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978)

NOTES

1 "The Prābhākara Mīmāmsā Theory of Related Designation," in Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective, ed. B. K. Matilal and J.L. Shaw (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1985), pp. 253-298; "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Apoha," Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 133-151; "The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language," Synthese 69 (1986): 81-106.

² For other expositions see Sreekrishna Sarma, "Syntactical Meaning - Two Theories," Adyar Library Bulletin 23 (1959): 41-62 and K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of

Meaning (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963), pp. 191-227.

³ MSBh, pp. 110-112. The pūrvapaksa continues through p. 114.

⁴ There are several obscurities about this pūrvapaksa. First, it is not clear what, p. 111, na cāyam samudāyo 'sti loke yato 'sya vyavahārād artho 'vagamyate, means. My attempt at interpretation above differs from that of Kumārila, ŚV, vākya-adhikarana, 100-101. Second, it is not clear how the pūrvapaksin thinks we comprehend the meanings of sentences in ordinary discourse. For it seems - Kumārila and Pārthasārathi at any rate take it to be the case - that all the arguments brought forward against deriving sentence meaning from words or word meanings are intended to apply both to Vedic and ordinary language. And the notion that convention could secure the meaning of each sentence in ordinary discourse separately is patently absurd (there would have to be an infinite number of stipulations). Here, Kumārila suggests (SV, vākya, 108) that the opponent means to say that the meaning of a sentence is got from the "purpose" for which it is used (arthad bhavel loke). Finally, it is unclear to me just who this opponent is. Could it be the Madhyamika, who tended to claim that all verbal discourse, except insofar as it has a use, is delusory? See in this regard Malcolm Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language," Philosophy East and West 28 (1978): 323-337. ⁵ NRM, p. 95, ll. 21ff. I would like to thank Pandit J. Venkatarāma Śāstrī of Madras Sanskrit College, who assisted me in understanding this text when I was in Madras,

1984-85. Thanks also to the Fulbright Foundation (Indo-American Scholars Program), which supported my research during that period.

atrābhidhīyate naitan matam api upapattimat / adrstakalpanaitasmin mate hi syād garīyasī // drstabādhaprasangaś ca tasmād abhihitānvayah / drstānugunyam tatra syāt, kalpanā ca laghīyasī //

NRM, p. 102, verses 10-11.

NRM, p. 104, ll. 16–28: kiñ ca dîrghatameşu väkyeşv aśakyam eva [padārthānusandhānam, saty api ca tasmin padārthānusandhānamātrena vākyārthah pratīyata iti sarvajanīnam etat.

Pārthasārathi points out that even on the anvitābhidhāna-vāda words first produce an awareness of their individual meanings, subsequent to which an awareness of the sentence meaning arises. For otherwise, if the words in a sentence did not first yield an awareness of their meanings (svārtha), a particular word could not designate its meaning qualified by the meanings of the other words in the sentence. Granted this, however, he argues, it is more reasonable to consider the word meanings as the cause of the sentence meaning rather than the words: "... Words, which are removed [from the sentence meaning], do not somehow produce knowledge of the sentence meaning bỹ jumping over the word meanings which immediately precede [the cognition of the sentence meaning]. And so it is correct to suppose that the comprehension of word meanings is the cause of the comprehension of the sentence meaning' (tataś cānantarabhūtapadārthātikrameṇa vyavahitāni padāni na kathañ cit vākyārtham pratipādayantīti yuktam padārthāvagatih vākyārthāvagateḥ kāranam bhavatīti kalpayitum, p. 104, ll. 21—22).

Thus, one of the main reasons given by the Prābhākaras for their position — that words are cognized first, prior to the word meanings — is taken by the Bhātta to be a reason for his own position. The significance of this fact for the Prābhākaras is that words appear to *initiate* our eventual awareness of the sentence meaning; so any power to convey sentence meaning ought to be vested in them.

Another argument given by the Prābhākaras for their position is that words are employed by the speaker with the *intention* of conveying the sentence meaning (cf. PP, p. 401, ll. 9–14). Usually, that which is taken up in order to achieve a certain effect is the cause of that effect. But Pārthasārathi counters (NRM, pp. 104, l. 30 — 105, l. 3) that the general principle is not valid. We employ sticks to cook food, but the sticks are not the cause of the cooking. Rather, the fire produced from the sticks is. So, although one takes up words to convey the complex state of affairs that is the meaning of the sentence, they are not necessarily the cause of the awareness of the meaning of the sentence. It may well be that an intermediate effect, the comprehension of the word meanings, is the actual cause.

Finally, Pārthasārathi attacks (pp. 106, l. 26 - 107, l. 26) the third traditional reason given by the Prābhākaras in support of an anvitābhidhāna, that words are acknowledged to have indicative or designative force (abhidhātrtva), whereas any assumption of indicative force on the part of word meanings is problematic. Moreover, the latter position would seem to deprive words completely of indicative power (PP, pp. 400, l. 19 - 401, l. 2); for according to the Prābhākara (and perhaps also Kumārila - see ŚV, śabdapariccheda, 107) words only remind us of their ownmeanings, they do not indicate them. The indicative power of words for the Prābhākara could lie only in their indicating their qualified meanings (viśistārtha) after merely reminding us of their simple meanings. Pārthasārathi, in a lengthy discussion, considers whether in fact there is anything wrong in holding that words could merely remind us of their meanings. He concludes that a word cannot be a mere reminder, since it does not function according to the mechanics of memory, i.e., awaken a memory impression (samskāra), which in turn gives rise to an awareness of its meaning. Rather, the cognition of the meaning of a word seems to follow immediately upon hearing the word. Thus, on the abhihitanvaya-vāda, words have indicative force after all - but with respect to their simple, not qualified, meanings.

The Prābhākara position is summed up in the traditional verse (see PP, p. 400, kārikā 11):

prāthamyād abhidhātrtvāt tātparyāvagamād api / padānām eva sā śaktir varam abhyupagamyatām //, "Because they are [cognized] first, because they are [universally recognized to be designative, and because the intention [of the speaker to use them to convey the sentence meaning is accepted leven by the opponent], it is better to assume that that capacity [to cause awareness of the sentence meaning] belongs to words [instead of word meanings]."

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Against this Pārthasārathi presents his own kārikā (NRM, p. 107):

Prāthamyam kāranam yat tu tad viparyayasādhanam / ye tatparyabhidhatrtve te 'pi anaikantikīkrte'//,

"The reason [given by the anvitābhidhāna-vādin for his view, that words] are prior to our cognition of word meanings, is a means for proving the opposite [i.e., the abhihitanvaya-vada]. And [the two reasons] because of the intention [of the speaker]' and 'because of the [universally accepted] indicative capacity [of words]' - these have been shown to be incon-

syāt svarūpābhidhāne 'pi dhīr viśistārthagocarā / viśesadhīr hi sāmānyād anāyāsena siddhyati //.

The awareness of the particular follows "automatically" from the universal, for a universal cannot exist except in a particular. Therefore, when something in general is indicated by a word as its simple meaning, the hearer immediately understands a particular thing as determined by the combination of that simple meaning with the simple meanings of the other words of the sentence. Pārthasārathi maintains that this implication of the particular by the universal is well-established (klpta). The only thing the abhihitānvaya-vāda must postulate which is not altogether obvious is the principle that simple meanings are restricted in combining with other simple meanings by occurrence together in the same sentence (niyamamātram ekavākyatayā kalpayitavyam, p. 118, 1. 2). But the anvitābhidhāna-vādin must also postulate this principle, for he, too, must account for how a word, in "indicating" a meaning qualified by other meanings, is restricted as to the other meanings with which it may interact. See the discussion of kārikā 14 (tulyo 'bhidhānapakse 'pi sa dosah śabdagocarah/ yat tu tatraikavākyatvam padarthesv api tat samam //), pp. 103-104.

The mechanics of how awareness of the particular is got from the universal are further discussed by Pārthasārathi, kārikās 38-43. Insofar as the sentence meaning (as the particular state of affairs in which inhere the universals indicated by the individual words of the sentence) is yielded by implication, Pārthasārathi, following Kumārila, characterizes it as lāksanika (p. 125, l. 10 and kārikā 43), that is, as indirectly indicated by the individual words of the sentence.

ākanksāsannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasangatān svārthān āhuh padāni ...

⁸ NM, pp. 364-365.

⁹ SV, vākya-adhikarana, 358-359.

¹⁰ NRM, p. 117, kārikā 31, ab: klptam anvitasāmarthyam padārthānām svabhāvatah Cf. p. 102, kārikā 13:

¹¹ NRM, pp. 103, l. 1 - 104, l. 11.

¹² NM, p. 366, Il. 9ff.

¹³ Cf. PP, p. 384, kārikā 8:

14 Intentionally (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 145–146.
15 It seems unlikely that we have to do with different established senses of 'green' and 'soft' here. For there seems to be no limit, e.g., to the various shades of green the word 'green' can mean. Is the meaning of 'green' then any color within a certain range? Certainly. But the point here is just that the particular color within that range is specified when the word is used in a certain context.

tasmāt sambandhagrahanasamayānadhigatānvitārthapratipādanābhyupagama eva śabdānām abhidhāyakateti tam angīkurvatā padānām anvitābhidhāyakatāśrayanīyā, PP,

pp. 400, l. 22 - 401, l. 2.

17 PP, pp. 392-394. I read this difficult passage somewhat differently than Siderits (cf. "Prābhākara Theory," pp. 263-264). According to the Bhātta, one sees whiteness, infers, from the sound of neighing and hoofbeats, the presence of a horse, and infers, from the hoofbeats, that something is running. Then these three separate ideas — of whiteness, a horse, and running - got by pramanas other than language, combine automatically to produce the complex notion, "A white horse is running." But Śālikanātha denies that the pramānas of perception and inference — or, as the case may be, implication (arthāpatti) — yield three such uncombined ideas (which then go on to combine of themselves). He considers three cases: (1) One sees a flash of white and hears the sounds of neighing and rapidly beating hooves, but does not know where they are coming from. In this case, having inferred that the neighing and galloping sounds belong to a horse, one immediately infers that the swift motion belongs to a horse. It is not the case that one just comprehends swift motion and that idea in turn combines, of itself, with that of 'horse' (tadāsav aśvavartinīm eva vegavatīm gatim anuminotīti, na punah kevalām evāvagamya, tasyānvayam padārthasāmarthyena avabudhyate, p. 393, ll. 3-5). (2) One knows that the neighing and galloping sounds are coming from the white thing one sees. In this case, one understands immediately by inference that horseness and running belong to the white thing. One does not obtain the ideas of horseness and running separately; they do not of themselves combine with the idea 'white' to form the notion "A white horse is running." (3) This is a variation of the first case in which one knows in addition that there are only horses in the area. Here, the common substratum of horseness and whiteness is obtained by implication. One does not separately cognize horseness and whiteness.

Pārthasārathi, mercifully, considers a much simpler example in the Prābhākara pūrvapakṣa of his text (p. 98, Il. 27—29): Although one sees Devadatta and wonders who his father is, and Yajnādatta, his father, is standing nearby, it may not dawn on

one that Yajñadatta is his father!

Pārthasārathi, in one of the most fascinating passages of his Vakyārthanirmaya (pp. 108—117), turns the tables against the Prābhākara in arguing that words lose their expressiveness (vācakatva) on his theory. This has to do with the fact that the Prābhākara, unlike the Bhāṭṭa, considers every word in a mere statement of fact (siddhārthavākya) to be used figuratively, insofar as the sentence as a whole indirectly designates a prohibition or an injunction. All meaningful employment of language must involve reference to actions to be carried out. But if every word in a sentence is used figuratively, then, because there is no meaning directly designated in the sentence which can anchor the meanings of the other words, the sentence cannot involve an anvitābhidhāna. Thus, the Prābhākara believes that there are meanings associated with such sentences only by virtue of inferences to the intentions (tātparya) of the speakers who utter them. Experience indeed teaches us that people use certain combinations of words to express certain ideas in their minds. Pārthasārathi brings out several

problems with this approach: (1) There seems to be no reason why it could not also be applied to injunctions and prohibitions. But then no type of sentence would involve an *anvitābhidhāna* (pp. 109, l. 21 — 110, l. 26). (2) This kind of account could also be applied to individual words. Just as there are correspondences between certain sentences and ideas in the mind of the speaker, so are there more specific correspondences between individual words and ideas. Thus, again, all language comprehension would be based on inference. But this, in particular, would undermine the authority of the Veda, which has no author whose intentions could be inferred as the meanings of its sentences and words (pp. 110, l. 26—114, l. 21). Finally, (3) a reliable inference to the intention of a speaker in using certain words in fact seems impossible (pp. 114, l. 25—117, l. 12).

19 Siderits is correct to suggest ("Prābhākara Theory," pp. 287-288) that one should not take too seriously the charge of theoretical prolixity (gaurava) brought by each side against the other. If a theory, in order to account for the facts, has to be more complex than another that makes less sense of them, then that is no fault. Moreover, the charge of prolixity usually depends on a skewed interpretation of the opponent's theory, and so is often merely polemical. Siderits discusses how the Prābhākara sees the Bhatta as postulating three śaktis in his theory: a capacity of words to designate their own meanings, a capacity of those meanings to combine and evoke the sentence meaning, and a capacity of words to endow their meanings with the latter capacity! The Bhatta, however, by arguing that word meanings combine automatically (insofar as universals necessarily imply particular things or states of affairs in which they inhere) is able immediately to get rid of two of the śaktis the Prābhākara imputes to him. In turn, he accuses the Prābhākara of gaurava just insofar as the capacity of words to designate complex (anvita) meanings is not universally accepted (whereas both the capacity of words to designate universals and the tendency of universals to imply particulars are) (NRM, p. 118, ll. 1-4), or else, insofar as a capacity to designate the anvaya is required in addition to a capacity for designating the anvitārtha (on the principle that there can be no awareness of a viśistārtha without awareness of the viśesana, p. 102, Il. 13-16).

The silliness of the issue becomes manifest when Pārthasārathi takes on the challenge (p. 119, ll. 19ff.) of showing the abhihitānvaya theory to be simpler than the anvitābhidhāna theory even when it assumes a śakti on the part of word meanings. In the case of a single word which has a single meaning (i.e., a single, unambiguous word) both the anvitābhidhāna- and abhihitānvaya-vādas posit two śaktis. On the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, the word has both, one with regard to its anvitārtha and another with regard to the anvaya; whereas on the abhihitānvaya-vāda the word has a śakti with respect to its own meaning and the meaning has a capacity to yield awareness of the sentence meaning (in combination with other word meanings). But on the abhihitānvaya-vāda fewer śaktis are involved in the case of several words expressive of one meaning (synonyms), such as the words pāni, kara, and hasta, which all mean 'hand.' Here, a śakti to designate this meaning must be posited for each word and a śakti to evoke the sentence meaning must be posited for the meaning, which equals a total of four śaktis. On the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, however, six śaktis will be involved: two for each of the three words. Hence, the abhihitānvaya is the simpler theory!

Although he does not subscribe to the exact arguments of the Prābhākaras,

Siderits believes that the anvitābhidhāna-vāda is preferable to the abhihitānvaya-vāda, because, as he sees it, the latter implies a more complex psychological process of language comprehension ("Prābhākara Theory," pp. 266—290). But in making this judgment Siderits accepts the Prābhākara interpretation of the abhihitānvaya-vāda as involving three separate śaktis. As I mentioned, however, the Bhāttas themselves do not see their theory that way. According to them, once again, words have only the capacity to designate their meanings; the latter then in turn combine together of themselves to yield the sentence meaning. This is certainly no more complicated than the process the Prābhākara describes. The real issue seems to be, rather, whether this can really happen as the Bhātta says, without the help of any awareness derived from another pramāna.

²⁰ Siderits sees an important difference between the two theories ("Prābhākara Theory," pp. 260-261) in that on the anvitabhidhana-vada a word designates only its context-qualified meaning. He takes this as a version of the doctrine, basic to the theories of meaning of Frege and Quine, that words "do not have meanings except in the context of sentences." The Bhatta, on the other hand, in insisting that a word designates its own-meaning before it interacts with the other meanings, would seem to believe that a word does have a meaning in isolation. But this slightly misrepresents both positions. It is not really accurate to say that for the Prābhākara words do not have meanings except in sentences, for he admits that every word as it is heard reminds us of its own-meaning. Rather, it is better to say just what the Prābhākara himself says, that according to him a word only designates a meaning in the context of a sentence. On the other hand, according to the Bhatta, although a word may designate its meaning in isolation, its meaning is completed only after it is combined with the meanings of the other words of a sentence. For the meaning of a word is a universal, and a universal implies a particular. The particular is specified by the meanings of the other words in the context in which the word is used.

Moreover, although Kumārila certainly does argue at length, and with considerable ingenuity, that words are able to evoke meanings in isolation (see esp. ŚV, vākya-adhikaraṇa, 143—149), he also makes it clear that a word by itself is not a pramāṇa (ŚV, śabdapariccheda, 99ff.), for it always denotes something with which we are already acquainted. (It is in this context that he says a word is "not different" from a reminder, ibid., 107 [see note 7 above]. But that may not have meant for him that it is precisely a reminder. For cf. śabdapariccheda, 73—76 and 94—95, where he suggests that an individual word "expresses" [vācaka] its meaning. Pārthasārathi, NRM, p. 107, argues that the vācya-vācaka relationship is distinct from the smārya-smāraka-bhāva.) For Kumārila, language is a pramāṇa only in the form of sentences, which bring to mind states of affairs that have not been previously experienced. All this, of course, relates to the definition of pramāṇa as anadhigatārthagamaka.

Strictly speaking, the concern of Frege, who first discussed this issue, was with the apparent fact that the truth value of a sentence, which is its referent, is not determined by the referents of the component expressions. In presenting this as a problem about meaning I have followed Searle, op. cit., pp. 181f.

Although we have flowers only in an analogous sense in the expression 'artificial flowers,' the basic sense of the word 'flowers' must be the same here as in 'real flowers' — otherwise, it seems, we would not regard artificial flowers as the *opposite* of real flowers.

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- 23 Searle, loc. cit.
- ²⁴ See Siderits, "Sense-Reference Distinction." Siderits tends to see this distinction being made only in Prābhākara Mīmāmsā, but I am arguing that it is also to be found in Bhātta Mīmāmsā.
- ²⁵ See Kumārila's discussion of negation, ŚV, vākya-adhikarana, 301—313.
- ²⁶ Except of course in a sentence such as, "Cat-hood is a universal."

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REVIEW

Frank J. Hoffman, *Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). Pp. xii + 126. Rs. 75.

This is a very fine philosophical essay, responding to a series of philosophical questions put from a modern Western philosophical perspective. The response to these questions is made through a careful reading and analysis of the Pali *Nikāyas*. While the questions and the philosophical criteria assumed are external to the texts being considered, the texts are interpreted in accord with their own rationality and concerns, giving us a rich and fruitful juxtaposition of emic and etic considerations regarding both context and content of these early Buddhist texts. Although he disavows any comparative program, by bringing together insights of the *Nikāyas* with those of recent philosophy of religion and Buddhalogical studies, Hoffman has provided us with a good example of how comparative philosophical thought can simultaneously deepen our understanding of contemporary philosophical issues and our understanding of traditional texts.

The major questions Hoffman puts to the Nikāyas are these:

- (1) Can the *Nikāyas* by themselves provide an adequate context for the study of early Buddhism?
- (2) Does Buddhism refuse to accept the principle of non-contradiction and therefore render itself logically unintelligible?
- (3) Does acceptance of "sabbam dukkham" commit Buddhism to an irrational pessimism (or nihilism)?
- (4) Is Buddhism inconsistent in denying a self (anattā), while at the same time affirming not only continuity and responsibility across lifetimes, but rebirth (punabbhava) as well?
- (5) Granted the denial of self (anattā) and the apparently insoluble problem of reidentifying the same person across different life-times, what sense can be made of the notion of immortality implicit in the concepts of amata and parinibbāna?

Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 431—436, 1989. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. (6) What roles do *saddhā* (faith) and *abhiññā* (para-normal knowledge) play in Buddhism, and do they support the claim that early Buddhism is empirical?

Although the first question is addressed in Chapter 1, where a number of methodological issues are discussed, the answer lies in the essay as a whole, which boldly and successfully takes the *Nikāya* texts themselves as the appropriate context for the study of early Buddhism. But of course, the texts become the context only by putting the Buddhalogical and philosophical questions to them, and then looking for answers in certain textual statements in the context of yet other textual statements on the assumption that the text makes sense as a whole. The theoretical issue of how the appropriateness of contemporary Buddhalogical and philosophical concerns to ancient texts is determined is not explored here. Do different discourses each have their own rationality? Is there some larger rationality under which these rationalities can be subsumed? Are there transcultural criteria of rationality, and if there are, how are they determined?

The second question, Is Buddhist discourse unintelligible because of non-adherence to the principle of non-contradiction? is answered in Chapter 2 by showing that the texts clearly assume the principle that in order to make sense a statement and its denial cannot both be affirmed at the same time. That no formal principle of non-contradiction is found in these texts is hardly suprising, since no formal logic at all is found here. Hoffman argues that to interpret the third member of the four-fold logic, 'both X and not X,' as a rule about propositions, and therefore a rule that allows the simultaneous affirmation of a proposition and its contradictory, is a mistake. These texts contain no rules about propositions whatever (which, in the absence of a formal logic is to be expected), concerning themselves instead with the events of speech utterances and the heuristic rules of sensible speech and effective debate. And these rules, he claims, allow one to say regarding something (X) that exists, that it is characterized simultaneously by both y and not-y (or z). For example, of someone's virtuous conduct (X), it might be said that it is due (partly) to moral practice (y) and (partly) to wisdom (not-y). Interpreted this way there is clearly no contradiction here, but since this is obviously a non-literal interpretation of "both X and not X" the question remains, why would the

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rule be formulated in such a way that it would have to be interpreted non-literally in order to make sense?

The third question, Does admission of "sabbam dukkham" commit the Buddhist to a thorough-going pessimism? is the focus of Chapter 3. Here, as a result of a careful analysis of pessimism, Hoffman notes that pessimism is essentially attitudinal and dispositional, rather than factual, inclining one to hopelessness and inaction. Since Buddhists characteristically emphasize the efficacy of the eight-fold path in achieving liberation from dukkha they can hardly be regarded as pessimistic. But does this mean that Buddhists are inconsistent, since if they accept "sabbam dukkham" their hope for nirvana is baseless? Not so, argues Hoffman, because "sabbam dukkham" is a descriptivecum-evaluative insight. It is descriptive in recognizing that, as a matter of fact, existence is impermanent, but evaluative in recognizing that while grasping for permanence in the face of impermanence is dukkha (the opposite of sukha), freeing onself from this grasping leads to nibbana. That is, recognizing "sabbam dukkham" disposes the Buddhist toward changing his attitudes and way of life so that dukkha can be extinguished. Although I appreciate the careful analysis supporting this argument, I wonder how far Hoffman is willing to go in relating the descriptive and the evaluative. Are they fundamentally distinct? If so are they on an equal footing ontologically and epistemologically, or is the evaluative more fundamental than the descriptive? Or are they ultimately identical?

In Chapter 4, Hoffman puts the fourth question as follows: "If it is not the same soul substance across lives at T₁ and T₂, then in what way is one justified in regarding the consciousness at T₂ as that of the same person? And if is not the same person, then what sense does it make to ascribe moral responsibility for actions performed by another?" (p. 60) There are two important issues here: (1) What criteria do the Nikāyas provide for reidentification of a person across life-times? and (2) Without assuming a permanent entity, what constitutes a basis for the kind of personal continuity presumed by moral responsibility? Regarding the first issue, Hoffman concludes that while the Nikāyas presuppose identifiable continuity across life-times, they do not provide satisfactory criteria for reidentification of the same person in different life-times. The second issue is quite different, however, for

moral responsibility presupposes continuing personality, not necessarily unchanging personal identity. And within a given life-time, continuity of the *khandhas* is itself a precondition of even asking about the nature and conditions of personal continuity, since questioning — a continuous activity — makes no sense without a continuing awareness. Thus, if *punabbhava* is taken literally as "re-becoming," in the sense of continued becoming, it is quite consistent with *anattā*. However, as Hoffman emphasizes, *punabbhava* misunderstood as transmigration is quite incompatible with *anattā*, but as we might expect, the texts offer no support for rebirth viewed as transmigration.

What puzzles me about this chapter is Hoffman's preoccupation with the "rebirth link." After establishing through careful analysis of viññaṇa and mano that the Nikāyas view personal existence in terms of interdependent processes, to focus on the rebirth link seems oddly inappropriate. The very terminology suggests two separate things (lives) in need of a link to each other, a suggestion at odds with the view of existence as continuous, interrelated processes. If existence is conceived of as continuing process, how can the question of identifying a person as the same in two different (separate) life-times even arise?

In Chapter 6, Hoffman analyzes texts dealing with *nibbāna*; parinibbāna, and amata, concluding that early Buddhism teaches neither transcendence of death nor extinction in death, views which have been held to presuppose the attā view. What then are we to make of nibbāna and its frequent characterization as amata? Hoffman takes us directly to the text of Samyutta Nikāya, V. 8., where the Buddha tells a monk that the restraint of lust, hatred, and illusion implies the realm of Nibbāna, and in answer to the monk's question, "What is the deathless (amata), and what is the way to the deathless?" replies that it is the destruction of lust, hatred, and illusion that is called the deathless, and the Noble Eightfold Way is the way to deathlessness. (p. 113) This, of course, is quite in conformity with the Buddha's silence on the question of afterlife and his insistence that his teaching was aimed at overcoming dukkha (in this very life) by eliminating its conditions.

Parinibbāna, on the other hand, offers a greater challenge. Although the texts do not explicitly say that it is extinction, they use the term to

refer to the death of an Arahant, and indicate that for such a one there is no more rebirth (punabbhava). Since they never refer to parinibbana as extinction, are we to assume that when it is viewed as amata a kind of transcendent immortality is intended? Hoffman argues against this view, suggesting that amata means not "endless. life," but "eternal life," in the sense of life not limited by death — or anything else (though I am not sure I understand what this means). While this agrees with the textual insistence that nibbana is the overcoming of the limits of existence (dukkha) as constituted by the grasping referred to as lust, hatred and illusion, it says nothing about the continued existence of the Arahant. Indeed, in supposing that all limits have been transcended, it rules out the possibility of saying anything at all about the Arahant's continued existence or nonexistence. This reinterpretation of eternal life as reaching the limit of one's experience rules out regarding immortality as a positive existence after death. Then why not regard it as extinction? It will hardly do to say that it cannot be called extinction because there is no enduring entity (attā) to be extinguished, since the question applies quite as much to continuing continuities as to continuing identities, and early Buddhism is fully committed to continuing continuities.

The sixth question, concerning the roles of saddhā and the empiricist thesis, is the subject of Chapter 5. Through careful textual analysis Hoffman shows that there are two distinctive, though complementary, notions of faith that dominate Nikāya considerations of this topic. On the one hand faith is a fundamental disposition toward the teaching such that one can be transformed by it, while on the other hand, faith is the confidence in the teaching that comes from checking it against various criteria, including cognitions and achievment of practical results. Overemphasis on the latter notion, Hoffman suggests, leads to the empiricist thesis.


Regarding the use of *abhiññā* to provide evidence for beliefs, Hoffman argues that while the six kinds of para-normal knowledge do indeed, like normal kinds of knowledge, provide evidence for various beliefs, a Buddhist's deepest convictions are not held exclusively on the basis of either of these kinds of knowledge, for faith, as a fundamental disposition, is not merely a cognitive matter, and is not falsifiable by mere cognitions, normal or paranormal. Although I think he is

right about this, since people do lose their faith — as well as come to faith — perhaps we need to go on to ask what, if not cognitions, does undermine faith? And if cognitions can undermine faith, what kinds of cognitions and under what conditions? The larger issue here concerns the sense in which faith can be regarded as knowledge, and how it can be related to various kinds of cognitive knowledge, an issue to which Hoffman contributes at least the beginnings of a serious discussion.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the high quality of scholarship evident throughout Professor Hoffman's analysis of the *Nikāya* texts, and to commend him for the boldness of his approach and the rigour of his comparative philosophical analysis. Those of us who work in philosophy of religion or Buddhism (or both) are indebted to him for this excellent essay in comparative philosophy.

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